S320A

TOTAL ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM COURSEWARE

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

SUBCOURSE

320A/8

41
CREDIT HOURS

CENTER FOR ARMY TACTICS

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

Lesson number	Lesson Title	Credit hours
1	European Strategic Environment	2
2	European Operational Situation	2
3	Division Movement Planning	3
4	Division Offensive Planning	26
5	Division Defensive Planning	8
	Total	41

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I M P O R T A N T !! Read and Post S320A/9

U. S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027

REINFORCING & FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS
PHASE 2C FOR SY99
ERRATA TO COURSE BOOK

CHANGE ALL REFERENCE FROM ACADEMIC YEAR 98 TO ACADEMIC YEAR 99. THE COURSEWARE IS A REPRINT OF THE 98, PER THE COURSE POINT OF CONTACT AS REQUESTED

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

PREFACE

As you progressed through the tactics portion of the Command and General Staff Officer Course, you have become increasingly able to view a tactical situation, understand the capabilities of various organizations, and balance resources against a mission to develop and the optimum solution to a tactical problem. This process has many names, but in the Army, we call it the tactical decision-making process.

S320A takes you one step further in this process; it gives you a comprehensive understanding of division combat operations. To do this, a scenario depicting forward deployed and reinforcing operations in Europe is used. You will exercise this scenario by planning communicating the tactical decisions of a reinforcing heavy division within a forward deployed, multinational corps.

This scenario places our forces in a mature theater. You will follow the development of a scenario at the operational level and develop tactical-level plans accordingly. During this subcourse, you will use the tactical decision-making process to develop a divisional plan for both offensive and defensive operations. In addition to these tactical plans, you will plan an intratheater move of a heavy division. address leadership and training considerations, and consider the integration of air forces.

To fully understand and master the learning objectives in S320A, you must apply the learning objectives from all previous tactics instruction: S410, *Mobilize, Deploy, and Sustain Combat Power;* S510, *The Nation and Military Power; S710, Senior-Level Leadership,'* and S740, *Military Law.* The primary learning method is practical exercises.

CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	1
PJE OBJECTIVES	3
INTRODUCTION	4
Appendix 1. References	1 - 1
Appendix 2. Glossary	2 - 1
LESSON 1. EUROPEAN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT	
Lesson Guide	Lsn 1 - 1
Appendix 1. Strategic Assessment 1995 (Extract)	Lsn 1 - 1 - 1
Appendix 2. Russia and Neighbors	Lsn 1 - 2 - 1
Appendix 3. EUCOM Strategy Of Engagement and Prepardness	Lsn 1 - 3 - 1
Appendix 4. Command Relationships: U.S. European Command	Lsn 1 - 4 - 1
LESSON 2. EUROPEAN OPERATIONAL SITUATION	
Lesson Guide	Lsn 2 - 1
Appendix 1. General Situation and First Practical Exercise	Lsn 2 - 1 - 1
Appendix 2. Krasnovian Order of Battle	Lsn 2 - 2 - 1
Appendix 3. Krasnovian Doctrine	Lsn 2 - 3 - 1
Appendix 4. LANDCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) 31201 (CRASHING FIST)	Lsn 2 - 4 - 1
Appendix 5. Air Operations in NATO	Lsn 2 - 5 - 1
Appendix 6. Solution to Practical Exercise	Lsn 2 - 6 - 1

LESSON 3. DIVISION MOVEMENT PLANNING
Lesson Guide ..... Lsn 3 - 1
Appendix 1. Extract from FM 55-10, *Movement Control in Theater of Operations,* Chapter 1, Overview of Army Movement Doctrine ..... Lsn 3 - 1 - 1
Appendix 2. Control of Tactical Movement (Extract from FM 71-100, *Division Operations,* Chapter 3) ..... Lsn 3 - 2 - 1
Appendix 3. Planning Movement ..... Lsn 3 - 3 - 1
Appendix 4. Strip Map ..... Lsn 3 - 4 - 1
Appendix 5. 25th Armd Div Troop List ..... Lsn 3 - 5 - 1

LESSON 4. DIVISION OFFENSIVE PLANNING
Lesson Guide ..... Lsn 4 - 1
Appendix 1. 10th (US) Corps OPLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG) ..... Lsn 4 - 1 - 1
Appendix 2 Service Support Plan 1 ..... Lsn 4 - 2 - 1
Appendix 3. Intelligence Estimate No 1 ..... Lsn 4 - 3 - 1
Appendix 4. Combat Service Support Status of the 25th Armd Div ..... Lsn 4 - 4 - 1
Appendix 5. Sample Restated Mission ..... Lsn 4 - 5 - 1
Appendix 6. Sample Course of Action Sketch and Statement ..... Lsn 4 - 6 - 1
Appendix 7. Sample War-Gaming Products ..... Lsn 4 - 7 - 1
Appendix 8. Sample Decision Matrix and Decision Tables for Two Courses of Action ..... Lsn 4 - 8 - 1
Appendix 9. Overview of the Deliberate Decision-Making Procedures ..... Lsn 4 - 9 - 1
Appendix 10. 25th Armd Div OPLAN Worksheet ..... Lsn 4 - 10 - 1

LESSON 5. DIVISION DEFENSIVE PLANNING
Lesson Guide ..... Lsn 5 - 1
Appendix 1. Sketch Map ..... Lsn 5 - 1 - 1
Appendix 2. 10th Corps FRAGO 3-9, Change 1 to 10th Corps OPLAN 6099 ..... Lsn 5 - 2 - 1
Appendix 3. 25th Armd Div Commander's SITREP (Extract) ..... Lsn 5 - 3 - 1
Appendix 4. CSS Status of the 25th Armd Div (Extract) ..... Lsn 5 - 4 - 1
Appendix 5. Overview of Combat and Quick Decision-Making Procedures ..... Lsn 5 - 5 - 1

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVE - S320A LESSON CROSSWALK

Learning Areas (1-5) with Learning Objectives	Lessons where all or part of the Learning Objective are likely to be discussed.	How evaluated (Q, Quiz; E Exam; PE, Practical Exercise; CD, Classroom Discussion, O; Other.)
1. National Military Capabilities and Command Structure	-	
a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces	2, 3, 4, 5	PE, E
b. Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.	1, 2, 3, 4, 5	PE, E
c. Explain the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the NCA, NSC, CJCS, combatant commanders, Service chiefs and Joint Forces Commanders (JFCs).	1, 2, 4, 5	PE, E
d. Summarize how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.	1, 4, 5	PE
e. Comprehend how the US military is organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint and multinational operations.	1, 4, 5	PE, E
2. Joint Doctrine	-	
a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.	1, 4, 5	PE
b. Give examples of the factors influencing joint doctrine.	2, 4	PE
c. Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.		
d. Summarize the relationship between Service wazzu doctrine and joint doctrine.		
3. Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War.		
a. Summarize the consideration of employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.	1, 2, 4, 5	PE, E
b. Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.		
c. Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.	1, 2	PE, E
d. Review wars, campaigns, and operations and explain the link between national objectives to supporting military objectives, and the importance of defined conflict termination.		
e. Summarize the relationship between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.	1	PE
4. Joint Planning and Execution Processes.		
a. Through the framework provided by joint planning processes, explain the relationship between national objectives and means available.		
b. Comprehend the effect of time, coordination ,policy changes, and political development on the planning process.		

c. Explain how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning.		
d. Explain how national intelligence organizations support JFCs.		
e. Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.		
5. Systems Integration at the Operational Level of War.		
a. Comprehend the relationship between the concepts of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the Military Technological Revolution (MTR).		
b. Understand how command, control , communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems apply at all levels of war.		
c. Comprehend how joint and Service systems are integrated at the operational level of war.	1, 2	PE
d. Understand that opportunities and vulnerabilities are created by increased reliance on technology throughout the range of operations.		

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

GOAL

You will be competent in --

-the concepts ofreinforcing and forward deployed operations and

-the application of brigade- and division-level tactical planning and execution processes, which will enable you to synthesize basic tactical problems and perform basic command and staff planning and execution functions during peace and war.

You have learned a tremendous amount of tactical knowledge and mastered a vast amount of tactical skills during your past tactics instruction. That doesn't take into account the embedded tactics information in courses such as S510, S620, and S410. These directly tie into application of combat power to solve a tactical problem. However, when hen you reflect on these courses, you can see how they also boost your tactical skills. S720 helped with the art of communicating a tactical decision, S740 gave you an understanding of military law, to help you to make legally proper decisions, and S730 provided concepts required for continual training of a force.

S320A will take advantage of your previous learning and put it all together in a scenario that uses all of the skills discussed above. At the end of this subcourse, you will have a better understanding of why the United States still has a military presence in Europe. In this subcourse, you will analyze Soviet- style doctrine of a heavy opposing force and develop tactical plans to counter both offensive and defensive situations. You will learn more about how a large tactical unit moves in a combat zone and understand more about how our NATO allies use airpower in a multinational theater of operations.

SCOPE

S320A, Reinforcing and Forward Deployed Operations, is designed to increase your understanding of U.S. Army warfighting doctrine and its application in planning and executing division combat operations. The subcourse provides basic knowledge and skills for future combined arms instruction in the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC). The course builds on your MQS II experience and the fundamental knowledge of tactical operations. and logistics doctrine.

Your previous tactics instruction in CGSC has prepared you for this course. The entire process is a building-block, sequential approach. This subcourse will allow you to practice and master your previously learned skills in a different environment: Europe. You will find that the process of tactical decision making remains the same regardless of what environmental factors change. Factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and time available (METT-T) constantly change. Your Lesson subjects, sequence, and projected length of study are shown in the following table.

Lesson Number	Lesson Title	No of Hours
1	European Strategic Environment	2
2	European Operational Situation	2
3	Division Movement Planning	3
4	Division Offensive Planning	26
5	Division Defensive Planning	8

In lesson 1, you will examine how the United States, NATO, and the Europeans are rethinking their commitments in a world where the arguments for multinational defense arrangements are, to many, far less compelling than they were during the Cold War. You will acquire knowledge of the current European environment in the context of the “new” Europe; U.S. interests, objectives, policies, and options in Europe; and the relevant actors and trends in the region. You will study important security issues inherent in the changing European environment. All this will enhance your knowledge of an important region while facilitating your ability to think through the many, complex variables that affect strategic and operational decision making.

Lesson 2 introduces a Soviet-style heavy opposing foperational-level force and shows how it could operate in a European environment. This will develop your understanding of Soviet-style operations so that you can use this knowledge to develop and analyze tactical courses of action. You will also review the lead-in to the 10th (U.S.) Corps operation plan that serves as a starting point for lesson 4.

In lesson 3, you will review the fundamentals of large-unit movement planning at the division level and solve a practical exercise to move a heavy division in Europe 120 to 180 kilometers from a staging area to a tactical assembly area.

In lesson 4, acting as a member of a heavy division plans staff, you will use deliberate decision-making procedures to develop a doctrinally sound division offensive plan. As a member of a division
planning staff, you will develop an operation order that clearly communicates a tactical decision.

Lesson 5 is another subcourse practical exercise. You will all employ previous instruction to evaluate an unexpected tactical situation, formulate a solution, and quickly develop a fragmentary
order (FRAGO) that enables the 25th Armd Div to counter an unexpected threat.

The subcourse examination will measure how well you mastered the subcourse learning objectives.

TERMINAL AND ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

S320A has three terminal learning objectives (TLOs). Two of the three TLOs have several enabling learning objectives (ELOs) that support achievement of one or more aspects of the performance standard for the associated TLO. ELO task statements are included under each lesson advance sheet. PJE learning objectives are listed under each ELO on the lesson advanced sheets and one in accordance with the table on page 3 of this introduction.

A. TASK: Plan division and corps combat operations in a joint and combined environment,

CONDITION: Acting as a general staff officer in a corps or a division, given the operational situation. the higher headquarters plan, appropriate references, practical exercises, and a written requirement to plan offensive or defensive operations.

STANDARD: The plan must-

Be developed using the deliberate tactical decision making process IAW ST 101-5

Conform to tactical doctrine IAW FM 63-1, FM 63-2, FM 63-2-1, FM 63-3, FM 71-100, FM 100-5, and FM 100-15.

Be presented orally and/or in writing according to the formats and procedures in FM 101-5, FM 101-5-1, ST 22-2, and ST 101-5

LEVEL: Synthesis

B. Task: Prepare a commander in chiefs strategic and operational assessment of his environment.

CONDITION: Given a specific commander in chiefs area of responsibility, a scenerio, assigned readings, classroom discussion notes, and an oral and written requirement with references.

STANDARD: Assessment will address-

National interests of the US, allies, and threat nations

US, allied, and threat theater objectives and strategy.

The Commander in chiefs strategic concept

Methods of achieving theater objectives IAW FM 100-5, FM 100-7, Joint Pub 3-0, and subcourse C510.

LEVEL: Synthesis.

C. TASK: Apply the fundementals of joint operational planning at the strategic and operational levels.

CONDITION: Given a scenerio and an oral requirement with references.

STANDARD: Application should-

- Explain the organization and functions of a joint task force IAW classroom discussion and Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 5-00.2.

- Develop the strategic and /or operational concept of the operation using the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), classroom discussions, and practical exercises IAW JCS Pub 5-03.1 and Joint Pub 3-0

- Incorporate the use of service components and functional assets, including special operations forces and space assets, into the development of operation plans through practical exercises IAW classroom discussion and Joint Pub 3-0.

LEVEL: Analysis

PROGRAM FOR JOINT EDUCATION (PJE)

It is important that you recognize both the distinctiveness and interdependence of joint and service schools in the education of officers in joint matters. Joint schools provide joint education from a joint perspective. Service schools provide joint education from a service perspective. The Command and General Staff Officers Course provides you with a service perspective education.

Instruction in this subcourse compliments joint instruction presented thus far in the course. This subcourse focuses at the brigade and division levels and provides a service perspective of the tactical level of war. In addition, you will see the integration of the sister services in operations conducted at the tactical level of war.

EVALUATION

1. GENERAL

CGSC Circular 351-3, School of Corresponding Studies (SOCS) Nonresident Catalog, outlines college guidelines for the evaluation of student academic performance. There is no intent to repeat those guidelines here but only to specify how those policies are applied in this subcourse. If you need to refresh your memory on the contents of CGSC Circular 351-3, do so now.

2. GRADES

a. General. You will receive one grade for S320A. The letter grade will indicate how well you mastered the learning objectives.

b. Grades.

(1) You will receive grades according to the following point scale.

Points	Grade	Description
90 to 100	A	You have exceeded the subcourse goal.
80 to 89	B	You have met the subcourse goal.
70 to 79	C	You have marginally met the subcourse goal.
Less than 70	U	You have not met the subcourse goal.

(2) These points are determined by your performance on the end of subcourse examination. The exam contains multiple choice and multiple response questions and is 100 percent of your grade for S320A.

c. The subcourse examination will cover all material presented in the subcourse, including the assigned readings and lesson guides. You must complete the assigned readings. Some exam questions will only be covered in the readings. Do not assume that all exam questions will be covered in the lesson guides. Many of the exam questions will be situational-type questions and will require that you apply the skills and knowledge you gained during the course.

COURSE PREREQUISITES

Prerequisite knowledge and skills are required for you to successfully proceed through the subcourse. Before beginning S320A, you must have mastered the learning objectives in S310 and S310A. You will also build on the knowledge and skills you learned in your advance course and in CAS3.

ISSUE MATERIALS

This course book contains the lesson guides, lesson assignments, and practical exercises needed for S320A. Maps and overlays required for S320A can be found in your box of Phase II materials.

Check to see that you have the following material.

FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, Sep 9
FM 63-2, Division Support Command, Armored, Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Divisions, May 91FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion, Feb 90
FM 63-21, Main Support Battalion, Aug 90
FM 71-100, Division Operations, 1996
FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception, Oct 88
FM 90-21, JAAT: Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations, Oct 91
FM 100-5, Operations, Jun 93
FM 100-1.5, Corps Operations, June 1996
FM 100-103, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone, Oct 87
FM 100-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, Oct 85
FM 101-10-1, Vol 2, Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors, Oct 87
ST 22-2, Writing and Speaking Skills for Senior Leaders, Apr 93
ST 100-3, Center for Army Tactics Battle Book, May 1995
ST 100-7, Soviet-Style Threat Tactical Handbook, Aug 96
ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes, Feb 1996
PT 100-1, Military Symbols and Graphics, May 95

Overlays

4-1	(Sheets 1 through 4)	25th Armd Div Combined Obstacles Overlay
4-2	(Sheets 1 through 4)	25th Armd Div Area of Operations

Maps, Series M648, Edition 1-DMA (1: 00,000)

--Series M648, Germany, sheet C4326 (Goslar), edition 1-DMG, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C4330 (Halberstadt), edition 1-GSGS, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C4334 (Bernburg), edition 1-DMA, 1:100.000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C4338 (Dessau), edition 1-DMA, 1:100.000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C4722 (Kassel), edition 1-DMG, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C4726 (Muhlhausen), edition 1-DMG, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C4730 (Nordhausen), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C4734 (Halle), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C4738 (Leipzig), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C4742 (Wurzen), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C5122 (Bad Hersfeld), edition 1-DMG, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C5126 (Eisenbach), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C5130 (Erfurt), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C5134 (Jena), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C5138 (Gera), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
--Series M648, German), sheet C5142 (Karl-Marx-Stadt), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany. sheet C5522 (Fulda), edition 1-DMG, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C5526 (Meiningen), edition 1-DMG, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C5530 (Hildburghausen), edition 1-DMG, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C5534 (Saalfeld), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C5538 (Zwickau), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
--Series M648, Germany, sheet C5542 (Aue), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000

Appendix 1 to this introduction lists supporting references used to develop this subcourse.

Appendix 2 to this introduction is a glossary, containing many of the acronyms and brevities found in the subcourse. You might find it useful to tab or mark appendix 2 for ready reference later in the course.

USE OF LESSON GUIDES

The lesson guides were designed and written to help you complete this subcourse. They instruct you concerning the learning objectives, list the study assignments and readings, and provide you a road map for each lesson. Your success requires that you read subcourse materials as directed by the lesson guide and follow the instructions. Lacking classmates and an instructor with whom to engage in meaningful. insightful discussion, you must complete lesson assignments by using the lesson guides.

Practical exercises and other requirements will cause you to use and apply the knowledge and skills you gain from your coursework. You will be required to perform a number of activities ranging from estimating combat service support requirements to executing steps in the tactical decision-making processes to war-gaming combat operations. These exercises require the same kind of work you would do in an actual tactical situation. Because you will need these skills to complete the examination, you should complete all these practical exercises and requirements.

In the practical exercises, you will often be assigned a role as a specific staff officer or as a battle staff officer in a specific staff section. Read the material that describes your role. on-going staff and unit actions, and the general requirement. After reading the material, stop and reflect on the overall content, your role and inherent responsibilities, and what is required. Put on the appropriate staff officer's hat and then read the specific requirement looking at it through the staff officer's eyes. Complete your analysis of the staff officer's requirement and then
begin work.

SUBCOURSE ASSISTANCE

Address all questions regarding administration and grades to:

USACGSC DIRECTORATE OF NONRESIDENT INSTRUCTION(DNRI)
EISENHOWER HALL, BLDG 120, RM 273N
250 GIBBON AVENUE
FORT LEAVENWORTH KS 66027-2314

If further assistance is necessary, call DSN 720-3401/3340/3361 or Commercial (913) 758-401/3361/3340.

Address all questions concerning lesson content or material to:

Commandant, USACGSC
ATTN: ATZL-SWT
CENTER FOR ARMY TACTICS
FORT LEAVENWORTH KS 66027-6900

Phone: DSN 552-5385; COMM (913) 684-5385.

EXAMINATION

On completion of the exam, return your complete CGSC Form 207 and CGSC Form 309 to DNRI. DO NOT RETURN THE EXAM BOOKLET. As soon as you receive a passing grade for the subcourse, destroy your exam booklet. Read Chapter 1 of CGSC Circular 351-3 for an explanation of the ethics standards.

Mail your complete CGSC Forms 207 and 309 in the pre-addressed envelope provided to:

USACGSC SOCS
EISENHOWER HALL, BLDG 120, RM 273N
250 GIBBON AVENUE
FORT LEAVENWORTH KS 66027-2314

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Appendix 1 to Subcourse Introduction. References

The following references were used to develop this subcourse. You will not receive all of these references with your course materials; they are not necessary for your successful completion of the subcourse. This list is provided so that you will know what references to consult should you want additional information in a particular subject area.

FM 3-100	Chemical Operations: Principles and Fundamentals, May 96
FM 5-100	*Engineer Operations,* 27 Feb 96
FM 6-20-40	*Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy),* 5 Jan 90
FM 34-130	*Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,* 8 Jul 94
FM 55-10	*Movement Control in a Theater of Operations,* 8 Dec 92
FM 63-2	*Division Support Command, Armored, Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Divisions,* 20 May 91
FM 63-20	*Forward Support Battalion,* 26 Feb 90
FM 63-21	*Ma/n Support Battalion,* 7 Aug 90
FM 71-3	*Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade,* 8 Jan 96
FM 71-100	*Division Operations,* 28 Aug 96
FM 90-2	*Battlefield Deception,* 3 Oct 88
FM 90-21	*JAAT: Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations,* 16 Oct 91
FM 100-5	*Operations,* 14 Jun 93
FM 100-15	*Corps Operations,* Oct 95
FM 100-103	*Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone,* 7 Oct 87
FM 101-5	*Command and Control for Commanders and Staff (Final Draft),* Aug 93

FM 101-5-1	*Operational Terms and Symbols,* 21 Oct 85
FM 101-10-1, Vol 2	*Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors,* 7 Oct 87
ST 22-2	*Writing and Speaking Skills for Senior Leaders,* Apr 91
ST 100-3	*Center for Army Tactics Battle Book,* June 96
ST 100-7	*OPFOR Battlebook,* 9 Aug 96
ST 101-5	*Command and Staff Decision Processes,* Feb 95
ST 101-6	*G1/G4 Battle Book,* Jul 96

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Appendix 2 to Subcourse Introduction. Glossary

AA	avenue of approach
AAA	antiaircraft artillery
AAG	army artillery group; allied army group
AAGS	Army air-ground system
AAR	after-action review
AASLT	air assault
ACCS	Army command and control system
ACE	Allied Command, Europe
acft	aircraft
ACLANT	Allied Command, Atlantic
acq	acquisition
ACR	armored cavalry regiment
AD	air defense
ADA	air defense artillery
ADAM	area denial artillery munition
ADGE	air defense ground element
AFCENT	Allied Forces, Central Europe
AFLANT	Air Force of the Atlantic
AFNORTHWEST	Allied Forces, Northwest Europe
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces, Southern Europe
AGL	automatic grenade launcher
AGOS	air-ground operations system
AGRA	army group of rocket artillery
AI	air interdiction
AIRCENT	Air Forces, Central Europe
ALO	air liaison officer
amb	ambulance
ammo	ammunition
anal	analysis
anx	annex
AO	area of operations
AOC	air operations center
AOCC	air operations coordination center
AOR	area of responsibility
AP	antipersonnel
APC	armored personnel carrier
APFSDS-T	armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding-sabot-tracer
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
app	appendix
ARLANT	Army of the Atlantic
armd	armored
ARRC	ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
ARSOA	Army special operations aviation
ARSOF	US Army special operations forces
arty	artillery
ASAP	as soon as possible
asgd	assigned
ASL	authorized stockage list
aslt	assault
ASIC	all-source intelligence center
ASOC	air support operations center
ASP	ammunition supply point
ASPS	all source production section
AT	antitank; annual training
ATACMS	Army tactical missile system
ATAF	allied tactical air force
ATC	air traffic control
ATCCS	Army Tactical Command and Control System
atch	attached
ATGM	antitank guided missile
atk	attack
ATO	air tasking order
ATP	ammunition transfer point; Allied Tactical Publication
ATS	air traffic service
auth	authorized
AVIM	aviation intermediate maintenance
AVLB	armored-vehicle-launched bridge
avn	aviation
AVUM	aviation unit maintenance

AWACS	airborne warning and control system
A^2C^2	Army airspace command and control
(b)	bulk (class III supplies)
BA	battlefield area
BAE	battlefield area evaluation
BAI	battlefield air interdiction
BALTAP	Baltic Approaches Command
BAS	battalion aid station
BCE	battlefield coordination element
bde	brigade
beg	beginning
BFA	battlefield functional area
BFV	Bradley fighting vehicle
BHL	battle handover line
BL	basic load
BMCT	beginning morning civil twilight
BMNT	beginning morning nautical twilight
bmr	bomber
bn	battalion
BOS	battlefield operating system
brg	bridge
BSA	brigade support area
BSFV	Bradley Stinger fighting vehicle
btry	battery
C	Celsius
C^2	command and control
C^2W	command and control warfare
C^3	command, control, and communications
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
C&J	collection and jamming
CA	civil affairs; counterair
CAA	combined arms army
CAOC	combined air operations center
CAS	close air support
CAS3	Combined Arms and Service Staff School
cav	cavalry
cbt	combat
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CCL	combat-configured load
CCM	cross-country mobility
CDMP	combat decision-making procedures
CEB	clothing exchange and bath
CF	covering force
CFA	covering force area
CFE	conventional forces in Europe
CFL	coordinated fire line
CG	commanding general
cgo	cargo
CGSC	U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Officer Course
CGSS	Command and General Staff School
Chap	Chaparral
CHOP	change of operational control
CINC	commander in chief
CINCCENT	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe
CINCUSAFE	Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIVADMIN	civil administration
cl	class
clas	classification
CMBG	Canadian mechanized brigade group
cmd	command
cml	chemical
CMO	civil-military operations
cntnr	container
co	company
COA	course of action
COFM	correlation of forces and means
CofS	chief of staff
col	column
coll	collection
COMAIRCENT	Commander of Allied Air Forces Central Europe

COMBALTAP	Commander, Allied Forces, Baltic Approaches
COMLANDCENT	Commander, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe
comm	communications
COMMZ	communications zone
con	control
CONUS	continental United States
convl	conventional
COO	combined obstacles overlay
COP	command observation post; contingency operation plan
COSCOM	corps support command
CP	command post, checkpoint
CPOG	chemical protective overgarment
CRP	combat reconnaissance patrol
CSA	corps storage area
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSG	corps support group
CSH	combat support hospital
CSR	controlled supply rate
CSS	combat service support
CT	completion time
CTAC	Center for Army Tactics
DA	direct action, Denmark
DAG	division artillery group
DAO	division ammunition officer
DASB	division aviation support battalion
DCA	defensive counterair
DCINC	deputy commander in chief
DDMP	deliberate decision-making proceduress
decon	decontamination
det	detachment
DF	direction finding, diesel fuel
DF-2	diesel fuel - 2
DISCOM	division support command
distr	distribution
div	division
DIVARTY	division artillery
DIVEN	division engineers
DLRO	Department of Logistics and Resourcing Operations
DMMC	division materiel management center
DOD	Department of Defense
DODAC	Department of Defense Ammunition Code
DODIC	Department of Defense Identification Code
DofS	days of supply
DP	decision point
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
DPICM	dual-purpose, improved conventional munition
DPU	data processing unit
DS	direct support
DSA	division support area
DSM	direct support maintenance
DSRO	Department of Sustainment and Resourcing Operations
DST	decision support template
DSU	direct support unit
DTG	date-time group
DTO	division transportation officer
EA	engagement area
EAC	echelon above corps
EAD	echelon above division
EC	European Community
ech	echelon
EECT	ending evening civil twilight
EEFI	essential elements of friendly information
EENT	ending evening nautical twilight
eff	effective
engr	engineer
ento	entomology
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
equip	equipment
ER	equipment readiness
EU	European Union
EUCOM	European Command
evac	evacuation
eval	evaluation
EXTAL	extra time allowance
EW	electronic warfare
F	Fahrenheit
FA	field artillery
FAA	forward assembly area
FAC	forward air controller
FAE	fuel-air explosive
FARP	forward arming and refueling point

FASCAM	family of scatterable mines
FD	forward detachment
FEBA	forward edge of the battle area
FID	foreign Internal defense
fin	finance
FIST	fire support team
FLCS	force level control system
fld	field
FLOT	forward line of own troops
fltbrg	floatbridge
FM	frequency modulation; field manual
FORSCOM	U S Army Forces Command
FRAGO	fragmentary order
FS	fuel storage
FSB	forward support battalion
FSCL	fire support coordination line
FSCM	fire support control measures
FSCOORD	fire support coordinator
FSE	forward security element, fire support element
FSO	fire support officer
FSSP	fuel system supply point
ftr	fighter
FW	fighter wing
fwd	forward
FZ	fuze
gal	gallon
gd	guard
GE	Germany
GEMSS	ground-emplaced mine-scattering system
gen	general
genr	generator
GLO	ground liaison officer
GM	guided missile
GMRD	guards motorized rifle division
GMRR	guards motorized rifle regiment
GOF	group of forces
g p	group
GP	general purpose
GRREG	graves registration
GS	general support
GSR	ground surveillance radar, general support reinforcing
GTA	guards tank army
GTD	guards tank division
GTR	guards tank regiment
HA	humanitarian assistance
HCF	High Command of Forces
HE	high-explosive
HEAT	high-explosive, antitank
hel	helicopter
HET	heavy equipment transporter
HHC	headquarters and headquarters company
HIDACZ	high-density airspace control zone
HIMAD	high-to-medium air defense
HNS	host nation support
hosp	hospital
how	howitzer
HPT	high-payoff target
HQ	headquarters
HRPT	highway regulating point team
hv	heavy
HVT	high-value target
hwy	highway
IAW	in accordance with
ICEDEFOR	Iceland Defense Force
IEW	intelligence and electronic warfare
IEWSE	intelligence and electronic warfare support element
IFV	infantry fighting vehicle
IGB	inner-German border
IHFR	improved high-frequency radio
illum	illuminate
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMRR	independent motorized rifle regiment
indep	independent
intel	intelligence
INTSUM	intelligence summary
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR	information requirement
ITB	independent tank battalion
ITV	improved TOW vehicle
JAAT	joint air attack team
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC	joint force air component commander

JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JP-4	jet propulsion fuel, type 4
JPI	joint-precision interdiction
J-SEAD	joint suppression of enemy air defenses
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOC	Joint Special Operations Command
J-STARS	joint surveillance and target attack radar system
JTF	joint task force
KIA	killed in action
km	kilometer
lab	laboratory
LANDCENT	Land Forces, Central Europe
LANTFLT	Atlantic fleet
lchr	launcher
LD	line of departure
LOC	line of communication
loc	location
log	logistics
LOGPAC	logistics package
LP/C	launcher pod/container
LRC	Logistics Readiness Center
LRSD	long-range surveillance detachment
LSA	logistic support area
lt	light
LTG	lieutenant general
LVN	Leavenworth
m	meter
main	maintenance
MANPAD	man-portable air defense
MARFOREUR	Marine Forces, Europe
MASH	mobile army surgical hospital
mat	material
MBA	main battle area
mbl	mobile
MC	military committee; mission capable
MCC	movement control center
MCO	movement control officer
MCOO	modified combined obstacles overlay
MCP	maintenance collecting point
MCS	maneuver control system
MCT	movement control team
mdm	medium
mech	mechanized
med	medical
met	meteorological
METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and time available
MG	major general
MGB	medium girder bridge
MI	military intelligence
MIA	missing in action
MLRS	multiple launch rocket system
mm	millimeter
MMC	materiel management center
MNC	major NATO commands
MOADS	maneuver oriented ammunition distribution system
MOD	mobile obstacle detachment
MOGAS	motor gasoline
MOPP	mission-oriented protective posture
mort	mortar
MOS	military occupational speciality
MOUT	military operations on urbanized terrain
mov	movement
MP	military police
MPAD	mobile public affairs detachment
mps	meters per second
MR	moon rise; motorized rifle
MRB	motorized rifle battalion
MRC	motorized rifle company
MRD	motorized rifle division
MRE	meal, ready to eat
MRL	multiple rocket launcher
MRR	motorized rifle regiment
MS	moon set
MSB	main support battalion
MSC	major subordinate command
MSE	mobile subscriber equipment
msg	message
msl	missile
msn	mission

MSR	main supply route
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment
MU	march unit
mtz	motorized
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NADS	NATO Augmented Defense System
NAEWF	NATO Airborne Early Warning System
NAI	named area of interest
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authority
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NDI	nondevelopmental item
NL	Netherlands
NLT	not later than
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
no	number
OAS	offensive air support
OB	order of battle
obj	objective
obs	obstacle
OCA	offensive counterair
OCOKA	observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach and mobility corridors
OCONUS	outside the Continental United States
OEG	operation exposure guidance
OMG	operational maneuver group
OO	on order
OPCON	(under the) operational control (of)
OPLAN	operation plan
opnl	operational
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
ord	ordnance
org	organization
(P)	packaged (class III supplies)
PA	public affairs
para	paragraph
PCH	press camp headquarters
PCL	prescribed chemical load
pct	percent
PDS	personnel daily summary
PDY	present for duty
PE	practical exercise
pers	personnel
petrl	petroleum
PFP	Partnership for Peace
PIR	priority intelligence requirements
PJE	Program for Joint Education
PL	phase line
PLL	prescribed load list
plt	platoon
PMCS	preventative maintenance checks and services
POB	PSYOP battalion
POG	PSYOP group
POL	petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POMCUS	pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets
pos	position
pp	pages
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
proc	processing
prot	protection
prov	provisional
PSC	personnel service company; principal subordinate command
PST	pass time
PSYOP	psychological operations
PzGren	Panzer Grenadier
QDMP	quick decision-making procedure
QM	quartermaster
R	reinforcing
RAG	regimental artillery group
RAOC	rear area operations center
RAU	radio access unit
RC	Reserve Component
rcvry	recovery
REC	radioelectronic combat
recon	reconnaissance
REG	repair and evacuation group

regt	regiment
rep	repair
repl	replacement
RES	radiation exposure status
res	reserve
RFL	restrictive fire line
RIPL	reconnaissance and interdiction planning line
rkt	rocket
ROE	rules of engagement
ROM	refuel on the move
RP	release point
rpt	report
RSA	regimental support area
RSR	required supply rate
RSSP	ration supplement sundries pack
RSTA	reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
RTFL	rough terrain forklift
Ry	railway
S&P	stake and platform
S&S	supply and service
SA	security assistance
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SAR	search and rescue
SAW	squad automatic weapon
scty	security
SEAD	suppression of enemy air defenses
sep	separate
SF	special forces
SFG	special forces group
SFOD	special forces operational detachment
SFV	Stinger fighting vehicle
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
sig	signal
SITREP	situation report
SO	special operations
SOC	special operations command
SOCCE	special operations command and control element
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command, Europe
SOF	special operations forces
SOI	signal operation instruction
SOM	scheme of maneuver
SOP	standing operating procedure
SOTI	security, operations, training, and intelligence
SP	self-propelled; start point
sp	special
spt	support
sqdn	squadron
SR	special reconnaissance
SRC	standard requirement code
SSM	surface-to-surface missile
ST	student text
sta	station
STON	short ton
sup	supply
SUPPT	supply point
svc	service
TA	terrain analysis; tank army, theater army
TAA	tactical assembly area
TAC	tactical (command post)
tac	tactical
TACAIR	tactical air
TACC	tactical air control center
TACP	tactical air control party
TACS	tactical air control system
TACSAT	tactical satellite
TAI	target area of interest
TAMC	transportation aircraft maintenance company
TAMCA	theater army movement control agency
TAR	tactical air reconnaissance
TB	tank battalion
TBP	to be published
TC	tank company
TCF	tactical combat force
TD	tank division
TDIS	time distance
TDMP	tactical decision-making process
tech	technical
TEL	transporter-erector-launcher
TF	task force
tgt	target
TLO	terminal learning objective

tlr	trailer
tm	team
tml	terminal
TMT	transportation motor transport
tng	training
TO	theater of operations
TOA	transfer of authority
topo	topographical
TOW	tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile
TPFDD	time-phased force deployment data
TPL	time-phase line
TR	tank regiment
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
trans	transport
trf	traffic
trk	truck
trp	troop
TRP	target reference point
TSOP	tactical standing operating procedure
TVA	target value analysis
TVD	theater of military operations
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UBL	unit basic load
UI	unidentified
UK	United Kingdom
UKAIR	United Kingdom Air
UN	United Nations
USACAPOC	U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
USACGSC	United States Army Command and General Staff College
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces, Europe
USAJFKSWCS	U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USASOC	U.S. Army Special Operations Command
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USCINCEUR	U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USFORAZ	U.S. Forces, Azores
USLANTCOM	U.S. Atlantic Command
USNAVEUR	U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
UW	uncoventional warfare
veh	vehicle
vet	veterinary
VGK	Supreme High Command
vic	vicinity
w/	with
WA	weather analysis
WEU	Western European Union
whl	wheeled
WIA	wounded in action
WO	warning order
WOC	wing operations center
WP	Warsaw Pact; white phosphorus
WSRO	weapons system replacement operations
WV	wheeled vehicles (fuel category)
XO	executive officer
XPLT	exploitation

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 1. European Strategic Environment

SCOPE

Until the Warsaw Pact dissolved in April 1991, post-World War II Europe was divided into two armed camps, each dominated by a superpower. Rejection of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, and the evolution of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) marked a thaw in the frozen political-military landscape of the Cold War. The United States and the Europeans are now actively rethinking their commitments in a world where the arguments for multinational defense arrangements are, to many, far less compelling.

The intent of this lesson is for you to acquire knowledge of the European environment in the context of the “new” Europe. The readings will acquaint you with U.S. Interests, objectives, policies, and options in Europe and the relevant actors and trends in the region. Most of the lesson will focus on issues associated with the changing environment. In the beginning, you will become familiar with the lesson outline and its relation to other courses. This outline will be followed by a short review of previous instruction relevant to regional analysis.

The lesson then allows you to become familiar with important security issues inherent in the changing European environment. You will begin to see how the changing conditions affect national security policy and regional plans and operations designed to protect U.S. interests.

This lesson will enhance your knowledge of an important region while developing your ability to think through the many complex variables that affect strategic and operational decision making. Later in the curriculum you will learn about the other combatant commands and refine your ability to accomplish strategic assessment.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

A.10 TASK: Describe the strategic environment in Europe

CONDITION: Given a written requirement, with references

STANDARD: The description must -

- Identify U.S. interests, objectives, and policies in Europe (include rationale).
- Identify the other relevant actors in the region and their interests.
- Identify threats to U.S. interests and the interests of our European allies.
- Highlight the history, evolution, and current organization of NATO
- Identify current issues facing NATO and its member states (post-Cold War era)

LEVEL: Knowledge

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2a, 3a, and 3c.

A.11 TASK: Explain the command structure, organizational concepts, and command relationships applicable to U.S. military forces in selected joint and combined commands.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement, with references.

STANDARD: The explanation must include the command structure, organizational concepts, and command relationships applicable to U.S. military forces in selected joint and combined commands IAW student issue materials and study requirements.

LEVEL: Knowledge

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2a, 3a, 3c,

B.20 TASK Describe the organization and warfighting capability of the US European Command (USEUCOM).

CONDITION. Given assigned readings and a written requirement.

STANDARD. The description must relate the USEUCOM organization and war-fighting capabilities to U S national and regional security interests and objectives, current U.S. military strategy, and existing joint and combined doctrine and operational war-fighting concepts and principles IAW student issue materials and study requirements.

LEVEL: Knowledge

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2a, 3a, 3c, 3e, and 5c

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use the lesson guide to help you achieve the lesson learning objectives. Follow the instructions in the lesson guide and read the materials listed below at the suggested time. When you complete a reading, return to the appropriate place in the lesson guide and continue to follow the instructions.

READINGS:

a. Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. Europe (15 pages)

b Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. Russia and Neighbors

c Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. EUCOM Strategy of Engagement and Prepardness

d. Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. Command Relationships: U.S. European Command (1 page).

LESSON GUIDE

INTRODUCTION

For many years after World War II, most of the U.S. forward deployed ground forces were in Europe. There, the United States and its West European allies stood poised to fight the Warsaw Pact, identified on the principal threat to the West's democratic way of life. With the failure of communism in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany (3 October 1990), the disbanding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (1 April 1991), and the fracturing of the Soviet Union into a smaller, looser Confederation of Independent States (CIS), a new estimate of the European strategic environment had to be developed.

The U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe continue, but the U.S. commitment to its partners in NATO remains firm. Our strategic planners must still support forward deployed forces in Europe and continuously prepare or update plans for their deployment, employment, and reinforcement under dramatically new political-military conditions Planning for a more ambiguous threat requires officers who are knowledgeable and flexible in adapting to change. As a future staff officer on higher staffs, you must be dedicated to the study of your command's operational environment and fully able to adjust to changing circumstances.

This lesson will help you learn to think about the critical aspects of the strategic environment. The result will help ensure that military operations are in tune with the other elements of national power and supportive of U.S. interests in the region. Initially, you will learn about the forces of change in Europe, a key region of the world considered vital to U S security. Acquainting you with Europe will be done through the "eyes" of NATO and two unified commands with responsibilities in the region, the European and Atlantic commands. As you learn about these theaters, you need to think seriously about the major issues having exceptional international significance. The graphic on the next page highlights key aspects of the European strategic environment that you should focus on during this lesson.

Your readings highlight many changes occurring in Europe, the guiding policies of the region's relevant players. and identified trends having potential security implications. Later in the subcourse. you will use a tactical exercise set in Europe to accomplish several objectives. one of which will be to further enhance your knowledge of Europe's regional security environment. You will find that this entire lesson is guided by the learning objectives and discussion issues in the lesson guide. This lesson will acquaint you with the ends the United States is trying to achieve in Europe. Massive and continuous change in the European environment has strategists everywhere questioning the "new" Interests and objectives (ends) and wondering if the U.S. resources (means) devoted to Europe are justified Judging the situation will require you to evaluate the geopolitical and strategic importance of Europe to the United States and to consider the critical issues confronting the region today.



A CHANGING EUROPE

Read appendixes 2 and 3 to this lesson guide to get the "juices" flowing regarding the changes taking place in Europe. As you read, pay particular attention to discussion of the major U.S. security interests in Europe. You will learn more about U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) later in this lesson. When you have completed these readings, return here and continue.

As you noted from the readings there have been recent dramatic changes in the European strategic environment. Change has brought much uncertainty, as the following graphic shows.



To help you clarify your thoughts about Europe's regional situation, try to first think about categories needed to explain the security environment. Then take a few minutes to identify three or four examples from your readings to show the nature of the change within each category.

You could have picked many categories. Chances are you would have selected something like political, economic, military, geographical, and psychological factors to consider. Maybe the list would have eventually grown to include social, historical, and cultural categories. For now, just start organizing the information you just read and add to it the information you already knew about the changes occurring in Europe.

To speed up the process, use the categories POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, GEOGRAPHICAL, and PSYCHOLOGICAL. Note some of the significant changes beside each that have potential U.S. security implications. The following example of significant political changes shows you what to do

Many of the following points shown as possible responses have been European security issues highlighted in network news reports and were covered in the readings. They are summarized here for your reference.

- POLITICAL FACTORS. *The disintegration of the Soviet Union and European democratization.* The termination of the Cold War and the perceived end of East-West confrontation has had the most impact on the security environment of Europe. Example conditions include-

  - Emergence of numerous independent successor states to the Soviet Union
  - Uncertainty about future intentions.
  - Loss of a major negotiation block for treaty ratification (Warsaw Pact)
  - A U.S. administration less prone to resource security expenditures for Europe
  - Rise in ethnic and religious rivalries throughout the European region.
  - Conflicts involving ethnically based claims of sovereignty
  - Decentralized control of nuclear weapons.
  - Nuclear proliferation and smuggling.
  - NATO troops in the former Yugoslavia.

Continue thinking for a few minutes. This exercise will help you think about what you know. Don't merely leap down the page to see what someone else has suggested. Do it yourself and you'll remember the material better-not to mention the satisfaction that comes from thinking through difficult situations. The first readings should have started you thinking about Europe, a key region of the world considered to be vital to U.S. security. What are the most significant changes in the European environment, and how do these issues affect U.S. security interests, objectives, and policies in the region? Room has been provided beside each category for you to pencil in a few thoughts. Don't feel like you have to put an answer beside every dot, but do take some time to think about the region and the various factors.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

-
-
-

MILITARY FACTORS

-
-
-
-
-

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS

-
-
-
-
-

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

-
-
-
-
-

POSSIBLE RESPONSES

Your responses and the ones below will have similarities and differences. Look at each response and think about what it means and see if you agree or disagree. Could you briefly describe some background information associated with each example that is given?

- ECONOMIC: *U.S.-European trade relations.* The competitive economic environment has negative aspects that frustrate relations between countries. Some examples include -

  - “Have” and “have not” countries of Europe.
  - Potential U.S. trade war with the European Union (EU).
  - Costly reunification of Germany.
  - New European markets for U.S. products and services.
  - Resentment of U.S. expansion into Russia/East European markets (help or profit?)
  - Impatience with the pace of reform in Europe.

- MILITARY: *U.S. force withdrawals from Europe.* The stabilizing influence of NATO appears to have an important role in the future of Europe, yet other emerging alliances or organizations may alter the roles and missions of the Atlantic Alliance. Examples include -

  - Significant U.S. military withdrawals and reduced commitments to European security
  - Expectation that Europeans will assume more of the burden for security.
  - Formation of numerous and varied alliances and treaty networks.
  - Continued retention of a large conventional and nuclear arsenal.
  - Changing force distributions and power vacuum in Europe.

GEOGRAPHICAL: *Strategic depth.* The reunification of Germany combined with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe enhanced the "cushion" between potential adversaries. Examples include -

  - Improved ability to project power into North Africa and Asia as required
  - Apparent increase in linkage with both terrorism and the drug trade.
  - Expansion of the European Region eastward.

- PSYCHOLOGICAL: *Strong ties with the United States.* Substituting the word psychological for national will, these factors are increasingly important in the equation for the "new" Europe. Examples include -

  - Strong, historic interrelationships with the West,
  - Widespread support for the EC (European Community).
  - Regional anxiety over the pace of democratic reform and unified Germany

Don't spend much time with this, but think about how you would support a position as to which of the above categories might be most significant in the changing Europe. Of course, you would quickly conclude that it makes a difference as to whose eyes you're looking through, whether you are thinking long or short term, and many other qualifying conditions. The main point to realize is that analysts are expected to study this and make hard calls that are part of recommendations made to the national leadership. The staffers will also have to know and explain the complex relationships between these categories and understand how other interested nations of the region look at the same information.

So far, the emphasis has been on the broad and sweeping changes in the European security environment. Now would be a good time to put on your U.S. hat and take a look at the situation. The large-scale change requires a *continual assessment* of what is happening to U.S. national interests in the area.

What is actually meant when senior leaders say that "the defense of Western Europe" is a vital interest of the United States? In short, the term "vital interest" is associated with the fact that the United States is *willing to use military* force to protect its interests.

Have U.S. interests in Europe actually changed, or does the United States merely need to adjust programs and policies (that is the ways and means) to account for differences in the security environment? This question will probably lead to a conclusion that "big" change, as noted in Europe over the past several years *does not automatically mean that U.S. interests change.* However, there may be a substantial change in the methods employed by the United States to accommodate shifting circumstances and priorities in the theater. As discussed in S510, The Nation and Military Power, our country's national interests have been the ends sought by strategists over the past several decades. By continually assessing our nation's capabilities (that is, elements of national power) and comparing them to the desired

end state, plans and programs were developed as methods to achieve the ends. These methods became the national policies, programs, and commitments designed to either directly or indirectly achieve these ends.

What is the applicability of the current National Security Strategy of the United States toward Europe? Why is it important to America? The sweeping changes that began in 1989 caused the United States to discard the former strategy of containment for what in 1994 became a strategy of engagement and enlargement. This strategy is central to U.S. policy toward an evolving post-Cold War Europe. That a stable Europe is vital to our own security is a history lesson already learned twice this century at considerable cost. Healthy European economies mean more jobs in the United States and better investment opportunities abroad The emergence of new democracies in Eastern Europe has provided the United States an unparalleled opportunity to play a major role in a free and undivided new Europe. The three major objectives of the 1995 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) are shown in the graphic below.

How do the issues you thought about earlier relate to each major element of the U.S. National Security Strategy? Some key points relating our NSS to Europe are summarized below.

The first and central element of U.S. security strategy in Europe must be security through military strength and cooperation. The Cold War may be over, but the U.S. role is not over. War still rages in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While this war does not directly pose a threat to our security or warrant unilateral U.S. intervention, U.S. policy attempts to achieve four goals-

- Preventing the spread of fighting into a broader European war that could threaten both allies and the stability of new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe.
- Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the conflict
- Halting the slaughter of innocents
- Helping to confirm the central role of NATO in post-Cold War Europe.

The tragic conflict in the former Yugoslavia serves notice that military forces and a military presence remain relevant in a post-Cold War world. It also has shown the difficulties of applying military force to conflicts as well as among states.

The United States must work with a number of institutions to resolve the ethnic conflicts and tragedy in the Balkans These include the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations, and NATO. Of these, only NATO has the military forces, integrated command structure, and broad legitimacy needed to draw in new participants and respond to new challenges. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO's mission has continued to evolve. NATO airpower (with substantial U.S. contribution) enforces the UN-mandated no-fly zone, provides support to UN peacekeepers, and remains ready to help support the peace once the various factions reach an agreement. You will examine NATO in more detail later in this lesson.

A new institution is assisting NATO in extending the scope of security cooperation with the new democracies of Europe. It is Partnership for Peace (PFP) and is largely the result of a U S. Initiative adopted at the January 1994 summit. This growing program of political consultation and military cooperation comprises 21 nations, Including Russia. In keeping with the U.S. strategy of enlargement, PFP is open to all former Warsaw Pact members and other European nations. PFP countries send representatives to NATO headquarters, and plans for joint military exercises are under way The goal is to expand stability, democracy, prosperity, and security cooperation to an ever-broader Europe

The second economic element of the new strategy for Europe (promoting prosperity at home) seeks to build upon open and vibrant market economies. These can be thought of as the engines that have given the United States the greatest prosperity in human history. As the United States works to strengthen its own economy, our leaders realize that we serve our own economic prosperity and security by helping market reforms in the new Eastern European democracies. This, in turn, will help deflate the region's demagogues and ease ethnic tensions. The United States strongly supports the process of European integration embodied in the EU and seeks to deepen partnership with the EU in support of U.S. economic goals. The short-term problems of converting Central and Eastern Europe into Western economic institutions will be rewarded if they succeed and become customers of America's goods and services tomorrow. Ultimately, the success of market reforms in Eastern Europe will depend more on trade than aid. Therefore, a U.S. priority is to reduce trade barriers with the former communist states.

The third NSS element is to support the growth of democracy and individual freedoms that has begun in Russia, the nations of the former Soviet Union, and Europe's former communist states Success of these democratic reforms Increases both European and U.S. security and are the best alternative to the aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds unleashed by the end of the Cold War. Nowhere is the success of democracy more important to the United States than in these countries.

The interests of the United States can never be considered in a vacuum. The Europeans obviously have strong viewpoints regarding their regional interests and the roles "outside" governments may be allowed to play.

How do U.S. and European interests complement one another? In what ways do they conflict? The possibilities are endless, however, consider the following examples:

- *Complementary U.S. and European interests-*

  - Strong economic ties and free markets. Trade with Europe produces over 2 million U S. jobs and revenues exceed $200 billion annually. As stated in appendix 2, approximately half of the total U.S. foreign investment is in Europe and more than 50 percent of all foreign investment in the United States is by European countries.

Strong political and cultural links. From 1820 to 1989, over 67 percent of all immigrants to the United States came from Europe and Africa.

- Mutual security cooperation, as previously discussed.

- Regional stability

- *Conflicting U.S. and European interests-*

- Willingness to share equitably in sharing regional defense responsibilities. For years, U.S. and European Governments have been at odds over sharing defense burdens. With recent and continuing U.S. force reductions, Congress may insist that Europe do more to assure the security of the region (to include areas outside the original NATO charter provisions).

- Continued U.S. leadership role in NATO Reduced troop commitments and the ongoing "drawdown" over time (and the European perception of this) may result in a reduced U.S. role.

U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE

- Enhance European Stability.
- Promote NATO's Partnership for Peace.
- Preclude Spread of Mass Destruction Weapons.
- Prevent Spread of Fighting in Former Yugoslavia.
- Ensure Faithful Implementation of Existing Arms Control Agreements.
- Continue Commitment to NATO.
- Provide Credible Overseas Presence.
- Stem Destabilizing Flow of Refugees.
- Maintain Security Through Military Strength and Cooperation.
- Promote Democratic and Market Reform in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.

This extract from our 1995 National Security Strategy summarizes more completely stated U.S. interests In Europe. Do you agree with these? Why or why not? You should have already identified most of these interests.

The United States may no longer have the resources (means) to achieve these objectives (ends). Does the United States need to maintain forward deployed forces in Europe to pursue its Interests? If so, how much is "enough"? There is no absolutely right answer to this question, although a stronger case can be made for maintaining a minimum level of flexible forward-deployed forces (GEN Joulwan makes a case for maintaining at least a corps-see appendix 3). Think about your own answer to the resources question before continuing.

You should now understand U.S. interests in Europe as derived from our NSS and have a better appreciation for the impact of recent dramatic changes. This establishes a context in which to examine threats to European stability, security, and the current U.S. role in NATO. Planners must study the current conditions and anticipate the steps required to preserve European security.

What do you consider to be the most prominent issues associated with European regional security? What is your rationale for your position? This question asks for your judgments. As you would suspect, each major issue can have many subissues. Determine what issues you feel are most important and identify some of those subissues. Use the space provided to pencil in some of your thoughts before you continue.

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-

Here are two possible responses to the question. These examples are not sacred, however, they should give you some food for thought as you make your personal assessment of the Issues.

- European regional stability is at risk.
  - Civil war and regional conflicts are dally realities.
  - A rise in radical political parties.
  - Nuclear weapons and delivery systems remain in the former Soviet republics.
  - Massive stocks of conventional weapons and militarily trained populations.
  - Withdrawal from Eastern Europe of former Soviet forces.
  - Religious fundamentalism.
- U S force reductions in Europe jeopardize regional security.
  - Diminished technical intelligence and security.
  - Reduced strategic lift.
  - Reduced theater logistics capability.
  - Reduced communications capability.
  - Reduced military-to-military liaison.
  - Facilitates power vacuum.

As you would suspect, each major issue may have many subissues. The following graphic summarizes some prominent issues

REGIONAL TENSIONS THREATEN STABILITY

FORMER SOVIET UNION
- SEVERE ECONOMIC TURMOIL
- ETHNIC RELIGION BORDER DISPUTES
- DEMOCRACY UNDER ATTACK
- CONTROL OF NUCLEAR ARSENAL

EASTERN EUROPE
- FRAGILE GOVERNMENTS
- STRUGGLING ECONOMIES
- ETHNIC AND REFUGEE PROBLEMS
- WAR IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

WESTERN EUROPE
- DIMINISHING FAITH IN US COMMITMENT
- NATO POST-COLD WAR ROLE QUESTIONED
- OVER 12 MILLION IMMIGRANTS

MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
- ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES
- INTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION—NBC AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
- SUB-SAHARAN REGION FACES FAMINE, DISEASE, POVERTY

322-1.6-5

Before moving to the next section, you need a break. You might look at CNN or whatever your favorite news service happens to be and see if there is something "newsy" coming out of Europe After that, you'll be refreshed and ready for the last part of this lesson,

The regional situation, especially the political-military landscape, continues to change dramatically as it has since 1989. U.S. interests in the region are in review, budgetary constraints are evident on U S commitments worldwide. and there is a lack of a clearly defined, overpowering military threat in the region NATO is one of the institutions responsible for the peace and stability in Europe for nearly a half century NATO now searches for its evolutionary role in the post-Cold War Europe.

CHURCHILL QUOTE

European history is replete with events of monumental import...milestones in the history of mankind. But for German beer, the Royal Navy, Swedish women, French postcards, and Scotch whiskey, none has ever or indeed, shall ever [illegible] equal in impact, the banding together of Western Europe with the former colonies of the New Worl to form the NATO coalition.

The world shall ever be a better place for its existence.

WINSTON CHURCHILL

322-1.6-4

Aside from the humor, as was often the case, Churchill was right, NATO has had a monumental impact on not only European history, but American history as well. NATO is an Alliance of 16 sovereign nations with a common interest in maintaining peace in Europe and defending their collective freedom through political solidarity and adequate military capabilities to deter and, if necessary repel aggression. NATO remains an indispensable foundation for European security by serving as the transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on issues affecting the vital interests of its members. The Alliance facilitates

coordination and cooperation in areas of common concern. It is through NATO, the most successful military coalition in history, that the United States can pursue its security interests throughout Europe, not just with the 16 NATO member states.

NATO security policy is based on maintaining a sufficient military capability to deter war and to provide for effective defense. Beyond military means, Alliance security policy depends on a political-military crisis management capability, active dialogue with non-Alliance members, and a cooperative approach to European security.

Now take a look at NATO's Integrated civil and military structure.



What evidence do you have to support the rationale that NATO is still a relevant organization? What will NATO's future be in dealing with the "new" European security issues? As you think about this, reflect on what you read about changing roles and missions, formation of new alliances, and shifting national power centers.

How does new NATO strategy differ from the former strategy? In broad terms the following graphic summarizes NATO's new strategic concept.



It IS important for you to understand the new NATO strategy. Some of the pertinent differences between this new strategy and the previous theater strategy are summarized in the table that follows.

'OLD' NATO STRATEGY	"NEW NATO STRATEGY
• Monolithic Warsaw Pact threat.	• Diverse and unpredictable threats.
• Large standing forces,	• Smaller active forces; reduced readiness,
• Oriented on war fighting.	• War prevention/crisis management.
• Defend in place.	• Mobility and flexibility.
• National formations,	• Multinational formations.
• Reliance on nuclear deterrence	• Little reliance on nuclear deterrence.
• Forward defense.	• Forward presence.
• "Layer cake" defense.	• Counter-concentration.
• General defense plans.	• General security guidelines
• Collective defense.	• Dialogue/cooperation/collective defense.

The following graphic summarizes many of the arguments that NATO should be retained as a relevant and flexible organization.

NATO: A UNIQUE ORGANIZATION

- STRUCTURE FOR COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION
  - MAINTAINS THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK
  - NACC OPENS NATO'S DOOR TO THE EAST
- REAL CAPABILITIES: WELL-TRAINED FORCES IN PLACE
  - INFRASTRUCTURE
  - FORCES
  - COMMAND AND CONTROL
  - SHARED TRAINING EXPERIENCE
  - STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS
- FLEXIBILITY TO MEET CHANGING SITUATIONS
  - CHARTER MAKES EVOLUTION POSSIBLE
  - ROME DECLARATION GIVES ALLIANCE A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT
  - CREATION OF NACC EXPANDED INFLUENCE
- SUPRA-NATIONAL CHARACTER OF 16 NATIONS ACTING IN CONCERT
  - DIMINISHES FEAR OF NATIONAL AGGRANDIZEMENT

322 1/8-4

However, there are other viewpoints. In the article “Arms Control, European Security and the Future of Western Europe” (from Strategic Review, Winter 1992, pp. 19 - 31), the author, Dr. Chernoff, states that NATO presently holds advantages as an alliance over alternative security organizations such as the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), the WEU (Western European Union), and the EC (European Community) However, he raises an Interesting point that if military calculations become less important within the context of European security, the alternative “European” security institutions could replace NATO. This was not one of your assigned readings, so it is not in your lesson guide. The key points are summarized for you

The author lists the following arguments for dissolving NATO:

- *The purpose of the Alliance has been served.* The Alliance was created in the face of a military threat that no longer exists. Therefore, there is no reason to continue the Alliance.

- *There is no unique basis for membership in the Alliance.* The ideological challenge that united member states with a common political, economic, and social approach is gone. Without a clear division of Europe into two political-economic groups, Alliance membership now appears arbitrary and confrontational

- *NATO is a conflict-based Alliance and an anachronism.* NATO is inherently tainted by its Cold War origins and adherence to the Alliance expresses an underlying conflicting view of international relations that is no longer justified.

- *A U.S.-dominated Alliance is no longer appropriate or acceptable.* The Western Alliance has always been dominated by the United States. Because of Western European integration, Eastern European democratization, and altered political and economic relationships between Europe and North America, public opinion in member states will no longer support such an Alliance. Even in a modified form, the Alliance is not only anachronistic, but unacceptable.

- *Something else is needed.* From a historical perspective, the only proven approach to security has been an international “system” guaranteeing a flexible balance of power. NATO is not well suited for creating or maintaining such a system.

Dr. Chernoff lists the following counterarguments for retaining the NATO Alliance

Europe has experienced enormous change, but not enough to shake apart the strong relationships forged in the post-World War II period Significant near-term military issues remain. During the transition period, NATO has an important role: particularly in arms control and in providing for efficient military planning and force structuring. Some evolution is necessary and NATO has demonstrated its ability to evolve. The precise nature of the changes in the Alliance must be based on the post-Cold War military order in Europe. Of particular importance is the internal course followed by Europe's largest military power, the successors to the USSR. Other functions NATO might perform in the short term include-

- Providing a stabilizing force or influence.
- Providing peacemaking or peacekeeping forces.
- Reducing regional concerns about a resurgent Germany.
- Offering a framework for security initiatives.
- Providing a source of forces for joint NATO UN EC, and CSCE action.
- Providing a consultative mechanism for smaller members to have equivalent influence with larger member states and discussion of crisis response out of the NATO area when common interests are involved.
- Improving multinational negotiating positions through consensus.
- Sharing defense costs and risks.
- Providing a source of allied forces familiar with interoperability operations.

What is your position on allowing former Warsaw Pact nations into NATO and other Western European alliances? Think about this for a moment Allowing these countries into the security system has mainly positive benefits. The Alliance (NATO or whatever) stands to benefit security by-

- Tending to unify action across diverse groups.
- Facilitating cooperation and consultation (NATO uses NACC to open doors to the East).
- Diminishing fears of nationalism.
- Allowing standardization in agreements.

The United States is currently working with its European allies toward expanding the NATO Alliance to Include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. These countries have made the most progress in reform of their economies and political systems.

Take a moment to visualize the strategic area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. This area encompasses Canada and the United States, which comes under the Canada-US Regional Planning Group, the Atlantic Ocean region between the United States and Europe, extending farther to the north, covered by Allied Command Atlantic, the first major NATO Command, and the second major NATO Command, Allied Command Europe (ACE) ACE is what we will focus on exclusively in this course. The ACE mission is to safeguard an area containing more than 330 million people, 3 million square kilometers of sea, and nearly 2 million square kilometers of land. This area extends from the northern tip of Norway to Southern Turkey and includes the Mediterranean Sea.

The military command structure of the two major NATO commands is shown above. Allied Command Atlantic is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). He is responsible for the major subordinate commands (MSCs) shown on the left Focus your attention on ACE. It is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). He makes recommendations to NATO's political and military authorities on military matters that might affect his ability to accomplish his mission of defending ACE SACEUR has direct access to defense ministers and heads of government of the NATO nations. He is responsible for preparing plans to defend his AOR and establishes standards for organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining NATO-committed forces. In crisis or war, SACEUR becomes responsible for implementing military measures to preserve the security or restore the integrity of ACE within the framework given him by NATO political authorities. In war, SACEUR would command all NATO land, sea and air forces in his area of operations. He is both a "Combined" and "Joint" forces commander.

Subordinate to SACEUR are three MSCs responsible for the southern, central, and northwest ACE regions These are also headed by combined and joint commanders responsible for developing defense plans for their respective areas and determining force requirements, deployments, and exercises. Note also that SACEUR commands a fourth entity-the ACE Rapid Reaction Forces (ARRC). First, some highlights regarding the three MSCs.

- Allied Forces, Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST), with headquarters in Kolsas, Norway, is responsible for defense of the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, and the sea between the two nations. It is the newest restructuring within ACE. You may recall the former subcommand called AFNORTH (Norway, Denmark, and Germany north of the Elbe River). AFNORTHWEST is a product of merging a portion of the old AFNORTH, a portion of the old Allied Command Channel (English Channel approaches and ports), the former command called United Kingdom Air (UKAIR), and an expanded maritime area AFNORTHWEST reflects the ACE AOR expansion into the Baltic and the need to avoid marginalizing Norway when Denmark was transferred to Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT).

- Allied Forces, Central Europe (AFCENT), with headquarters in Brunssum, the Netherlands, is responsible for defense of Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the Baltic Sea This is a somewhat expanded region as a result of the changes in AFNORTHWEST. You'll come back to the AFCENT region, since this is the context for the rest of S320A.

- Allied Forces, Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), with headquarters in Naples, Italy, is responsible for defense of Italy, Greece, Turkey, and the Mediterranean Sea. Portugal lies in the AOR of the Supreme

Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), and is outside of ACE. Currently, France and Spain do not formally participate in the NATO integrated military structure, although Spain plays an active military role through a series of cooperative agreements with the major NATO commands.

- Command Relationships. NATO-committed national forces generally remain under full national commands during peacetime. Exceptions are the integrated staffs in the various NATO military headquarters; certain air defense units that are on constant alert, such as the Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS); and some standing multinational naval and communication units. In time of crisis or war, something known as transfer of authority (TOA) occurs wherein member nations transfer operational control or operational command of their NATO-committed national forces to NATO Such forces constitute the main defense forces of NATO.

Before continuing your study of AFCENT, take a look at some recent evolutionary developments within NATO's Reaction Forces.



This is another example of major force restructuring and realignment in NATO. The concept shown here classifies NATO reaction forces as either immediate (small army, air, and maritime units at the highest state of readiness) or rapid reaction forces (additional land, air, and sea elements with greater combat capabilities).

The primary land component of the rapid reaction forces is a multinational corps, led by the United Kingdom, called the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The United States contributes one heavy division and a package of corps combat support troops to the ARRC, all theater-based. Reaction forces would probably be committed before deployment/employment of NATO main defense forces, One last category of NATO forces not listed on the diagram is augmentation forces, which are provided by Canada, the United States and European mobilization of reserve component forces.

Let's return to the AFCENT piece of Allied Command Europe and continue your journey to the area of operations of the land component. AFCENT has the command structure shown below.



The commander of the former NATO Baltic Approaches Command (BALTAP) now reports to AFCENT. The commander, Baltic Approaches Command (COMBALTAP), is responsible for Denmark and a limited area around the chokepoints through the Danish straits. Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT), has incorporated the former Air Forces, BALTAP, and has replaced the former 2 Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) and 4ATAF C0MAIRCENT now commands all air forces in the Central Region, including several squadrons stationed in the United States and Canada. It is headquarter in Ramstein, Germany. Finally, on the ground side. Land Forces, Central Europe (LANDCENT), has replaced the former NORTHAG and CENTAG with which you may have been familiar. LANDCENT controls all land forces not under ACE control in the Central Region Its command Yates between a Dutch and a German general and its headquarters is in Heidelberg Germany For NATO operations, V (US/GE) Corps is under the operational command of LANDCENT not USAREUR or USEUCOM.

Now take a look at LANDCENT



The preceding diagram shows the current corps organizations under- LANDCENT. Note that there are no longer strictly national corps in the Central Region From left to right.. the German/Danish corps currently has one German division and one Danish division. the German/Dutch corps has two German divisions and one Dutch division, the German/U.S. corps has two German divisions and one U.S. division;

the U.S./German corps, still known as V Corps, has one U.S. division plus one German division; and the so-called EURO Corps has French and German divisions Remember that there is no longer a VII (U.S.) Corps in Germany (it has been eliminated from U S. Army force structure). You won't go any further into specific units in this lesson. Simply understand the trend that these now are all multinational organizations.

What exact/y is USEUCOM, and what is its relationship to NATO? USEUCOM is commanded by a very Important geographic CINC (the USCINCEUR) who is responsible for Europe and also most of the African continent. A key point to note is that USCINCEUR is also "dual-hatted" as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) Note the four-star box above USEUCOM and ACE. Due to the significant responsibilities inherent in his role of SACEUR the day-to-day operations of USEUCOM are coordinated by a deputy CINC (DCINC), a nominative four-star traditionally U.S. Air Force billet. Note that there are other dual-hatted U.S. commanders who tie into the NATO side as well.

Given the current trends in NATO, is it time to start rotating the position of SACEUR among the three largest members (the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom)? There's really no right or wrong answer although this could be a logical consequence of the decreased relative U.S. contribution So far the SACEUR has been a U.S. general, currently General George A. Joulwan.

The USEUCOM mission is to support U.S. interests throughout its AOR, to provide combat ready forces to NATO, and to support other commands as directed. The USEUCOM AOR has expanded to include all of Europe east to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria in the Near East, and North/Sub-Saharan Africa. This area encompasses an aggregate population of more than 1 billion people. USEUCOM is a unified command with headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany. Its Army component is composed of a corps, its Air Force component (USAFE) is comprised of both air combat and support forces with headquarters at Ramsten AFB, Germany; its U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (USNAVEUR), are headquartered in London England. USEUCOM also has a Marine Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR), component with headquarters in Vaihingen, Germany. Also at Vaihingen is the headquarters for Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), which provides rapidly deployable SOF elements throughout the USEUCOM AOR.

The following graphic summarizes some trends in USEUCOM today.



As can be seen from this chart, many of the same trends, uncertainties, and challenges you previously read about concerning NATO are also threats to U.S. interests. New national identities continue to emerge. Conflicts that are tribal or religious in nature continue to erupt. European leaders are concerned about U.S. commitment during a period of instability.

Enough about USEUCOM. Let's close this lesson by looking at some final NATO concerns.

NATO FORCE STRUCTURE—US PERSPECTIVE

- **Must reinforce the trans-Atlantic political relationship.**
- **Must sustain US conventional and nuclear force presence in Europe.**
- **Must strengthen the "European Pillar."**
- **Must encourage greater European share of defense responsibilities.**
- **Must preserve solidarity in defense, cooperation, and collective military action.**
- **Must maintain effective integrated military structure as it continues to adapt and become leaner.**

The list above summarizes the U.S. perspective regarding the NATO force structure. A key challenge is obtaining a greater degree of European burden sharing while preserving an effective, integrated military structure

You now possess basic knowledge regarding the European environment. As this course progresses through the operational level to the tactical scenario, you will continue to expand your understanding of this region

CONCLUSION

This lesson does not stand alone. From previous course work you should now see the importance of understanding the strategic environment of the areas where the United States has national interests. You should have gained an appreciation for the continuing nature of conducting regional assessments and for the dynamic processes that guide the development of our national policy formulation.



This graphic shows the transition that the U.S. Army is making in today's changing environment- from a Cold War army to a power projection army and, ultimately to a versatile information-based army. It is essential that you understand the strategic context of these changes.

The lesson 1 readings should help you better understand the dynamics of change at work in Europe. Your studies in this lesson included a look at U.S. interests, objectives, and policies in the region and trends that may cause changes in U.S. positions on a variety of issues Obviously, collective forums/alliances (for example, NATO, WEU, CSCE, EC) will be an important part of adapting and managing change within the European environment. You also examined potential new threats to U.S. security interests in Europe and read about the evolution, basic organization, and new issues facing both NATO and the United States. You looked at USEUCOM, with its forward-based and reinforcing forces, which provides both our allies and potential adversaries with a clear demonstration of U.S. commitment and resolve USEUCOM's assigned forces are still the nucleus around which NATO's forces and plans are organized NATO remains the key to the strategic stability of Europe.

Regional turmoil will continue. No one has a crystal ball to predict new challenges that will arise in the future. It is Important for a concerned citizen or professional military officer to study regional situations having security implications to the United States and its citizens. The U.S. Army Europe force structure has also changed in response to the new European strategic environment. USAREUR has moved to an end strength of 65,000 soldiers, now part of multinational organizations, with an expanded focus covering nearly 100 countries. The United States will continue deployments of thousands of soldiers from Europe on missions that range from peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance.

"IF THERE IS A LESSON OF THIS BLOODY CENTURY, IT IS THAT WE, ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC, PAY A VERY TERRIBLE PRICE WHENEVER EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES BEGIN TO WALK THEIR SEPARATE WAYS. WE DID SO TWICE AND TWICE WE PAID. LET US NOT LEARN THE LESSON FOR THE THIRD TIME."

— GENERAL J.M. SHALIKASHVILI
FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE
10 OCTOBER 1992

One of your professional responsibilities is to understand the importance of linking the strategic, operational. and tactical levels of war. This doctrinal cornerstone ensures that national policy is properly translated to those who Implement the policy to the lowest level of execution. Failure to make this translation leads to misalignment of ends, ways, and means that may be tremendously costly in lives, money, and other valuable resources. Vietnam typifies a failure to align our national interests with tactical plans and objectives As resources continue to dwindle the responsibility to link our strategy and tactics "top to bottom" and from "side to side" becomes increasingly critical.

NEXT LESSON

During this lesson, you looked at the how and why Europe IS changing and what those changes could mean to the United States. In lesson 2, you will look more closely at some specific differences between conducting military operations in Kansas and in Europe. You will see the impact of operating in an alliance. examine an operational-level heavy opposing force (the fictitious Krasnovians), and become more familiar with the scenario you will use during the remaining three lessons.

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 1. European Strategic Environment

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. Strategic Assessment 1995 (Extract)

Europe

With the end of the abnormal stability that the Cold War imposed on Europe, the diverse nature of the continent has once again come to the fore Europe has some of the world's most modern societies, well-established democracies, advanced economies, and cooperative international systems. At the same time, it is home to many relatively poor states, states in which democracy and market economies are struggling to gain a foothold, and regions with ethnic tension and conflict.

This chapter deals with Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, as well as the North Atlantic Alliance, to which the U.S. and Canada belong. The chapter's coverage extends to the Baltic States and Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet Eurasian states are addressed in Chapter 4. Dividing the Eurasian area into separate chapters may tend to restrict discussion of broad issues such as those dealt with by the 53 states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), but it breaks up what would otherwise be an inordinately long chapter.

Significant changes are underway in Europe and NATO; some changes predate the end of the Cold War but many flow from its termination. The perceived threat of a massive Soviet military attack has been replaced by new challenges from turmoil in the East and the South. Allies are discussing a new trans-Atlantic relationship reflecting a reduced U.S. military presence in Europe and an enhanced European pillar. Western Europe is increasingly integrating, and Central and East European states are pressing for integration with the West.

Differences in security perspectives have emerged. Northern and Central European states tend to focus primarily on the threat of instability in the East, while Mediterranean states worry more about developments to the south. States in Central and Eastern Europe seek security assurances from the West, primarily out of concern about actual and potential developments in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. Conflict in the Balkans raises the specter of European national conflicts so familiar in the past.

There is a range of perceptions of the situation in Europe. Some optimistically see Europe as the wealthiest, most progressive, cooperative, and secure region in the world. They see no real threat to Europe

From *Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 1995, pages 31 through 50

1947

1948

1949

1952

[illegible]

1954

Western European Union (WEU) created [illegible]

[illegible] Luxembourg, Italy, Netherlands, [illegible]

1955

Federal Republic of Germany joins NATO [illegible]

1966

[illegible] withdraws from WTO

1973

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Established (35 original states, West and East)

1982

Spain joins NATO

1990

German unification, expanding NATO and WEU area

GDR withdraws from WTO

Portugal and Spain join WEU

Evolution of Post-Cold War Security Institutions

1991

NATO creates North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), inviting Central & East European and New Independent States of the former USSR to join.

WTO dissolves

1992

Greece joins WEU subject to ratification; Iceland, Norway, and Turkey become associate members of WEU; Denmark and Ireland become observers in WEU.

WEU creates Forum of Consultation, inviting most Cent.& E. European states.

1994

NATO announces Partnership for Peace program, inviting NACC and other CSCE states to participate. WEU offers associate partnership to nearly all Cent.& E. European states, including Baltic states but excluding Albania and other states of former Soviet Union.

[1] Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States.

[2] Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Dem. Rep., Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR.

and believe that NATO no longer has a mission and will or should fade away.

Other analysts are relatively pessimistic. They point to the difficulties in achieving European unity. They emphasize continuing economic problems in Western Europe, such as low economic growth and high unemployment, which adversely affect relations among European Union (EU) states, limit assistance to the East, and increase pressure for reductions in defense budgets and forces. They perceive a lack of leadership within Europe itself and fear the U.S. is no longer as interested or willing to lead the Alliance. They point to a number of problems within individual countries and in their bilateral and multilateral relations, often focusing on the roles of Germany and France. They see the continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia as calling into question the capability of the EU and NATO and fear that conflict may spread.

The analysis in this chapter acknowledges the difficulties faced in Europe but is relatively bullish on the ability of institutions such as NATO, the EU, the Western European Union (WEU), and the CSCE to address the problems successfully. This web of security-related institutions with overlapping membership is increasingly reaching out to states in the East as well as to European states formerly viewed as "neutral."

Defining Trends

NATO Is Adjusting Better than Expected

Some observers maintain that NATO is eroding or that it is an anachronism that should go the way of the Warsaw Pact. Most observers, however, believe that the Alliance has been adapting itself—some would say admirably—for a new era, steadily transforming its political focus, security agenda, and military structures. In NATO's forty-five year history, there have been a dozen summits involving heads of state and government; half of these have occurred in the last seven years, launching major initiatives that demonstrate NATO's desire to stay relevant in a rapidly evolving security environment.

NATO has developed a substantial outreach program through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, in which NATO's 16 members have engaged in cooperation with more than 20 states in Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. While some people have

Key Post Cold War NATO Decisions

Brussels Summit, May 1990

Adoption of a Comprehensive Concept for Arms Control and Disarmament that established an interrelationship between arms control and defense. The new concept addressed all types of [illegible] weapons, and changed the focus from simply achieving reductions to seeking true enhancements to regional security and stability.

London Summit, July 1990

Agreement to review NATO strategic concept of forward defense and flexible response; re-designate nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort; and invite former Warsaw Pact adversaries to establish diplomatic relations at NATO.

Copenhagen Ministerial Meeting, June 1991

Agreement on NATO's core security functions in a new Europe: to provide one of the indispensable foundations for European security; serve as a trans-Atlantic forum on common vital interests; deter and defend against any threat; and, preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

Rome Summit, November 1991

Approval of new Alliance Strategic Concept characterized by dialogue, cooperation and collective defense. The new Concept declared a shift to a more politically active Alliance, spelled out roles for NATO's military in peace and crisis, and called for much smaller, more flexible active force structures. Further, the Alliance created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to deepen the ties to Eastern states begun by the London initiatives for diplomatic relations.

Oslo Ministerial Meeting, June 1992

NATO agreed to support CSCE peacekeeping activities on a case-by-case basis.

Brussels Ministerial Meeting, December 1992

NATO agreed to support UN peacekeeping operations, particularly in the former Yugoslavia.

Brussels Summit, January 1994

NATO materially expanded its ties to the rest of Europe through the Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative; took steps to create a more responsive military structure with approval of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept; strongly supported the concept of a European Security and Defense Identity by offering to make CJTFs and other assets available to the WEU; and, gave approval to begin a major NATO effort to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

advocated immediate NATO membership for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, it became apparent at the NATO summit in January 1994 that the NATO allies were not ready immediately to accept new members into NATO, that further work was needed to develop the NATO relationship with Russia, and that the ground had not been laid for NATO expansion with the U.S. Senate and European parliaments. An evolutionary, step-by-step process leading to the point where NATO expansion seems only natural may stand the best chance of success.

The expectations raised in 1991 by the rhetoric of the Rome NATO summit declaration and the new Alliance Strategic Concept, calling for NATO to promote stability throughout the trans-Atlantic region, have vet to be fulfilled. NATO, however, now supports the initiative to establish a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), which is to strengthen the Alliance's European pillar while reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link and enable European allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defense. NATO has also launched an initiative to develop a concept for Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). More will be said later about each of these. The Alliance has also moved from a near-dogmatic belief that it must never tread outside of NATO territory, to the conviction that to remain relevant it must be prepared to operate out-of-area. The experience in the former Yugoslavia, however, may dampen allies' enthusiasm for out-of-area operations.

The Alliance's 1991 new Strategic Concept and related declarations lay down a whole new set of missions. NATO's military was told to expand its horizons to include roles in peacetime and in crisis management, as well as to retain the ability to go to war. In 1992, NATO declared itself prepared to support peacekeeping under the auspices of the CSCE and the United Nations. By 1994, NATO was heavily involved in peace operations in the former Yugoslavia and had drafted a new doctrine for peace operations that is to provide the foundation for future training, exercises, and planning.

NATO's intervention in the former Yugoslavia has been criticized by some as too little and too late, and serious policy differences have emerged among allies. Nonetheless, NATO has had limited success and, more importantly, has gained valuable operational experience in crisis response. NATO has been on extended duty in the Adriatic blockade Operation SHARP GUARD and in Operation DENY FLIGHT over Bosnia. The Alliance's military operations in the former Yugoslavia mark the first time NATO has engaged in combat operations since its founding in 1949. NATO forces were largely responsible for the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo in February 1994. While developments in late fall 1994 make it more problematic, were a peace agreement to be reached, NATO's military leaders have developed contingency plans for Operation DISCIPLINE GUARD which would deploy a peacekeeping force to Bosnia.

As NATO's military missions have changed, forces and command structure have been reduced, reflecting the decreased threat of general war. NATO itself has few assigned forces, and the militaries of nearly all its member states are shrinking. This indicates a strategy of anticipating and managing crises and a growing reliance on reserve forces. NATO's integrated military structure has reduced both the number and size of its commands, consolidating areas of responsibility and streamlining command links.

The focus on political tasks and, for the military, the shift to peace operations and crisis intervention and smaller, more flexible forces are intended to improve NATO's capability for effective crisis management and prevention of war. There is, nevertheless, growing concern that the continued reductions in defense budgets of the allies may forestall the technological modernization necessary to give these smaller forces the needed flexibility and mobility Such a development would have serious repercussions for the path NATO has committed to follow.

Finally NATO is making a concerted drive to address emerging tensions and crises More they erupt into military conflict. Evidence of this broader political and economic focus can be found in the NACC workplans. The NACC has set out an ambitious agenda for activities related to defense conversion, privatization, environmental reclamation, economics, and other issues. NACC meetings have issued position statements on conflicts and situations far removed from NATO itself, such as the armed confrontation along the Tajik-Afghan border and the nuclear crisis in North Korea. The respective roles of NACC and PFP are still evolving.

Defense Budgets Are Declining in Most NATO Countries

In real terms, defense budgets in the U.S. and most other NATO member states peaked in the latter half of the 1980's and have been in stead! decline since. The U.S. defense budget began its decline early (in 1986) and since 1990 has fallen faster (13 percent versus 10 percent) than the aggregate budgets of other NATO countries. Defense budgets of NATO member states

A Growing Network of Institutions

LEGEND

■ = *member*
● = *associate member*
▶ = *associate partner*
◆ = *observer*

		United States	Canada	Belgium	France	Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	United Kingdom	Greece	Denmark	Iceland	Norway	Turkey
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1973)	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991)	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
PFP	Partnership for Peace (1994)[a]	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949)	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
EU	European Union, formerly the European Community (1957)			■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■			
WEU	Western European Union (1954)			■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	6	◆	●	●	●
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States (1991)																

[a] NATO members and states that signed a PFP Framework Agreement but not necessarily an Individual Partnership Program.

[1] Includes Cyprus, the Holy See, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, and San Marino.

[2] "Yugoslavia" has been suspended.

[3] Austria and Sweden are not members but, together with Finland (which has observer status), participate in the NACC Ad Hoc

have followed measured, deliberate reductions, and many expect reductions to continue for several more years, with some exceptions. While the aggregate of the allies' real spending on defense is in decline, some countries-Turkey, Norway and Luxembourg-for differing reasons have actually increased their defense budgets in recent years, and some states may strive to maintain current real levels of defense spending.

The reasons for declining budgets are not surprising: the lack of a threat of attack by hostile forces; competing domestic demands long subordinated to Cold War defense priorities; the economic recession; and a perceived urgency to invest in restructuring and "re-invention" of governments and industries in preparation for greater economic competition in the future. Of these reasons, the first-the absence of a visible threat-is the basic rationale that allows consideration of all the rest.

At the same time, reductions are unlikely to gain greater momentum due to concerns over defense industry job losses, the time necessary to effect defense conversion to commercial enterprise, the recent ebbing of recessions (especially in the U.S.), and the growing realization that there are greater and more costly demands for military power in the post-Cold War era than initially perceived. For the U.S., the many post-Cold War contingencies, both outside and inside the NATO region, and the costs of all-volunteer forces have imposed great strains on U.S. military manpower and equipment.

The trend in declining budgets in NATO is most evident in the area of active force reductions. Generally, the forces of NATO nations have declined by 15 percent since 1990, although in some force indicators (e.g., maneuver brigades, fighter aircraft, and combatant ships) those states with the most modern forces have taken reductions of up to 30 percent (Germany) and 40 percent (U.K. and U.S.). Percentage reductions in major force indicators of NATO forces are projected through 1998 on the accompanying chart.

A less visible yet telling effect of reduced budgets and smaller forces is the reduction in opportunities for NATO forces to train together. Exercises now are fewer and smaller and often rely on simulation technology.



Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.
[4] Signed "associate agreement."
[5] Signed "partnership and cooperation agreement."
[6] Membership pending ratification.

(11/94)

Decline in Major Force Indicators, 1990-98
(percent)



SOURCE: Report to U.S. Congress. Secretary of Defense. April 1994.

NOTE: It is important to note that this chart, in focusing on percentage changes, does not reflect the comparative size of U.S. and non-U.S. NATO forces nor their quality, which is affected by such things as length of service and training.

The arsenal of NATO integrated forces and infrastructure. which has been ready for Europe's defense and often tapped for contingencies from the Middle East to Africa to the Falkland Islands, is dwindling significantly, and NATO's superior multinational experience from decades of collective training is waning even more quickly.

Western Europe Is Deepening and Broadening Its Integration

The transformation of the European Community into the EU is the most recent achievement of a long, often tedious, and yet persistent integrative process that has been underway since shortly after World War II. Before 1991, integration in Europe was confined to trade and related economic policies. With the creation of a single market-which was officially inaugurated on January 1, 1993, although not all aspects have yet been fully implemented-economic integration reached a new plateau and now appears to be all but irreversible, though the tendency to suffer occasional setbacks can be expected to continue.

In the early 1990s, the integrative process spread to the social, political, security, and defense arenas. With the signing of the Treaty on European tinion-the Maastricht Treaty-in December 1991, integration was broadened to include both Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs and development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, with provision for an eventual defense component. A Common Defense Policy is now envisaged. How deep such integration will go and how quickly it will progress are matters for speculation. While few expect Europe to stop at the single market stage, progress is likely to be cautious and evolutionary, with periods of apparent backsliding, as EU members struggle to compromise on the way forward. The unexpected delays in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-1993 and the weeks of public debate over a new successor EU Commission President in spring 1994 are examples of the difficulties faced in integration. The most important challenges for the EU in the next several years will be addressed at the Intergovernmental Conference set for 1996.

As the, EU pursues deeper internal integration, it is also broadening its geographic reach. The 12 members in 1994 will become 15 in 1995, with the addition of Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Six countries from Central and Eastern Europe **have** signed association agreements and could start entering the Union by the beginning of the next century How effectively the EU could coordinate-its activities with in excess of twenty members is a major question, but the Union does seem committed to further expansion.

The accession to the EU of Austria, Finland, and Sweden will increase the economic power of the EU. On the other hand. it will also take some adjusting to accommodate the three new "neutral" states; with current member Ireland, more than a quarter of EU membership will comprise **states** formerly described as "neutral." The EU will also share a new long border with Russia in Scandinavia. If East European states are eventually admitted, this will have even greater implications in the context of addressing issues beyond those traditionally discussed by NATO allies.

Parallel to integration in the EU, the WEU, since 1987, has gradually expanded its activities, both operationally (participating in the Persian Gulf War and operations in the former Yugoslavia) and politically (moving its headquarters to Brussels and absorbing the functions of the defense-oriented Eurogroup and the armaments cooperation-oriented Independent European Program Group). The WEU has also expanded its membership from the seven states that founded it in 1954 to nine members (with a tenth-Greece-awaiting membership ratification), two observers, three associate members, and nine associate partners. At half the WEU's meetings, when all are invited to attend, there are 24 states represented.

The WEU is now the most visible embodiment of the ESDI and the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance. Most observers expect ever-closer WEU ties with both the EU and NATO.

The trend in U.S.-EU relations is toward increased ties and greater collaboration on global issues. Potentially, the EU has the collective strength to be Washington's most significant partner, and the U.S. and

NATO and Partnership for Peace



EU already work together on many security issues. In 1990, the U.S. and the EU agreed to establish high level bilateral contacts, and there are indications that both sides would like to see cooperation grow after the 1996 EU Intergovernmental Conference.

Central and East Europeans Are Struggling for Internal Reform While Seeking Integration With the West

Events in Central and Eastern Europe have been in fast-forward over the past five years. Having experienced three distinct periods since the revolutions of 1989-90, the region is now poised for another shift.

Initial Euphoria: In 1989–90, Central and Eastern Europeans experienced euphoria, stemming from their successful revolutions and optimism about establishing democracies and market economies and joining NATO and the EC. This period saw German unification and NATO's extension of a "hand of friendship" to the East.

Return to More Cautious Optimism: In 1991 came the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the failed coup in the Soviet Union, and a NATO Summit which resulted in the new NATO Strategic Concept, the creation of the NACC to engage the East, and the initiation of military ties with the East. Central and Eastern Europe's initial euphoria turned to more cautious optimism.

Increasing Skepticism: By 1992 and 1993, the Soviet Union had disintegrated, and Boris Yeltsin initially acquiesced in but subsequently opposed the bids of several nations in Central and Eastern Europe to join NATO. NATO and EU hesitancy to embrace Central and Eastern Europe contributed to pessimism about the prospects for the extension of Western security institutions and economic support to the East, while Russia's domestic turmoil and entanglements in the "near abroad" led to increased skepticism about Russia's democratic development. Greater realism about the time frame for a successful economic transformation began to set in. Voters in Lithuania and Poland in 1993—and in Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria in 1994—expressed their frustration at the ballot box, returning ex-communists to power.

Testing NATO: The fourth period, beginning in 1994, has seen Central and East Europeans reluctantly resigned to a slower process of integration than they wish but willing to participate in cooperative arrangements, testing Western intentions. NATO's Summit in Brussels in January adopted the PFP program, suggesting possible eventual membership in NATO through PFP participation and the possible inclusion of forces of PFP partners in the newly conceived Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) presumably for out of area contingencies. Central and East Europeans, increasingly skeptical about Western intentions, are pressing NATO to clarify

Ethnic Homogeneity of Eastern European Nations

Titular Nationality	Largest Minority	Other Nationalities
Poland	(Germans)	
Hungary	(Germans)	
Czech Republic	(Slovaks)	
Slovenia	(Croats)	
Albania	(Greeks)	
Romania	(Hungarians)	
Slovakia	(Hungarians)	
Bulgaria	(Turks)	
Serbia		
Lithuania	(Russians)	
Croatia	(Serbs)	
FYR Macedonia	(Albanians)	
Estonia	(Russians)	
Latvia	(Russians)	
Bosnia	(Serbs)	

SOURCE CIA

NOTE After the titular nationality group, the group in parenthesis is the largest minority group

vhether participation in the alliance's new PFP program is truly considered a step toward NATO membership.

If NATO (and the EU) appear to defer indefinitely membership for new entrants from the East, Central and East Europeans could become disillusioned and seek some alternative security arrangements, although working out such arrangements would not be easy. Poland, for example, has been establishing ties with Germany and France, which could provide the basis for a trilateral security group. Poland has also been developing ties with Ukraine; if Ukraine remains independent, a Polish-Ukrainian relationship could provide security assurances in the future vis-a-vis larger neighbors. Finally, a strong pan-Slavic pull within the Polish military could provide the basis for some accommodation with Russia, depending on what happens there.

Ethnic Tensions Are Widespread But Largely Under Control Except in the Former Yugoslavia

Europe has a mixture of ethnic situations, including states that are nearly ethnically homogenous and states with a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity. Many European states also have increasing numbers of immigrants, some coming from former colonies but many increasingly coming from Southern and Eastern Europe seeking jobs and relief from ethnically-based conflict.

Ethnic tensions are, in general, being managed peacefully in Western Europe. The German government has been able to reduce domestic violence against immigrants and foreigners. In Northern Ireland, the ceasefires announced in late August by the Irish Republican Army and in October by armed Protestant militants are promising, although it remains to be seen whether this signals the beginning of the end of 25 years of sectarian violence there.

CSCE has been helpful in developing conflict-prevention mechanisms focused on diplomatic measures to keep potential conflicts from erupting into violence. The fruits of these efforts can be seen in the Baltics, in the mitigation of problems between Slovakia and Hungary and in Macedonia. The French initiative on stability talks also seeks to use diplomacy to prevent conflicts between states.

In Central and Eastern Europe, three types of ethnic minorities can be distinguished:

- National minorities in border regions where boundary lines separate elements of a group from the main body of their ethnic nation (such as Hungarians in Vojvodina. Transylvania, and Slovakia);
- National minorities separated by great distances from their home country (such as German minorities in Romania);
- Exceedingly mixed ethnic populations in certain regions (such as the former Yugoslavia)

These three types of situations give rise to different problems and conflict resolution approaches. The problem of frontier minorities can be addressed by special agreements between neighboring states or negotiated revisions to existing frontiers, although the latter are politically difficult Tensions arising from the presence of isolated minorities can be reduced by providing adequate legal protection for minority rights. In mixed regions, guarantees of minority rights from the government in sontrol of the region are also crucial, as is promoting peaceful coexistence among the groups that consider the region their home.

Although several areas of ethnic tension remain in Central and Eastern Europe, violence has generally been avoided, with the glaring exception of the former Yugoslavia. In most areas, the interests of ethnic minorities have been accommodated by peaceful means.

Poland exemplifies a twentieth-century Central European trend toward ethnic homogenization within national borders. When Poland achieved independence in 1918, Poles comprised only 60 percent of the population. By 1990, as a result of border adjustments and mass migrations, they comprised nearly 98 percent. A good-neighbor treaty with Germany has addressed the concerns of the 1.3 percent German minority.

The January 1993 division of Czechoslovakia into a generally ethnically homogenous Czech Republic and a somewhat less homogenous Slovakia took place on paceful, if perhaps not entirely amicable, terms. However, ethnic tensions could

Map of Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Former Yugoslavia, Pre-conflict

SOURCE: CIA

evolve concerning the Hungarian and Czech minorities in Slovakia.

Hungary is also nearly ethnically homogenous. Tensions arise, however, over the status of Hungarian minorities in neighboring states-notably in Romania (2.3 million Hungarians), Slovakia (600,000 ethnic Hungarians), and the former Yugoslavia (400,000 ethnic Hungarians primarily in the Vojvodina autonomous republic of Serbia). Hungary and Romania have not yet signed a good neighbor treaty, and Hungarian relations with Slovakia and Serbia have not always been cordial.

Romania is nearly 90 percent ethnic Romanian but also has a relatively large ethnic Hungarian population (8.9 percent). Issues involving Hungarians in the Transylvania area have been the most contentious.

Bulgaria has potential ethnic problems with the 8.5 percent of its population who are ethnic Turks, as well as with several smaller minorities. Official discrimination against Turks was terminated under a new Bulgarian government, and this has contributed to warming of Turkish-Bulgarian relations. However, Bulgaria risks being drawn into conflict in the ex-Yugoslavia over ethnic issues, particularly if hostilities extend to Macedonia.

Sizable ethnic Albanian populations exist in states neighboring Albania, including Serbia and Montenegro (where 14 percent of the population is ethnic Albanian, concentrated in the Kosovo region), and Macedonia (which is 21 percent ethnic Albanian).

Finally, the treatment of large ethnic Russian minorities in the three Baltic states was a major issue in negotiations on Russian troop withdrawals from that region, especially in Latvia and Estonia.

Europe's Southern Region Faces Increasing Instability

Instability in and near Europe's southern region is an increasing security concern. Of immediate and primary concern is the conflict in Bosnia and the danger that it will expand. Beyond this, instability in North Africa and terrorism from the Middle East pose a number of risks to Europe. Tensions between Greece and Turkey have also increased significantly.

Former Yugoslavia. The bloody three-year conflict and ethnic hatred among and within the successor states to Tito's Yugoslavia present a major challenge to post-Cold War Europe. Not since World War II has Europe experienced the types of horrors seen in the former Yugoslavia-ethnic cleansing, indiscriminate shelling of civilian centers, concentration camps, organized rape as an instrument of intimidation, and mass movements of refugees. Beyond what has already been experienced, there is the potential that the conflict could expand across borders.

The institutions created by the international community during the Cold War to manage crises have failed to end the violence in the former Yugoslavia, although they have helped to moderate it. The inability of the EU and its Atlantic and Eurasian partners to stop the violence casts a shadow over the concept of a new European security order.

North Africa and the Near East. The risk of civil war in Algeria, instability elsewhere in North Africa, and the security risks posed by the irresponsible Libyan regime have serious implications for security in Southern Europe. To the east, the Middle East peace process has lessened the threat of full-scale war in the Levant but has increased the threat of terrorist reactions by opponents of the peace process. The situation in Iraq remains a major concern to neighboring Turkey and others.

This instability poses risks in the Mediterranean basin and to Southern Europe itself. The safety of Americans, Europeans, and others in the North African states is an increasing concern, as is the waxing potential for terrorism emanating from this part of the world. Many countries in Southern Europe rely on natural gas and oil from North Africa and would be seriously affected by any disruption. Major conflict or civil war in North Africa could also result in a massive flow of refugees to Southern Europe; there are already hundreds of thousands of North African immigrants in Southern Europe, and some estimate that a major conflict in North Africa could lead to 500,000 to 1,000,000 refugees.

Greece and Turkey. Tensions between Greece and Turkey have increased lately; if not moderated, these could pose significant problems for cooperation in NATO. Activity by each nation's air and naval elements in the Aegean are cause for concern, and the situation in Cyprus continues to be a source of tension. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia, with the potential for Turkish support for Muslim elements in Bosnia (in tension with Greek ties to Serbia), has made it increasingly difficult to moderate the tensions between Greece and Turkey. Efforts by NATO allies and others to persuade Greece to drop its blockade of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have been unsuccessful to date.

Turkey also faces instability in neighboring Iraq under Saddam Hussein, as well as from terrorists among its own sizeable Kurdish minority.

U.S. Security Interests

Europe is of vital importance to the U.S. and has been a central focus of American defense efforts. Because of the strategic importance of Europe and its resources and the close ties between America and Europe, the U.S. three times in this century-in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War-has sent American military forces to Europe to help prevent aggressive powers from dominating Europe by force.

Europe includes many of the most politically, economically, and militarily advanced countries in the world, countries fully engaged and influential at the highest levels in international politics, trade and commerce, assistance programs, and defense and security collaboration. European states outnumber any other region of the world in the UN Security Council and the two institutions of the most advanced economic states-the G-7 economic summit structure and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The U.S. has strong political, economic, social, and cultural ties to Europe. In many areas of economic activity, Europe is of greater importance to the U.S. than any other region of the world; trade is a notable exception, as U.S. trade with Asia now exceeds U.S. trade with Europe.

The majority of Americans claim European ancestry or ethnic origin. In the 1990 U.S. Census when 249 million people were counted, 164 million indicated specific foreign ancestries or ethnic origins; 143 million of these-87 percent of those indicating specific foreign ancestries and 57 percent of the total population-indicated European ancestries. Moreover, historical and political-philosophical ties between the U.S. and Europe are obvious, deep, and too numerous to mention.

Many European states have modern, deployable militaries capable of contributing to collective security in NATO and outside the NATO area. In the Persian Gulf War, for example, European NATO allies and friends in Europe contributed significantly to coalition efforts. Many countries in Europe provided rights for coalition partners to *overfly* their territory en route to and from Southwest Asia.

U.S. Population Claiming Sole or Primary European Ancestry or Ethnic Origin
(millions/percent)

	millions	percent
German	45.6	16.5
Irish	2.7	9.0
English	2.7	9.0
Italian	11.3	4.5
Polish	6.5	2.6
French	6.2	2.5
Scot-Irish	4.3	1.7
Scottish	3.3	1.3
Dutch	3.5	1.4
Swedish	2.9	1.2
Norwegian	2.5	1.0
Welsh	1.0	0.4
Other West European	5.1	2.1
3 Baltic state groups	0.6	0.2
Former Yugoslavia	0.8	0.3
Other East Europeans	3.5	1.4
Totals	142.6	57.3

SOURCE: US Census, 1990

At least six key U.S. security interests can be identified for the Europe and NATO area:

Ensuring a Free, Secure, Peaceful, and Cooperative Europe

The U.S. has a vital interest in a free, secure, peaceful, and cooperative Europe and North Atlantic area. Ancillary to this is a Europe that is democratic and prosperous, open to U.S.-European trade and investment opportunities, and supportive of political, economic, and military cooperation with the U.S. in Europe and other important parts of the world. The U.S. wants a Europe that abides by international law and humanitarian principles endorsed by the UN and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The U.S. seeks an expanded zone of peace and security throughout Europe. The President has cited as goals "a free and undivided Europe" and "an integrated democratic Europe cooperating with the United States to keep the peace and promote prosperity."

Trends in trans-Atlantic cooperation, integration in Western Europe, and outreach to the East are favorable to these interests, while the continuation and possible expansion of conflict in the Balkans and growing instability to the east and south are **not.**

Maintaining Mutual Security Commitments and a Strong, Adaptive NATO

Commitments to the security of Europe and the North Atlantic area are enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty, in which the U.S. and its NATO allies have agreed that an attack against one would be considered an attack against all, and that each ally would take whatever action it deemed necessary, including the use of force, to restore and maintain security. The U.S. has a strong interest in maintaining support among signatory counties for the security commitments reflected in the NATO treaty, as well as in other security instruments.

The continued U.S. military presence in Europe reflects Washington's commitment. At the end of Fiscal Year 1993, of 308,000 U.S. military personnel deployed in foreign areas, nearly half-149,000-were stationed in Germany or elsewhere in Europe. President Clinton-has made a commitment to maintain approximately 100,000 U.S. military personnel in Europe for as long as the European allies want them there. (There are additionally some 17,000 personnel afloat in the Europe area.)

Critical to these wider interests is maintaining the viability and vitality of NATO as an institution which is able, as necessary to deter and defend against any attacks on its members. NATO has been a key element in maintaining general peace in Europe for the last 45 years, unprecedented in modem times. A strong NATO can also play a critical role in promoting peace and security beyond NATO's borders. Invaluable for this are NATO's integrated command structure, its forces which

[illegible] importance of Europe for the U.S. [illegible] Europe has more of the Gross World Product than any other region — in 1992, 35% at market exchange rates and 27% at purchasing power parity exchange rates [illegible]

Europe was the U.S.' second-largest customer in 1993, taking 31% of U.S. exports of goods and services exports (exceeded only by Asia with 33%).

Europe was the U.S.' second-largest supplier in 1993, providing 29% of U.S. imports of goods and services, (exceeded only by Asia with 41%).

Europe provides the U.S. with relatively balanced trade, with a $7 billion U.S. merchandise trade deficit in 1993 (compared to $115 billion for Asia).

About 50% of U.S. direct investment abroad is in Europe, and over 60% of foreign direct investment in the U.S. is from Europe.

Nearly 3 million Americans are employed in the U.S. by European-owned firms, and 1.5 million American workers are supported by U.S. exports to Europe.

cooperate in areas of intelligence and warning, command and control, doctrine, equipment and joint training, and the base structure in Europe and the Atlantic.

The general trend in maintaining the Alliance's viability and vitality is favorable to U.S. interests, although differences among allies on issues such as policy regarding former Yugoslavia can sometimes challenge Alliance cohesion. Programs to reach out to the East, promote European integration and ESDI, develop new security concepts such as CJTF, engage carefully and effectively within policy limitations in the Balkans, and pursue arms control and counter-proliferation initiatives can help to maintain a strong NATO, ii managed properly. An unfavorable trend is the increased tension between Greece and Turkey, which diminishes the cohesion and strength of the Alliance in its strategically important southeast corner. Alliance Interests would be served by efforts to ameliorate relations between these two allies and promote their sense of security.

Encouraging European Integration, Consistent with Open Relations with the U.S. and a Strong NATO

The U.S. has long supported European economic and political integration. With the January 1994 NATO Summit, the U.S. convinced the European allies that it fully and firmly supported both an ESDI that could be "separable but not separate" from NATO and the role of the WEU as embodying the European pillar of NATO. Concerned that ii not managed correctly. European integration could freeze out the U.S. and Canada and undercut NATO, the U.S. encourages European integration through a transparent process that permits continued close relations and collaboration between Europe and the U.S. and Canada. The U.S. supports establishment of an ESDI that is consistent with maintaining a strong NATO.

Close cooperation on security issues between NATO and the WEU, including transparency of planning and activity and reciprocal access to information on such issues as development of concepts for CJTF, will be critical.

Maintaining Access to Military Facilities in Europe and the North Atlantic

About 70 percent of all the military sites used by U.S. forces in foreign territories are located in Europe and the North Atlantic. These facilities have played important roles supporting U.S. forces in Europe and operations outside Europe. For example, in the Persian Gulf War, 16 states in Europe provided en route staging support at 90 airfields as the buildup accelerated. More than 95 percent of flights to Southwest Asia were staged through Europe, consisting of about 2,200 tactical and 15,402 strategic airlift sorties. Additionally, tanker aircraft operated from ten airbases in seven European countries. Coalition forces operating from Turkey used NATO-developed bases there; bases in the U.K. and elsewhere supported B-52 bomber operations. More recently, bases and facilities in Europe have played indispensable roles

U.S. Military Personnel in Europe (Excluding Afloat), 1988-98
(thousands--end fiscal year)



As of June 94
Source. Sec Del Annual Report Jan 94 and DoD/WHS

in U.S. humanitarian and other peace operations in areas of the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, Africa, and even the former Soviet Union.

As the U.S. reduces its forces in Europe, it has been reducing the number of facilities used there.

Promoting Successful Reform and Increased Security for Central and Eastern Europe

It is in the U.S. interest to promote within Central and Eastern Europe democracy, market-based economies, and effective, defensively-oriented militaries responsible to duly-elected civilian governments. Democracies and defensively-oriented militaries tend not to fight each other, and market economies offer the best chance for prosperous and peaceful societies.

It is also in the U.S. interest to encourage countries of Central and Eastern Europe to pursue, as a way of improving security, increased bilateral and multilateral ties-a web of contacts extending to the U.S., other NATO members, and regional neighbors and institutions.

On balance, the trends are favorable, with the exception of developments in former Yugoslavia.

Helping to Prevent, Contain, and Resolve Ethnic Conflicts

The U.S. has an interest in helping to prevent, contain, and resolve conflicts in Europe, with particular emphasis now on ethnic quarrels which are most prevalent. Interests can best be served by early diplomatic efforts to defuse tensions before they erupt into violence; once lives are lost, it is far more difficult and costly to contain or stop a conflict.

Trends are generally favorable in both Western and Eastern Europe, with the notable exception of Bosnia.

Key U.S. Security Policy Issues

Developing NATO's Partnership For Peace Program

NATO began its outreach program to the East in July 1990 with a declaration issued at the NATO Summit in London, followed by the establishment of the NACC at the November 1991 Summit in Rome. While the NACC had laudable goals of establishing security contacts and providing technical assistance to Eastern states, its limitations immediately became apparent. The immense diversity among NACC partners (say, between Poland and Uzbekistan) led to calls for a more differentiated approach and to increasing demands for membership in NATO by the westernmost NACC members. At the same time, disagreements among the allies over how far NACC should go in satisfying operational requirements of the partner states (as opposed to serving mainly as a consultative body) further limited the scope of NACC activities.

U.S. Forward Based Forces Available in Europe
Approximately 100,000
Shore Based Forces

USAREUR
Credible Corps
2 Heavy Div W/2 Bdes each
Combat Support/Service Support

USAFE
2.33 Fighter Wing Equivalent
Composite Wings
Theater Airlift, Tankers

USNAVEUR & MARFOREUR
Sixth Fleet in Mediterranean
Carrier Battle Group
Amphibious Ready Group

SOCEUR
Joint Special Operations Task Forces
Land, Air, Naval Elements

SUPPORT AND REINFORCEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE

Source: U.S. EUCOM

NATO's most recent response came in January 1994 when NATO Summit leaders in Brussels adopted the PFP program, the goals of which are to: (1) enhance operational cooperation between NATO and the partner states; (2) develop defense transparency among partner states; (3) advance the development of democratic means of control over the military in the newly emerging democracies; and (4) provide a vehicle to help the partners realize that (unlike NACC, where NATO foots the bill) participation in NATO activities has obligations as well as benefits.

Since January, more than 20 states have become PFP partners, including the Central and East European states, Sweden, Finland, Slovenia, Russia, Ukraine, and several other ex-Soviet Eurasian states. Offices have been constructed at both NATO Headquarters in Brussels and at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium, to accommodate representatives of these states. Exercises involving forces of NATO members and new PFP partners have been planned, and some have already been conducted.

Implementation of PFP, if not handled carefully, could, to one degree or another, have some unwanted, unintended consequences.

Sub-Regional Cooperation. Rather than encouraging forms of sub-regional cooperation and stability-such as that established by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (the so-called "Visegrad" states)--the PFP program could have an unintended, unfortunate effect of transforming the region's potential security partners into competitors, diverting attention from cooperation with neighbors and toward a race to see which nations are most willing and able to meet the West's standards and expectations.

NATO could minimize the potential negative consequences of its bilateral ("16 to 1") agreements with each PFP partner by encouraging partners to cooperate directly with their neighbors, ensuring that each agreement remains transparent to neighbors, and supporting Visegrad, Balkan, and Baltic common security activities.

Democratic Reformers. By deferring the NATO membership question in developing PFP, NATO leaders appear partly to have responded to a perceived need to placate Russia and support Yeltsin and reformers in that country NATO must work now to ensure that PFP also supports democratic reformers in Central and Eastern Europe and does not have the unintended effect of undermining their political bases of support, thereby undermining the credibility of the U.S. and NATO in Central and Eastern Europe.

Russians and Central and East Europeans have traditionally seen security as a zero-sum game where one side wins and the other loses. To the extent that Central and East Europeans perceive the PFP as the West succumbing to Russian pressure in terms of PFP being used as a stalling device against NATO membership, the West will lose credibility and influence.

If the PFP does not soon generate highly visible programs that bolster support for the region's reform-oriented leaders, then the prestige, influence, and support that NATO presently enjoys may be lost on future Central and East European leaders and publics. For such projects to be successful and visible, financial resources will be necessary. President Clinton recognized this when he announced on a trip to Poland in July 1994 that he would request $100 million for Fiscal Year 1996 to support PFP programs, of which $25 million would go to Poland and $10 millon to the Baltic states. The challenge for the U.S. is to energize other NATO allies and partners to commit resources to PFP programs, and to work with those allies to initiate cooperative programs with PFP partners, as Great Britain and Denmark have done with the Baltic states.

Civil-Military Relations. Military rather than political forms of cooperation have been emphasized in PFP. As a result, PFP could have a number of unwanted and unintended consequences. First, states with stronger military traditions and institutions could have an advantage. Second, pushing the military to the forefront in the East-West partnership could work against efforts in Central and East European states to establish control over their militaries. Emphasizing the political dimension of

PFP and working to ensure a civilian Ministry of Defense component would moderate this potential negative effect.

Security Perceptions-ideals and Reality. By intentionally leaving vague any detailed criteria and timeframe for NATO admission in order not to exclude anyone, PFP suggests an undifferentiated Europe, which does not have much credibility in Central and Eastern Europe. Many Central and East Europeans believe that democratic reform has already failed in most of the former Soviet Union, and that some form of authoritarian rule there is likely for the foreseeable future. They also fear that Russia is moving toward an imperial foreign policy that threatens their security and their democratic governments.

PFP, if provided adequate resources and implemented properly, may reinvigorate NATO and herald a new European security architecture. If it is not provided adequate resources and is implemented carelessly, however, PFP could undermine European security and widen the gulf that separates East from West.

Managing the NATO Expansion Issue

Though NATO has resisted the Central and East European nations' desire for immediate membership in the Alliance, the PEP proposal has expressed NATO's long-term commitment to expand. Active participation in PFP is seen as a necessary-although not sufficient-condition for eventual NATO membership. NATO has left vague the time frame for possible expansion and has not provided any detailed criteria for determining qualification for membership beyond the NATO Treaty's Article 10 reference to a state being in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the North Atlantic area.

As the Alliance moves forward with its study on implications of NATO expansion and what it takes for a state to join NATO, and as it eventually makes decisions on NATO expansion, it will face several key questions, such as: why NATO expansion is necessary when few perceive any immediate military threat to the East; whether NATO expansion will be counterproductive in terms of drawing new dividing lines in Europe and isolating states left out; whether expansion will cause adverse reactions against NATO and against reformers in those states not included; and, what demands expanding NATO defense commitments will place on Western forces and defense budgets, which are now being reduced.

NATO will want to proceed carefully, balancing the desires of Central and East European states to be fully reintegrated into Europe and the desire of NATO allies to project security eastward, with concerns about the seriousness of extending new security guarantees. NATO will also have to balance the view, that NATO expansion can help keep NATO vibrant and alive, with the view that NATO expansion will be a divisive issue in an Alliance of 16 members already seriously troubled over Bosnia and in need of clarifying a new trans-Atlantic (West-West) relationship. NATO will need also to balance its intent to control its own destiny and not be subject to a veto by outside states such as Russia, with its concern not to undercut reformers and promising developments in countries that are not invited immediately or even eventually to join NATO. Russian President Yeltsin has warned of a "cold peace," and much will depend here on the nature and strength of relationships that NATO and others in the West establish with Russia and other Eastern states.

To balance these interests, NATO is taking careful and measured steps to strengthen PFP. NATO is also moving to address what internal steps are required in NATO to eventually expand membership and to assess the implications of expanded membership. NATO will also help prospective members understand what NATO membership entails. Consultations will be required to determine how to frame the expansion debate in NATO publics and parliaments, how eventually to decide which interested states should be admitted to NATO and when, and how to advance NATO relationships not only with those states that may initially join NATO but also with other PEP partners not expected to join NATO at the outset or even eventually.

Developing Combined Joint Task Forces

The CJTF initiative, approved at the January 1994 NATO summit, is intended to provide NATO a powerful, new organizational concept for responding to crises by rapid deployment of forces. This initiative is designed to: (1) satisfy the requirements of the NATO Strategic Concept for more flexible and mobile forces; (2) provide a vehicle for NATO participation in crisis management and peace support operations; (3) facilitate operations with non-NATO nations such as the PFP partners; and (4) permit the use of NATO infrastructure and forces to support the evolution of ESDI.

While no official definition of a CJTF has been adopted, NATO Summit language suggests that the term refers to a multinational, multi-service task force consisting of NATO-and possibly non-NATO-forces capable of rapid deployment to conduct crisis management and peace operations of limited duration under the control of either the NATO military structure or the WEU. There is a presumption in NATO that CJTF operations would be beyond NATO's borders. NATO CJTFs are expected to be a hybrid capability that combines the best attributes of coalition and alliance forces: rapid flexible crisis response and a trained, ready, multinational, multi-service force backed by an in-place infrastructure.

The WEU is also working on the CJTF concept and appears to envisage CJTFs that are smaller than what NATO has in mind but employed for similar missions. The WEU may want to address early on the possibility of working with NATO and seeking the use of NATO assets, such as the SHAPE Technical Center, for its own CJTF planning NATO insistence on fully developing the CJTF concept would help guard against NATO's slipping into the role of "Europe's military hardware store." Fully developing the concept would require resolving the thorny issue of command and political control over operations involving NATO forces in operations beyond the direct defense of NATO territory addressed in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty or under WEU. Systematic cooperation between NATO and the WEU in assembling and deploying CJTFs will be crucial to preserving the trans-Atlantic nature of the Alliance.

While the geographical areas in which NATO would deploy a CJTF is first of all a political question, military capabilities and limitations will also shape the decision. In contemplating the regions where NATO CJTFs might be deployed, it can be assumed that any mission will aim to protect Alliance interests. Likely interests include preservation of peace in the lands and waters immediately adjacent to NATO territory. Similar security interests might extend to distant areas where conflict could threaten European security and stability.

CJTF logistical support will be a major challenge for an alliance that has known only interior lines of communication, fixed bases, and a wealth of host nation support. NATO will have to adjust to rapid deployments, long and potentially unsecured lines of supply and communication, and minimal base facilities.

Another major challenge will be the creation of requisite communications and information systems. A deployed CJTF headquarters must have not only the traditional rearward, lateral, and forward military linkages, but also links with local governments, non-government organizations, and international agencies. For the time being, CJTFs will be heavily dependent on U.S. national assets for strategic and operational support in communications and intelligence.

Many questions surrounding the implementation of the CJTF concept are virgin territory for NATO military planners, among them the division of labor among Major NATO Commands (MNC), Major Subordinate Commands (MSC), and a CJTF during operations; the degree of interoperability of on-hand communication; the availability of intelligence; training and exercise requirements and their costs; and the need for a detailed assessment of movement requirements of a CJTF. NATO military staffs have begun to tackle these issues.

A special aspect of adapting a rapid development capability to a consensus-based alliance is the case in which a nation assigns personnel to a CJTF headquarters in peacetime but withholds consent to deploy them to a certain out-of-area crisis. This and other issues will require time to

Operations In and Around Former Yugoslavia

PROVIDE PROMISE:
An operation, controlled by a joint task force headquarters, that provides humanitarian assistance via military aircraft to people of Bosnia.

As of 20 September 1994, the U.S. had flown 3,746 sorties into Sarajevo where they delivered 46,482.5 metric tons of cargo (NATO allies had flown an additional 6,632 sorties); U.S. had also air-dropped to needy people in Bosnia 17,482.4 metric tons of food, 220.4 metric tons of medical supplies, as well as several thousand tons of non-food supplies.

SHARP GUARD:
NATO-led, U.N. Chapter VII peace-enforcement operation, with WEU participation, to enforce U.N. sanctions in the Adriatic Sea.

Operation has involved two U.S. surface ships and a submarine and 18 other allied surface ships from 10 countries. As of 15 September 1994, allied ships had challenged 39,051 ships, stopped or boarded 2,955, and diverted and inspected 778.

The U.S. ceased enforcing the arms embargo with respect to Bosnian government forces in mid-November.

DENY FLIGHT:
NATO-led, U.N. Chapter VII peace-enforcement operation using airpower to deny military flights to warring parties, protect U.N. Protection Forces on the ground in Bosnia, and enforce U.N. exclusion zones.

ABLE SENTRY:
U.N. Chapter VI peace operation deploying forces into Macedonia as a preventive deployment to help deter the spread of conflict.

More than 500 U.S. troops participate in this operation, along with Nordic troops.

resolve, among them the dearth of English-speaking commanders and staff officers in East European militaries.

Modifying NATO Structures and Activities

Although from 1991 to 1994 NATO made a number of bold decisions at its summit meetings, many of those decisions have vet to be implemented, and more changes will be required as the security situation evolves.

One area for possible further change is the NATO integrated military structure. Although NATO staffs have already been streamlined, many have called for another review to ensure that the command structure is fully oriented toward the new missions. A number of questions arise. Are all the current headquarters still necessary? Have they been reduced in active strength to the minimum necessary? Are they mobile, flexible, and kept up-to-date by essential investment in modem command-and-control and information equipment?

A second issue is preparing for the new missions of the Alliance, such as peace operations and humanitarian relief. Forces such as the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, the Standing Naval Forces, and the ACE Mobile Forces need to be trained and equipped to perform new tasks. Deploying and sustaining forces in out-of-area operations require significant planning and training.

Another area where further modification of NATO may be on the agenda is balancing burdens and responsibilities between the European and North American pillars of the Alliance. This requires the development of effective political and military ties with the WEU and the emergence of an ESDI that works in tandem with the U.S. and Canada. The task of crafting an ESDI that is a partner and not a competitor to NATO has fallen on the WEU. Transparency will be essential to building a trusting and productive relationship. It will not be enough for WEU and NATO representatives to hold occasional meetings; systematic coordination and information sharing is needed. The U.S. and Canada will be the only NATO allies not routinely seated at the WEU table to deliberate security issues. The WEU must take care that its positions are not presented in NATO fora as faits accompli. In turn, Washington must demonstrate trust in its European allies in order to allow the ESDI to develop.

Finally, NATO's increasing political role suggests a new approach that seeks to identify and resolve tensions that may affect the Alliance before they become crises, as well as to employ the Alliance's formidable infrastructure and resources to respond to unexpected contingencies. For example, NATO's Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, Civil Emergency Planning Directorate, and Committee on Challenges of Modem Society might be chartered to plan for responses to natural and man-made disasters. While initial planning could concentrate on the NATO and NACC regions, the Alliance could eventually tackle similar issues in regions beyond Europe. The associated requirement to move from reactive to proactive planning would not be easy for a consensus-based organization like NATO.

Bosnia Map of Control, Fall 1994

SOURCE CIA

Resolving or Containing Conflict in the Balkans

Precipitated by a lethal mixture of economic backwardness, historical animosity, exploitative leaders, and the suppression of human and minority rights, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia has become a case study of the local consequences of the breakdown of the Cold War international system and the pains associated with the emergence of another:

- It has highlighted the complexity of ethnonational conflicts and the interconnections among the political, economic, social, cultural, and security problems associated with the end of communism.
- It raises serious questions about the international ramifications of intra-state conflicts.
- It presents challenges to a number of well-established principles of international order, such as non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, the right of national self-determination, and the inviolability of borders.
- It underscores the limitations of existing European institutions to deal with the international fall-out of such conflicts and the need to develop institutions for effective and timely conflict prevention and management.
- It poses fundamental questions about the viability of a Euro-Atlantic community based upon a system of nation-states and dedicated to democratic values and open societies.

The efforts of European institutions failed to avert conflict in former Yugoslavia. Indeed, early European diplomatic recognition of secessionist states may have exacerbated the situation. The efforts of other countries and international organizations similarly failed.

Involvement of the U.S. and Others. The U.S. and other powers have been caught in a dilemma. They feel a moral obligation to assist victims and to help resolve the conflict. Yet they are well aware of the long history of bloody ethnic conflict in the Balkans and are leery of sending their military forces to the area, especially. when warring factions doggedly continue to fight and do not appear interested in a peace arrangement.

The U.S. and other states are thus cautious about their involvement. They have pursued four courses of action: humanitarian relief, containment of the conflict, diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict, and making plans to help maintain the peace with military forces once a peace agreement is reached. All of these measures aim to moderate the damage caused by the conflict while limiting exposure of U.S. or other foreign military forces to hostilities.

The U.S., under Operation PROVIDE PROMISE, and some allies have flown humanitarian assistance to people in Bosnia. The U.S., NATO allies, and members of the WEU under Operation SHARP GUARD have been willing to commit maritime forces in the Adriatic to maintain U.N. sanctions, and these and other states have taken other measures to restrict trade with certain of the parties. In late November 1994, in response to Congressional interest in lifting the embargo on arms for the Bosnian government forces and Croatia, the U.S. ceased enforcing the arms em-

bargo with regard to Bosnian government forces. Under Operation DENY FLIGHT, the U.S. and NATO allies have also been willing to commit air power to deny military flights to warring parties, to protect UN. Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) on the ground in Bosnia, and to enforce U.N. exclusion zones. Coordination with the U.N. of the employment of these forces has had some difficulties. The naval forces are now operating under the NATO integrated military command structure, as are allied forces involved in the airpowver operations, demonstrating the value and capability of the NATO command structure.

Some states have committed ground force units to UNPROFOR in Bosnia, ivhich have been used to help ensure humanitarian relief is delivered and to keep certain equipment from being used by warring parties. The US. has been leery of deploying American ground forces into the former Yugoslavia. Under Operation ABLE SENTRY, U.S. and Nordic ground forces have been deployed in Macedonia to help deter the spread of conflict. The U.S. has indicated it will deploy ground force units into Bosnia only when a peace agreement has been negotiated and put into place.

Following earlier unsuccessful international efforts to negotiate a settlement in the former Yugoslavia, an International Contact Group, consisting of representatives from France, Germany, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S., has launched a diplomatic initiative to reach a peace settlement in Bosnia. This initiative proposes that the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia be given control of 31 percent of Bosnia's territory, and the Bosnian Serbs-who now control about 70 percent of Bosnia-be given 49 percent. The Muslim-Croat Federation has reluctantly accepted this proposal, but the Bosnian Serbs have not.

Lifting the Arms Embargo for *Bosnia.* Some have called for lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government, so that Muslims and Croats might better resist the Bosnian Serbs, who have dominated the conflict with support from Belgrade. Those who advocate lifting the embargo cite the right of a state to defend itself.

Others point out that, while lifting the embargo on arms to Bosnian government forces could help these forces defend against attacks by Serbian forces, it could raise a number of problems. It is not clear whether the Bosnian Government would be better or worse off. The U.K. and France and perhaps others might pull their forces out of UNPROFOR, Serbia might feel less inclined to restrict its support for Bosnian Serbs, and the fighting could escalate and be prolonged. It could give the appearance of committing those who lift the embargo to supporting the Bosnian government, with all the implications that could have, including impact on efforts to negotiate a settlement, relations with allies and others such as Russia who now oppose lifting the arms embargo, and efforts in other areas of the world to provide unified international sanctions or embargoes.

A strategy has been considered that would set a future date for a general lifting of the embargo for Bosnian govrernment and Croat forces if Bosnian Serbs continue attacks and do not agree to a peace settlement, but, as mentioned, the U.S. has unilaterally ceased enforcing the arms embargo on Bosnian government forces.

Kosovo and Macedonia. Developments in the Kosovo autonomous province of Serbia and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia could trigger an escalation of conflict in the Balkans and even beyond. In Kosovo, Serbian repression continues, and an increasing number of people appear to believe that moderation in resisting Serbia is achieving few if any results. Conflict in Kosovo could lead to a scenario that involves massive refugee flows and a spillover of conflict to many states in the region, with implications far beyond. In Macedonia, the economic situation is disastrous, given disruption of trade with embargoed Serbia and the Greek economic blockade of Macedonia. Some 25 percent of wage earners in Skopje have not been paid for months, and labor troubles could lead to ethnic strife.

The West has taken some steps such as the deployment of troops into northern Macedonia under Operation ABLE SENTRY. Efforts by the U.S. and the European community to provide greater assistance

and help develop an east-west infrastructure for Macedonia, so it is not so dependent on north-south commerce and ties, would help alleviate the pressure on Macedonia; encouraging Greece to end its blockade would be even more immediately significant.

The Future in Former Yugoslavia. If the International Contact Group's proposal succeeds in stopping the fighting and achieving a peace settlement, and if post-settlement the U.S. deploys 25,000 military personnel to the area as part of a peacekeeping force of 50,000, a question will then be whether peace can be sustained and the lives of peacekeepers protected. On the other hand, the failure of the Euro-Atlantic community to force a settlement in Yugoslavia's ethnonational conflicts and to help establish an arrangement through which the successor states may live in security would cast a shadow on the notion of building a collective security system to manage change and crises in Europe and beyond.

At best, some form of collective security may be able to stop the conflict or at least manage it and prevent expansion or escalation of the conflict. At worst, conflict in the former Yugoslavia could continue for a long time and spill over into the broader Balkan area and possibly beyond. NATO states are concerned that violence in one area of Europe can reduce inhibitions to violence elsewhere.

Implications for U.S. Relations with Allies and Friends. Differences between the U.S and allies, especially the U.K. and France, on such issues as deploying ground forces in Bosnia in current conditions and lifting or enforcing the arms embargo on the Bosnian government and Croatia have led to much speculation about the implications for U.S.-allied relations and even the future of NATO. These differences mar add to other incentives European allies have to pursue close defense cooperation in Europe; the U.K. and France, for example, reportedly are creating a joint air command for peacekeeping missions. The U.S. appears to recognize the priority a strong NATO has in U.S national security interests and the need to relate policy on the former Yugoslavia to this higher interest in maintaining a cohesive Alliance.

Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. Strategic Assessment 1995 (Extract)

Russia and Neighbors

The disintegration of the USSR left in its wake fifteen successor states, each struggling to cope with the demands of statehood and the need to define a role in the international system. After three years of independence, it is by no means certain how many of these entities will be viable states within their present borders. Nor is it clear whether the two largest, Russia and Ukraine, will seek integration with the Western security system. Major factors underlying these uncertainties include:

- Growing doubts in the region about the wisdom of the December 1991 decision to dismantle the USSR;
- The failure of many new leaders in the region to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens;
- Uncertainty within many of the new states regarding their potential to achieve economic independence and political sovereignty (a trend bolstered by a growing backlash against economic hardships and rampant corruption);
- Conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia; and
- A general awakening to the fact that the major Western countries may not be able to reduce the dislocations associated with the transition from a Soviet-style command economy to a market system.

These developments have forced many of the Soviet successor states to reevaluate their future in the international system. This in turn challenges the West to reassess its own policies regarding these states.

Defining Trends

Russia is Intervening in the Security Matters of Other Former Soviet States

In 1992, Russia was reluctant to interfere in the security problems of other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev initially established a policy of non-interference, in an apparent effort to curry favor with the West-on which, Kozyrev believed, Russia was critically dependent for economic assistance. Kotyrev believed that the foremost threat to Russia's security was economic and political isolation, and that Russia could overcome this threat only through economic and diplomatic integration into the Western dominated international system.

This policy, however, was soon challenged by those who believed that Russia had to rely upon itself for its security and place in the international community. This

From Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 1995, pages 51 through 66.

group argued that Russian security policies should focus on protecting Russia's vital interests-especially in the area they called the "near abroad" (that is, the former Soviet Union)-rather than on integrating into an international system controlled by the West.

The debate between Kozyrev and the advocates of a foreign policy based on defending Russia's own vital interests continued for almost two years. It ended abruptly early in the morning of October 4, 1993, when President Yeltsin rushed to the Ministry of Defense to implore the military to put down the rebellion in the streets of Moscow. In exchange for the military's sup port, Yeltsin evidently made several concessions-including acceptance of a security policy based on Russia's vital interests.

Despite the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' position prior to October 1993, however, many of Russia's policies regarding the CIS during that period were apparently made by individual ministries based on bureaucratic interests and proclivities, not official state policy. At the same time, moreover, Russia displayed a tendency to provide military support throughout the region in a manner that weakened the authority of the other Soviet successor states.

It is important to note, however, that Russia's determination to be involved in security matters throughout the "near abroad" has not been entirely unwelcome. Many Soviet successor states in the Caucasus and Central Asia are having major problems in establishing their sovereignty and look to Moscow for support. This is reflected in the fact that Russia has sought and achieved troop stationing agreements with most of the states in the "near abroad," and in the increased interest within the CIS in new forms of political, economic, and security cooperation.

Moldova. Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, former Soviet armed forces stationed in the Trans-Dniester Region of Moldova began to actively support Dniester activists seeking independence from Moldova. In May 1992, Russia asserted its control over these units, and in June, Major General Aleksandr Lebed was placed in charge of

Moldova

SOURCE: CIA

the Russian forces of the 14th Army stationed in the Trans-Dniester region. On July 29, Russian peacekeeping forces were deployed to the Trans-Dniester region in accord with a Moldovan-Russian agreement. Russian forces remain in the region, and negotiations between Russia and Moldova indicate that they will remain there for several more years.

Georgia. In June 1992, President Yeltsin and Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze signed an agreement on settling conflicts in the region. A month later, they agreed to send Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian peacekeeping forces into South Ossetia, where they remain today.

in August 1992, Russia also sent forces into Abkhazia, a former autonomous republic under Moscow's control that has resisted integration into an independent Georgian state, in order to evacuate Russian tourists caught between Georgian and Abkhazian warring factions. After the evacuation, Russian forces remained in Georgia, ostensibly to keep the peace, after Georgia and Russian signed an agreement on September 3, 1992, calling for the complete neutrality of Russian forces and pledging Moscow's respect for Georgia's

Georgia

SOURCE: CIA

borders. Nevertheless, the Russian military reportedly provided support to Abkhazian forces throughout late 1992 and 1993. Moreover, Russia actively sought to broker a negotiated settlement to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict during the winter of 1992-93, and even refused to finalize a friendship treaty with Georgia in the spring of 1993 until progress was made in settling the Abkhazia conflict.

Russian involvement in the conflict took a turn in October 1993, when Georgia sought Russia's help in overcoming internal armed opposition to the Georgian government. This led to a treaty between the two countries regarding Russian basing rights in Georgia, which in turn paved the way for Russia to perform peacekeeping functions along the Georgian-Abkhazian border. Russia's role as peacekeeping "facilitator" was recognized by the U.N. Security Council on July 21,1994, in UNSC Resolution 937.

Tujikistan. Russia also became involved in Tajikistan's conflicts after anti-Islamic, old-guard political forces achieved victory in the Tajik civil war in December 1992. On january 22, 1993, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan agreed at the Minsk CIS Summit to send primarily Russian troops to CIS border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, in order to defend against Tajik opposition attacks from Afghan territory. In a separate operation, the CIS authorized Russian forces to perform peacekeeping functions within Tajikistan.

Armenia* and *Azerbaijan. Russian military activities in Armenia and Azerbaijan have been limited. In accordance with CIS agreements, Russia turned over Soviet military equipment to both countries, and has not become actively involved in their dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Tajikistan

SOURCE: CIA

Nagorno-Karabakh

SOURCE: CIA



Source: TASS

RussIan peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia.

In late January 1994, Russia offered to provide peacekeeping forces to patrol a security zone between the two countries. This offer was not accepted, however, and while Russia continues to express concern over the conflict, it has limited its involvement.

Domestic Pressures and Mutual Apprehensions Impair Russia-Ukraine Relations

On December 1, 1991, 76 percent of Ukrainian voters supported Ukrainian Independence from the Soviet Union, as urged by the newly elected Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk. The primary objective at the time was to wrest control of Ukraine's political and economic destiny from the Soviet central government. Russian and Belorussian political leaders shared this *desire* to *do away* with *the* Soviet central government mechanism. As a result, agreements were signed that abolished the Soviet Union and established the much more amorphous ClS in its place.

Russian political leaders who pushed for the formation of that CIS had intended for the Commonwealth to succeed the Soviet Union as a confederation of states. It was not their intention that the successor states should go their own ways on security matters. Rather, Russia advocated a CIS military structure that would subordinate a major portion of the old Soviet military-including all of the strategic nuclear and naval forces—to a ClS military command responsible to the collective heads of state of the Commonwealth. In January 1992, Russia even went so far as to proclaim that it would not establish its own army, but would rely on forces controlled by the CIS to defend Russian territory. Political leaders in Moscow believed that Russia's political and economic weight would give it the strongest voice in CIS security decisions. Moreover, they feared that the creation of a separate Russian military would upset and alienate the other Soviet successor states.

Moscow was not ready for the Soviet Union to break up so quickly and completely Russia had merely wanted to replace the mechanism by which the republics were joined together with something less objectionable. Ukraine's declaration in January 1992 that all military forces stationed on Ukrainian territory belonged to Kiev--and its subsequent efforts to convert these forces into an Ukrainian army and navy-came as a surprise to many in Moscow, and presented a major challenge to Moscow's plans for the CIS. In May 1992, Moscow countered by creating its own army, which included many Russian forces stationed in other CIS states. Moscow also challenged Ukraine's claim to nuclear forces and the Black Sea Fleet stationed in the Crimea.

Good Russian-Ukrainian relations require mutual trust on security matters, which has been in short supply. Ukraine's unilateral demands for independence in security matters have hurt communication> and understanding. This distrust has nearly turned into open rancor during the negotiations over ownership of the Black Sea Flect. In particular, the disruptive behavior of the fleet's Russian commanders-such as Admiral Kasatonov, who openly resisted the efforts of Moscow and Kiev to divide the fleet in a mutually acceptable way-has presented negotiations from taking place in a calm and conciliatory environment. Agreements regarding the fleet reached in August 1992, April 1993, and June 1993 were quickly repudiated by at least one of the parties to the dispute.

Source TASS

Russian partiament burning after military attack October 1993.

In short, relations between Russia and Ukraine have been strained since soon after the CIS agreement was signed in December 1991. Many Russian leaders have not reconciled themselves to the breakup of the Soviet Union. They believe that their own security will be placed in jeopardy if Ukraine moves out of Moscow's sphere of influence on security matters.

Furthermore, domestic problems have distracted them from the task of building good relations with Ukraine. Throughout 1992 and 1993, Yeltsin clashed repeatedly with the more conservative Russian legislature over policy issues and the division of political power between the branches of government. This confrontation, which was punctuated by threats to close down the legislature and counter-threats of impeachment, practically paralvzed the Russian government. Moreover, the struggle for power spread to the provinces, where many locally elected officials were re-cvcled communist party leaders who resisted the reform efforts pushed by the president.

Ukrainian leaders, on the other hand, have been hesitant to compromise with Russia, fearing this might open them to the charge of diminishing Ukrainian independence. They tend to blame Russian interference for domestic problems that have not been resolved. And they are paralyzed by major differences within the count? regarding how closely Ukraine should be connected to Russia.

The Rukh political party, based in western Ukraine, spearheaded the drive for independence and had a major influence on Ukrainian politics immediately after the break with Soviet Moscow. However, a large number of Ukrainians, particularly in the central and eastern parts of the country, soon began to question the wisdom of policies designed to sever Ukraine from Russia. In November 1992, USIA polls showed 52 percent of all Ukrainians agreeing with the statement that it was "a great misfortune" that the Soviet Union no longer existed.

Russian concerns about possible Ukrainian entry into Western economic and security circles have led it to take steps that undermine Ukrainian independence, such as maintaining economic and political pressure on Kiev as Ukraine struggles with its domestic problems. A prominent example of this economic pressure has been Russia's frequent interruption of oil and gas deliveries to Ukraine, which has resulted in major production problems within Ukrainian industry. Moreover, some political groups within each country have sought to gain political advantages for their cause by pitting the grievances of ethnic Russians in the Ukraine against the resentment many ethnic Ukrainians harbor against Russia.

Further, controversial boundary decisions made during Soviet times-when borders were often drawn without regard to historical and geographic logic-have been revisited, fueling mutual distrust. Of particular note in this regard is the issue of Crimea's political status. Historically a part of Russia, Crimea was arbitrarily removed from Russia's jurisdiction by Khrushchev in 1954 and made part of Ukraine. The population, however, remains largely Russian and the region has strong ties with Russia. The peninsula is also the historic home of the Black Sea Fleet, and as such has major naval bases and support facilities that are of value to both countries.

Crimean political activists who favor increased autonomy and even independence gained a major victory in the local Crimean presidential elections of January 30, 1994,

Ukraine's East-West Political Split



Source. The Economist July 16th. 1994

when Yuriy Meshkov-an outspoken advocate of Crimea's return to Russian control-won with 73 percent of the vote. Those favoring increased autonomy also easily won the parliamentary election conducted on March 20. Crimea's new parliament voted on May 20, 1994, to restore the controversial Crimean constitution of 1992, which had been put aside because Kiev objected to the degree of autonomy it claimed for Crimea. Crimean regional leaders tend to look to Moscow, not Kiev, as their protector.

The split between the western part of the country and the central and eastern parts has plagued Ukrainian politics since independence, causing policy gridlock and hamstringing Kravchuk's administration. The western part of the country has been primarily concerned with establishing Ukrainian independence from Moscow and moving the country into Western Europe's sphere of influence to the greatest extent possible. In contrast, the eastern part of Ukraine, in which most of Ukraine's ethnic Russians live, has been more willing to cling to Russia for economic as well as cultural reasons. The economic base of the eastern part of Ukraine was strongly connected to Russia-and heavily subsidized by Moscow-in the Soviet Union. Thus, managers in this part of the country have been unprepared and unwilling to reorient their largely obsolete industries in the direction sought by the Ukrainian nationalists of the west.

Resistance in the eastern part of Ukraine to the economic reforms and nationalism favored in the west led to the openly stated suspicion that Moscow was using ethnic Russians in the east to sabotage Ukrainian independence. Political infighting between the nationalists of western Ukraine and the pro-Russian and reform-resistant population of central and eastern Ukraine have stymied policy making in Kiev, leading to economic stagnation, domestic strife, and the diplomatic suspension of Ukraine between Eastern and Western Europe-without a clear foothold in either.

On July 10, 1994, Leonid Kuchma won Ukraine's presidential run-off election, gaining 9.8 million votes to Leonid Kravchuk's 8.9 million. Kuchma, who stood for closer relations with Russia, won in all regions of eastern, east central, and southern Ukraine, while Kravchuk, who ran as a nationalist, won in all western and west central regions. While this outcome may help to defuse tensions with **MOSCOW** on some issues, it may also lead to increased internal tension if Ukrainian nationalists push to the fore the issue of asserting their country's independence vis-a-vis Russia. External tensions with Russia may also increase if the nationalists turn their spotlight on Russian interference in Ukrainian domestic affairs.

Leaders Supporting a Strong Russia are Gaining Power in Russia

The results of the December 1993 Duma elections were a severe political blow to President Yeltsin, decreasing his ability to exercise the powers he gained under the new constitution and forcing him to make major concessions to more conservative forces. Russia's more-open actions in the "near abroad" and increased role in the former Yugoslavia are a direct result of these concessions.

Since 1992, conservative and even moderate Russian politicians had loudly

complained that the Russian Foreign Ministry was allowing the U.N. Secretary General and NATO to exclude Russia from playing a role in resolving the civil war in Bosnia. On February 15, 1994, Yeltsin announced that Russia would no longer tolerate exclusion, and unilaterally injected Russia into the negotiating process by sending a special envoy, Vitaliy Churkin, to Serbia. Churkin's immediate success in getting the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw heavy weapons from Sarajevo not only obviated the need for NATO air strikes against Serbian positions, but inaugurated a new era of Russian involvement in the Bosnian peace process. Russia's subsequent participation in the Contact Group addressing the Bosnia problem reflects an apparent intention to act in concert with the other major powers, rather than as an independent force.

During the last three years, Russian military leaders-particularly Major General Lebed-have also spoken out on regional politics, expressing political views at odds with those of the Russian leadership, even when ordered not to by the Russian president and minister of defense several times since July 1992.

Force Redeployments, Reorganizations, and Reductions are Affecting the Readiness of Russian Forces

Starting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's December 1988 announcement at the U.N. of unilateral force reductions in Eastern Europe, the Soviet-and now Russian-military has experienced a series of major redeployments, re-organizations, and reductions. The completed force withdrawals from Germany and the Baltic states at the end of August 1994 did not end the process. Russia is still involved with internal redeployments and troop reductions.

The reductions in nuclear arms called for by the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty are being implemented on schedule, considerably reducing the number of deployed strategic nuclear missiles under Moscow's command. The reduction has also been accompanied by re-targeting agreements with the United States that eliminate peacetime targeting of U.S. sites and reduce the combat alert status of some units. Russia and China have also agreed not to target each other in peacetime.

General purpose forces, whose training has been severely reduced, have experienced considerable degradation in their combat readiness. Those units that have maintained a high degree of readiness have been used to conduct domestic and international peacekeeping missions.

Moscow also lost control of some of the Soviet Union's best military equipment when Ukraine and Belarus declared their ownership of all general purpose forces stationed on their territory. For the most part, these forces had been formed from equipment evacuated from Eastern Europe in accordance with the 1988 Soviet unilateral reduction announcement and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.

Strategic Nuclear Assets On Hand and Accountable Under START[1]

	Kazakhstan	Russia	Ukraine	Belarus
ICBMs	92	861	176	54
Strategic Bombers	0	120	42	0
SLBMs	0	788	0	0
Warheads	820	7199	1576	54

Source: DOD

[1] Data shows weapon locations as of summer 1994.

Additional, newer items of equipment were removed and stored east of the Ural mountains in order to meet the CFE limits, considerably diminishing the military forces west of the Urals under the control of Russia in comparison with its Soviet predecessor of a few years before.

The current Russian active duty military force, while capable of protecting Russia's borders from any short-term threat, no longer has the ability to project force into the heart of Europe. Russia's navy has also lost much of its power projection and sustainability capabilities.

Russia is, however, fully capable of rebuilding a force that could threaten its neighbors. With four or five years of determined mobilization, Russia could reassemble a force capable of threatening other countries located near its borders. Remobilization, however, does not appear to be high on the agenda of any of Russia's present political leaders. Reductions in Russia's active duty military force do not threaten Russia's stated defensive goals, even though the Russian general staff undoubtedly feels a need to improve combat training. Moreover, shifts in Moscow's military intentions would undoubtedly be preceded by perceptible changes in political leadership.

U.S. Security Interests

In the former Soviet Union, numerous political and ethnic entities have declared their independence and have started the process of nation building. Some of these states appear to be successful, while others do not. Boundaries and political affiliations have been settled in some regions, but not everywhere. Instability plagues the region, and will likely continue to do so for several years.

The process of political and economic reform in many of the new states has been characterized by indecisiveness, acrimony, and open conflict. Democracy and market economies were originally the goals of all states in the region, but little or no progress has been made towards these goals in many of these nations. In some cases, the banner of democracy has simply been hoisted over traditional forms of government by the few for the few. The principles of the market economy are not universally accepted or completely understood in most of the new states. Moreover, the drive for political and economic independence from the former Soviet central authorities has started to give way in some areas to serious thoughts of political and economic reassociation.

Preventing a Military Threat

While the development of democracy and market economies is the long-term SOlution to the region's instability, the U.S. has an interest in preventing the re-emergence in the region of a military threat to U.S. interests. The risk of a new Soviet-type military-ideological threat, fortunately, appears to be small, since Russia-which would have to be the nucleus of such a threat-is making progress with political and economic reforms, thus reducing the possibility that it will re-emerge as an adversary.

Encouraging the Growth of Democracy

In the long term, the success of democratic reforms-particularly in Russia and Ukraine-will enhance U.S. security. In turn, the establishment of democratic values will profoundly reduce the chances of conflict. Democratic reforms are the best long-term answer to the aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds unleashed at the end of the Cold War.

Promoting Economic Reforms

Promoting economic reforms in the former Soviet Union will significantly increase the chances that democracy will take root in the region. Additionally, economic reforms in the region, undergirded by political reforms, will open foreign markets for the U.S., as secure, democratic, market-oriented nations are more likely to support and engage in free trade.

Promoting Regional Stability

Ethnic and border disputes present a real threat to the stability of the former Soviet Union. Many of the Soviet successor states-including Ukraine-are having problems establishing their sovereignty, are

Source: TASS

Russian troops on the Tajik-Afghan border.

embroiled in violent conflict, or are ignoring democratic reforms. It is in the U.S. interest that ethnic feuds and the uneven development of reforms throughout the region not be allowed to threaten positive developments within the former Soviet Union or other parts of Central and Eastern Europe.

Key U.S. Security Policy Issues

Future Security Cooperation with the West

Late 1993 proved to be a watershed year in shaping the U.S. attitude towards Russian participation in post-Cold War international security problems. Russia's decision that securing its own vital interests had to take precedence over cooperation with the West, and the specter of ultra-nationalists rising to power in Moscow, made it clear that the West was incorrect in its assessment that Russia was too preoccupied by domestic problems to be interested in international affairs.

While always acknowledging that Russia was a major power, the U.S. and the rest of the West often tended to address international security problems without fully taking stock--or advantage-of Moscow's interest in such matters. The situation began to change in early 1994, when Russia inserted itself into the situation in Bosnia.

Consequently, Washington has started to consult more with Moscow on a variety of problems. In the spring of 1994, the U.S. welcomed Russia as a fifth member of the Quadripartite Contact Group addressing the Bosnia problem. Similarly, it consulted with Russia on the North Korea nuclear problem, and worked in the U.N. Security Council to acknowledge Russia's peacekeeping role in Georgia after Russia showed a readiness to conform to international norms.

The U.S. approach towards security cooperation with Russia is best represented by the Partnership for Peace program, which envisions broader European cooperation on security matters, while at the same time hedging against the appearance of a new threat to European security. The U.S. encourages Russia's contribution to international security, but at the same time recognizes that Russia is not yet ensconced in the democratic and market traditions, and a Russia turned hostile or unstable would present a major challenge for European security. Nevertheless, security cooperation between Russia and the West will continue to expand as political and economic reforms take root in Russia and other areas of the former Soviet empire. At least six factors will affect future cooperation between the states of the former Soviet Union and the West on security matters:

Security cooperation within the CIS. There is a growing acceptance in most of the non-Russian states that their security depends on cooperation-even alliance with Moscow. This has led to a number of bilateral military cooperation treaties between Russia and the other successor states. Russian security cooperation with its neighbors, as a rule, will come with a stipulation that those receiving Moscow's assistance or guarantees will not allow other major military powers to station troops on their territory without approval from Moscow. Consequently, non-Russian states of the region-with the possible exception of Ukraine-will tend to shy away from forms of cooperation with the West that might meet with Russian disapproval.

Ukraine's position. Ukraine has cooperated with the U.S. and with Russia on

Source: TASS

Russian Defense Minister General Grachev at joint U.S.-Russian military exercises.

some nuclear issues, especially the U.S.-Russian-Ukrainian trilateral agreement facilitating Ukraine's denuclearization and ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On the other hand, Ukraine could seek a security position that is independent of Russia, in which case Kiev will want to cooperate as much as possible with the West on security matters. A Ukraine that is fully independent of Moscow on security matters and cooperative with the West will likely increase strains and decrease cooperation between Russia and the West in the near term.

Russia's vital interests. Cooperation with the West will also hinge on Russia's assessment of its vital interests. Moscow's new policy of defending its vital interests regardless-of the West's attitude on a given problem may well lead to situations in which cooperation between Russia and the West is not possible-even to situations where confrontation is possible.

The West's intentions *in the "near abroad."* Another key factor is Moscow's perception of the intentions of other major powers towards the area of the "near abroad" and Russia itself. Like the West, Russia comes out of the Cold War with lingering doubts about the trustworthiness of its former opponent. This inclination to distrust the West was heightened in 1993 when NATO first seemed ready to expand to the borders of the former Soviet Union, and the Western powers talked of mediating conflicts within the Caucasus and Central Asia. President Yeltsin's strong objection to additional NATO eastward expansion plans reflects Russia's continued extreme sensitivity to proposals or policies that appear to be aimed at isolating Russia or decreasing Russia's influence in the regions along its borders.

Russia will continue to promote European security agreements that boast Russia's role while devaluing the role of NATO. Russia's decision to join the Partnership for Peace program should be veiwed as a tactical step in Moscow's long-term plans for re-organizing and expanding Europe's security structures.

The West's willingness* to treat *Russia as a partner. Russia's leeriness of Western intentions will be also affected by the West's willingness to include Russia as an equal partner in resolving international problems of interest to Moscow. If Moscow's participation is sought early in future planning processes, the West can expect Russia to cooperate as long as the West is not pushing a position at odds with Russia's vital interests. However, if the West is seen to be excluding Russia from the planning process-as Russia believed was the case in Bosnia in 1993-then Moscow may obstruct Western activity, using its veto authority in the U.N. Security Council if necessary.

The power of ultra-nationalists. The ascent to power of ultra-nationalists in Russia would for all practical purposes end any possibility of cooperation between the West and Russia. Ukraine, on the other hand, would be even more eager to cooperate with the West under such circumstances, assuming it still believed that its security depended on its ability to remain free of Moscow's domination.

The Possible Rise of Ultra-nationalism in Russia

The results of the December 1993 parliamentary election in Russia raised the specter of ultra-nationalists gaining political control in Moscow, followed by Russian soldiers marching south and west to re-establish the old Tsarist and Soviet empires. The statements of Vladimir Zhirinovsky

Ethnic Russians/Russian Troops in the CIS



SOURCE: DOD
NOTE: First Figure—Percent of population that is ethnic Russian/Second Figure—Number of Russian troops.

were well known in the West before the elections, but were of little concern because he had no power base in government. But the vote in December-and the efforts by several states in Central Europe to use the ultra-nationalists' election success to add urgency to their pleas to gain entry into NATO-changed the West's perception of the ultra-nationalist threat, making it a major topic of discussion.

The possibility of an ultra-nationalist government in Russia does exist-and has for two to three years. The appeal of the ultra-nationalists can be traced to several factors: resentment over the loss of superpower status, alarm over the growth of crime, and dissatisfaction with the growing gap between the upper and lower economic classes in Russia. In the minds of the ultra-nationalists and their supporters, these problems can be traced either to Western schemes or to the actions of Russian leaders acting in the interests of the West.

However, ultra-nationalists are not on the verge of taking charge in Moscow. The vote for the ultra-nationalists in the December 1993 election was at least in part a protest against the dislocation caused by the erratic reform policies of Yeltsin and Gaidar. Moreover, while the election resulted in ultra-nationalist and traditionalist parties gaining close to 40 percent of the seats in the Duma, centrists-who support continued reform but at a slower pace-gained a sufficient number of seats to ensure that reform will be continued, albeit at a slower pace and under more direct control by the government.

Combined with the fact that advocates of a foreign policy based on Russia's vital interests who are not ultra-nationalists gained the upper hand in the executive branch, this indicates that, while Russia will be more independent of the West on security matters, it will not necessarily be reactionary or confrontational. There is, to be sure, support for a stronger Russia in international affairs, but not necessarily support for an aggressive foreign policy that risks confrontation with another major power.

The ultra-nationalists will, however, be able to influence both Russian policies in the "near abroad" and, indirectly, the activities of other Soviet successor states in the region. The ultra-nationalists are sure to create trouble wherever there are Russian populations living under the control of other ethnic groups-both inside and outside of Russia itself. This, in itself, will likely cause the Russian government to make national security decisions in an environment that is highly emotional and confrontational.

Moreover, the ultra-nationalist groups will h-v to portray U.S. international actions as inherently anti-Russian. Thus, relations

between Washington and Moscow will be conducted in an environment in which ultra-nationalist forces seek to use US. actions to attack the legitimacy of the Russian regime in power.

The U.S. has sought to counter the specter of ultra-nationalism by supporting reform efforts designed to improve the material well-being of the average Russian and enhance the likelihood that Russia will play a positive role in international affairs. However, because of the prolonged deterioration of the Russian economy and the ability of ultra-nationalists to take political advantage of that deterioration, U.S. policy makers increasingly must consider how their actions toward Russian domestic matters and international issues of interest to Russia will be perceived by the average Russian-whether that perception seems reasonable or not.

Ukrainian Stability

The fact that Ukraine's internal differences over economic and international policies corresponds to an east-west ethnic and geographic division within the country presents the possibility of domestic instability. Labor problems in eastern Ukraine and the political battles between Crimean officials and the government in Kiev may foreshadow increased turmoil. Of the two, the Crimea problem has the greatest potential for creating international repercussions.

The elected government in Crimea is now actively seeking to loosen its ties to Kiev. While it is unclear as to how much autonomy the Crimeans are willing to settle for, many politically active Crimeans demand nothing less than reunification with Russia or independence. Crimean appeals for Russian support have resulted in the dispute becoming international in nature, with both Kiev and Moscow reacting to the provocations of local Crimean officials. Anti-Ukraine Crimeans--with the support of Russian ultra-nationalists and even many moderate Russian political elements-have engaged in activities that have threatened to bring Russia and Ukraine into military conflict. For example, throughout the spring of 1994, Russian and Ukrainian leaders exchanged a series of low-key threats based primarily on reports of troop movements around the Crimea. Many of these reports proved to be false provocations originating from local political factions.

The leaderships of both countries appear to be trying to prevent increased tension over the Crimea. However, political conflicts between Crimean Russians and Ukrainians may continue to occur quite often-resulting in bellicose charges and counter-charges, illegal seizures of property, and threatened troop deployments by Kiev and Moscow.

The situation is complicated by the fact that neither the Russian nor the Ukrainian government can afford politically to be seen as giving in to the other. Russia's leadership must be seen by its citizens to fully support the rights of ethnic Russians abroad, especially in the Crimea, which many Russians view as rightfully a part of their country. Ukraine's leadership, on the other hand, cannot afford to accept any agreements regarding the Crimea that convey the impression that Kiev is ceding part of its territory to Russia-the country that has historically dominated Ukraine and now looms as Kiev's most serious military threat. While the outcome of the Ukrainian parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994 may allow the political leaders of the two countries to discuss the problem in a spirit of good faith, domestic political pressures on both groups of leaders will remain.

The problem is further aggravated by the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet, which is supported by extensive facilities located on the Crimean peninsula. Russia is determined to maintain access to these facilities to support the part of the fleet that will go to Moscow. Specifically, Russia wants exclusive access to the facilities in Sevastopol, and is attempting to get Kiev to base its portion of the fleet in Odessa, which is not located on the peninsula. While Kiev has been willing to let Russia have the majority of the fleet's ships, and even recognizes Russia's need for an extensive support system, acceptance of Russia's exclusive access to support facilities in the Crimea is probably more of a concession than Kiev is

Source TASS

Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma (left); Crimean President Yuriy Meshkov.

willing to make, in light of its current efforts to assert control over the Crimea.

Because the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus were interested in disbanding the central Soviet government as quickly as possible when they established the CIS in December 1991, they ignored many such contentious issues that would eventually have to be addressed. Agreements by the Commonwealth signers to recognize each other's borders may have been politically expedient, but the capricious manner in which some of these borders were established are now being challenged by ethnic groups that are disadvantaged by the results. The Crimea will no doubt remain a problem for a long time, primarily because the leaders of both Russia and Kiev lack the political confidence and public support to offer the concessions that are necessary to resolve the situation.

For its part, the international community has tended to view the Crimea problem as an internal Ukrainian issue, and Russia as an external troublemaker seeking to take land that belongs to another nation. This position has tended to limit the West's potential to contribute constructively to the resolution of the problem. The West's view of the situation suggests that it should support Kiev; yet it cannot afford to antagonize Russia on an issue of such importance. Consequently, the West has relegated itself to the sidelines.

Nevertheless, the international community may have to play a role in the Crimea problem if a peaceful solution is to be achieved. The possibility of Russia and Ukraine accepting international arbitration would be greater if the problem were redefined as an international issue resulting from the inadequately prepared and hastily signed CIS agreement. Such arbitration might be welcomed by the political leaders involved, although not by Russian ultra-nationalists, who would likely interpret it as Western encroachment into Moscow's historic sphere of influence.

The Future of Economic Reforms

The status of economic reforms varies throughout the region, but in no state can the economy be considered strong. During 1992 and 1993, Yeltsin alternated between enacting radical economic reform measures advocated by the West and watering down those measures in order to limit public and political opposition. The result is that neither the market system envisioned by advocates of "shock therapy" nor the centrally managed reform approach advocated by economic moderates has materialized. The inflation rate in Russia reflects the results of the government's seesaw policies. During 1992 and 1993, the monthly rate was never lower than the July 1992 rate of 7.1 percent, and it reached a high of 31.1 percent two months later. (In January 1992, the rate hit 296 percent when the government lifted price controls, but this figure was an anomaly.)

The problem was aggravated by the fact that Russian legislatures during this time failed to create the legal basis for an investment-friendly environment. Moreover, there has been little progress in converting the vast military industrial complex to the production of consumer goods-a problem of major importance, since the most effective production elements of Russia are in the military industrial sector.

The Ukrainian economy is in even worse condition. Virtually no effort has been made by the Ukrainian government-or the governments of the other Soviet successor states, for that matter-to convert

from a command to a market economy. Consequently, Ukraine has a small and unstable market sector and a huge, unproductive, and outdated state-controlled sector.

The dismal economic performances of the two largest states of the region have resulted in growing dissatisfaction with the political leadership of both countries, to the point that a further downturn in their economies could provoke major political unrest and a downfall of the leadership. Payment of wages routinely lags for months in Russia and Ukraine-in August 1994, Russia reported that wage arrears amounted to 3.5 trillion rubles and were increasing by 15 percent a month, resulting in numerous regional strikes and public protests. In mid-1994, Russian opposition groups called repeatedly for universal strikes in the transportation and oil industries in hopes that they would cause the downfall of the Yeltsin government.

As a result, some political leaders in the region have started to pay increased attention to the social consequences of their economic reform policies. Since at least the beginning of 1993, the Russian government has devoted increased attention to alleviation of economic hardship and prevention of social unrest. Unfortunately, these measures have not proven very fruitful.

Nevertheless, economic reform measures continue to be enacted. During 1994, the government made great and much-needed strides in controlling government deficits and inflation. In February 1994, the inflation rate dropped to 9.9 percent from 22 percent the month before, and remained in the single digits for several months.

Additionally, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin successfully resisted pressure from the uniformed military and military-industrial leaders to approve a 1994 military budget of almost 90 trillion rubles, rather than the 40 trillion cap favored by the government, which may reduce defense orders by 80 percent. Moreover, in **July** 1994, Chernomyrdin started the long-awaited bankruptcy program for unprofitable state-supported industries.

In an effort to minimize social fallout from such reforms, the government has increased its control over the reform process, in an effort to balance the dislocations caused by market reforms with compensatory social programs. It has also increased efforts to reduce economic crime-including that by growing organized crime organizations-the prevalence of which tends to undermine public support for reform.

Ukraine and the other successor states, on the other hand, have vet to take major measures to reform their economies. A major reason for this appears to be that these countries have historically been more dependent on Russia than vice versa. To some extent, most had grown accustomed to this dependence, and were genuinely unprepared for what came next when the carpet of Russian support was pulled out from under their feet. In the fall of 1994, the newly elected president (Kuchma) and parliament passed a series of reform measures, but it is too soon to assess their **success.**

This economic relationship between Russia and the rest of the CIS is becoming more evident to the political leadership of the region, and may well lead the non-Russian states, including Ukraine, to seek closer economic ties with Russia. As the dominant partner in any such economic relationship, Moscow will be able to choose and mold these economic ties on the basis of the advantages they offer to Russia.

The U.S. has been a strong supporter of economic reform in the region. Moreover, while the U.S. has advocated an aggressive approach to market reform, it recognizes that success requires that states themselves take the initiative. Washington's policy has been that U.S. support must follow the initiation of reform by individual states. Consequently, even in Russia, which has undertaken the greatest reform efforts to date, U.S. support has been provided in a series of stages corresponding to the reforms undertaken by Moscow.

U.S. bilateral economic support activities have been concentrated on the more rapidly reforming regions of Russia, in order to develop the fundamental building blocks of a market system and to provide models at the local level. Initial efforts involved primarily technical assistance programs. In FY 1994, Congress increased assistance to S2.5 billion.

In FY 1995, U.S. activities will shift to support for trade and investment. In order

General Purpose Forces Military Equipment in the CIS[1]

Ownership (Country)	Tanks	APC/IFV	Arty	Tac SSMs	Aircraft	Helicopters
Armenia	120	300	220	0	6	30
Azerbaijan	380	720	165	0	47	15
Belarus	3,400	3,300	1,590	30	271	95
Georgia	50	70	60	0	15	0
Kazakhstan	1,100	2,200	2,000	0	32	100
Kyrgyzstan	240	465	135	0	200	0
Moldova	0	127	96	0	31	3
Russia	19,500	35,000	24,000	600	3,000	2,400
Tajikistan	200	420	200	0	0	0
Turkmenistan	900	1500	800	12	160	0
Ukraine	5,300	5,175	3,600	132	534	0
Uzbekistan	125	700	465	4	100	50

[1] Includes only Armed Forces. Does not include Border Guards and Internal Troops
Source: DOD.

to lay the groundwork for this stage, Vice President Gore has met with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in a series of meetings since 1993. The U.S. hopes that, as a result of these efforts, capital flowing from the U.S. private sector will play a larger role in the economic renewal of Russia.

At the same time, the U.S. is actively pressing the international business community and international financial institutions to assist Russia's efforts to move to a market economy. The urgency of such international support increased after the Russian parliamentary elections of December 1993, which reflected the growing disillusion of the Russian people with the reform efforts. It is primarily through international channels-particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-that meaningful financial and long-term technical support can be provided to Russia and the other newly established states of the region.

The IMF has been designated by the U.S. and the other Western industrial nations as the main agent for steering Russia and the other Soviet successor states through the reform process. The IMF provides loans to states only after they agree to undertake macroeconomic policy changes and establish economic performance targets. The IMF turned its attention to the former Soviet Union in 1991, inviting the Soviet republics to enter into a "special association" with the IMF and World Bank shortly after the failed August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow. Russia became a member of the IMF in June 1992; it has the ninth-largest IMF quota (which determines countries' voting and borrowing rights), ranking behind only the G-7 countries and Saudi Arabia. As of May 1994, Russia's quota allows it to borrow approximately S4.1 billion annually-if it meets its IMF budgetary and macroeconomic reform targets, which so far have posed major problems.

In April 1993, the G-7 deputies announced a S43 billion aid package to Russia. Because of Russia's problems with meeting IMF performance targets, the G-7 countries also agreed to create a new loan facility within the IMF- the Systemic Transformation Facility (STF)-which is intended to address criticisms that the rigorous conditionality of the IMF does not permit it to be sufficiently responsive to the needs of Russia and the other former Soviet republics. As of April 1994, Russia had received S3 billion in loans under the STF.

Russia's Challenge on the CFE Flank Agreements

The CFE Treaty signed by members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 1990 called, among other things. for limits on the number of forces that could deployed on the

northern and southern flanks of the former Soviet Union. These limits are to be achieved by November 1995.

However, since 1992, Russia has sought to have the flank limits revised upward to account for its assessments of new security threats to Russia in the wake of the Soviet Union's demise. Russia believes that increased turmoil in regions like the Transcaucasus and the possibility of a "Muslim threat" from the south requires it to have more forces deployed on its southern flank. On September 5, 1994, Minister of Defense Pave1 Grachev emphasized this point by stating that the limits were against Russia's "vital interests."

Currently, agreements call for the Russian military to have no more than 580 armored personal carriers, 700 tanks, and 1,280 artillery pieces in its northern and southern flanks by the deadline in 1995. The agreement does, however, allow the Russians to transfer unlimited numbers of armored personnel carriers to internal security forces (as opposed to the Russian army) in the flank regions, as long as "such organizations refrain from the acquisition of combat capabilities in excess of those necessary for meeting internal security requirements." Moreover, the treaty offers Russia the possibility of addressing its flank concerns without breaking the limits through storage rules, temporary deployments, non-limited equipment, and other means.

Since 1992, a Russian military build up in the southern flank region has occurred, with the transfer of troops and weapons previously stationed in the Baltic states and East Germany. In 1994, Russian deployments in the flank regions exceeded the November 1995 limits by approximately 2,000 armored personnel carriers, 400 tanks, and 500 artillery pieces.

The flank limits were negotiated at the behest of Turkey and the nordic NATO countries out of concern that force reduc*tions* in Central Europe would be rede*ployed* on the flanks and create an increased threat to those countries. They retain these concerns, and oppose Russia's request to revise the limits upward There is also concern that ii the CFE flank limits are revised, further revisions are bound to follow until the treaty is of little or no value. Additionally, some suspect that Russia is really seeking revisions in the flank agreement in order to enhance its military capability to impose its will in the "near abroad."

Although some Russian officials have stated that they intend to be in full compliance with the flank region limits by the deadline of November 1995, pressure to revise the limits will probably exist throughout the year. Moreover, the other signatories to the CFE treaty will have to decide what actions to take, if any should Russia fail to comply with the limits by the deadline.

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 1. European Strategic Environment

Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1.

USEUCOM

STRATEGY **OF** ENGAGEMENT AND PREPAREDNESS

From Strategy of Engagement *and Preparedness,* USEUCOM, February 1995, cover and pages I through 20.

W'e stand at a turning point of a long and bitter historical process that over the last eight decades has cost our own nation and the peoples of USEUCOM's area of responsibility untold blood and treasure. We must either understand the dynamics of a new world and strive to realize its potential--or succumb to its dangers.

This USEUCOM Strategy foIlows s the *National Security Strategy* and the National *Military* Strategy to chart the course of this command for the coming years.

We look forward to continued progress toward democracy and free market economies throughout the region. We engage actively in the process because it serves our vital interests and. more importantly. because it represents the triumph of the values for which our nation has always stood. Many of our military missions take non-traditional forms. But the goals which we pursue with peacetime engagement activities are fundamental American goals of very long standing

At the sane time, we have no illusions about the nature of some of the challenges still facing us. A glance at any newspaper will show that this is truly a theater in conflict. We will stay prepared. As the National *Military Strategy says.* "being ready to fight and win our Nation's wars remains our foremost responsibility." Equally important is that we are also a theater in transition and how EUCOM and the United States engage in peacetime truly will determine the security of the United States and NATO well into the 21st Century.

USEUCOM's peacetime engagement is in accordance with very high expectations for the future of this region. But let me be very clear--we will stay prepared to deal with armed challenges at any level as directed by the National Command Authorities.

This document will serve as authoritative guidance to the USEUCOM staff and subordinate commands in the planning process.

ONE TEAM--ONE FIGHT!

GEORGE A JOULWAN
General, U S Army

The CINC'S VISION

A Community of Free, Stable,-and Prosperous Nations Acting Together While Respecting the Dignity and Rights of the Individual and Adhering to the Principles of National Sovereignty and lnter-national Law.

USEUCOM Theater Objectives

MAINTAIN, SUPPORT, AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

PROMOTE STABILITY, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

SUPPORT THE PEACE INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

ENSURE FREEDOM OF MARITIME AND AERONAUTIC LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCs) IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

ASSIST HOST NATIONS IN AFRICA IN DEMOCRATIZATION

PROVIDE PROMPT RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS IN EUCOM FORCES

ACHIEVE A HIGH QUALITY OF LIFE FOR TROOPS AND THEIR FAMILIES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 7

II. USEUCOM STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 7
- WESTERN EUROPE AND NATO 7
- CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 8
- MIDDLE EAST AND THE NORTH AFRICAN LITTORAL 8
- SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 8
- SUMMARY 9

III. USEUCOM THEATER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 9
- OVERVIEW 9
- PROMOTING STABILITY 9
- THWARTING AGGRESSION 11

IV. USEUCOM STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 12
- OVERVIEW 12
- ENGAGE IN PEACETIME 12
- RESPOND TO CRISIS 14
- FIGHT TO WIN 16

V. RESOURCES 18
- OVERVIEW 18
- FUNDING 18
- FORCES 18
- INFRASTRUCTURE 19

VI. QUALITY OF LIFE 19

VII. SUMMARY 20

I. INTRODUCTION

The *National Military Strategy derived* from the President's *National Security Strat*egy. provides the framework for the USEUCOM strategy. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Joint Publications (JP) 0-2. Unified *Actions Armed Forces* (UNAAF). JP 3-0. *Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, and* JP 5-0. *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.* provide detailed guidance.

As one of the five U.S. area unified commands, USEUCOM is responsible for an area of more than 13 million square miles. including large parts of Europe, Africa. and the Middle East. More than a billion people live here. They and their institutions represent the widest possible differences in prosperity. stability. politics, religion, and attitude towards the United States. Their diversity requires a regional focus in the development of many parts of our strategy.

Starting from such a context, this strategy document describes the theater environment. and explains the command's strategic objectives (ends). the strategic concepts it will follow to achieve those objectives (ways), and the forces and resources required to implement those strategic concepts (means).

Our intention is to move as rapidly as possible toward the CINC's vision of the Area Of Responsibility (AOR):

> *A community of free. stable. and prosperous nations acting together while respecting the dignity, and rights of the individual and adhering to the principles of national* sovereignty *and international law.*

II. USEUCOM STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The nations of the AOR enjoy a very high degree of autonomy and independence. The character of even transnational dangers varies by region, and our strategy must differentiate accordingly. At the most detailed planning level, USEUCOM manages its programs on a country-by-country basis. Here it suffices to divide the area of responsibility into four main theaters:

- Western Europe and NATO
- Central and Eastern Europe
- The Middle East and the North African Littoral
- Sub-Saharan Africa

WESTERN EUROPE AND NATO

The NATO Alliance, its member states. and the friendly and democratic neutrals of Western Europe are vital to the interests of the United States and at the heart of American engagement in our area of responsibility. For economic, political. cultural and historical reasons. the nations of this region are our natural allies. To that affinity is added in many cases the common experience of nearly fifty years' partnership in NATO. one of the most successful alliances of modem history. Our forward presence today continues in that tradition. The Alliance and its political and military Iegacy make the U.S. a power of the first rank in Europe, even though we neither have nor want territory in Europe. NATO also amplifies our influence because it mobilizes the contributions of its other members.

This region is one of stable democracies and great economic prosperity. not the least because of its successful partnership with the U.S. Both its population and its gross domestic product are larger than those of the United

States. Its Infrastructure rivals that of any other part of the world. For all these reasons. our link with this region is the foundation of our engagement and influence throughout the AOR.

As we recognize the great contribution this region makes to our national security, we must also clearly see the profound change in the security environment here. Despite the ab sence of the discipline imposed by global confrontation, the consensus which in the past has proved so beneficial has been maintained-but it is no longer externally enforced. The range of possible political outcomes has become broader. Careful and cogent articulation of the benefits of the transatlantic link for all is imperative.

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

The young nations of this region transcended a difficult and tragic history with one of the most remarkable revolutions of all time. Now, in the midst of the most fundamental social, economic, political, and military changes, this region has in general made extraordinary progress toward democracy, stability, and free market economies. In so dynamic a situation, our continued determined engagement consolidates the gains already made and supports beneficial but inherently very difficult further progress. Many men of good will are striving toward a peaceful and just resolution of the numerous problems in the region. Where they have succeeded, as in Poland. progress has been accelerating; where they have failed. as in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. savage war has been the result. Great issues still hang in the balance. Just east of our AOR, in Russia, the survival of a moderate democratic regime is not yet assured. Everywhere in the region, organized crime attacks the rule of law and undermines the very foundations of democratic society. Nuclear smuggling has added new and dangerous dimensions to both traditional criminality and terrorism.

Our contribution to the development of militaries appropriate to democratic societies-on the national level-and of a transparent and stable security environment--on the international level-undergirds and accelerates a process that is clearly in our national interest.

Although our role is less immediate, we also participate as directed by the NCA in current regional anti-crime efforts. This criminal activity is a trans-national danger as revealed by recent incidents of nuclear smuggling. It also attacks American citizens directly through narco-trafficking. Winning the fight against international crime is required for the establishment of the rule of law and true democracy here. Losing it will have direct and negative effects on freedom and prosperity in our own nation.

MIDDLE EAST AND THE NORTHAFRICAN LITTORAL

A primarily maritime region, the Middle East and the North African littoral are a vital U.S. national interest both as a strategically significant military and commercial line of communication and as the locus of enduring political commitment. Vast quantities of conventional weaponry, much of it highly advanced, make the combination of ancient and intiansigent conflicts and radical political forces in this region explosive. To this dangerous mix has been added the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This environment has spawned both organized crime and terrorism on a large scale. U.S. forward presence is embodied in the Sixth Fleet and the network of U.S. bases.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Although there is no permanent U.S. military presence, the U.S. has significant ties to this vast and geographically isolated region. The well-being of those living in it is threatened not only by conflicts among states, but by the disintegration of the states themselves. Those problems are compounded by environmental disaster, disease, organized crime, and

economic decline. As our efforts in Rwanda have shown, U.S. military engagement can be constructive by providing a quick response which gives other agencies time to tackle the fundamental problems. The emergence of South Africa as a democratic regional power has a potentially beneficial effect on all the nations in the region.

SUMMARY

USEUCOM is both a theater in conflict and a theater in transition. The transnational dangers of ethnic conflict, organized crime, and terrorism, spreading from pockets in the AOR which are congenial to them, threaten both this whole area and the U.S. itself. Three of the four major regions of the AOR are the scene of actual and potential armed conflict at various levels. In the fourth, Western Europe, which forms the foundation of our presence, fundamental change for the better in the security environment has also created possibilities that demand our continued care and utmost vigilance. We have a historic opportunity to create a stable, free, and democratic Europe. How well USEUCOM and the United States engages in the next five years will determine the true security of the United States and Europe well into the 21st Century.

III. USEUCOM THEATER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

OVERVIEW

The National *Military* Strategy establishes two national military strategic objectives:

"promoting stability;" and

"thwarting aggression."

These can be adopted without change as USEUCOM's overarching theater military strategic objectives.



Figure 1

Promoting stability requires USEUCOM to influence daily the complex interaction of many nations in Peacetime and must be conceptualized region by region. *Thwarting aggression* rests on a set of capabilities which are essentially the same no matter where in the AOR we have to employ them, and is best described in terms of the theater as a whole. For all objectives. we have developed standards which the CINC uses to track our progress.

PROMOTING STABILITY

Western Europe and NATO

MAINTAIN. SUPPORT, AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION: Stability in Europe can only be achieved if we keep NATO able to affect what happens in the AOR. Our major effort must be to ensure NATO's viability into the next century. Without it, the U.S. loses its integrated presence in Europe. one of the most wealthy and powerful regions of the world, and a significant proportion of its force projection capability to other parts of the USEUCOM AOR and to CENTCOM. The failure of NATO would expose Americans and Europeans to the dangers of both the renationalization of defense and a re-emerged military threat from the east. It would also rapidly erode the foundation of stability and trust which underlies the remarkable

political and economic vitality that the entire North Atlantic community has enjoyed since the end of the Second World War.

Central and Eastern Europe

PROMOTE STABILITY. DEMOCRATIZATION, AND MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: To resolve the numerous actual and potential conflicts of this region peacefully, we must help develop military institutions that are sufficient for their nations' needs and reasonably transparent to their neighbors. The new economies and democracies of this region can ill-afford the enormous burdens imposed by rearmament based on the requirements of unilateral defense.

In democracy, governmental agencies play different roles and have a different relationship to one another and to the nation's citizens than they do in a totalitarian regime. This is emphatically the case for defense agencies, and the roles they are expected to play are both new and very complex. Responsiveness to civilian authority and responsible resource management require particular organizational attitudes and large cadres of specially trained experts. We encourage developments in a democratic direction, even as we recognize that the ultimate response to these challenges turns on the decisions of the citizens of the nations concerned.

ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: In one area, the violent forces of prolonged and remorseless combat have created a situation which requires special objectives. USEUCOM supports achieving the overarching goal of containing the conflict in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia by completing missions directed by the National Command Authority. Achieving this goal is of major interest to both Europe and the United States. History has shown the explosive potential of Balkan violence-if it spreads beyond its current borders it could threaten both our allies and stability throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The surest and best way to contain the conflict permanently is to achieve a negotiated settlement that causes all parties to pursue their various objectives through means other than force of arms. Once this objective have been achieved, then this area, too, can join the progress of the rest of Central and Eastern Europe toward democracy and free market economies.

Middle East and the North African Littoral

SUPPORT THE PEACE INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: Conflicts in this region are deeply rooted. They are not likely to be resolved quickly. Resolute U.S. engagement has achieved progress. and USEUCOM can provide the foundation for a large spectrum of possible U.S. actions. It is in our interest, and in the interests of the nations and peoples involved, that progress continue without resort to armed force, the threat of armed force, or terrorist violence.

ENSURE FREEDOM OF MARITIME AND AERONAUTIC LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC): The advantages of this region as a line of communication are so great economically that they contribute to prosperity, and hence stability, in the entire northern part of the USEUCOM AOR and in the U.S. itself. The availability of these LOC's also helps us to thwart *aggression.* should the need arise.

Sub-Saharan Africa

ASSIST HOST NATIONS IN AFRICA IN DEMOCRATIZATION: Military establishments are a necessary part of a modern state, but they can easily become destructive of its well-being and that of its citizens. The beleaguered nations of sub-Saharan Africa can not afford the costs of inefficient militaries or the depredations of undisciplined ones. The development of just and effective governments has been repeatedly hindered in this region by the actions of military organizations which decided to translate their hold on physical power into political power. USEUCOM will focus the resources it has available for this

region to help militaries take a constructive part in the building of democratic nations.

PROVIDE PROMPT RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: Humanitarian crises as large as the one in 1994 in Rwanda are likely to occur in this region in the future. Sometimes the scale and nature of the crisis and the urgency of the need mean that only military capabilities can prevent widespread loss of life. In such situations, USEUCOM must be able to respond and stabilize the situation until other agencies can be mobilized.

THWARTING AGGRESSION

Although ***promoting stability*** takes much of our day-to-day attention. thwarting aggression is our most important overall objective. Our role in the AOR depends on it, and our presence is welcome ultimately because of our ability and willingness to achieve it-by combat if necessary. The *National Military Strategy* (NMS) makes the point explicitly:

> *Being ready to fight and win the Nation's wars remains our foremost* ***responsibility.***

While the United States maintains the unilateral capability to wage decisive campaigns to protect U.S. and multinational security interests, our forces will most often fight in concert with our regional friends and allies, since coalitions can greatly increase combat power and lead to a more rapid and favorable outcome. In the EUCOM theater, thwarting aggression requires above all that we maintain a high state of readiness in EUCOM forces.

Maintain a High State of Readiness in EUCOM Forces

We never lose sight of the fact that USEUCOM's ability to apply devastating military power anywhere in the AOR is its main reason for existence and the foundation of all its other activities. That ability requires EUCOM forces which are in a high state of readiness. The CINC's Training Guidance provides the foundation for conducting training that produces readiness, and readiness provides the cornerstone for achieving additional critical objectives.

MAINTAIN THE ABILITY TO FIGHT AND WIN DECISIVELY: Recent history has witnessed serious military conflicts which were not foreseen. In an area of responsibility as large and as full of confrontation as the USEUCOM AOR. it is imperative for the U.S. to respond quickly to threats to our national interest. Initially. we will be largely dependent on in-theater assets. The ability quickly to employ military force on a large scale is a prerequisite of credible presence and of solving crises at a lower level of violence. Under some circumstances. a mission may require the rapid disengagement of forces committed to lesser regional contingencies; under others, we will require ways of countering the possible use of weapons of mass destruction.

PRESERVE CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITY: USEUCOM must and will maintain the ability to conduct various types of operations in the gray zone between peace and war. Peace support operations of various sorts are conducted on an on-going basis by EUCOM forces, as is sanctions enforcement. In addition. our government assumes responsibility for the safety of U.S. nationals outside of their country. Should the evacuation of non-combatants become necessary anywhere in the AOR, USEUCOM must be prepared to conduct it rapidly and successfully.

PROVIDE RECEPTION AND ONWARD MOVEMENT OF FORCES: U.S. and NATO infrastructure in Western Europe, both for training and for transportation, provides an indispensable pan of our ability to fight in the AOR and to support force projection capabilities to other parts of the world.

IV. USEUCOM STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

OVERVIEW

The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) prescribes a strategy of "engagement and enlargement." From this, the *National* Military *Strategy derives a three* part strategy based on "peacetime engagement." "deterrence and conflict prevention," and "fighting and winning our Nation's wars" USEUCOM's strategy, which we call "'Active Engagement and Preparedness," divides into similar strategic concepts: *engage in peace*-time; respond to crisis; and fight to *win.*



Figure 2

USEUCOM organization focuses on the last concept; most of our forces spend most of their time and resources ensuring that they are able to fight to win with the decisiveness that the American people expect of their aimed forces. This is a traditional military role and our most important purpose. Our ability to do it is a necessary foundation for all other activi-*ties. Engage* in *peacetime is* a forward-looking concept that attempts to shape the security environment to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. On balance, it probably produces more impact per dollar than any other kind of activity. *Respond to crisis serves both* overarching USEUCOM strategic objectives: it *promotes* stability and it thwarts aggression. It takes on many different forms in the AOR; it drives our high tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) and daily puts Americans in harm's way. Our implementation of this strategic concept fundamentally changes the security environment in the short term. These three USEUCOM strategic concepts are discussed individually below.

In implementing our strategy. we strive to work in concert with our allies and friends. The discipline imposed by the need to build agreement usually improves our policy, and serious contact with the views of others deep ens our understanding. *When we* reach *policy* implementation, our power of all sorts is increased by the participation of others.

In all cases, though, leadership is required, and that role most often falls to the United States. To lead effectively, we must both express clearly a vision of what is to be *achieved,* and provide a significant proportion of the resources required. Often we will be acting energetically at the vanguard of a common policy.

Finally, the United States maintains the ability to act unilaterally, as do other sovereign nations.

The strategic concept *engage in* peacetime takes different forms in each of the four regions of the AOR The two other concepts, respond to *crisis* and *fight* to *win,* can be discussed with reference to the entire AOR.

ENGAGE IN PEACETIME

Engage in peace time looks toward the future and uses military resources in nontraditional ways to mold the security environment in the AOR. Beginning from the baseline of confidence and security building measures, and the implementation of various treaties and accords (e.g., the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Vienna Document 1994), it

encompasses a wide range of bilateral and multilateral activities. They are all designed to preclude armed conflict by enhancing security cooperation and interaction. Since achievement of this goal is not guaranteed, we simultaneously seek to prepare the conditions for success should actual warfighting become necessary. Because it is based on interaction with individual nations, engage ***in peacetime*** is different for each region.

Western Europe and NATO

Robust American presence here sustains our presence and our policies in the rest of the AOR. Even though we have enjoyed nearly fifty years of military, economic, and diplomatic benefits from our relationship with the countries in this region. we do not take that relationship for granted. Our peacetime engagement keeps the relationship strong and effective.

STRENGTHEN NATO: NATO is the formal political and military organization which embodies the very strong informal community of interest which we have with our traditional European allies. We must continue to strengthen NATO through encouraging the appropriate evolution of its command and control structure, providing our fair share of the military forces required, supporting the NATO Security Investment Program, participating in all aspects of NATO operations. and making NATO our agency of choice for all multinational military activities in this region. We support NATO as the prime organization through which all member nations conduct their military outreach to the new democracies of the former Warsaw Pact. Because its military capabilities are unique for an intemational organization, NATO's working as an agent for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the UN is an important contribution to stability outside of NATO territory.

MAINTAIN BlLATERAL INTERACTION WITH FRIENDLY DEMOCRATIC NEUTRALS IN THE REGION: These countries, although formally neutral, have close ties with the U.S. and we will continue to work IO intensify the interchange on the military level. Partnership for Peace has brought many of these nations closer to NATO and opened the way for closer multilateral relationships. a process which we encourage.

MAINTAIN A NETWORK OF BASES THAT CAN SUPPORT FORCE PROJECTION TO AND BEYONDTHE REGIOn: The primary significance of these bases comes in their role in responding to crisis and fighting to win. Establishing these bases, maintaining them. and deploying to them. however, are all activities which strengthen the effects of our presence and produce beneficial interaction with host nations.

COOPERATE ON MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT. ACQUISITION, AND MAINTENANCE: Because technological and industrial capabilities are similar, Western Europe and the U.S. cooperate on the development, acquisition, and maintenance of military materiel through defense cooperation agreements and security assistance programs. These programs offer economies of scale. enhance interoperability, and bring all parties closer to one another. USEUCOM executes many of these programs for the Department of State and for the Department of Defense; in either case we pursue them vigorously. because they promote security through enhanced cooperation.

Central and Eastern Europe

STRENGTHEN PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE Partnership for Peace (Pfp) can become the Marshall Plan of the new European security environment if we pursue its goals tenaciously. PfP engages with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to promote stability with progress toward democracy. In doing so, NATO is developing common standards, procedures, and doctrine with new partners and leveraging partner assets in future peace engagement operations. We participate in this program energetically, and President Clinton's Warsaw Initiative seeks very significant material resources to accelerate this effort. We participate in PfP exercises, and in exercises

with partners in the spirit of PfP. to the extent that the partners desire this activity and our own resources allow. The first steps on the long road to functional interoperability have already been taken. and we are eager to move further. We expect PfP to help tear down the barriers raised by more than forty years of propaganda, and to create the conditions of mutual security in an environment of military sufficiency and transparency.

PURSUE OPPORTUNITIES FOR BILATERAL MIL-TO-MIL EVENTS WHICH FURTHER THE AlMS OF PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: Bilateral activities undertaken in the spirit of PfP and in pursuit of partnership goals can quickly produce real progress. The USEUCOM Joint Contact Team Program. the George C Marshall Center for European Security Studies. and some bilateral and multilateral exercises fall into this category. Such activities give the Partners the opportunity for contact with our military system and perhaps equally important, the opportunity to come to know Americans on an individual basis. As relationships among the new partners deepen, the more traditional forms of security assistance are likely to come increasingly into play, as are other forms of defense cooperation of the sort conducted among current NATO members.

CONTINUE ARMS CONTROL: The arms control process that we have today is a result of agreements often reached by parties in an adversarial relationship. Implementation of those agreements still furthers military sufficiency and transparency. Importantly. it also keeps those agreements viable for use should international relationships. against our hopes. expectations. and best efforts. once again become adversarial.

Middle East and North Africa

SUSTAIN AMERICAN PRESENCE THROUGH PERIODIC FORCE DEPLOYMENTS In most cases, permanent stationing of American units in this region is difficult. By periodic force deployments we underline both our will and our capability to protect our Interests. By the same token, we enhance our capability to support the peace process.

ENCOURAGE MILITARY TRANSPARENCY: Confidence that no nation is about to attack another facilitates a meaningful dialogue on conflict resolution. Although intentions are essentially impossible to gauge. capability assessments can be made with a degree of accuracy. When nations cooperate with one another in making such assessments, or even better, agree on some form of arms control, they lay the basis for a peaceful interaction that can reduce and ultimately eliminate conflicts which threaten peace.

Sub-Saharan Africa

FOCUS RESOURCES: In this large, complex. and distant region our resources are not equal to all the projects we would like to undertake. For that reason we systematically focus our efforts where we feel that they can make a difference.

SUSTAlN FORWARD PRESENCE: Our presence in this region is very limited. Port visits, combined exercises. and visits by general officers play an important role in maintaining our relationships and influence. Security assistance in all its forms is often the prime form of our interaction with the nations of this region.

RESPOND TO CRISIS

The NCA directs USEUCOM response to crises in some cases because our response is the only way to prevent massive loss of life, and because in other crises early response can rectify an unsatisfactory situation or preclude the development of one in which fight to win is the only effective course of action.

Respond to crisis involves humanitarian operations. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). sanctions enforcement, and the whole spectrum of peace support operations. It is the prime reason for USEUCOM's high OPTEMPO. Often it supports the objective of promoting stability; sometimes it is intended to thwart aggression by threatening to use or

actually applying U.S. military power against actions which we regard as endangering our vital interests. It may even be structured as a prelude to the implementation of our third strategic concept, fight to win.

In all cases, we will attempt to complete our action in the shortest possible time. Commitment of U.S. forces to a crisis normally detracts from their training and readiness; consumes resources; and limits flexibility and speed of response elsewhere.

In some cases. our actions are designed purely to relieve human suffering resulting either from natural disaster or from man-made catastrophes. USEUCOM forces are committed when significant loss of life threatens to happen so quickly that no other agency can respond in time, and where a reasonable degree of security for our forces can be assured. We use primarily our logistic capability to conduct these missions and we use it to stave off great loss of life until other agencies better suited to this work can be mobilized.

NEOs are a special kind of humanitarian mission in that they are designed to preserve American lives. They differ from other humanitarian missions also because they are conducted in what is by definition an unfriendly environment (although it may still be permissive) and because the application of military force may be required to accomplish the mission. Speed, planning, organization. and a high degree of flexibility are all required to accomplish NEOs successfully. Although they can be very demanding, they are by nature of short duration, and therefore do not tie up critical resources for a long time.

Peace support operations of all sorts do tend to tie up critical resources for a long time. This is because the military objectives that will achieve the stated political goals are hard to define, and because the desired political end state often requires processes that advance slowly. In addition, peace support operations often produce situations of asymmetry-we are likely to be opposed by actors very deeply committed to their cause.

In USEUCOM's theater in conflict we are employing a whole range of measures against these challenges.

Our forces stand sentry where aggression is possible. but has not yet occurred, demonstrating our concern and involvement.

Elsewhere. we have established a protected region. exploiting the clear national and geographic definition of the aggressor to prevent his access to that area and to conduct humanitarian and limited society building operations within it.

Sometimes we have established limited sanctuaries by preventing the application of certain kinds of military force where geographic intermingling has made complete separation of the combatants impractical. We have also diminished the suffering caused by aggression by providing humanitarian aid in ways no one else could.

Where we have identified a nation state as surreptitiously pursuing expansionist policies by supporting aggression on the part of a different group, we have used sanctions enforcement to limit that state's ability to do harm and to encourage openness to diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict.

In other cases. we have consciously limited our objectives. preserving life and establishing an infrastructure until others became able to continue the life-support mission over the long term.

In implementing civilian political direction to respond to *crisis.* there are several principles which we wish to observe:

before committing forces. clearly define political and military objectives that will lead to the desired military and political end state;

once forces are committed to a mission, do not change it incrementally-in other words, "avoid mission creep;"

define a chain of command, missions, and rules of engagement that allow commanders to size the force properly and pursue objectives actively; and

pursue missions which only military forces can accomplish. once they are accomplished. disengage.

CLEARLY DEFINE POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES THAT WILL LEAD TO THE DESIRED MlLITARY AND POLITICAL END STATE. In peace support operations this can be even more difficult than in traditional fight to win conflict situations. The "enemy" can be difficult to define, and he has a great interest in making himself that way; the actual enemy force will camouflage its very existence to the extent that it can. and is likely to deploy in such a way as to make collateral damage hard to avoid. Limited time will be available to analyze these problems. It is all the more important that we observe this principle, since, particularly in the case of an astute enemy. the first point of his own strategy will be to cause us to forget it.

ONCE FORCES ARE COMMITTED TO A MISSION, DO NOT CHANGE IT INCREMENTALLY-IN OTHER WORDS, 'AVOID MISSION CREEP." Even if the first principle is scrupulously observed, actual contact with a situation will reveal a whole range of ways in which it might be possible for us to do some good. Bitter experience has shown that succumbing to the temptation to do more leads to disaster. As a rule of thumb, we do not change the mission of an engaged force at all unless. after consultation with and direction from the appropriate civilian decision makers, we do it in a major way. If another mission is envisioned-e.g.. peacekeeping to peace enforcement-then the force commander must size and organize the force accordingly before it is committed.

DEFINE MISSIONS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT THAT ALLOW COMMANDERS TO SIZETHE FORCE PROPERLY AND PURSUE OBJECTIVES ACTIVELY. This principle is valid for conventional warfighting and is even more valid for peace support operations. In the latter case. though. it is more difficult to follow. Our participation in peace support operations often produces an asymmetrical conflict because our antagonists normally have a great deal more at stake than do we. Consequently, a waiting game always works to our disadvantage. It ties up committed forces and consumes resources without achieving anything to resolve the crisis. Furthermore, whenever we expose any kind of American military power to enemy fire and order it, in essence, to wait for the enemy to do something, we invite American casualties.

For all these reasons, we must retain the initiative if we are to conduct peace support operations successfully. Knowing that we are in a position to observe this principle will be a major factor in USEUCOM's recommending the use of American military forces in the first place.

PURSUE MISSIONS WHICH ONLY MlLITARY FORCES CAN ACCOMPLISH; ONCE THEY ARE ACCOMPLISHED, DISENGAGE. In relation to the scale and urgency of possible missions to be accomplished, our military forces are among our most scarce national resources. lt makes sense to employ them only when no satisfactory alternative exists, and to withdraw them from a crisis as soon as they have established the conditions in which other agencies can be effective.

FIGHT TO WIN

Fight to win is our most important strategic concept. The fact that it is known to be in our overall strategy, and that we demonstrate the capability to implement it, is the key to our welcome and our influence in every region in the AOR. In peacetime or in crisis, we will always be preparing to fight to win. We will:

Maintain ready forces;

Enhance our interoperability with allies and friends;

Prepare for the reception of additional forces;

Maintain adequate infrastructure and host nation agreements; and

Modernize.

MAINTAIN READY FORCES: Military proficiency. particularly at unit Ievel, is challenging to attain, and, once attained, extremely perishable. Formally. equipping and (mining forces is the responsibility of the military services, represented in USEUCOM by the components. We support the components both in Congress and in the Department of Defense in the acquisition of resources. But the unique character of the USEUCOM AOR mandates an active role for the CINC in training issues. His Training Guidance sets the principles and priorities of training in the command. Training in USEUCOM is designed to produce the highest levels of readiness for combat in its forces and in rotational forces. At the same time, our combined exercise programs are conducted in such a way that they promote democratization and help achieve regional stability: they develop and demonstrate real military capability, and by showing how demanding and strict discipline can be combined with the highest respect for the rights and dignity of the individual. they exemplify one of the most important foundations of democratic society. Readiness includes the capability to counter the acquisition and/or use of WMDs and to fight in a WMD-dominated environment.

ENHANCE OUR INTEROPERABILITY WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDS: It is extremely likely that any future conflict is going to be fought by the U.S. as a combined operation. Our effectiveness is enhanced, our own responsibilities reduced, and our victory made more decisive when we fight as part of an alliance or coalition. In order to make the best use of the forward-deployed forces available and to overcome the formidable technical problems associated with combined operations, we consciously pursue interoperability with allies and friends. This includes conducting combined exercises. developing doctrine together, formalizing agreements on how we operate with one another. sharing technology. and using common consumables and hardware.

We will continue to fulfill our NATO responsibilities by providing critical intelligence and communication support, much of the nuclear force that guarantees European security, a strong in-theater presence, and key leadership.

PREPARE FOR THE RECEPTION OF ADDITIONAL FORCES: To win a conventional conflict decisively. USEUCOM may need additional forces. Integrating such forces rapidly and efficiently into the force structure already present requires thorough planning, the advance identification of units likely to be sent, and the preparation of those units through training and equipping for the kinds of missions they would accomplish in fighting in the AOR. In particular. we welcome the constant flow of Reserve and National Guard component forces in our peacetime engagement and warfighting strategy. Such infusion of reserve units permits needed exercise of reception capabilities and clearly assists in offsetting high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO.

MAINTAIN ADEQUATE INFRASTRUCTURE AND HOST NATION AGREEMENTS: At the beginning of any conventional conflict stand huge logistic challenges. These can be met satisfactorily only if USEUCOM in peacetime has carefully developed and maintained a network of bases for force projection. and developed basing and transit agreements with the nations of the AOR in advance.

MODERNIZE: Training and equipping of forces, including modernization. is the responsibility of the services. USEUCOM, however, has the responsibility to make its needs known, and to support modernization projects which are of particular significance for the AOR. Along with the other unified commands, USEUCOM often becomes one of the prime advocates of systems that enhance jointness. and is among the more influential organizations demanding systems whose service assignment has not yet been determined. We work through the formal mechanisms of the Planning, Programming. and Budgeting System (PPBS). through the Quarterly Issues and Activities report. and through informal communication at all levels to give our views weight inside the Department of Defense; we work through JCS/LA to make our concerns known to Congress.

+V. RESOURCES

OVERVIEW

The wisest objectives and the most ingenious strategies are of no use without resources. USEUCOM requires adequate resources in the categories of:

Funding;

Forces; and

Infrastructure.

FUNDING

USEUCOM components, working through the services and the PPBS. request the funding they need to meet their responsibilities for training and quipping their forcer. and for conducting operations which can be foreseen.

Figure 3

During the development of the President's budget, USEUCOM supports its components in the PPBS system through the CINC's Integrated Priority List (IPL), the Defense Resources Board (DRB), and the Program Budget Decision cycle. During the Congressional budget cycle we also provide input to members of Congress and congressional committees on subjects of importance to USEUCOM on which we possess special expertise.

As a consequence of our crisis response concept, we conduct many operations which can not be foreseen. To accomplish these, the components are forced to mortgage their readiness in the hope of eventual reimbursement We will work for the establishment of a funding mechanism that will support contingency operations without putting at risk the ongoing programs we have planned and which Congress expects us to carry out.

FORCES

Personnel

We believe that the current congressional mandate of approximately 100,000 service members in our AOR gives us adequate personnel strength to meet NCA tasking, support commitments to NATO, and respond to crises as described in this strategy. As a purely resource issue, the forces must continue to be large enough to:

secure our leadership position in NATQ;

continue training at appropriate levels with our allies, both in and out of NATO;

permit rapid response to regional contingencies; and

maintain infrastructure to support reinforcement and force projection capability.

SECURE OUR LEADERSHIP POSITION IN NATO: Our leadership position in NATO is secured in part by our force contribution. If we are Seen as a minority partner in terms of what we contribute in military capability, our leadership position in the Alliance will be at risk.

CONTINUE TRAINING AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS WITH OUR ALLIES, BOTH IN AND OUT OF NATO: We expect to fight as part of a coalition or alliance. The ability to do that well comes only from extensive practice. The size of the forces and headquarters here must be adequate to support training at the levels at which we employ combined units.

QUICKLY RESPOND AND REINFORCE : *Fighting to Win* requires the ability to form a capable force in the AOR on short notice. Reinforcing an existing structure already in the command is many times faster than reconstructing an organization which at the start of the crisis has major pieces missing

Equipment

High quality equipment is a hallmark of American forces. Providing it is the responsibility of the services. We support the deployment of modem technology to the AOR. to include technologies useful for countering the acquisition and/or use of WMD and their delivery systems Modem equipment supports all aspects of our strategy by increasing our presence and by giving us the ability IO win conflicts with minimum loss of American life and in a very short time.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Respond to Crsis and *Fight* to *Win* require an enormous force projection capability. Unless we already have basing infrastructure and host nation support in place, our ability to act will be hampered by our inability IO support. The NATO Security Investment Program is the least expensive way we have of attaining this capability.

VI. QUALITY OF LIFE

Quality of life is a category by itself because it is simultaneously an objective and a strategy.

Quality of life is an objective because maintaining decent standards of living for our service members is an end worthy of pursuit in itself. It is a strategy because over the long term it is the key IO recruiting and retaining high quality service members.

Of all our diverse military assets, there is none more impressive than American service members. These citizens volunteer for difficult and dangerous jobs with their eyes open. Their motive is patriotism. and they bring talent and commitment to the nation our of proponion IO the monetary recompense we offer. They will perform their missions IO the highest standard regardless of the Quality of Life we offer. But if we continually put their families in an environment of inadequate housing. inaccessible medical support. and insufficient day care, they will not stay when they have fulfilled their commitment. And, as the word spreads back home. their younger cohorts will be discouraged from volunteering to join. Finally. Quality of Life is an integral part of the readiness of the force and must be factored into our assessment of USEUCOM's mission potential.

No part of this strategy is feasible without the contribution of American service members. Maintaining a wholesome quality of life for them IS our responsibility: it is also the foundation of our future success.

VII. SUMMARY

This strategy document is derived directly from the Nutional Military, Strategy and other national guidance. We face a security environment of great complexity and conflict in the four regions of the AOR. We have IWO overaching military strategic objectives and we translate them into appropriate regional objectives. We have three major strategic concepts. Engage in peacetime is our most forward-looking concept, because through it we try IO mold the security environment for a better future, consciously using military forces and resources in proactive ways to reduce the likehood of future armed conflict We have adopted respond to crisis because the dynamic international security environment inevitably provides Instances of aggression which in themselves produce great injustice and. if left unchecked, can lead to much wider conflict And we remember that we must always be prepared to fight to win because that capability undergirds our presence and all our other efforts; because it is the ultimate guarantor of our country's well being. Implementing our strategic concepts requires forces. infrastructure, and funding. As both an objective and a strategic concept we strive IO achieve an appropriate Quality of Life for our service members.

The European Comnand stands ready to support the national security objectives of the United States of America. As an integral part of NATO. as a crisis response force in Europe. Africa, and the Middle East, or as a force that can fight and win. We are a forward-deployed force: we are a clear symbol of American commitment and resolve in times if instability, and uncertainty: we are a visible representation of American values and ideals and respect for individual dignity We are one team-Army Air Force. Nay, Marines, and dedicated civilians-committed to a clear vision and a mission. ONE TEAM-ONE FIGHT!

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 1. European Strategic Environment

Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 1. Command Relationships: U.S. European Command



From Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1,The Joint Officer's Guide. 1993 National Defense Uiversity, figure 2-15

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. European Operational Situation

SCOPE

This lesson provides the bridge from the European strategic environment you studied in lesson 1 to the tactical environment where you will plan division operations in lessons 3, 4, and 5

The lesson examines three aspects of the operational environment The first aspect IS the threat in our scenario-the Krasnovians. You will study notional Krasnovian operational-level doctrine, a generic Soviet-style heavy opposing force (OPFOR). The second aspect is an overview of air operations in a NATO environment, paying attention to peculiarities of air employment The third aspect is an examination of the operatronal level of war with an overview of the scenario used to support this subcourse The Instrument for the overview is an operational-level war plan, LANDCENT Operation Plan (OPLAN) CRASHING FIST This plan together with Information on the Krasnovian forces operational and logistics status supplied in appendixes to this lesson, will give you information needed to solve the tactical problems presented in lessons 4 and 5. This lesson begins a process carried forward and completed by subsequent S320A lessons You should complete this lesson with a sufficient level of comprehension to employ this knowledge during development and analysis of tactical courses of action This lesson builds on knowledge learned earlier during tactics instruction it introduces the organization capabilities and doctrine of Krasnovian army- and front-level employment

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

A 11 TASK: Explain the command structure. organizational concepts and command relationships applicable to U S military forces in selected joint and combined commands.

CONDITION Given a written requirement with references

STANDARD The explanation must include the command structure, organizational concepts. and command relationships applicable to U.S. military forces in selected joint and combined commands IAW student issue material and study requirements.

LEVEL Comprehension

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: 1b, 1c. 3a. 3e. and 5c

A 20 TASK Describe employment of offensive air support (OAS) in support of a division

CONDITION. Acting as a staff officer in a heavy division reinforcing NATO's Central Region, given a written requirement, with references.

STANDARD. Description must include NATO'S Central Region air tasking process, OASs two missions, preplanned OAS request procedures, immediate OAS request procedures, and in accordance with lesson material and S310.

LEVEL. Knowledge

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: 1a, 1b, 3a, and 3c

B.10 TASK Describe Soviet-style operational art

CONDITION: Given a written requirement, with references

STANDARD. Description must address the following IAW ST 100-7, student notes, and assigned readings

LEVEL: Knowledge

The Importance of Soviet-style operational art in regard to military science; the importance of surprise and deception to operational planners, the primary forms of maneuver; the emphasis on maneuver, depth, and mass at the operational level, the concept of combined arms operations; emphasis on encirclement and envelopment, and the Importance of troop control at the operational level

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVE. 1b, 2b, and 3a

B 11 TASK. Describe the conduct of Soviet-style army- and front-level offensive operations

CONDITION Given a scenario with a Soviet-style front-level offensive operational plan and a written requirement, with references

STANDARD Description must address primary forms of operational maneuver, missions and planning considerations, and echelonment of army-and front-level units in the Soviet-style It must also address consideration of the preparedness of enemy defenses, the mission and composition of operational-level forward detachment, and deep attack capabilities in Soviet-style operations Description must be in accordance with ST 100-7, student notes. and assigned readings

LEVEL Knowledge

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVE. 1b, 2b, and 3a

B 12 TASK: Describe the conduct of Soviet-style army and front-level defensive operations

CONDITION Given a scenario with a Soviet-style front-level offensive operational plan and a written requirement, with references

STANDARD. Description must address the reasons for assuming the defense, transition to the defense, organization and composition of Soviet-style operational-level defense, and the allocaton of assets at the operational level defense in accordance with ST 100-7. student notes and assigned readings.

LEVEL: Knowledge

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVE: 1b, 2b, and 3a.

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use the lesson guide to help you achieve the lesson learning objectives. Follow the instructions in the lesson guide and read the materials listed below at the suggested time When you complete a reading, return to the appropriate place in the lesson guide and continue to follow the instructions.

READINGS:

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2 General Situation and First Practical Exercise

Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. Krasnovian Order of Battle

Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2 Krasnovian Doctrine

Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. LANDCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) 31201 (CRASHING FIST)

Appendix 5 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. Air Operations in NATO

Appendix 6 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. Solution to Practical Exercise

ST 100-7

LESSON GUIDE

INTRODUCTION

The thickness of this lesson does not indicate how long it will take you to work the lesson. It contains refrence material that you will use for other lessons. Take a moment to flip through the lesson materials.

- The lesson guide itself is 25 pages long. It should be easy reading.

- Appendix 1 is a practical exercise that will take you about 15 to 20 minutes to work if you read and understand the lesson guide materials.

- Appendix 2 is a Krasnovian order of battle and appendix 3 is a Krasnovian doctrine guide You will use these guides as reference material.

- Appendix 4 is LANDCENT Contingency Operation Plan CRASHING FIST (COP 31201). The plan contains essential higher headquarters and background information.

- Appendix 5 is an overview of offensive air support operations in NATO. Some NATO procedures differ from U.S. national doctrine. This overview provides a quick description of the system you will use during the rest of S320A

- Appendix 6 is a solution to the practical exercise presented in appendix 1,

This subcourse is written to make the materials as manageable as possible. Work the lesson in accordance with lesson guide and you should find it very manageable

This IS the first opportunity for you to transition from notional force employment in Kansas to an example of how forces might be employed a theater of war. The S320A scenario is presented in a post-Cold War European setting.

The setting and the scenario are *purely notional.* It is difficult to envision war in Europe today involving large-scale operational forces. For the study of combat operations, the scenario offers learning opportunities for comprehending the flow of forces to a theater and the subsequent employment of those forces In this lesson, you will examine aspects of the operational environment that will provide you the Information necessary to plan combat operations in the following lessons.

You learned basic tactical procedures and terminology in S310A and S310B. Now you will study tactical operations in a European environment Later, as you take more phases of the nonresident CGSOC, you will have the opportunity to employ forces in yet different operational environments By using different forces in different environments, you will improve your understanding of tactics.

This IS also useful to you in the near term This instruction directly supports lessons 4 and 5. If you understand Soviet-style employment doctrine, you will be able to develop courses of action against a heavy OPFOR, the Krasnovians

In this lesson, you will examine Soviet-style operational-level operations, review what employment factors are different in Europe from other areas (especially employment of allied airpower), and then look at the tactical scenario used for the rest of S320A First, you will examine Soviet-style doctrine (the principles they followed to employ military force) for planning their operations and organizing their forces. Then you will examine how they put their doctrine into execution, both offensively and defensively. Recall S510 and S620. and remember the distinctions made between operations and tactics. Well, the Soviets were leaders in that distinction

To a military professional who studied Soviet-style war-fighting and military thought, operations and tactics have two very distinct meanings. Operations involve forces of front or army level; that is, forces probably tailored for a specific mission Tactics on the other hand, involves combat actions of forces at division level and below You studied tactical-level operations during lesson 1 of S310B.

It IS also Important to remember that changes in the world situation during the past few years have caused us to take another look at potential threats to U.S. national security and the security of our friends. Whereas a few years ago we had a well-defined threat, today we have an ambiguous situation with extreme political sensitivities Involved Our primary adversary used to be the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact We studied Soviet doctrine and developed tactics, techniques and procedures to defeat Warsaw Pact forces using that doctrine Now the Warsaw Pact is no more. But the Soviet-style doctrine remains alive and well and it is used by many countries throughout the world.

This combat operations course has a threat force that uses Soviet-style doctrine We must emphasize the term Soviet-style" not Russian doctrine. The Egyptian Army uses Soviet-style doctrine, and it is not perceived as a threat to US national security today In fact, Egypt is a close ally. The Egyptians were influenced by the Soviets for many years and adopted their doctrine. The Iraqi Army uses Soviet-style doctrine When you stop to think about it, there are two predominant doctrines used by many armies throughout the world US -style and Soviet-style. You don't change your doctrine like you change a piece of equipment It takes years to educate leaders in a doctrine. As you complete this course, don't assume that there IS any hidden meaning in the use of Soviet-style doctrine. The notional Krasnovian threat portrayed in S320A IS merely a heavy OPFOR that uses Soviet-style doctrine

Soviet-Style Operations

Several concepts developed and practiced by former Soviet Army theorists are key to the conduct of warfare at the operational and tactical levels. Some of these concepts are formal principles of Soviet operational art and tactics; some are just key concepts of warfighting. You will examine the most important of these concepts starting with a review of their conceptual-framework.

Since this block of instruction builds on the tactical-level instruction you received in lesson 1 of S310B and is parallel in presentation, it will go quickly. To speed understanding, you will see some graphics that are very similar to what you saw in S310B. There are many differences between the tactical and operational levels; unfortunately (or fortunately depending on your views), you will not have time to delve deeply into the subject of Soviet-style operational art. Your study will be limited to those points necessary to understand the subsequent instruction.

Soviet-Style Doctrine

For years, the Soviets had a single unified military doctrine to guide their armed forces. This doctrine was primarily an offensive one. When they declared a new “defensive” military doctrine in 1987, their doctrine changed to a more balanced focus between offense and defense. Certain force structure changes began about this time as well, although the resulting structure proved no less offensively capable than the previous structure.

In the Soviet conceptual framework, military doctrine was the highest level of military thought. It encompassed a broad spectrum of activities. Directly subordinate to military doctrine was military science that investigated all phenomena related to warfighting. This investigation included fields such as troop control, military geography, history, logistics, organization, education, and so on. To fully understand the impact of this statement, you must relate it to the philosophical underpinnings of communism.

Fundamental to the precepts of theoretical communism was the idea that science held the key to knowledge in all disciplines: economics (dialectic materialism), social organization (therefore, communist distrust and suppression of organized religion and psychology), and military events. Hence, when the Communist Red Army destroyed the Royalists’ White Army in the fighting that followed the Russian Revolution, the Red Army (led by Communist ideologues) developed a doctrine that downplayed “unscientific” military judgment and emphasized application of scientifically developed principles and

norms. The product of this scientific approach to military thought was found in their fundamental approach to planning and command and control. You will see this emphasis clearly when these subjects are reviewed later in the lesson.



The primary field of investigation under military science was military art Soviet doctrine recognized three basic levels of military at?: strategy (national and TVD (Soviet theater of military operations) level), operational art (front and army levels), and tactics (division level and below). Further, it equated each of these three levels to certain-sized units (as designated in parentheses above). This lesson focuses on the middle, or connecting level. You will look at the other two briefly only to develop a framework for understanding operational art.

Of these three levels of military art, the Soviets had long believed that the operational level was key to war-fighting Whereas the post-World War II U.S. Army officially recognized “operational art” only about 1982 with the revision of FM 100-5, the Soviets have continually recognized and practiced war at the operational level since the 1920s. Most importantly, the Soviets had a force structure that supported the operational level of war far longer than any other nation. As they developed operational doctrine, the Soviets envisioned and fielded huge fronts of armies designed to quickly overwhelm and crush any adversary

As the world witnessed over the past few years, for many different reasons, the Soviet Union and its huge land force dissolved. It is doubtful that the large number of forces they organized will ever be seen again. At the conclusion of the Cold War, just prior to its dissolution, the former Soviet Union maintained 14 military districts and 3 groups of forces (GOFs) in Europe (Western GOF-Germany, Northern GOF - Poland, and the Northwestern GOF-Baltic countries). Each GOF was capable of forming at least one front in time of war. Each front would doctrinally consist of three to five armies, and each army of two to five divisions. That represented a force of approximately 50 armies within these 17 or so potential fronts Combined, this represents a potential force of over 250 divisions-certainly a force structure capable of fighting operationally.

Theory

As the preceding graphic illustrates, theory flows from doctrine. It clearly illustrates the Soviet-style scientific approach to war and armed conflict is clearly illustrated in their penchant for calculating a

correlation of forces and means (COFM). COFMs attempted to quantify the degree of superiority of one side over the other; it employed a complicated analysis of materiel, morale, weapons, and combat situation. The outcome of the correlation equation formed a key decision aid for Soviet-style planners.

KEY DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS

Application

Theory drives application of military force; that is, how Soviet-style planners translate military thought into action. The Soviet experience during the Great Patriotic War (the Russian name for World War II) influenced their partiality for the encirclement as the preferred form of maneuver. They learned very quickly from the Germans how to conduct encirclement operations. U.S. encirclement doctrine, by the way, is derived largely from Soviet doctrine, derived, in turn, from German doctrine.

During the course of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviets conducted over 15 major encirclement operations, defeating or destroying over 200 enemy divisions in the process. The Soviet Army's encirclement of Paulus' Sixth Army near Stalingrad provides an excellent example of an encirclement operation on a "shoestring." In this case, the Soviet forces encircled 22 German divisions, about 300,000 men, using an overall correlation of forces and means of about 1:1. To do this, the Soviets massed 70 percent of their infantry, 80 percent of their artillery, and 100 percent of their tanks on the two main attack pincers. Of course, historians know "the rest of the story" even though this course doesn't go into it. (The bottom line is the Germans lost too much of their manpower and equipment to do anything but fight a delaying action. They were lost from that point on.)

Mass

Mass is a key concept of Soviet-style military doctrine. To the Soviets, "quantity had a quality all its own!" The Soviet-style concept of mass depended heavily on COFM calculations. This was in keeping with the scientific substantiation that Marxist-Leninist thought required. Just one look at the massive force structure that the Soviets developed before the 1990s shows how key this concept was, and always has been, to the Soviet military.

Surprise

Surprise is one of the most important principles of Soviet operational-level maneuver. There is even a special Russian word that illustrates this importance-maskirovka. Maskirovka means the "masking" of capabilities, disposition, and intentions by means of operations security (OPSEC), deception, decoys, camouflage, and so forth. Surprise is actually the fruit of successful maskirovka efforts.

Deception efforts, as a part of maskirovka, are so important that Soviet-style doctrine calls for a separate deception plan for an operation, not an annex like U.S.-style doctrine tends to use. Doctrinally, the deception plan would be formulated at the highest levels (at least at the front level), and all subordinate elements we would be expected to support this plan in a predetermined manner.

Momentum

Another very important principle of Soviet-style operational art is momentum. It has been said that the "Soviet-style fights to move where we move to fight." This implies how important gaining and maintaining momentum has been to the Soviet-style commander.

Speed is one aspect of momentum. Soviet-style doctrine calls for average gains of 40 to 50 kilometers a day during an offensive operation. The former Soviets recognize that on day 1 of a given operation, 15 to 20 kilometers of penetration is about all that could be expected, particularly against fully engineer-prepared defenses This Indicates, then, that on subsequent days, the Soviets expected to achieve gains of 90 kilometers or more to maintain such averages. Soviet-style forces are designed to achieve this speed through a combination of mobility, ample logistic support, and continuous action. As you recall, continuous action comes from echeloning forces in depth.

This echelonment will come at all levels from TVD echeloning strategic echelons to divisions echeloning regiments.



The previous graphic illustrates some of the options a Soviet-style commander might employ when echeloning forces Remember as at the tactical level, the objective is to keep fresh, uncommitted forces close to the front so they can be thrown into the fight quickly. At the same time, these forces cannot be so close that they lose their flexibility to take advantage of success.

Appendix 3 to this lesson guide describes to a much greater level of detail, Soviet-style offensive echelonment at the operational level. Part II of the appendix describes how a division would echelon. This discussion becomes especially Important in lesson 4 of S320A when you will develop a friendly course of action to counter a Soviet-style division.

Surprise confers the initiative, but it does not guarantee success. The Soviets believed that surprise must be followed up by a weighty blow against critical areas and an advance at high speed into the enemy's rear area to prevent establishment of an effective defense. Soviet doctrine recognized two basic forms of offensive operational maneuver

1. Broad front advance on multiple axes.
2. Encirclement

In the following graphic. the diagram on the left represents an offensive on a broad front to overcome the defense simultaneously on multiple axes This attack would probably be launched initially by a single

operational echelon using all available axes, retaining only a relatively small combined arms reserve The enemy would not be able to deal with the multiple penetrations and exploitation forces moving at high speed into his rear area, disrupting command and control (C2) and logistic systems The enemy's operational groupings would be fragmented, and even if they were able to remain combat effective, they would not be able to coordinate their actions to significantly affect the course of operations

Soviet-style doctrine maintains that, to use this method, the attacker must generally have forces numerically superior to those of the defender or must have considerable operational/strategic surprise If such high levels of force superiority could not be achieved, the attacker would likely have to employ a variant of the second form of operational offensive maneuver



The diagram on the right of the graphic above represents an offensive massing of forces against the weakest areas of enemy defenses to penetrate quickly and encircle major enemy forces The encirclement allows the attacker to use his strength against the defend?: s weaknesses to defeat or neutralize the defender's strongest defenses at the weakest points and drive deeply into his rear areas Once there, the attacker takes advantage of his position in the enemy s rear area to assault the strongest concentrations of the enemy in its flanks and rear-separating the strongest forces from its logistical support and slowing its ability to reestablish a stable defensive line

It is important to understand the role this type of operation had in Soviet thinking The Soviets were on the receiving end of many German encirclement operations early in World War II The Soviets proved to be quick studies and based their own encirclement doctrine on German doctrine It IS Interesting to note that our encirclement doctrine is basically Identical to Soviet-style doctrine at least as far as the mechanics are concerned. It is also important to understand that an encirclement operation doesn't just happen. Such an operation often takes weeks, or even months. of preparation and deception to establish favorable conditions.

The Soviets were able to choose either the broad front, multiple axis attack, the encirclement, or a combination as their primary method of operational offensive maneuver In any case, the success of their attack would be dependent on surprise, a high concentration of forces on the main axes a high rate of advance into the enemy's rear area, and the use of all deep attack means

The Soviets thought that future operations would probably be characterized by a complete absence of a continuous forward line of own troops (FLOT). They hoped that this intermingling of friendly and enemy forces would prevent the enemy's use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Of course, they also recognized that there would be problems in conducting these types of operations. The attacker's flanks would be as open to attack as the enemy's Command and control and logistic problems would be compounded by the great distances covered and the speed of the main attacking forces Junior leaders would require a level of initiative that was generally lacking in the Soviet-style military structure The Soviets were aware of these problems, though, and continued to work on changes in their doctrine, organizations, and training to reduce them to manageable levels

Turn to Appendix 3, Krasnovian Doctrine, and read part I. If you find yourself very comfortable with the information, you can scan portions. You should find the reading easy as the document presents information at the operational level that you have already studied at the tactical level. It is important that you know what is in the document so that you can refer to it later. When done, return here.

OPERATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE

The Front



Front operations comprise the major ground component of strategic operations. A front is a wartime formation of several armies or separate divisions. The analogous U.S. Army organization is an army group. Size and composition will vary with mission within the overall strategic operation. A front might have mission objectives 700 to 800 kilometers distant and be given 12 to 15 days to reach them. The zone of action could be as wide as 300 to 400 kilometers A typical front may have-

- three to five combined arms armies (CAAS) or tank armies (TAs)
- air forces
- one or more artrillery divisions
- one or more surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigades
- a SAM brigade.
- an air assault brigade
- a spetsnaz brigade.
- airborne or amphibious forces (if required)

In addition to the above forces, the Supreme High Command may provide the front with strategic rocket forces and strategic air armies



The Army

An army IS the largest operational grouping of ground maneuver forces The analogous U S Army organization is a corps As IS also true with a U S Army corps, composition and size of a Soviet-style army depend on the mission A Soviet-style force will have two types of armies: combined arms armies (CAA) shown in the previous graphic. and tank armies (TA) Even though the Soviets were strong proponents of "all arms" organizations, they recognized the need for a quick-moving, high shock-power force to exploit success They use tank divisions for this role at the tactical level and tank armies at the operational level for exploitation An army commander might be given a mission that requires him to reach objectives up to 350 kilometers from his start point within 3 to 4 days HIS zone might be as wide as 100 kilometers

You read previously that an army is the !argest operational grouping of ground maneuver forces. What does this really mean? An army commander, like his U.S. Army corps commander counterpart, can influence the outcome of a battle in three primary ways allocation of fires allocation of logistics, and designing a good plan. The army method of allocating ground fires is by providing army-level artillery to his subordinate divisions so they in turn can form the temporary artillery groupings you studied in S310B He does though keep some longer range forces for his use

Front and and commanders will allocate nondivisional artillery as well as some of the organic artillery of uncommitted divisions to their first-echelon motorized rifle divisions (MRDs) and tank divisions (TDs) Fire support organization at army level includes both tube and missile artillery They are found in the following groupings

- Army group of rocket artillery (AGRA) (see ST 100-7, page FS-11):
    - Assets from front and army multiple rocket launcher (MRL) brigades.
    - Varies from 3 to 6 battalions
- Army artillery group (AAG).
    - Front artillery allocated among committed armies proportionate to importance of missions
    - When the army commander gets front artillery assets, he decides what will be suballocated to his first-echelon divisions
    - The division executing major army mission gets most artillery
    - The remaining artillery battalions may be formed into AAGs
    - The primary mission of AAG is: counterbattery.

Of the four phases of offensive fire support, army-level controlled fire support is most critical to Phase I-fire support of the movement forward (or fire support of the advance from the depths). This is the only operational-level phase planners target the most dangerous enemy long-range weapons It consists of long-range fires designed to protect a maneuver force moving in march formation from an assembly area in the depths to a line of deployment for the attack. Doctrinally, they engage targets up to 45 kilometer (km) from the line of departure (LD)

A front commander's main considerations when organizing artillery for an operation include-

- Allocating artillery battalions IAW the importance of missions
- Possibly considering keeping artillery in reserve

Some of the principles that the army commander would consider include-

- Weighting the main attack
- Employing second-echelon division artillery (don't employ artillery of maneuver regiments of second-echelon division).
- Not reinforcing second-echelon divisions.
- Maintaining a balance of guns for counterbattery missions and howitzers for close support

These are similar to tactical-level employment concepts

Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Support

Antiair operation objectives at the operational level are similar to those at the tactical level. They are primarily Intended to unify air defense assets with the objective of defending friendly forces and contributing to the achievement of air superiority The antiair operations have a target set (enemy aircraft, SAM system and associated command, control. and communications (C3) facilities), which overlap those of the strategic-level air operation This close connectivity makes them mutually supportive and requires careful coordination If enemy forces had the initiative in the air, the major focus of the antiair operation would be on defensive action to protect friendly forces and installations ADA assets will surround units at a sufficient range to prevent enemy aircraft from getting close enough to drop their ordnance loads on the troops being protected If they can't destroy all the enemy forces, they want to keep them out of range In any event, at the operational level, as is true at the tactical level, air defense assets are considered an integral part of the all-arms concept the maneuver commander will keep them Integrated at all times

If enemy forces do not hold the initiative in the air, then the Krasnovian immediate priority would be to conduct an antiair operation to provide their forces freedom of movement while simultaneously causing maximum attrition to enemy air and AD systems If enemy forces did hold the initiative then forces used to regain the initiative would include air forces of the front air defense forces, missile troops and artillery

Soviet-style operational-level air defense doctrine divides the defense of maneuver units into three phases

- Phase 1 All actions taken to destroy enemy aircraft while still on the ground Frontal aviation and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) play the major role in this phase

- Phase 2 Ail actions taken to destroy enemy aircraft while in flight but still at some distance from friendly ground faxes Frontal aviation has a sizable role, and medium-range air defense has a role

- Phase 3 Destruction of enemy aircraft that have penetrated into the airspace of friendly maneuver elements This role belongs to the tactical air defenses

When planning operations against Soviet-style air defense, there are several enduring principles. First is a tremendous volume of fire. Soviet-style forces use a verity of air defense weapons, both missiles and guns, and a force structure the provides a significant number of these weapons with a suitable mix of capabilities to ground force commanders. They situate the system for all-around security. They recognize that air attack can come from any quarter and that is not enough to provide security for only the units close to the forward edge and only in the direction of enemy forces.

The second principle is the high degree of coordinated actions between supported maneuver units and supporting air defense units and between air defense units. This principle emphasizes the Soviet-style perception of air defense as a single system composed of of its various parts rather than a series of separate, distinct actions that bear no relation to each other or the conduct of the ground battle Air defense is an integral element of the ground battle

Additionally Soviet-style air defense theorists emphasize the principle of surprise. they seek benefit both from the physical destruction that can be achieved by an attack on an unsuspecting enemy and also from the psychological effects of violent and unexpected fires on aviation crews They recognize that the psychological effects are often only temporary but that they can reduce the effectiveness of attacking air crews at critical moments

Other characteristics of Soviet-style air defense operations are-

- Mobility and maneuver of air defense weapons. The Soviet-style mobile tactical air defense system allows air defense units to maneuver with tank and motorized rifle forces

- Continuous activity by air defense units Comprehensive air defense coverage can be guaranteed only if air defense units are constantly active and provided with the adequate logistic support.

- Aggressive action It is recognized that air defense unit commanders must exploit the full capabilities of their equipment if they are to carry out their missions successfully Thus demands aggressive action, initiative, and originality on their part

Operational Defense

You've looked at the basic types of offensive action with emphasis on the meeting engagement and the attack from the march Now turn your attention to the tactical defense to see how a Soviet-style force would doctrinally defend.

Soviet military writers have long seen the offense as the decisive form of military activity, they recognized the defense, however, as a possibility on the combined arms battlefield The overall goal of the defense would be to ruin or repulse the offensive of a superior enemy force Inflict significant losses on the enemy, hold important terrain, and through these actions create favorable conditions for the Soviet-style force to transition to a decisive offensive Assumption of the defense occurs in two situations in direct contact and out of direct contact with the enemy

Reasons for Operational Defense

- TO CONSOLIDATE GAINS OF ADVANCE
- TO PROTECT THE FLANKS OF A FORMATION OR ALONG SEACOAST
- TO REPULSE AN ENEMY
- TO AWAIT ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
- TO REGROUP AFTER SUFFERING SEVERE
- TO FREE RESOURCES FOR OTHER ELEMENTS OF FORMATION WHO ARE ON THE
- TO AWAIT LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Defense is temporary and will lead to the resumption of the offense

As you recall, economy of force is one of the reasons a Soviet-style force would assume the defensive. The Soviet General Staff Academy lecture material on operational art reads "Army defensive operations may become necessary in different stages of a front offensive operation Defensive operations may become necessary to ensure economy of force and facilitate the concentration of forces on axes where the offensive operation is to be undertaken ...."

The General Staff Academy lecture material on front defensive operations says.

Defensive operations may be assumed when the defending forces are in parity with those of the enemy, or even superior to the opposing enemy troops. In such cases, the aim of the defense will be to inflict casualties on the enemy by defensive action, followed by initiation of an attack against an already exhausted enemy in the manner of operations conducted in the Kursk salient in 1943.

Some factors are common to the Soviet-style defense at all levels. You will note that, just as at the tactical level, the skillful use of key terrain is the thread that ties many of these factors together. A Soviet-style force would plan massed fires of all available systems to destroy an advancing enemy force. Counterattacks would be planned at all levels to deliver the final, decisive blow to an already weakened enemy.

The front's first defensive echelon (first operational echelon) would consist of a security zone that could extend out 50 or so kilometers and either three defensive belts or two belts and a mobile reserve (immediate operational reserve). The forces in this echelon would come from the front's first-echelon armies. These forces would be deployed 80 to 120 kilometers deep.

If the front was lightly defended, then It is more likely to have two belts and a mobile reserve, as opposed to forming three belts. The width of the front is not fixed, but in Europe, for example, the front would probably defend a sector 350 to 400 kilometers wide.

Characteristics of Operational Defense

- DEFENSE IN DEPTH -- MULTIPLE DEFENSIVE
- BUILT AROUND STRONGPOINTS AND DEFENSIBLE
- CONCENTRATED ON AVENUES OF
- ATTEMPT TO DELAY, DEFEAT, OR WEAKEN THE ENEMY FORWARD IN THE SECURITY
- BASED ON INTEGRATED ANTITANK
- MOBILE ANTITANK RESERVES AND MOBILE DETACHMENTS
- RARE FOR AN ENTIRE ARMY TO GO ON THE

The development of nuclear weapons increased the importance of the security zone and reserve. Modern Soviet-style defensive doctrine at front and army levels stresses defense in depth But rather than the multiple, continuous belts used in World War II, the defensive area now consists of clusters of strongpoints. Gaps between forces would be covered by fires and obstacles.

The use of minefields and other obstacles would be extensive. A Soviet-style force would supplement engineer task-organized mobile obstacle detachments (MODS) with MRLs and army-level helicopters with remote mine-laying capabilities to help emplace the obstacles.

At both front and army levels, the key is stubborn defense forward by motorized rifle elements and decisive counterattacks by mobile, tank-heavy reserves Operational reserves and the second echelon

may make up as much as half of the force. While a second-echelon division of an army would occupy defensive positions, its major task would be to counterattack and destroy penetrating enemy forces.

The front's second echelon (if the defense was front-wide) would begin at about 150 kilometers deep and would continue to a depth of 250 to 300 kilometers. Its composition would depend on its size. two defensive belts, one defensive belt and a mobile reserve, or just a large mobile reserve.

Turn to appendix 3 again and scan parts II and IV. Familiarize yourself with the Information so that you may use it later When done return here

Now it's time to apply some of the concepts you have been studying. Turn to appendix 1 and work the practical exercise. It illustrates how an operational-level Soviet-style commander (in this case the commander of the 2 Krasnovian Front) might outline an operational plan of attack. The exercise will help you save time in the long run as it will clarify meaning of the offensive concepts presented plus working with the 2 Krasnovian Front will familiarize you with the units. This will help you quickly grasp the enemy subparagraph of LANDCENT COP CRASHING FIST. When you finish the practical exercise, review the solution at appendix 6. When you have finished, return to this point.

Welcome back Now that you are comfortable with the operational-level employment doctrine, it is time to move on to another important topic-airpower Now you will move to air operations in Europe

OPERATIONAL CAMPAIGN PLAN

Combat operations in NATO are joint and combined. Alliance forces (ground, air, and naval) have both national and multinational units In the discussion about NATO airpower, you read that the alliance developed its own employment doctrine For air, it was ATP-27; for ground activities, NATO has ATP-35, Land Force Tactical Doctrine This is addressed here not because you will use ATP-35 in this course, but because it is important to know that all NATO members agree to use the same tactics, techniques and procedures To phrase it a different way. forces from the 16 member nations have agreed to operate in a standardized manner This is Important for many reasons. Two of the most critical are the ability to augment forces from one nation with units of a different nation and the ability to support forces from one nation with units of a different nation For example, you will see in lesson 4 that a German division is part of a U.S.-led corps. You will also see that offensive air support is provided by an allied tactical air force-the jets providing close air support (CAS) might not be American. While you will not use ATP-40, the field manuals (FMs) you will use are compatible to the agreed tactics, techniques, and procedures (FMs comply with NATO STANAGs-Standardized Agreements).

Well, now that you have reviewed how the Krasnovians will employ their forces and examined the differences between tactical air power use in Europe and other theaters, you will now move on to the concluding subjects for this lesson-understanding the scenario and understanding LANDCENT's plan called CRASHING FIST

To understand the context of CRASHING FIST, you will quickly review how NATO operates

The following graphic shows the NATO military structure for the scenario. You will use the plan issued by the Commander, Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), to gain information about the threat and the operational aspects of the scenario. The AFCENT plan is not included in your materials, but you have

the key AFCENT information in the LANDCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) 31201 (CRASHING FIST), paragraph lb, Friendly Forces (appendix 4). A point of clarification is that the allied army groups shown on the graphic (I and II AAG) no longer exist in actual NATO military structure



You will now review events leading to the scenario's current state of hostilities. As you have read, some political and military leaders of the former Soviet Union have assumed power and are attempting to reestablish the geopolitical situation as it existed before the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and disintegration of the Soviet Union. They changed the name of Russia to Krasnovia and proceeded to use force to subjugate their former satellites.

A quick word of caution: don't fight the scenario. Take it for what it is intended to be: a vehicle to let you study the employment of forces in a forward-deployed theater.

You pick up the situation with the two subordinate fronts of the Western Krasnovian TVD situated as shown on the following sketch map

NATO intelligence analysts anticipate the Krasnovians will use the 1 Krasnovian Front to make their main effort in the north toward Berlin. The 2 Krasnovian Front will make a supporting attack to keep alliance forces in the south from reinforcing northward.

NATO member states agreed to resist the Krasnovian landgrab. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) has authorized his principal regional commander facing the Krasnovian threat, Commander in Chief of Allied Forces, Central Europe (CINCENT) to execute Allied Forces, Central Europe (AFCENT) Contingency Plan 30101 (CHESHIRE CAT). AFCENT is a joint headquarters, the air component is AIRCENT, and the land component is LANDCENT. LANDCENT's contingency plan that supports CHESHIRE CAT is called CRASHING FIST You will read this plan in a few moments.

So, on with the scenario. The European allies abrogated the treaty that limited the number of military forces stationed in Europe (the Conventional Forces, Europe (CFE) Treaty) and immediately began to mobilize in Europe and reinforce from across the Atlantic. Force buildup is a slow affair, so German territorial forces bought time for the remainder of NATO's strength to mobilize.





This sketch map illustrates friendly force dispositions for Phase I of CRASHING FIST (preconflict preparation and transition to war). Phase I starts with the Krasnovian violation of the CFE Treaty (T-Day) and terminates when hostilities begin (D-Day) Primarily, this phase provides time for a buildup of NATO strength Another key event for Phase I IS to immediately deceive the Krasnovians as to what NATO's

defensive plans are. The COP target of the deception story IS the Krasnovian TVD commander, the story line IS that NATO's defenses are weakest in the north

Initially (on T-Day), NATO forces were far to the west. Terms of the 4 + 2 Treaty had prohibited NATO forces from the five land-states of the former East Germany LANDCENT's peacetime command structure was corps reporting directly to LANDCENT In preparation for hostilities, LANDCENT activated the II Allied Army Group (AAG) to command existing fighting forces As you can see, at the start of Phase I, II AAG has three corps in peacetime locations that are generally along the former inner-German border (IGB) Additionally. LANDCENT has available to it two corps that are rapidly mobilizing farther to the west Because the Krasnovians violated the 4 + 2 Treaty. the German government moved two divisions from German Territorial Forces to NATO control LANDCENT contingency plans provided for the establishment of the I AAG to command additional forces as they become available for use

The central corps of the three astride the former IGB is the 10th (U.S.) Corps It is of particular Interest to you for this lesson because that is the unit in which you will conduct planning In addition to normal corps associated troops, the 10th Corps has one German division and two U S divisions, a Canadian mechanized brigade group (CMBG) and a U S armored cavalry regiment



Phase II (deployment and initial defense) of CRASHING FIST begins with the outbreak of hostilities, although some movement of forces happens during Phase I This sketch map illustrates force disposition. Note that the majority of combat power has now moved east

The 10th (U S.) and 1st (NL) Corps have moved into combat locations to relieve pressure on the two German divisions Note the arrival of the 2d (U.S.) Corps (at M+30, T-Day = M-Day) and the 25th Armd Division in 10th (U S) Corps.

The object of this phase is to continue the deception story of weakness in the north, to buy time for mobilizing forces to become combat ready, and to set the stage for LANDCENT's counterattack that is designed to defeat the Krasnovian strategic reserve (37 GTA) and ultimately defeat the Krasnovian TVD



Phase III IS the LANDCENT counteroffensive. It will start when NATO leaders agree that the 37 GTA IS committed to a single course of action and the I AAG has sufficient combat power in the proper location to defeat the 37 GTA. As you can see from this sketch map, LANDCENT's plan (which, don't forget, was derived from the joint AFCENT plan) requires careful synchronization and careful implementation of the deception story If the 37 GTA is not committed in the north, this plan will not work

Turn to Appendix 4, LANDCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) 31201 (CRASHING FIST), and scan this higher headquarters plan. When you are finished, return here.

SUMMARY

You covered a lot in this lesson. You should be familiar with the basic concepts of Krasnovian doctrine, the employment of tactical airpower in NATO, the overall scenario, and COP CRASHING FIST, with emphases on the LANDCENT mission, intent, concept, and taskings for II Allied Army Group and 10th (US) Corps

Operations in Europe are different from operations in Kansas But the operations are different because factors of METT-T have changed, not the nature of combat operations What you must learn from operations in different environments is that the art of war, strategic, operational, and tactical, remains constant. Only the variables change

When you start lesson 3, you will become a member of the 25th Armored Division and have the opportunity to move the division from where it picked up its equipment from POMCUS (storage in Europe) to where the 10th (U.S.) Corps will use it to defeat the 2 Krasnovian Front.

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. European Operational Situation

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. General Situation and First Practical Exercise

GENERAL SITUATION

Background. After a period of disorder and worsening internal political and economic conditions in the republics of the former Soviet Union, reactionary forces led by KGB and former Soviet military officers coordinated the seizure of power in several of the republics and established the state of Krasnovia These officers established a dictatorship and vowed to restore the power, prestige. and position of Krasnovia and to underwrite the rebirth of the former Warsaw Pact as the Socialist Pact alliance At the same time, they designated the Communist and Socialist Parties as the only legal and authorized parties in Krasnovia and the Socialist Pact nations. The forces of the former Soviet Union, still awaiting movement from the former East Germany under provisions of the Four + Two Treaty, have withdrawn to consolidate with former Soviet forces remaining in Poland also awaiting withdrawal. Once these forces of the new Krasnovian Army have consolidated and reorganized, they are expected to attack west to seize the former East German territory and to establish a defensive line along the former inner-German border (IGB). Once they have attained this objective, they are expected to forcibly Incorporate the former East Germany into an alliance with Krasnovia and the Socialist Pact.

Krasnovian forces. The Krasnovian Theater of Military Operations (TVD) will attack with three fronts The 1 Krasnovian Front in the center will be the TVD main effort The 2 Krasnovian Front in the south will be the TVD supporting attack, responsible for protecting the southern boundary of 1 Krasnovian Front. Operational objectives of the TVD are to seize the capital, Berlin, and reestablish the former IGB. The 3 Northern Front is responsible to secure the Baltic coast, to prevent NATO's reinforcement from the Baltic Sea approaches, and to secure sea lines of communications in the Baltic

FIRST PRACTICAL EXERCISE. LESSON 2

You are a member of the staff of the 2 Krasnovian Front. It is now D-3. Your units are in assembly areas near the Polish-German and Czech and Slovak-German borders as indicated on the attached sketch map (sketch map 2-1).

The ND's operational objectives are stated above. As the front staff, outline your operational plan of attack. Draw your solution on the sketch map on the following page. Be prepared to explain your rationale. At a minimum, you should address:

- Type of operational maneuver selected
- Army boundaries
- Immediate and subsequent (objective) mission lines (both army and front)
- Main attack axis for each first-echelon army
- Echelonment of divisions within each army



Sketch Map 2 - 1, 2 Krasnovian Front AOR

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REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. European Operational Situation

Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide Lesson 2. Krasnovian Order of Battle

1 Krasnovian Front

18 TA
- 94 GMRD (BMP-2/T-80)
- 207 MRD (BMP-2/T-80)
- 7 TD (T-80)
- 16 TD (T-80)
- 160 TD (T-72)

37 GTA
- 10 GTD (T-80)
- 47 GTD (T-72)

47 TA
- 6 MRD (BMP-1/T-72)
- 8 GMRD (BMP-2/T-80)
- 15 GTD (T-80)
- 23 TD (T-80)
- 37 GTD (T-80)
- 9 IMRR (BMP-2/T-80)

Front-Level Units

Air Forces of the Front
- 2 fighter divisions
- 2 fighter-bomber divisions
- 2 indep recon regiments

20 GTD (T-80) (37 GTA) [Front reserve]
20 AASLT Bde
34 Artillery Division
- 27 Gun Bde (2S5)
- 19 How Bde (2S3)
- 24 How Bde (2S3)
- 35 How Bde (253)
- 36 Rkt Lchr Bde (BM-22)
- 12 AT Bde

UI spetsnaz bde
UI RVGK sig bde
UI radl and cml recon bn
UI pers and equip decon bn
UI smoke bn
75 Mat Spt Bde
1 Cml Bn of the Rear
Various other CS and CSS units

21 Hugh-Powered Arty Bde (257)
- 1 SSM Bde (SCUD-B)
- 3 SSM Bde (SCUD-B)
- 5 SSM Bde (SCUD-B)
- 1 SAM Bde (SA-4)
- 4 SAM Bde (SA-12)

27 Cml Prot Bde
- 15 Engr Bde
- 2 Ponton Brg Regt
- 42 Ponton Brg Regt
- 23 Aslt Crossing Bn
- 131 Aslt Crossing Bn
- 73 Sig Bde
- 87 lndep RADREL Bn
- 16 Rdotech Recon Regt
- 37 Rdo Recon Regt
- 91 Rdo Jamming Regt
- 32 AD Jamming Regt
- 55 Early Warning Regt

2 Krasnovian Front

2 GTA
- 3 MRD (BMP-2/T-80)
- 17 GMRD (BMP-2/T-80)
- 22 TD (T-80)
- 57 GTD (T-80)
- 13 IMRR (BMP-2/-T-80)

16 TA
- 20 MRD (BMP-2/-T-80)
- 73 MRD (BMP-2/T-80)
- 12 TD (T-80)

Front-Level Units

Air Forces of the Front
- 2 fighter divisions
- 1 fighter-bomber division
- 1 lndep recon regiment

42 TD (T-80)(16 TA)[Front reserve]

21 AASLT Bde

10 Artillery Division
- 22 Gun Bde (2S5)
- 14 How Bde (2S3)
- 17 How Bde (2S3)
- 29 How Bde (2S3)
- 37 Rkt Lchr Bde (BM-22)
- 41 AT Bde

UI spetsnaz bde

31 Mat Spt Bde

1 High-Powered Arty Bde (2S7)
- 19 SSM Bde (SCUD-B)
- 48 SSM Bde (SCUD-B)
- 67 SSM Bde (SCUD-B)
- 60 SAM Bde (SA-4)
- 66 SAM Bde (SA-12)
- 43 Cml Prot Bde
- 56 Engr Bde
- 3 RVGK Sig Bde
- 54 Sig Bde
- 23 Rdotech Recon Regt
- 41 Rdo Recon Regt
- 3 Rdo Jamming Regt
- 7 Early Warning Regt
- 15 AD Jamming Regt
- 15 Ponton Brg Regt
- 27 Aslt Crossing Bn
- 31 Aslt Crossing Bn

Various other CS and CSS units

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. European Operational Situation

Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2 Krasnovian Doctrine

GENERAL

The following material addresses some general guidelines that describe, Krasnovian military doctrine and the employmen! of Krasnovian ground forces. It supplements Student Text 100-7. Kranovian military doctrine is that of a Heavy opposing Force (OPFOR) based on the doctrine of the former Soviet Army. This discussion is broken into two parts The operational level discussion explains that the Krasnovians, following the teaching of their Soviet predecessor, are a top-down organization that relies on tactical-level activities to ensure the success of the operational plan.

PART I: OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS - ARMY AND ABOVE (OPERATIONAL EMPHASIS)

Krasnovian military doctrine emphasizes the operational Ievel of war. Operalional art is the component of military art that falls between military strategy and tactics Each of the five services of the Krasnovian armed forces has its own operational art. Combined arms operational art prescribes the interaction between the ground forces and other forces, especially aviatron. Within the ground forces, operational art refers to the operations of large formations: fronts and armies.

The Front

Front operations are the major ground component of strategic operations in a continental TVD. A TVD coordinates the operations of several fronts.

A front is a wartime formation comprising several armies or separate divisions Its size and composition vary with the mission it receives within the overall strategic operation A typical front may have--

- Three to five combined arms armies (CAAs) or tank armies (TAs)
- A tactical air army.
- One or more artillery division
- One or more surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigades.
- A surface-to-air missile (SAM) brigades.
- An air assault brigade.
- A spetsnaz brigade.

If required, the front may include airborne and amphibious forces. Other assets support it, including strategic rocket forces, strategic air armies, navel forces, railroad troops, and contstruction troops.

The front is both and administrative and an operational entity. It incorporates the air and ground forces required for operations in a given area. There is no fixed front organization. The number of armies and separate division that constitute the combat elements of a front vary widely. The front's composition depends on its mission within the context of the overall strategic operation. The combat division assigned to the front are further assigned to the armies or placed in a separate (or front

combined arms reserve) status This assignment depends on the nature of the operation and on the combat situation as it develops.

Krasnovian logistics doctrine will organize the combat service support or rear service structure of a front to meet logistical support requirements Front rear services must support all aspects of the front operation, lncluding augmentation of its armies. The front structure includes transport, supply, evacuation, repair. and medical units The rear services use road, bridge, and railroad construction units to establish and maintain the lines of communrcations. Road and rail traffic control units operate these lines of communtcation

Front-Level Offense

The intent of a front offensive is to destroy enemy military forces and to achieve operational missions to support strategic political and economic goals The overriding aim in a Krasnovian front offensive is to delay or prevent the war from turning nuclear Commanders can accomplish this by the swift, early destruction or neutralization of enemy nuclear weapons by nonnuclear means. Leaders using Krasnovian doctrine expect high rates of advance by attacking ground forces. They also plan to conduct strikes throughout the rear These actions cripple the enemy's ability to respond effectively to the Krasnovian offensive and to tactical nuclear warfare. The top priority target for Krasnovian weapons would be enemy nuclear delivery systems. A front offensive involves much more than attacks against enemy forward defensive positions. It involves coordinated. repetitive, and intensive strikes throughout the entire depth of enemy field forces. These strikes may include-

- An initial, massive, nonnuclear air operation.
- Surface-to-surface rockets and missiles.
- Heliborne and airborne assaults.
- Deep attacks by operational maneuver group (OMGs).
- Weapons of naval forces.
- Unconventional warfare.
- Radioelectronic combat.
- Chemical and nuclear warfare, if necessary.

Front-Level Planning

In planning a front offensive operation, a Krasnovian commander always considers those situations in which either side would employ nuclear weapons Destroying or neutralizing the enemy's nuclear-capable delivery systems is essential. Thus the front commander plans continuous reconnaissance to accurately target systems with a nuclear capability. Front-level planning (missions, employment of forces main and supporting attacks, and axes of advance) is essentially the same for both nuclear and nonnuclear operation. The similarities end, however, in planning the scheme of maneuver and fire support. Normally, conventional operations require successive intermediate operations with a continuous regrouping of forces Frontal (tactical air armies) aviation has the mission to engage targets enemy rear area. The artillery has the mission to neutralize the enemy near its forward edge.

Forms of Operational Maneuver

Planning at front level must support the conduct of operations deep in the enemy's rear area. Krasnovian military doctrine recognizes two broad categories of operational maneuver: the broad front *mulitiple axis* attack and the encirclement (fig 2-1). Either method can be employed, or even a combination of the two, but encirclement operations are preferred whenever possible (fig 2-2). The encirclement requires fewer forces than the broad front multiple axis attack, and surprise only enhances

its effectiveness. The broad front multiple axis operation generally requires either significant surprise or overwhelming forces.

The Krasnovians would almost certainly initiate hostilities with an air operation designed primarily to destroy or neutralize enemy air defenses and air forces on the ground and to gain at least local air superiority. This air operation would use practically all fixed-wing assets within the theater for the first 2 to 3 days of the offensive. The ground offensive would probably follow within hours of the initiation of the air operation. After the operational goals of the air operation have been attained, significant fixed-wing assets would then be released to the various front in the theater (2 Krasnovian Included) to support continuing ground operations.



Figure 2-1, Forms of operational maneuver

The attack across a broad frontage on multiple axes lends itself to situations in which the Krasnovians would enjoy a considerable numerical advantage over an enemy. Krasnovian commanders may also use this form of maneuver when they have achieved considerable operational surprise

The encirclement is a deep flanking maneuver or envelopment on a larger scale Fronts and armies conduct encirclement operations extensively. The Krasnovians feel that encirclement operations are the most decisive means of destroying an enemy force. The Soviets used two basic methods of achieving encirclement in World War II. The first method was a double penetration on converging axes, which involved two major penetrations by a single front or by neighboring fronts to encircle an enemy force. The second method was a single penetration followed by flanking attacks. This was most useful when a natural obstacle (the sea or a major river) served to block enemy withdrawal



Figure 2-2. Operational forms of encirclement.

Operational Offensive Concepts

Unlike NATO, the Krasnovians define their offensive (and defensive) actions more in regard to the enemy situation (for example, attack against a defending enemy) than to time (hasty or deliberate). This is because the enemy situation dictates the employed tactics and operations as well as the time available. The Krasnovians define three basic types of offensive actions.

- If both sides are attacking, advancing, or maneuvering, it is a meeting engagement.
- If the Krasnovians are attacking and the other side is defending, it is an attack against a defending enemy.
- If the enemy is retreating and the Krasnovians are attacking, it is a pursuit

Meeting Engagement

A meeting engagement can occur at any level from company to front. The Krasnovians use two different terms to differentiate the scale of action. A “meeting battle” is tactical action at division level or below. At the operational level, fronts and armies fight a larger-scale battle or “meeting engagement.” A meeting engagement has the following characteristics:

- Rapid changes in the situation.
- Limited time to organize.
- Combat on a wide frontage to maneuver forces to strike the flanks and rear of the enemy
- Introduction of forces into the attack from the march in prebattle or battle formatrons.

An operational-level meeting engagement can arise under various circumstances, Including the following:

- At the beginning of the war, when operational units are moving forward to meet an attacking enemy or when an attacking force meets an enemy moving forward to occupy initial defensive positions.

- During an offensive, when Krasnovian forces meet an enemy's counteroffensive or advancing reserves

- When an army functions as an OMG and encounters enemy counterattacks or advancing reserves.

Success in the meeting engagement normally goes to the side that not only achieves some degree of surprise but also seizes and holds the initiative Krasnovian theorists believe that a smaller force that seizes the initiative may defeat a larger one even though it lacks detailed knowledge of the enemy or elaborate plans of its own The Krasnovian operational commander employs maneuver extensively Lead elements (forward detachments and advance guards) try to overcome the enemy force They may fight a holding action as a last resort. Follow-on forces try to maneuver and strike the enemy force in its flanks or rear. Krasnovian tactics are well suited for this type of action because they are relatively simple and emphasize tactical drills The meeting engagement concludes with one of the following actions

- A transition to the pursuit if the enemy withdraws
- A transition to the defense if the Krasnovians are unable to overcome the enemy force
- A continuation of the march

Attack Against a Defending Enemy

The attack against a defending enemy IS the second basic form of offensive action The Krasnovians further define it in relation to the method used to bring forces into the offensive Thus, they identify an attack as either from a position out of direct contact with the enemy (from the march) or from a position in direct contact with the enemy The enemy situation dictates the operational formation employed and the time available for planning and preparation. Army and front attacks against a defending enemy attempt to exploit gaps, unit boundaries, and other enemy weak points on the most favorable axis

In an offensive, the zone of advance IS the sector assigned to the front or army commander He conducts offensive operations within this sector. The width of the sector depends on a number of factors including the mission. nuclear threat, correlation of forces, terrain. weather, and enemy disposition In an attack against a defending enemy, a commander would not distribute his forces evenly across the entire zone of advance but would designate primary (main) and secondary operational axes with the desired correlation of forces to achieve the missions in the designated time.

The Krasnovians would attack on selected strike sectors within the front sectors to create the initial penetrations They would form rapidly, create the penetrations, and then disperse to avoid vulnerability to nuclear and improved conventional strikes The goal would then be to maintain a rapid tempo of advance into the depths of the enemy. Krasnovian commanders could insert forward detachments at the tactical level and OMGs at the operational level early to develop the deep offensive. The Krasnovians could block major withdrawal, supply, and advancing reserve routes by using OMGs, forward detachments, and airborne or air assault forces. They would add the fires of SSMs, artillery, aviation, and naval support throughout the depths of the TVD This would effectively isolate the enemy forces and allow for their subsequent destruction by follow-on Krasnovian forces.

Pursuit

The pursuit is the third basic type of offensive action. Its goal is to complete the destruction of an enemy. The Krasnovians use three pursuit techniques: direct (frontal), parallel, and a combination of direct and parallel. The preferred technique is the combination method Using this technique, a small Krasnovian force pursues the enemy along the enemy's direct withdrawal route, attempting to prevent the enemy from withdrawing in an orderly manner or from occupying favorable defensive positions At the same time, exploitation forces, moving along parallel routes, try to block the path of the withdrawing enemy. Air assault or airborne forces may also be inserted to block the enemy's withdrawal. Once these forces halt the enemy, the main Krasnovian force attempts to conduct a flanking movement to complete the destruction of the enemy force Krasnovian commanders plan for a pursuit when they plan their attack They outline possible enemy withdrawal routes, friendly pursuit routes, and allocate nuclear and other fire support means. Units at regimental level or above initiate pursuit immediately upon discovering the enemy's withdrawal. Only orders of a higher commander can terminate a pursuit. The pursuit ends-

- When the enemy forces are destroyed
- When pursuing elements outdistance their support and are in danger of being cut off
- When the enemy successfully establishes a strong defensive position.

After the pursuit ends, the Krasnovian forces regroup and redeploy for the next operation

Characteristics of Offensive Operations

Krasnovian offensive operations conducted by fronts have several notable characteristics. This section discusses the most important characteristics described in current Krasnovian writings and gained from Soviet experiences in World War II.

Surprise

The Krasnovians regard operational surprise as an important principle of operational art. Surprise is one of the most important conditions for the successful achievement of operational missions. Krasnovian operational-level forces achieve surprise by conducting actions the enemy does not expect. This forces the enemy to conduct combat operations at a disadvantage,

Surprise results from offensive operations with an integrated system of measures, implemented over time and space The Krasnovians stress that there are diverse and numerous ways to achieve surprise:

- Keeping the concept of the operation absolutely secret.
- Selecting the right axis and timing for the main strike.
- Concealing the preparations for the operation
- Using new methods of conducting combat operations.
- Opening massive fire unexpectedly from all assets.
- Employing new technological means of warfare.
- Achieving a swift breakthrough and carrying the offensive to the enemy's operational depths
- Maneuvering personnel and equipment extensively.
- Exploiting terrain, weather, season, and time of day for combat operations
- Deceiving the enemy about one's intentions by extensive and skillful use of operational concealment and misinformation.

Reconnaissance and intelligence collection capabilities have increased greatly in modern times, as have the scale and complexity of warfare Totally concealing preparations for large operations is difficult.

The Krasnovians do not believe, however, that the importance or necessity for surprise has lessened They say that it is crucial, at the operational level, to conceal the scope and scale of the operation, the plan for and axis of the main strike, and the exact time at which combat operations will begin Their commanders and staffs maintain great secrecy regarding the concept of the operation and the composition of the main strike groupings They pay a great deal of attention to issues such as-

- Communications discipline.
- Concealment of command and control (C2) assets
- Deceptive actions on secondary or false axes
- Active disinformation to mislead the enemy
- Skillful use of new tactics and technology to accomplish the operational mission

The Krasnovians say that the importance of surprise has also Increased due to the enormous destructive power of modern weapons Achieving operational surprise can ensure the success of a mission In some cases, it may be so critical that it determines the outcome of the operation

Rapid Advance

The Krasnovian offensive is characterized by a high rate of advance Over a period of several weeks or more, the Krasnovians anticipate a rate of advance of approximately 50 kilometers per day under nuclear or nonnuclear conditions As mentioned above, they do not expect this rate to be uniform

When confronting an enemy in a defensive position the Krasnovians would target weak points in the defense They would drive to the enemy's rear area whenever possible by bypassing major force concentrations They would attempt to cripple the enemy quickly by destroying or disrupting his nuclear capability, C2 facilities, and logistic system before he could effectively react

Even if the Krasnovians must deal with an enemy emplaced in defensive positions across their entire frontage, they would still try to avoid a costly, time-consuming battle of attrition They would try to penetrate to the enemy's rear area to topple his defensive structure They anticipate that elements of a front second echelon would probably not have to fight enemy forces in defensive positions They anticipate overrunning prepared positions within the first 2 to 5 days of the war They expect combat to be characterized by rapid movement into the enemy rear, interrupted by violent, relatively brief meeting engagements.

Concentration of Forces (main and supporting attacks)

A front normally conducts a main attack over one or more axes. The closeness of one axis to another depends on whether the front is to fragment or envelop the enemy in its drive to achieve its missions. The direction of a main attack is critical to defeat the enemy and seize territory. One or more supporting attacks accompany the main attack A supporting attack ties down opposing enemy forces to prevent them from reinforcing the sector threatened by the main attack

An operational-level commander may designate certain sectors of enemy defenses as strike (breakthrough) sectors. These are areas, normally across a main attack axis, that he deems necessary, desirable. or likely for major penetration Under nuclear conditions, he may destroy enemy defenses in a strike sector by tactical nuclear strikes followed by rapid exploitation by maneuver units. Under nonnuclear, but nuclear-threatened, conditions, he may attack the sector with massed air and artillery fires and with numerous attacks on multiple axes by maneuver units.

The benefit gained by the attacker using only conventional weapons on the nuclear-threatened battlefield is that the enemy must also avoid concentrating forces. The defender must leave gaps or

lightly manned sectors between his units. Whenever possible, the Krasnovian commander directs his attack against these undefended or lightly defended areas He thus achieves a favorable force ratio without massing his own forces.

The greater range and Increased mobility of modern artillery weapons enable Krasnovian artillerymen to mass fires against a target without concentrating the weapons themselves. This practice reduces their vulnerability to a nuclear strike It also hinders the enemy from predicting long in advance where a main attack might occur. The Krasnovians also integrate the fires of fire support hellcopters and close air support fixed-wing aircraft into their overall fire planning Again, thus enhances their ability to concentrate fires without exposing masses of troops to possible enemy nuclear strike.

Operational Formation

For Krasnovian commanders, the term "operational formation" is the basic organization for combat by a front or army The Krasnovians are quite flexible in their organizatron for combat The operational formation must correspond to the needs of the mission and develop the necessary correlation of forces to achieve that mission This section briefly defines the basic elements of the front operational formation in the offense We will examine more closely two of the three key offensive concepts that the Krasnovians recognize echelonment and mission depths. (The third concept, main and supporting attack axes, was discussed earlier.)

Echelonment

Echelonment is how a force organizes in depth for combat. Doctrinally, the Krasnovians seldom, if ever, use more than two echelons at any level. Krasnovian planners have used the concept of echelonment of their forces in response to the Increased depth of enemy defenses By echeloning their forces, they can ensure the continuous buildup of combat force in the decisive sectors at the critical time. They do not consider reserves to be echelons

Krasnovian forces have a wide range of options for echelonment. They might have a clear numerical advantage over the enemy across their entire frontage, or the enemy might have positioned the bulk of its defending forces forward In those cases, the Krasnovians would be more likely to use a single, strong echelon to effect multiple, narrow penetrations In other cases enemy defenses might be well prepared or echeloned in depth Then the Krasnovians would tend to use an attack force echeloned in depth to maintain the momentum of the attack after the initial penetration.

Usually, CAAs make up the first echelon of the front. Tank armies (TAs) would normally appear in its second echelon or as the front OMG. A front may place TAs in its first echelon to attain greater speed when terrain and other conditions dictate. This variant would also be likely if a massive nuclear strike preceded the ground offensive or if enemy defenses were unprepared. A front's first echelon normally contains most of its forces The remainder, or follow-on, forces of the front could include a second echelon, a combined arms reserve, an OMG, and special reserves.

Missions and Norms

The mission of the front's first echelon would be to overcome enemy defenses and to attack through the immediate operational depth (to enemy corps rear areas). Front first-echelon forces may receive support from the artillery, other combat support, and logistic elements of the front's second-echelon forces.

A front second echelon, normally at least one army, has the primary mission to exploit success achieved by first-echelon forces. It normally does this by continuing the main thrust of the offensive to

the front subsequent mission Once the second echelon has been committed, the former first-echelon forces would then normally constitute a combined arms reserve.

The primary mission of a first-echelon force is generally to penetrate forward enemy defenses. The primary mission of a second echelon (if organized) is generally to exploit the success of the first echelon Reserves. when formed, are contingency forces, given no Initial mission. The Krasnovians seek to form reserves at all levels from regiment to front when the assets are available.

Echelonment is determined largely by factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T), although the most Important determining factor IS the preparedness of the enemy defenses The more prepared the enemy defenses, the more a Krasnovian force will be echeloned in depth.

First-echelon fronts typically receive immediate and subsequent missions The front's subsequent mission normally coincides with the TVD's Immediate strategic mission The TVD second-echelon fronts also receive Immediate and subsequent missions that correspond to the overall mission of the strategic operation within the TVD. A typical immediate mission for a second-echelon front would Include-

- Neutralizing or destroying, in zone, the enemy's nuclear delivery capabilities
- Destroying the enemy's main forces
- Creating favorable conditions for developing the offensive deeper into enemy territory.

A typical subsequent mission would include-

- Destroying any newly detected nuclear delivery capabilities
- Destroying any remaining army group forces, theater reserves, and national forces
- Seizing important Industrial and poirtical centers deep in enemy territory

Krasnovian analysis of the terrain and enemy situation in the Krasnovian TVD yields time and distance norms for a TVD first-echelon front offensive operation These norms are as follows.

Depth of mission

- Immediate mission-250 to 350 kilometers
- Subsequent mission-600 to 800 kilometers

Expected time to achieve mission

- Immediate mission-6 to 7 days.
- Subsequent mission-12 to 15 days

Expected average rate of advance

- Average-50 kilometers per day (This rate wilt not be uniform While fighting through major enemy defenses, Krasnovian forces expect a rate of only several kilometers per hour or up to 30 kilometers per day. Once they achieve a major penetration, their rate would increase considerably.)

Width of zone of action

- Width-300 to 400 kilometers. (The Krasnovians base this width on a front with three or four armies in the first echelon. The zone of action depends on the number of axes of advance in the front first echelon. In assigning division frontages, the Krasnovians consider assessments of friendly and enemy forces as well as the nature of the terrain. The average division zone of action for offensive

operations in a main attack is 15 to 20 kilometers. The width of a first-echelon army making the main attack might vary from 60 to 100 kilometers depending on the number of divisions in that army. For armies not making the main attack, the width of the zone of action could be even greater than 100 kilometers. The depth of the front forces may be 300 to 400 kilometers measured from the forward edge of friendly troops.)

The norms indicated above for mission depths and times to achieve assigned missions are expressed as ranges. Within those ranges, the depths and times for a specific operation depend primarily on the preparedness of the enemy's defenses, For example, an enemy in well-prepared defensive positions or in defenses prepared in depth would probably require the shallowest mission depths and the most time to achieve the assigned missions. An enemy in partially prepared defensive positions or in positions lacking depth would require average mission depths and times Lastly, an enemy in unprepared defensive positions or one moving into position, or even one caught by surprise, would require the greatest, most optimistic mission depths and the shortest times within the ranges of the norms.

Maneuver

Krasnovian offensive operations greatly emphasize the role of maneuver. An offensive operation has three basic goals. The achievement of a tactical penetration; the development of the offensive into the operational depths, and the resulting isolation. encirclement, and destruction of the enemy force.

Krasnovian forces would try to attack the enemy's weakest points and gaps, preferring to make multiple penetrations They would shift forces (air. ground, naval) and means (such as fire and materiel) to win a decided advantage over the enemy and to make maneuver possible.

Fire

Fire is a generic term that Includes artillery. aviation, tank. as well as other kinds of fire The Krasnovians feel that modern conventional weapons are approaching the destructiveness of "weapons of mass destructor!" that is, NBC weapons As a result, maneuver by fire has assumed an Increasingly Important role in warfare In a nuclear environment, the Krasnovians could effect penetrations by nuclear weapons alone and exploit their results with ground forces, In a conventional environment, the Krasnovians would continue to mass ground forces and nonnuclear fires while also attempting to deceive the enemy or prevent being detected They would concentrate forces rapidly at the decisive points and times and then disperse them. In a conventional war, air superiority would remain a key factor

The Front OMG

The OMG is an element of the operational formation that has a particular mission. It may help the first echelon penetrate the enemy defenses. if required. Then it may raid deep into the enemy rear area as early in the offensive as possible. Possible OMG missions include-

- Destroying enemy nuclear weapons, air defenses, communications, and C^2.
- Seizing airfields or disrupting line; of communication.
- Assisting advancing main forces by seizing bridgeheads, road junctions, and similar objectives.

The term "operational maneuver group" is not synonymous with a particular organization. The word "group" connotes a force that is task organized for a particular mission. An operational commander may form an OMG either before or during the course of an operation. It normally consists of forces drawn from the resources of its parent front or army. However, a front OMG may consist of resources

controlled by the High Command of Forces (HCF) in the TVD or by the Supreme High Command (VGK). At army level, an OMG probably consists of at least one TD or motorized rifle division (MRD). At front, the OMG would be larger. from two or more divisions to an entire army in size.

The Krasnovians may not always form OMGs. Forming OMGs depends on a number of factors, including the mission; the planned direction(s) of the main attack, the tactics, strength, and readiness of enemy forces, and the nature of the terrain over which an attacking force must maneuver

The Krasnovians would most likely to use an OMG when the enemy defense system is at a low state of readiness or when enemy defenses are relaitively shallow and not supported by large reserves. They could also use the OMG against the enemy's reserves. This would slow or prevent their commitment against attacking second-echelon forces

Secondary front and army offensive operations may not have sufficient forces and combat support to employ an OMG Forming an OMG directly affects the correlation of forces that an army or front commander can achieve The commander may have to sacrifice forces In either the first or second echelon to form an OMG. However, the OMG is also a force multiplier It meets the Krasnovian desire to place a substantial force in the enemy rear area quickly to achieve simultaneous attacks throughout the enemy's defense The Krasnovians have not yet resolved the problems of combat and service support or C^2 for the OMG They probably have not yet perfected the employment of OMGs, particularly at front level.

Other Elements

Artillery, air defense, aviation, airborne, air assault, engineer, and other specialized groups and units are also part of the operational formation of fronts.

Deep Strikes

A nonnuclear Krasnovian front offensive would probably begin with a massive air operation. This air operation could begin shortly before, or at the same time as, the initiation of ground force operations. The Krasnovians would employ the air operation continuously for several days, using massed assets from frontal, strategic, and naval aviation The two main goals of the air operation would be to neutralize enemy theater nuclear capabillty and to gain tactical air superiority for the remainder of the operation Typical targets of the air operation would be nuclear delivery systems, airfields and aircraft air defense systems, and C^2 facilities. The Krasnovians would be willing to accept great losses in their own air assets to achieve their goals. They believe that they could conduct the remainder of the offensive with older, possibly obsolete, aircraft provided they can cripple enemy tactical airpower.

Ground attacks by front ground forces would follow a massive fire preparation conducted by first-echelon armies. If the Krasnovians use nuclear weapons from the onset, they would probably do so in a massive, in-depth strike before the nonnuclear preparation Whether they use them or not, the Krasnovians always Include nuclear strikes in their fire planning

A front could launch an airborne or air assault operation either at the start of an offensive or at a later time, possibly after completion of the air operation. It could be of airborne-regiment or possibly airborne-division size. The airborne force may plan to link up with advancing ground forces, probably an OMG. Possible objectives would include nuclear weapons, C^2 centers, enemy airfields, major bridges, and logistic facilities. The Krasnovians equip their airborne forces with BMD airborne assault vehicles. On the ground, especially in the enemy rear area, these forces fight as motorized infantry

Many aspects of an army or front operation help achieve simultaneous deep attacks throughout the enemy's defense. These include the air and airborne operations mentioned above as well as air defense, air assault, unconventional warfare, and naval and amphibious operations.

The Army

Krasnovian operational-level doctrine remains very similar in philosophy from front to army An army is the largest peacetime ground maneuver formation. Armies conduct either offensive or defensive operations to support front missions.

Army Organization

In wartime, the composition and size of an army reflect its mission. An army has a permanent staff structure and a complement of divisional and nondivisional combat and combat support elements. Its structure provides adequate control and ground-based support for the divisions assigned to it during the army's participation in a front operation. When the army's divisions are actively engaged in front combat operations, front assets will support the army's combat support elements.

An army may be either tank or combined arms. In the World War II Soviet army (from which the Krasnovian army derived), tank armies were the "exploitation" forces for a front operation Tank armies were committed through a breach in the enemy's positional defense to open up the operation They were to drive rapidly toward deep objectives, destroy enemy strategic reserves, or maneuver rapidly to the flanks to encircle large enemy groupings that would subsequently be destroyed by the slower-moving infantry The original TAs comprised little besides medium and heavy tank units and assault gun units. These TAs had a relatively small complement of motorized infantry. Today, Krasnovian infantry elements are completely mechanized, and the Krasnovian MRD includes a significant number of tanks Tank armies, divisions, and regiments have all evolved into more balanced combined arms organizations with the expansion of artillery and motorized rifle subunits. Thus, the historical distinction between CAAs and TAs has largely disappeared. Any Krasnovian army, regardless of its divisional makeup. IS designed to accomplish the tasks envisioned on a highly mobile battlefield.

Army-Level Offense

An army offensive IS Intended to destroy enemy military forces and to achieve operational missions in support of front operations The army IS the smallest Krasnovian force organized and equipped to conduct operational maneuver It can strike throughout the entire tactical-operational depths of the enemy through a combination of operational maneuver and fires. The forms of maneuver and types of fires used at the army level are similar to those at the front but on a smaller scale

Missions and Norms

An army in the first echelon of a front offensive normally has an immediate mission to attack through enemy defenses to the operational depth, the enemy corps rear area. The achievement of an army's mission is the culmination of successive attacks conducted by its divisions.

In the Krasnovian TVD, a typical army immediate mission would be to destroy the integrity of a NATO corps, including seizing important areas to facilitate offensive operations deeper into the NATO rear area The task on the first day of the operation might be to penetrate the forward defending NATO division and, subsequently, to advance to the counterattacking corps reserves. The army subsequent mission would depend primarily on the nature of the enemy defenses. It could include any or all of the following actions:

- The complete defeat, in zone, of the NATO corps.
- The destruction of army group reserves,
- The destruction of the integrity and operational stability of the opposing army group.

The combined depth of the army's immediate and subsequent missions correspond to that of the immediate mission of the front. The following are typical time and distance norms for an army offensive operation in the Krasnovian TVD:

Depth of the operation

- Immediate mission-100 to 150 kilometers.
- Subsequent mission-250 to 350 kilometers

Expected time to achieve

- Immediate mission-3 to 4 days.
- Subsequent mission-6 to 7 days,

Expected average rate of advance

- Average-50 kilometers per day (The Krasnovians expect 30 kilometers per day or less in initial offensive operations against a defending enemy.)

Width of zone of action

- Width-60 to 100 kilometers. (The width of the zone of action depends on the mission and the Krasnovian assessment of the correlation of forces and desired rates of advance.)

The section entitled "Missions and Norms" for the front gave an example of how the preparedness of the enemy's defenses affected the time-distance norms listed above. The concept remains the same for the army.

Operational Formation

The army's organization for combat is quite flexible, much like that of the front. The operational formation may include a first echelon, a second echelon, a combined arms reserve, special reserves, and an OMG.

Echelonment

The nature of the enemy's defenses also largely determines how Krasnovian offensive formations will be echeloned. If enemy defenses are not well prepared in depth or backed up by operational-level reserves, the army would probably attack in a single strong echelon followed by a combined arms reserve and possibly an OMG. If the enemy is well prepared in depth or has operational reserves, the army would probably attack in two echelons. In other words, if the enemy defense has an operational second echelon or reserve, the Krasnovians would employ an operational second echelon to sustain the

momentum of the offensive

First- and second-echelon forces operate together to destroy defending enemy forces up to assigned mission depths, An army commander normally plans to commit his second-echelon forces after attaining the army's immediate mission. If he employs an army OMG, he could commit it as early as the first day of an operation.

One or more first-echelon divisions attack on a predetermined army main attack axis. The forces conducting the main attack have the mission to penetrate the enemy's prepared defensive positions. Other first-echelon divisions conduct supporting attacks. First-echelon regiments of the army's first-echelon divisions attack from the march at top speed to achieve deeper penetration of the enemy's main defenses. They plan to exploit surprise and enemy disorganization. Second-echelon regiments of the army's first-echelon divisions exploit the best penetrations into the deep tactical rear of the enemy.

The army's second echelon normally consists of one or more divisions. This second echelon advances behind army first-echelon forces. It marches with its units dispersed laterally on multiple routes to minimize vulnerability to enemy detection and attacks. Depending on the development of the battle and assigned mission, the army commander commits his follow-on forces at the most opportune time and place. This achieves penetration, deeper exploitation, and dissolution of enemy defenses at tactical and immediate operational depths

Reserves

An army will normally retain one or more regiments as a combined arms reserve in an offensive. This could be a mission for an Independent motorized rifle regiment (IMRR) in those armies with an IMRR. Other reserve regiments may come from army second-echelon divisions or from first-echelon divisions in supporting attack sectors

Forward Detachments

The characteristics of the offensive are surprise, speed, and attempts to preempt or forestall the enemy. Krasnovian doctrine emphasizes that regimental through army-level formations use forward detachments when enemy defenses are less than fully prepared. Some elements of first-echelon forces may attempt to strike deep into the enemy forward defensive area before enemy defenses are fully organized and solidified. Forward detachments of an army's first-echelon divisions, fully supported by artillery and close air support, may receive such missions. It is also possible that an army could employ a regimental-sized "operational" forward detachment to achieve similar, but deeper, results in the enemy main defensive area.

Division forward detachments, normally reinforced tank battalions (TBs), could advance during the night before the offensive. They would attack on multiple axes across the army's offensive zone to penetrate enemy covering forces. They would then drive at top speed in prebattle or march formation to seize and hold key terrain within the main defensive area. Battalion-sized heliborne assaults may also occur. They would be designed for linkup with the forward detachments. Such tactics in support of an operation would be to disrupt or preempt the enemy defensive structure while opening multiple avenues for swift attacks by larger first-echelon forces.

Throughout the operation, strong forward detachments would probably continue to press the advance into the enemy rear on several axes. Numerous deep penetrations by forward detachments or OMGs early in the operation would result in an intemingling of enemy and friendly forces. This situation would complicate or prevent enemy use of tactical nuclear weapons. The Krasnovians would probably accept

heavy losses in deep-penetration forces if they could cause the enemy's defensive structure to collapse before using nuclear weapons,

The Army OMG

An army may form an OMG either from its own resources or from supporting front assets An army commander may establish an OMG before an operation as part of the Initial plan, or he may use it during an operation to exploit an unforeseen opportunity At army level, the OMG may be as large as a reinforced division. An army that uses one of its divisrions as an OMG may have a smaller second echelon or reserve as a result. An army OMG could operate 100 kilometers or more beyond other army forces.

Command and control of an army OMG is accomplished by a combination of radio. an airborne command element, and air and ground couriers. Sustaining the OMG requires highly mobile transport and supply. The Krasnovians attempt to maintain a ground line of communications, but they plan for resupply by air.

The relationship between the army OMG and the second echelon vanes depending on the concept of the operation. If the OMG is operating away from the main axis of advance, its activities and those of the second echelon may not be directly related If the OMG is operating on the main axis of advance. the second echelon may have to destroy forces the OMG bypasses or secure the OMG's lines of communications.

Unlike the second echelon, the army OMG acts as a large operational raiding force Typically, it has one or more objectives, perhaps located on the main axis. It would attempt to avoid a decisive engagement with large enemy forces however, it could conduct raids en route In this case, it would probably attack them with units detached for this purpose (raiding detachments). The relative Importance of raiding versus achieving a mission depends solely upon the mission(s) of the OMG

Other Elements

A front first-echelon army receives artillery units from the front artillery division The army commander then allocates army and frontal artillery to his divisions He may retain some artillery at army level to form an army artillery group and perhaps an army group of rocket artillery Within the army, artillery from second-echelon divisions may reinforce first-echelon divisions until the second echelon is committed to battle. The artillery would then rejoin its parent divisions A first-echelon army on the main attack axis would probably receive, from front, additional engineers and river-crossing equipment, air defense weapons, chemical units, and transportation assets

The army commander would allocate these assets primarily to support the main effort. Subordinates could also receive these assets according to their specific needs. An army offensive could also Include an airborne or heliborne assault operating with an OMG to seize deep objectives Small spetsnaz teams could conduct reconnaissance and sabotage,

Conduct of the Offense

An army carries out the same three basic forms of combat action as the front. Again, as at the front level, the Krasnovians define these forms in terms of the postures of the attacker and defender, not the time available.

Meeting Engagement

As an operational formation, an army conducts a meeting engagement. Its subordinate units conduct meeting battles.

Attack Against a Defending Enemy

The army, like the front, conducts two basic types of attack: from the march (out of direct Contact) and from a position in direct contact with the enemy. The characteristics of these attacks are the same as for the front. (For a discussion of this, refer to the section on the "Front-Level Offense.")

Pursuit

The same techniques are used as at front level. First-echelon armies will rely on their forward detachments and air assaults to cut off the withdrawing enemy. Operational pursuits may extend to a depth of several hundred kilometers.

Echelonment

Figures 2-3, 2-4, and 2-5 are doctrinal templates of a Krasnovian tank army (2 GTA) against enemy defenses of various degrees of preparedness.



Figure 2-3. Take army operational formation against a fully prepared defense.

The Krasnovian definition of enemy defenses is important here, not our perception of our own defenses. A fully prepared tactical defense is one for which the enemy has had from 3 to 5 days to prepare. An unprepared tactical defense is one in which the enemy has had less than 8 hours to prepare. All other tactical defenses would be termed "partially prepared."

- Against a *fully prepared enemy defense,* a Krasnovian army would normally echelon its forces with more divisions in the first echelon than in the second echelon, although the second echelon could be nearly as strong as the first. The typical reserve is a tank regiment or an IMRR. In the 2 GTA, we would expect to see the two motorized rifle divisions in the first echelon. One of the two tank divisions would probably constitute the second echelon, while the other tank division would probably be designated the

OMG. In the case of the 2 GTA, the IMRR would be the probable reserve. We would not expect to see forward detachments used at the army or division levels against a fully prepared enemy defense.



Figure 2-4. Tank army operational formation against a partially prepared defense.



Figure 2-5. Tank army operational formation against an unprepared defense.

- Against a partially prepared enemy defense, all divisions of the army except the OMG would probably be forward in the first echelon. With no second echelon, a reserve would generally be constituted. We expect to see both army- and division-level forward detachments employed against partially prepared defenses.

- Against Unprepared enemy defenses, we expect to see all of the divisions of the army in the first echelon, including the OMG. In this case, the reserve would probably be somewhat stronger; two aneuver regiments, probably tank regiments, would be a suitable army reserve. Against an unprepared enemy defense, the Krasnovians would make extensive use of forward detachments at all levels, from

first-echelon regiments to army. This off offensive would appear to be one massive meeting engagement, with Krasnovian forces moving in column formation whenever possible Momentum would be the chief goal against such a weak defense

Reserves

Reserves are an Integral part of the operational formation of fronts They are contingency forces held by the commander to meet any unforeseen circumstances An offensive reserve IS doctrinally about one-ninth of the parent force, or two levels down Thus, a division reserve during an offensive operation would typically be a battalion The operational formation of a front in the offense may contain three basic types of reserves combined arms, antitank (AT), and special

Combined Arms Reserve

A combined arms reserve may reinforce or exploit the efforts of first- or second-echelon forces, repel and conduct counterattacks, provide flank and rear area security or respond to any other contingency that may arise

A front in the offense would generally retain at least one division as a combined arms reserve Against a relatively weak and shallow enemy defense or in other cases, the front might employ only a single echelon The front would then probably retain a larger combined arms reserve of two, three, or more divisions

Normally, a front will have an AT brigade assigned to its artiliery division The front's AT assets may reinforce first-echelor, units or the combined arms reserve Alternatively, they may form an antitank reserve, often reinforced with engineer assets.

Front commanders also, retain special reserves that are formed from their special troops These include engineer, chemical protection communications, and radioelectronic combat units

PART II: OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS - DIVISION AND BELOW (TACTICAL EMPHASIS)

Tactical Organizations

Krasncovian division units are based on the same Soviet-style organizations as the Nebraskii forces described in lesson 2 of M/S320 for specific structure and equipment, refer to the maneuver section of Student Text 100-7. Division- regimental- and battalion-level tactics are also similar to those of the Nebraskiis however, the following information is added to emphasize important points and point out those differences (that is, operational norms) that result from geography and mission

Hierarchy of Mission Depths

Hierarchy of mission depths is broken between division (tactical) and army (operational) levels. Thus, first-echelon divisions could be, expected to fight for several days before ever attaining the army immediate mission. The overlapping hierarchy resumes again for army-and front-level units

Missions and Norms

Well-defined norms govern Krasnovian offensive operations. These norms depend principally on an assessment of friendly and enemy capabtlities In paticular, they depend on the preparedness of enemy defenses They may also reflect other factors TS such as terrain and weather. Thus, Krasnovian planners

have established norms in distances, rates of advance, and time factors. The norms discussed in this appendix apply only to the Krasnovian TVD. These factors guide planning for an operation.

The Krasnovians generally assign two missions (objectives) at all levels above company. The first-echelon forces are normally responsible for achieving the immediate mission line. Second-echelon forces plan to achieve the subsequent mission line. If there is no second echelon, the first echelon also must achieve the subsequent mission. Regardless, first-echelon forces continue to fight through to the subsequent mission line as long as they are able. At the tactical level, the mission line is normally a force-oriented line on the map At the operational level, this mission line can be either force or time oriented, or both. Krasnovian forces normally are required to destroy all enemy forces up to that line. The subsequent mission at one level IS the immediate mission of the next higher headquarters. Thus, the subsequent mission line of a first-echelon regiment will also be the immediate mission line of a first-echelon division This overlapping effect is designed to complete the destruction of enemy forces

Main and Supporting Attack Axes

Krasnovian military doctrine at division level and above generally requires at least one main attack axis and one supporting attack axis for every offensive operation. A main attack axis is normally narrower than a supporting attack axis. Assets, especially artillery, are centrally directed to support the main attack axis. This is to ensure a higher correlation of forces and means (COFM) on the main attack axis. A COFM of 5.1 is not uncommon on a main attack axis at the army level. The supporting attack axis, on the other hand, is normally wider, receives considerably fewer assets from higher headquarters, and may be nothing more than a fixing attack. A COFM of 1:1 or less is possible on an army supporting attack axis. Follow-on forces, especially tank forces, often follow the main attack, exploiting the success of the first echelon Command posts, especially forward command posts, normally follow the main attack.

Tactical Offensive Maneuver

The Krasnovians recognize and practice the same three forms of tactical offensive maneuver they do at the operational level, the meeting battle, the attack against a defending enemy, and the pursuit

Meeting Battle

The meeting battle is the primary form of maneuver employed by Krasnovian forces as they move from initial staging areas to attack enemy forces. This maneuver is fought primarily by forward detachments and advance guards at all levels from regiment to army. Much of the fight in NATO's covering force area would be against reinforced battalion-sized advance guards (of first-echelon regiments) or forward detachments (of first-echelon divisions), or even against an army forward detachment (reinforced maneuver regiment).

The forward detachment organization is very much like that of the advance guard A divisional forward detachment, normally formed from a second-echelon regiment, may look exactly like an advance guard battalion. A division could conceivably form more than one forward detachment, but in any case, normally only if the enemy defenses were perceived as less than fully prepared. An army could also form a forward detachment, probably based on a reinforced maneuver regiment. Air assault forces can also function as forward detachments. Forward detachments at all levels are designed to move well ahead of the main forces, avoiding contact whenever possible, seeking to secure key objectives that would facilitate the momentum of the force. River crossing sites, mountain passes, transportation nodes, firing positions for artillery groups, and enemy reserves are examples of such objectives.

The advance guard battalion is a forward security force for first-echelon regiments as the division moves in march column. Advance guards within a maneuver division are usually based on a motorized rifle (tank) battalion with additional reinforcements of up to a battalion of self-propelled (SP) artillery, a company of tanks (motorized rifle troops), and air defense, engineer, and chemical units. The advance guard equals about one-third of the combat power of a first-echelon regiment Figure 2-6 represents a typical advance guard based on a motorized rifle battalion. Figure 2-7 depicts an advance guard conducting a meeting battle where both forces are moving to contact.



NOTE: This diagram shows some, but not all, variants of reconnaissance and security groupings that an advance guard battalion could dispatch, depending on the situation.

(1) Combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP)--usually a platoon A battalion may send out as many as three CRPs to reconnoiter Hanks and alternate routes as well as the primary route
(2) Forward patrol -- a squad or platoon that provides march security ahead of the forward security element
(3) Forward security element (FSE)--a reinforced platoon or company that provides march security ahead of the advance guard main body
(4) Patrol squad -- a single APC IFV or tank that either conducts reconnaissance or provides march security for the subunit that dispatched it. In this example, it provides flank security or reconnaissance for the FSE. however, the forward patrol could send a patrol squad forward along its route of march for additional security
(5) Flank security element -- a platoon or company that provides march security to the flank of the main body
(6) Rear security element -- a platoon or company that provides march securitv to the rear of the main body

Figure 2-6. Reconnaissance and security grouping.



1. Combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP).
2. Forward patrol.
3. Forward security element (FSE)
4. Advance guard main body.

Figure 2-7. Advance guard conducting a meeting engagement (battle).

Regardless of which force fights the meeting engagement or battle, the Krasnovians prefer to attack an enemy from the flank or rear whenever possible. Figure 2-8 provides an example of the two types of tactical envelopment practiced by the Krasnovians. The primary difference between the close envelopment and the deep envelopment, besides the obvious difference in depth, IS that the latter form occurs outside of organic supporting indirect fires. As a result, a force conducting a deep envelopment would normally take its own supporting indirect fire means along. The close envelopment IS normally conducted within range of organic supporting artillery



Figure 2-8. Example of a (A) close envelopment and (B) a deep envelopment.

Attack Against a Defending Enemy

If the enemy force is defending and not moving to contact, the Krasnovians are forced to conduct an attack against a defending enemy. They do this either from positions in direct contact or out of direct contact with the enemy. The Krasnovians prefer to attack from positions out of direct contact, also called an attack from the march. If not forced to deploy into attack (battle) formation, Krasnovian forces prefer

to remain in march formation to maintain their momentum. This allows them to conduct the equivalent of an extended meeting engagement across the entire zone of attack. Figures 2-9, 2-10, and 2-11 represent the doctrinal echelonment of a tank division against various degrees of preparedness.



Figure 2-9. Tank division combat formation against a fully prepared defense.

Since the Krasnovians initiate their attack from staging areas in the rear, they would most likely move from the depths using advance guards (conducting meeting engagements) until they reach their forward assembly areas. First-echelon regiments of attacking divisions could form up for the attack as close as 20 or 30 kilometers from the enemy defensive positions, as long as they were out of range of enemy artillery The rest of the division would go into assembly areas about 60 to 75 kilometers from enemy defenses.



Figure 2-10. Tank division combat formation against a partially prepared defense

From these forward assembly areas (or forming up areas), the first-echelon regiments conduct the attack. Division and regimental reconnaissance elements conduct their detailed reconnaissance up to 24 hours ahead of the lead regiments. The lead regiments would probably not leave their final assembly areas using advance guards. They would move in march (column) formation, one regiment per route. As they reached predetermined deployment lines, they would deploy into prebattle formation (first, battalion columns on separate routes, then company columns. and so on). About 1 kilometer from the enemy forward defenses, the lead battalions go into battle (attack) formation with maximum firepower forward. The final assault then lakes place, and fighting continues to the immediate and subsequent mission lines of the respective units.



Figure 2-11. Tank division combat formation against an unprepared defense.

Figure 2-12 on the-next page is a doctrinal representation of a battalion as it deploys through its successive stages of prebattle formation,

This attack would not take place in isolation For it to succeed, the Krasnovians would have to mass significant fire assets against our defenses, in particular, artillery, antitank, air, and SSMs. To do this, artillery battalions would be sent down from front and army to the first-echelon units conducting the main attacks. Army, divisional, and regimental artillery groups (AAGs, DAGs, and RAGS) would be formed to ensure the success of the attack. If air assets were employed, they would probably not be used simultaneously in the same sector with artillery. The Krasnovians plan four phases of offensive fire support to offensive operations Figure 2-13 illustrates Krasnovian employment and sequencing of fires.



Figure 2-12. MRB deployment for an attack from the march.



Figure 2-13. Phases of offensive fire support

Phase I

Phase I, Fire Support of Advance from the Depths, is an operational-level phase. Its fires are normally fired by army artillery groups (AAGs) firing counterbattery and preplanned fires to support maneuver forces moving forward from the depths.

Phase II

Phase II Fire Preparation of Attack, covers the maneuver forces as they deploy through prebattle formations to conduct the attack. This phase is primarily designed to isolate and totally destroy forward

defenses at the points of penetration on main attack axes. As such, a massive amount of artillery is required to support each main attack axis. Artillery densities of 100 tubes per kilometer of breakthrough frontage are not uncommon on main attack axes. Supporting axes could expect about 40 tubes per kilometer of attack frontage, considerably less than for the main attack. The preparation may last from 15 minutes to over an hour, although an average preparation lasts about 30 minutes The preparation phase lifts and shifts to the next phase of fire support as the final assault begins. This phase normally occurs as the forward forces reach their final deployment line about 1,000 meters forward of the enemy defenses

Phase III

Phase III, Fire Support of Attack, provides fire support to maneuver forces as they fight through to the division immediate mission line. Phase III fires are fired primarily by DAGs and RAGs against deeper, preplanned targets throughout the enemy defenses.

Phase IV

Phase IV, Fire Accompaniment of Units Advancing in Depth, supports the maneuver forces as they fight to the division subsequent mission line while conducting the exploitation. This phase differs from the previous three phases in that most of the fires are not preplanned, but are, rather, on-call type missions.

The Krasnovians plan to commit second-echelon forces once the first-echelon forces have penetrated the enemy forward defenses. Generally, they commit follow-on forces to reinforce the success of the lead forces The Krasnovians are flexible in their use of second-echelon forces, at least at the division and army levels. Their troop control and planning methods rely extensively on objective data. They plan variants to the original plan in detail as time permits. Battalions in the attack use simple but rigid tactics relying extensively on battle drill,



Figure 2-14. MRR in the attack from the march

Figures 2-14 and 2-15 are doctrinal templates of Krasnovian tank and motorized rifle regiments in the attack from the march Each regiment is attacking with two reinforced battalions up and one back, typical against a fully prepared defense or through restrictive terrain. The regimental commander has two basic options available: he either attacks with two or three battalions forward. In the case of a main attack of restrictive terrain, he would probably employ two reinforced battalions forward. In the case of a supporting attack, unprepared enemy defenses, or unrestrictive terrain, he would probably employ three reinforced battalions forward. In any case, note that all first-echelon battalions are normally reinforced, each with a motorized rifle company (for a tank regiment) or a tank company (for a motorized rifle regiment).



Figure 2-15. Tank regiment in the attack from the march

Pursuit

Pursuit is the third form of offensive maneuver that the Krasnovians recognize. They recognize three forms of pursuit: frontal, parallel. and a *combination* of the first two. Figure 2-16 describes these forms of pursuit. *The* Krasnovians *prefer to use the combination pursuit whenever possible. Success* in the pursuit depends on a high rate of advance and continuous pressure on the enemy. Pursuit is initiated whenever an enemy withdrawal is detected. It is concluded only on the orders of the next higher commander. Figure 2-17 depicts an example of a division-level pursuit.



Figure 2-16. Forms of pursuit.

The Krasnovians attempt to initiate pursuit against withdrawing covering forces once their withdrawal IS detected In the case of a pursuit against withdrawing covering forces. the first-echelon regiments normally attempt to conduct a frontal pursuit with advance guards or forward detachments and the main body of the first-echelon regiments attempts to conduct the parallel form of pursuit



Figure 2-17. Pursuit of a withdrawing enemy.

PART III: DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS - ARMY AND ABOVE (OPERATIONAL EMPHASIS)

Role of the Defense

The role of the defense at the operational level is well defined. Fronts and armies may conduct defensive operations-

- To hall and repulse an enemy offensive.
- To hold key terrain.
- To inflict maximum losses on the enemy
- To buy time
- To perform economy-of-force missions.

The general goal of defensive actions is to defeat advancing enemy forces and to create conditions favorable for transition to the offense. The difference from past concepts for the defense is a greater emphasis on aggressive execution and conduct of counterstrikes. Current defensive operations would involve increased use of maneuver, mines, and barriers.

The Krasnovians view the defense (at all levels) as a temporary condition until they can assume or resume the offensive. Their military writings and training reflect this. They believe that they can attain victory only through offensive actions. Krasnovian planners generally discuss full-scale front defensive operations in the context of an initial NATO offensive In such a scenario, the Krasnovians initially defend, then follow with a counterstrike But within a given fro or army offensive operation. subordinate formations and units may execute defensive missions. This may be out of necessity as when encountering a superior enemy force during the course of an offensive, or it may be in an economy-of-force role, permitting the concentration of forces on the main attack axes. The primary focus of Krasnovian operational-level defensive planning is at army level.

The Krasnovians define a front or army defensive operation as the aggregate of operations and battles of subordinate units unified by a single concept and plan The combined arms concept IS an integral part of the Krasnovian approach to defensive operations The subordinate operations include those of-

- First- and second-echelon maneuver forces.
- Reserves.
- Missile troops and artillery units
- Air forces of the front.
- Army aviation.
- Airborne and air assault units
- Air defense forces.
- Naval and amphibious forces (on a coastal axis).

Krasnovian commanders do not conduct a static positional defense Reserves and second-echelon forces have planned commitment lines. Should a penetration develop, they would assume blocking positions or initiate counterattacks on these lines Echelonment within belts and the belt system itself allows room and the necessary forces for maneuver.

Krasnovians disperse forces laterally and in depth to reduce their vulnerability to nuclear attacks and strikes by improved conventional munitions strikes. They achieve depth in an army defense by establishing battalion positions within a series of defensive belts or lines. These are not

shoulder-to-shoulder, solid defensive lines like those used in World War II. Defensive belts within army or front defensive sectors are uneven, deeply deployed, and concentrated on major avenues of approach.

Modern Krasnovian defensive concepts emphasize the need to delay, defeat, or weaken the enemy offensive as far forward of the main defensive line as possible. Reconnaissance troops attempt to locate enemy forces and determine enemy intentions. When possible, an army or front establishes a security zone An army security zone may extend as far forward as 50 kilometers The depth of such a security zone depends primarily on the forces, resources, terrain, and time available. The security zone should delay. weaken, and deceive the enemy Using artillery, rockets, missiles, helicopters, and aircraft, Krasnovian commanders would try to attack the enemy in concentrated areas before an attack. They would conduct counterpreparation fires to break up and disorganize enemy formations in advance of the main defense lines Krasnovian missile and artillery forces would locate far forward in initial fire positions to strike the enemy as deeply as possible. They would then fall back to planned primary and alternate firing points in the main defensive area.

The basis of the defense is a coordinated and integrated fire system that is primarily antitank in nature The AT weapons deploy to achieve interlocking fires along the front and in depth. The AT reserves up to front level provide a quick-reaction AT force to block penetrations, generally in conjunction with mobile obstacle detachments. Commanders carefully integrate their obstacle and barrier plans with their fire plans to create fire destruction zones. Enemy nuclear-capable weapon systems remain the top priority target in the defense because of the threat they represent. Krasnovian units continually improve defensive positrons for defense against both conventional and nuclear munitions. Engineer support is extensive

Armies will employ the same types of reserves in the defense as they do in the offense. In the defense, the Krasnovians may also designate a battalion- or regimental-sized force to be an antiassault reserve This may be a quick-reaction force separate from a combined arms reserve or second echelon. All Krasnovian units will plan reactions to possible enemy airborne or air assault operations in the defense, whether or not they form a specially designated reserve.

Conduct of the Defense

In the Krasnovian view. transition to the defense occurs either in direct contact with the enemy or out of direct contact with the enemy. After hostilities begin, the Krasnovians consider the most likely form of defense to be that executed in direct contact with the enemy. This could occur during an offensive when a Krasnovian army might conduct a defense because it encountered a superior enemy force, or it may be required to perform an economy-of-force role to permit the concentration of forces on the front's main attack axis. Krasnovian military scientists write much less about operational-level defense than they do about tactical-level defense This reflects their traditionally offensive emphasis and belief that full-scale front defensive operations or TVD strategic defensive operations would be rare.

An entire army would probably not shift to the defense in direct contact with the enemy. If its forward tactical units go over to the defense, they would use the tactics described earlier. Their initial priorities, then, would be to establish good defensive positions; this might require offensive actions to seize suitable terrain Planning time for these units would obviously be limited but, depending on the enemy situation, follow-on forces could have a great deal of time. They would establish typical defensive positions as discussed above Krasnovian forces in direct contact with the enemy during the assumption of the defense are unlikely to withdraw to establish a security zone. Ground forces would continue to upgrade their positrons as long as they are defending. As a result, with the exception of the security zone, the defense in direct contact with the enemy eventually differs little from the defense executed out of direct contact with the enemy.

The Krasnovians might establish a defense out of direct contact with the enemy before a war begins or, during wartime, they might establish one along a secondary axis. It can also occur during an offensive, when follow-on front and army forces must block an enemy counteroffensive. If under no direct enemy pressure, the Krasnovian army would probably establish a security zone. The time available for preparation of the defense depends on the enemy situation.

Figure 2-18 depicts a Krasnovian tank army in a static defense. There are two likely variants we could expect to see at the army level. The most likely variant would have two motorized rifle divisions forward in the main defensive belt, with a third division (a tank division) spread across the army sector in the second defensive belt. The fourth division (also a tank division) would become the army counterattack force, located in assembly areas in the vicinity of the second defensive belt. If forced to defend with fewer divisions, they would certainly opt for a strong first belt, retaining a substantial counterattack force in lieu of a second defensive belt.



Figure 2-18. Defense by a tank army.

PART IV: DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS-DIVISION AND BELOW (TACTICAL LEVEL)

The basic elements of the Krasnovian defense are the company strongpoint and the battalion defensive area. A Krasnovian commander will disperse these tactical unit positions based on the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons. For example, if the enemy uses a medium-sized nuclear weapon of about 20-kiloton yield against a regiment defensive area, it should not be able to destroy more than one battalion. Company strongpoints in a battalion area are far enough apart that a small-sized yield of a few kilotons cannot destroy more than one company strongpoint. Platoon positions within a company strongpoint are at intervals so that a “super small” yield of less than one kiloton cannot destroy more than one platoon. The army commander places the series of strongpoints to cover the most likely enemy attack routes. He blocks or covers gaps by obstacles, reserves, and AT positions.

The Krasnovians recognize two forms of transitioning to the defense: *in direct contact* or out of *direct confect* with the enemy. The primary difference between the two is the absence or presence of a security zone, similar to our covering force area. They plan to conduct a stubborn defense throughout the depth of the security zone, fighting from generally fully prepared company strongpoints. Several situations would cause the Krasnovians to go over to the defense in the course of an offensive operation.

The current Krasnovian doctrinal defense is primarily static. It centers around company strongpoints formed into battalion defensive areas. Fire sacks, similar to our kill zones, are planned at all levels from company level upward. Tank-heavy counterattacks are planned for commitment at all levels above company in the event that the enemy should succeed in penetrating forward defenses. Artillery is planned for direct and indirect fires. Tanks and antitank forces are integrated into forward motorized rifle formations to strengthen the forward defenses. The Krasnovian use of key terrain and extensive engineer preparation of obstacles and positions is impressive by any standard.



Figure 2-19. Defense by a tank division

Figures 2-19 and 2-20 depict Krasnovian tank and motorized rifle divisions in the main defensive belt of the army. Where the main enemy attack is expected (in this case, the northern regiment sector), the first-echelon regiment is echeloned more in depth, with two battalion defensive areas forward in the first defensive position and one back in the second defensive position. The southern regiment is typical of a defense against a suspected supporting attack or of a situation where the regiment defends a sector broader than 8 to 10 kilometers.



Figure 2-20. Defense by a motorized rifle division

Refer to figure 2-20 for the rest of this discussion Tank-heavy counterattack forces are kept in reserve at battalion through division levels to complete the destruction of enemy forces that succeed in penetrating or bypassing the fire sacks. At the division level, reinforced forward detachments are sited forward in the security zone only when defending out of contact They fight stubbornly from well-fortified strongpoints, withdrawing only on orders from the division staff. They normally withdraw to subsequent positions within the security zone. They finally occupy previously prepared strongpoints about 5 kilometers forward of the main defenses, referred to as the “forward positions.” The forward detachment normally withdraws to forward positions out of the expected enemy main axis of advance. The plan may require the forward detachment to withdraw to prepared positions within the main defensive belt Fresh companies from second-echelon regiments also occupy forward positions, but generally only on the expected enemy main axis of advance. This final line of company strongpoints forward of the main defenses (forward positions) is designed to deceive the enemy as to the true location of the main defensive belt.



Figure 2-21. Tank battalion defensive area

The Krasnovians plan to engage the enemy as far forward as possible with both direct and indirect means. Artillery concentrations are preplanned and extensive. Fires are planned forward, to the flank, and on top of their own positions. Figures 2-21 and 2-22 depict a typical defensive area of a tank battalion and a motorized rifle battalion, both based around company strongpoints. The company strongpoints are usually arrayed with two forward and one back. They are well fortified with extensive obstacles sited forward and to the flanks. This battalion defensive area forms a fire sack in which the enemy forces are to be destroyed by the maximum application of indirect and direct fires.



Figure 2-22. Tank battalion defensive area.

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. European Operational Situation

Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. LANDCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) 31201 (CRASHING FIST)

This appendix provides LANDCENT guidance and tasks to subordinate commands. While extensive, this plan contains nowhere near the detail or level of completeness to be found in an actual contingency operation plan (COP). It goes into greater depth and IS more specific than AFCENT COP 30101 (CHESHIRE CAT) since actual employment of troop units IS included. It provides essential information for use in practical exercises The Information contained in this contingency operation plan applies to any plans developed for 10th (U.S.) Corps in a NATO environment.

In the scenario for S320A you will work with the three plans shown in bold print below To save time, the AFCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) CHESHIRE CAT is not included in your instructional materials LANDCENT COP 31201 (CRASHING FIST) is presented in this appendix The II Allied Army Group (AAG) plan is not presented because the AAG does not exist in peacetime--the AAG is activated only during periods of crisis or war Therefore, the taskings for subordinate corps are addressed in LANDCENT COP 31201 along with the AAG taskings

10th (U S.) Corps OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG is presented in Lesson 4. The 25th Armd Div OPLAN IS a primary subject of Lesson 4--you will be developing parts of the OPLAN.



LANDCENT COP 31201 (CRASHING FIST) is presented on following pages. A series of asterisks (* * *) indicates that material has been intentionally omitted.

LANDCENT COP 31201 (CRASHING FIST)

Copy no of 320 copies
Headquarters, Land Forces Central Europe
HEIDELBERG (MV7773), GE
041100A Jun 9
9X-D-053

LANDCENT CONTINGENCY OPERATION PLAN (COP) 31201 (CRASHING FIST)

REFERENCES:

a. STANAG 2014, Operation Orders, Warning Orders and Service Support Orders, 22 Oct 9_.

b. ACE Directive 80-17, 12 Feb 9_.

c. SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP) 10002, 14 Dec 9_.

d. AFCENT General Defense Plan (GDP) 33002 (CARAVAN COWBOY), 24 Mar 9_.

e. AFCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) 30101 (CHESHIRE CAT), 1 June 9_.

f. AIRCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) 35201 (COZY GOOSE), 10 June 9_.

g AFCENT Contingency Operation Plan 30105 (CHARTRUESE CATHUSIAN)

h. Maps. * * *

Time Zone used throughout the Plan. ALPHA

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization).

1. SITUATION

Continued destabilizing and debilitating developments in the western region of the former COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) resulted in a power vacuum. In a coordinated move, disenchanted military officers and hardline Communists seized power throughout the region. They established the Socialist state of KRASNOVIA Its hard-line government repressed internal dissent and then Intervened to suppress ethnic unrest in ROMANIA This dramatically halted and violently reversed the democratic trends of the past 10 years

The United Nations, NATO, and many concerned individual nations pursued numerous approaches, but they were powerless to bring an end to the crisis KRASNOVIA vigorously refused all demands to withdraw from ROMANIA. Although POLAND fully supported multinational diplomatic and economic moves directed against KRASNOVIA. it felt severely threatened due to its proximity to the crisis. Without consultation with other states, POLAND unilaterally threatened KRASNOVIA's interests in the region The

Polish government threatened internment of forces still in POLAND, seizure of pre-positioned stocks still on Polish soil, the termination of present basing rights, and the denial of any future basing rights.

Striking quickly, KRASNOVIA deployed its 16 TA and 37 GTA into POLAND to protect its military interests. Former CIS forces, remaining in GERMANY awaiting return home, declared allegiance to KRASNOVIA, relocated to POLAND, consolidated with Krasnovian elements there, and assisted in the subjugation of that country.

GERMANY, FRANCE, the UNITED KINGDOM, and the UNITED STATES declared the Four Plus Two Agreement abrogated and the restriction on NATO forces in GERMANY's eastern five districts invalidated. In a move to minimize tension throughout the region, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) refrained from deploying units forward into the former EAST GERMANY. It was hoped this would preclude undue pressure on the Krasnovian government

Krasnovian forces in POLAND have undergone major reorganization and collective training. They have experienced a significant improvement in their materiel and personnel status and a marked improvement in both their level of training and morale. Recently, Krasnovian forces have been conducting large-scale training exercises in training areas in POLAND, predominantly in the Pommeranian Military District. Krasnovian forces have attained an ability to conduct offensive operations not seen in the region since the mid-to-late 1980s.

a Enemy Forces Annex C (Operation Overlay)

(1) The Krasnovian strategic objective is to reestablish control of Eastern Europe

(2) The Krasnovian operational objectives are to reestablish the buffer provided by the old Warsaw Pact, prepare to defend along the old inner-GERMAN and CZECH borders, and repel NATO counterattacks.

(3) The Krasnovian TVD consists of two strategic echelons. The first strategic echelon consists of five armies organized into two fronts, the 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts Following 20 to 30 days of mobilization, Krasnovian TVD forces are expected to attack into the LANDCENT area with both fronts The main effort IS expected in the north, where the first operational echelon of the 1 Krasnovian Front will initially attack with two armies (42 TA in the north and 18 TA in the south). The operational goals of the 1 Krasnovian Front are to capture BERLIN, continue to secure the old IGB, establish and improve defensive positions along that line, resupply and reconstitute their forces, and consolidate their gains The lead armies will be followed by a third (37 GTA) seeking to ensure continued advance or exploitation of success where possible. 2 Krasnovian Front will make a supporting attack in the southern portion of the LANDCENT area. It is anticipated that 2 Krasnovian Front will conduct its main attack with 2 GTA toward FULDA and KASSEL in the north and with a supporting attack from 16 TA toward NURNBERG and LANDSHUT in the south. The operational goal of the 2 Krasnovian Front attack is to prevent LANDCENT from reinforcing in the north or from counterattacking against the flank of 1 Krasnovian Front. The second strategic echelon, consisting of five to six armies organized into two fronts, is forming east of the URALS. Lead elements of the second strategic echelon should start arriving in POLAND at about D+30

(4) Enemy Vulnerabilities.

(a) Ability to maintain control of Eastern European countries and Krasnovian allies in the face of renewed nationalism and active resistance movements in POLAND, ROMANIA, the eastern districts, and on Krasnovian home soil.

(b) Krasnovian forces are most vulnerable in their ability to rapidly mobilize, deploy, employ, and sustain committed forces and their decision-making abilities to exploit apparent successes.

(c) In the LANDCENT theater of operations (TO), the Krasnovian center of gravity is the ability to attack rapidly with high shock effect and to sustain the momentum over extended LOCs from the Krasnovian homeland to, and through, hostile territories while possibly making simultaneous attacks against AFNORTHWEST and AFSOUTH.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) III (GE) Korps, under German national authority initially, defends in sector along the GERMAN-POLISH and GERMAN-CZECH borders to delay Krasnovian forces.

(2) Allied Forces, Central Europe (AFCENT) intent is to defeat the Krasnovian attack and create military conditions favorable to NATO at war termination AFCENT-

(a) Defends to defeat the first strategic echelon of the Krasnovian TVD.

(b) Concurrently builds operational reserves

(c) Counterattacks the second operational echelon and destroys enemy units in zone.

(d) Ejects bulk of enemy forces from NATO territory and ensures that enemy units remaining are unable to operate effectively above regimental level.

(e) Restores the territorial integrity and sovereignty of NATO member states

(3) Air Forces, Central Europe (AIRCENT). AIRCENT-

(a) Conducts operations to gain and maintain air superiority.

(b) Provides offensive air support (OAS) and attacks echeloned forces in accordance with the procedures for joint-precision interdiction (JP1).

(4) Allied Forces, Baltic Approaches (BALTAP).

(a) Conducts triservice defense in sector to defend national integrity of JUTLAND and the DANISH ISLES.

(b) Protects allied airports and seaports of supply and debarkation

(c) Prevents egress of Krasnovian naval elements from the Baltic

(d) Controls the SKAGERRAK and KATTEGAT SLOCs

(5) Federal Republic of Germany (GE) Territorial Forces.

(a) Provide security to rear of LANDCENT corps boundaries

(b) Coordinate host nation support in LANDCENT AOR

(6) LANDCENT conducts operations IAW AFCENT GDP 33002 Its operational objectives are to restore the GERMAN-POLISH and GERMAN-CZECH borders, destroy any Krasnovian forces remaining in Germany after restoration of the borders and eliminate the threat posed by the second strategic echelon. LANDCENT-

(a) Activates I Allied Army Group (AAG) and II AAG

(b) Defends in sector from NORTH Sea to intersection of ELBE River and GERMAN-CZECH border.

(c) Plans for employment of Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in sector.

(d) Prepares to receive ARRC in sector

(e) Establishes liaison with French forces in sector

(7) II AAG activates and conducts operations IAW AFCENT GDP 33002. II AAG-

(a) Defends in sector from NORTH Sea to Intersection of ELBE River and GERMAN-CZECH border.

(b) Coordinates north coastal operations with BALTAP and denies Krasnovian access to NORTH GERMAN ports.

(c) Protects BALTAP southern flank and defeats first operational echelon armies of 1 Krasnovian Front.

(d) Forces commitment of second-echelon army (37 GTA)

(e) On order, counterattacks to assist in destruction of the second operational echelon

(f) On order, restores GERMAN-POLISH border in sector and prepares to defend against second strategic echelon attacks.

(g) Assists German Territorial Forces in control of displaced persons

(h) Establishes liaison with French forces in sector

(8) I AAG activates and then operates IAW AFCENT GDP 33002. I AAG-

(a) Occupies hide positions and plans counterattack against main attack

(b) Assists German Territorial Forces in control of displaced persons

(c) Counterattacks to destroy second operational echelon

(d) Establishes liaison with French forces in sector.

c Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization)

(1) On implementation of NATO Augmented Defense System (NADS)-

(a) I (Nord), II (Sud), and III (Ost) German Korps detach predesignated OberKommando and Military District command structures and relinquish to them responsibilities for German Territorial Army requirements in their respective AORs.

(b) I (Nord), II (Sud), and III (Ost) German Korps redesignated as I (GE), II (GE), and III (GE) Korps respectively.

(c) II (GE) and III (GE) Korps retain tactical and operational responsibilities for their designated sectors.

(2) On activation, II AAG receives OPCON of 1st (NL) Corps, 10th (US) Corps and II (GE) Korps

(a) 00, receives OPCON of 7th (GE) Pz Gren Div in phase II.

(b) Be prepared to receive OPCON of 1st (GE) Pz Gren Div from BALTAP during phase III

(3) * * *

d. Assumptions

(1) Ill (GE) and II (GE) Korps will be in position to defend GERMAN-POLISH and GERMAN-CZECH borders (respectively) at D-Day.

(2) NATO indications and warning system provides at least 20 days warning of attack preparations and 48 hours attack warning.

(3) NAC renders political decisions in a timely manner to allow military operational execution.

(4) Prior to contrary political determination, NATO ground forces will not cross the POLISH border (PL ARGON) or the CZECH border (PL NEON).

(5) IAW reference d, forward-deployed LANDCENT forces will be in position to defend in sector at the outbreak of hostilities.

(6) Nations providing augmentation forces designated for COMLANDCENT will flow forces into theater IAW reference c.

(7) Reinforcing forces arrive according to schedule for reception, onward movement, and change of operational control (CHOP) to appropriate principal subordinate commands, and they are available to initiate counterattack

(8) Krasnovian forces may use chemical weapons

(9) Krasnovian use of tactical nuclear weapons IS expected only in retaliation.

(10) FRANCE will not Integrate into the military structure of NATO, but will participate in military operations in accordance with existing agreements upon initiation of hostilities.

2. MISSION

When directed, LANDCENT conducts a forward defense in sector with assigned forces to assist in the defeat of the Krasnovian TVD by destruction of the 1 and 2 Krasnovian Fronts reestablishes the GERMAN-POLISH and GERMAN-CZECH borders, restores German territorial integrity, and secures conflict termination on conditions favorable to NATO

3. EXECUTION

INTENT The purpose of this operation is to defeat the Krasnovian TVD. I intend to destroy the 1 Krasnovian $\underline{\text{Front}}_1$ which is making the TVD main attack, while defeating the 2 Krasnovian $\underline{\text{Front}}_1$ which is making the TVD supporting attack To accomplish this. LANDCENT will defend well forward in sector, significantly reducing the combat capabilities of the the first operational echelon Forward units will identify and contain the enemy main effort When sufficient operational reserves are built up, we will counterattack to destroy the enemy's second operational echelon army On conclusion of this operation, we must have secured the LANDCENT sector, the enemy must be Incapable of regimental or higher operations, the borders with POLAND and the CZECH Republic must be restored, we must have prepared a coherent defense, and our forces must be disposed for future defense in support of AFCENT plans.

a. Concept of Operation. The campaign in LANDCENT's TO will be conducted in five phases The deception effort will attempt to induce the Krasnovian TVD commander to commit the second-echelon army in the north of the II AAG sector and to mask the true location and posture of the I AAG counterattacking forces LANDCENT will accept risk by not having a true reserve and by assigning very large sectors for forward corps.

b. Maneuver

(1) Phase I-Preconflict Preparation/Transition to War (T-Day to D-Day). This phase commenced with violation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, hereafter referred to as T (for treaty violation)-Day. and ends when Krasnovian forces attack into NATO territory. Objectives in this phase are to avoid being surprised,, to receive reinforcements, and to prepare for the outbreak of hostilities. This phase will see LANDCENT Increase vigilance of LANDCENT forces. On indication of imminent hostilities or attack, forces will deploy to forward dispersal areas. Phase I will culminate on D-Day with Krasnovian westward violation of German territorial integrity. LANDCENT initiates deception efforts to lead Krasnovian TVD commander to focus on potential for success in northern portion of LANDCENT sector

(a) Operational Concept The intent during phase I is for all actions to support increased readiness for defensive operations and preparation for the reception of reinforcements from contributing nations before the outbreak of hostilities. LANDCENT will prepare to receive and will receive OPCON of III (GE) Korps on initiation of stage II of NADS General command tasks common to all LANDCENT subordinate units Include--

1 Increase unit readiness.

(a) Activate intelligence channels to facilitate early warning of threat mobilization and attack

(b) Implement ACE countersurprise measures.

(c) Increase counterterrorist and countersabotage measures.

(d) Increase air defense posture

(e) Exchange liaison elements

(f) Refine rules of engagement

(g) Complete Infrastructure, mobility. and maintenance projects where possible

(h) Raise sustainment stocks to highest attainable level

(i) Initiate logistic corrective action for all continuing national shortfalls and report uncorrected shortfalls through Intermediate HQs to LANDCENT G4 for cross-leveling where possible, consolidation. and reporting to Logistics Readiness Center (LRC), SHAPE.

2 Prepare to receive reserves and theater reinforcement augmentation.

(a) Implement political arrangements to expedite reception, staging, and movement of reinforcing formattons

(b) Secure LOCs, APODs, POMCUS, and bed-down airfields

(c) Pre-position ground and air assets to decrease decision-implementation lag

(d) Prepare to execute national support agreements with emphasis on preplanned host nation support

(e) Open LOCs and MSRs in LANDCENT rear and implement traffic controls to ensure support to deploying forces

(f) On declaration of general alert and initiation of NADS, the three German Korps will activate wartime organizations. Territorial units and functions will separate and function under German national authority as OberKommandos for appropriate areas. All German corps will assume operational and tactical responsibilites and ensure cadre units are fully mobilized. III (GE) Korps will remain under German national control until stage II of NADS.

(g) When directed, activate II AAG and I AAG

(h) On order, provide additional fire support to augment fires of III (GE) Korps

(b) Tasks to Subordinate Commands

1. II AAG.

(a) Activate command, initiate communications channels and assume OPCON of 1st (NL) Corps, 10th (US) Corps, and II (GE) Korps.

(b) Coordinate cohesive defense with BALTAP (LANDJUT)

(c) Coordinate initial defense with III (GE) Korps and prepare to receive OPCON of 7th (GE) Pz Gren Div

(d) Coordinate cross-boundary air defenses with LANDCENT, BALTAP, AIRCENT and III (GE) Korps.

(e) Coordinate air operations with BALTAP, I AAG, AIRCENT, and III (GE) Korps. (Continue for all phases)

(f) Prepare to receive the ARRC in sector.

2. I AAG. * * *

3. 1st (NL) Corps. * * *

4. 10th (US) Corps.

(a) On NAC decision, deploy forces to forward locations

(b) Coordinate initial defense with III (GE) Korps, 1st (NL) Corps on the left and II (GE) Korps on the right.

(c) Continue reception of forces IAW reference c.

5. I (GE) Korps. * * *

6. 1 (BE) Corps. * * *

7. II (GE) Korps

(a) Coordinate initial defense with 10th (US) Corps on the left and III (GE) Korps

* * * * * * *

8. III (GE) Korps

(a) Activate OberKommando Ost and CHOP predesignated assets upon implementation of NADS

(b) Assume operational responsibility for eastern five districts upon implementation of NADS.

(c) Establish covering positions as far forward as possible oriented on GERMAN-POLISH and GERMAN-CZECH borders

(d) Plan fires for and prepare to receive fire support augmentation from 1st (NL) Corps, 10th (US) Corps, and II (GE) and I (GE) Korps.

(e) Coordinate battle handover and rearward passage of lines with II AAG. 1 (NL) Corps, and 10th (US) Corps.

* * * * * * *

9. 2d (US) Corps Move into assembly areas/hide positions as mobilization, deployment and reception completed.

(2) Phase II-Deployment/Initial Defense (D-Day through D+TBD). This phase may begin during phase I with the deployment of the first NATO command forces forward into GDP locations Phase II begins with a Krasnovian attack into NATO territory (D-Day) LANDCENT objectives are to identify and contain the front making the main attack, defeat armies making supporting attacks, protect and move counterattacking forces to achieve positional advantage against the army in the second echelon. Activities may continue into phases III and IV until the major reinforcing formations have closed in theater and effective forward defense is established. Be prepared to receive AFCENT reserve formations

OPCON for conduct of phase III.

Deception effort continues to indicate potential weakness and failure of defense in II AAG and to conceal location and intent of I AAG.

Concurrently, AIRCENT will gain and maintain air superiority in LANDCENT's TO; conduct JPI/AI east of RIPL (PL ARGON) with priority of effort forward of II AAG, shifting to I AAG after defeat of first operational echelon armies of 1 Krasnovian Front and prior to counterattack; OAS priority in II AAG AOR and will be prepared to shift priorities to I AAG on 8-hours' notice.

(a) Operational Concept. Efforts must be directed toward maintaining a mobile defense while building combat power in the rear area in preparation for counteroffensive. LANDCENT prepares to defend in sector with II AAG. Forward of LANDCENT/II AAG positions, III (GE) Korps will function as a covering force for 24 hours while the forward corps move into sector. III (GE) Korps will cover with 8th (GE) Pz Gren Div oriented toward the GERMAN-POLISH border and 7th (GE) Pz Gren Div oriented generally along the GERMAN-POLISH/GERMAN-CZECH border III (GE) Korps will delay Krasnovian forces east of the ELBE River for 24 hours. On order, II AAG will assume OPCON of III (GE) Korps for battle handover. Upon III (GE) Korps handover of the battle to II AAG main defense forces, II AAG passes III (GE) Korps to the rear and defends in sector. Deep operations will delay, disrupt, and deplete the second-echelon army. General LANDCENT command tasks include-

1. Deploy to forward defensive positions

2. Process, stage, receive, and reposition deploying forces to marshalling areas to facilitate CHOP to NATO.

3. Plan for AFCENT counteroffensive

(b) Tasks to Subordinate Commands

1. II AAG

(a) Establish cohesive defense from north GERMAN coast south to AUSTRIAN and CZECH borders Observe neutrality of each country.

(b) Maintain a cohesive defense with LANDJUT Corps on left flank. Continue in all phases.

(c) Coordinate Baltic coastal operations in conjunction with BALTAP

(d) Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) operations to determine threat main effort IAW AFCENT collection plan.

(e) Coordinate, facilitate, and accept handover of battle from and rearward passage of elements of III (GE) Korps. Positioning of all long-range fire support elements will be well forward to

support the covering operations and facilitate disengagement of III (GE) Korps. First priority of calls for fire will be to III (GE) Korps.

(f) Facilitate rearward and lateral passage of III (GE) Korps elements through sector as required.

(g) Receive 7th (GE) Pz Gren Div OPCON

(h) Continue to receive forces IAW reference c until deployment completed.

(i) Defend in sector along a line running from STRALSUND on the North Coast (UA750200) to DEMMIN (UV710750) to NEUBRANDENBURG (UV851362) to NEUSTRELITZ (UV725161) to ZEHDENICK (UU891721) to BRANDENBURG (UU316095) to WITTENBERG (UT380500) following the ELBE River to RIESA (US800880), then to DRESDEN (VS100550) and then to the point where the ELBE River crosses GERMAN-CZECH border (VS402365).

(j) Allow controlled penetration of Krasnovian main effort to a line running from PARCHIM (PE895230) to LUDWIGSLUST (PE670118) to DANNENBERG (PD401846) to SALZWEDEL (PD460591) to WOLFSBURG (PD222095) to BRAUNSCHWEIG (PC048915) to OSCHERLEBEN (PC531677) to ROSSLAU (UT108540) to WITTENBERG (UT380500) in preparation for AFCENT counteroffensive operations.

(k) Be prepared for boundary change adding 1st (GE) Pz Gren Div sector to army group area if depth of designed penetration is exceeded.

(l) Defend in sector running from WITTENBERG (UT380500) to DRESDEN (VS100550) to the point where the ELBE River crosses GERMAN-CZECH border (VS402365) against Krasnovian secondary effort and destroy the army making the 2 Krasnovian Front main attack.

(m) Be prepared to accept attachment of one attack helicopter group from 2d (US) Corps.

(n) Guard along a line running from HALBERSTADT (PC407506) to STASSFURT (PC790485) to DESSAU (UT095464) as the 1 Krasnovian Front penetration develops.

(o) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations toward NEUPRIN (UU533685) in the north; BRANDENBURG (UU316095) in the center; or along an axis CHEMNITZ (US550350) (formerly KARL MARX STADT) to DRESDEN (VS100550) in the south.

(p) Be prepared to restore GERMAN-POLISH border and GERMAN-CZECH border in sector.

(q) Reserve will be committed only with approval of LANDCENT commander

(r) Be prepared to operate in concert with the forces of the CZECH Republic should

that nation abandon its neutrality or be drawn into the conflict. (Continue in all phases.)

(s) Be prepared to operate in concert with the forces of AUSTRIA should that nation abandon its neutrality or be drawn into the conflict (Continue in all phases.)

2. I AAG. * * *

3. 1st (NL) Corps. * * *

4. 10th (US) Corps.

(a) Defend in sector from TREUENBRIETZEN (UT545749) to WITTENBERG to EILENBURG (UT388049) to GRIMMA (US407789) to ALTENBERG (US204505) to LICHTENSTEIN (US337260) to FALKENSTEIN (UR138947) to POSSECK (TR918802) to destroy 2 GTA to cause the defeat of 2 Krasnovian Front.

(b) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations toward BRANDENBURG (UU316095) in the north or PILSEN (VR778507) in the south.

(c) Commit reserve only with approval of commander, II AAG

(d) Coordinate, facilitate, and accept handover of battle from and rearward passage of elements of III (GE) Korps.

(e) Facilitate rearward and lateral passage of III (GE) Korps elements through sector as required.

(f) Continue to receive forces IAW reference c until deployment completed

5. I (GE) Korps. * * *

6. 1 (BE) Corps. * * *

7. II (GE) Korps

(a) Facilitate rearward and lateral movement of III (GE) Korps elements through sector as required.

(b) Defend in sector from TR970660 to UQ690430 to defeat the 16 TA

(c) Establish cohesive defense south to AUSTRIAN and CZECH borders Maintain neutrality of each country.

* * * * * *

8. III (GE) Korps

(a) Conduct covering force operations from the GERMAN-POLISH/GERMAN-CZECH borders to PL BORON for 24 hours.

(b) Destroy enemy reconnaissance units.

(c) Delay and disrupt forward detachments and first-echelon divisions

(d) Defend as far forward as possible oriented on GERMAN-POLISH and GERMAN-CZECH borders.

(e) OO, given fire planning authority and first priority of calls for fire of long-range fire assets of 1st (NL) Corps, 1 (BE) Corps, 10th (US) Corps, and I (GE) Korps.

* * * * * *

9. 2d (US) Corps

(a) Complete moves into assembly areas/hide positions

(b) Continue to hide and prepare for counterattack

(3) Phase Ill-Counteroffensive (00). This phase will commence once intelligence sources confirm the commitment of the 37 GTA by the Krasnovian TVD commander and I AAG elements are in their attack position

(a) Operational Concept. Initiation of this phase depends on our success in making the Krasnovian TVD commander believe an opportunity exists to exploit vulnerabilities in the north of the II AAG sector. II AAG forward corps will continue defense in sector to control the shoulders of the penetration and, at the same time, funnel attacking forces into the vicinity of COLDITZ LETZLINGER HEIDE, north of MAGDEBURG. On order, I AAG counterattacks to destroy the second-echelon Krasnovian army seeking to continue the offensive through the shaped penetration created by the collapsing defenses in the north of the II AAG sector Deep operations shift to delaying and disrupting the second strategic echelon.

(b) Tasks to Subordinate Units

1. II AAG

(a) Continue defense in sector from north GERMAN coast south to AUSTRIAN and CZECH borders.

(b) Coordinate Baltic coastal operations in conjunction with BALTAP to divert Krasnovian assets in support of main attack.

(c) Continue to defend in sector

(d) Allow controlled penetration of Krasnovian forces in preparation for AFCENT counteroffensive operations.

(e) Be prepared to pass counterattacking I AAG

(f) OO, counterattack to destroy the lead elements of the second operational echelon armies.

(g) Be prepared to pass the ARRC

(h) On order, initiate counterattack toward BRANDENBURG or CHEMNITZ-DRESDEN.

2. I AAG

(a) On order, counterattack in zone into and through the II AAG sector to destroy the 37 GTA east of BERLIN vic FRANKFURT AM ODER

(b) Skirt and avoid becoming decisively engaged in BERLIN.

(4) Phase IV-Reconstitution/Defense. This phase begins with the defeat of the second operational echelon army. The objectives are to prepare for and absorb the attack of the second strategic echelon and restore GERMAN national boundaries along antebellum lines.

(a) Operational Concept The battlefield will be reorganized with I AAG in the north and II AAG in the south. All units will occupy defensive positions and be prepared to revert to offensive operations on 24-hours' notice

1. OO, boundary between II AAG and I AAG to be established along a line generally following the E30 autobahn from FRANKFURT AM ODER to MAGDEBURG and then along Bundestrasse 81 to HALBERSTADT.

2. Significant reassignment of forces will accompany implementation of on-order boundary dependent upon actual force locations after destruction of the first strategic echelon.

(b) Tasks to Subordinate Units

1. II AAG

(a) Defend in sector

(b) Pass OPCON of 1st (NL) Corps to I AAG.

2. I AAG. * * *

(5) Phase V-Confict Termination/Post Conflict/Extended Operations

(a) Operational Concept To be published upon further NAC guidance

(b) Tasks to Subordinate Units To be determined in line with NAC guidance

c Coordinating Instructions

(1) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and implementation on receipt of appropriate message through the NATO alert system

(2) II AAG and I AAG provide completed plans this headquarters NLT 151200 Jun 9_.

(3) T-Day = M-Day

(4) Receive reinforcement/replacement augmentation IAW reference c

(5) Request for release of nuclear and chemical weapons will be passed through COMAAGs. COMLANDCENT. CINCENT, and SACEUR to NAC for consultation and approval

(6) Restrict continued westward movement of non-German refugees They will be cleared from imminent danger of areas of conflict. consolidated at displaced persons containment areas in the rear, and passed to the German territorial army control

(7) There are two on-order RIPLs

(a) PL KRYPTON runs generally parallel and east of the GERMAN-POLISH border and will be activated as a RIPL on D-Day by message from AFCENT (See Annex C.)

(b) PL OZONE runs generally parallel and south of the GERMAN-CZECH border and will be activated by message from AFCENT dependent upon Krasnovian violation of CZECH neutrality and use of CZECH approaches to the LANDCENT AOR. (See Annex C.)

(8) Operations beyond either RIPL are limited to engagement of Krasnovian troop and logistic concentrations outside urban and population areas Targets not meeting these criteria may be engaged on clearance and approval by SACEUR

(9) Major ground operations into POLAND are not authorized (See Special Considerations in ROE.)

(10) Ground or air operations into or over AUSTRIA or the CZECH Republic are not authorized without prior approval of SACEUR

(11) Civil control and rear area security within the borders of GERMANY are a national responsibility.

(12) Principal subordinate commands will help host nation authorities destroy enemy forces located in rear areas.

(13) Fire Support Submit target nominations and air requests IAW SOP. For planning only, the following air allocations are projected. Report further allocation to corps level through LANDCENT G3 (Air).

(a) TAR

	D-Day	D+1	D+2	D+3	D+4	D+5	D+6
III (GE) Korps	20	20	10	5			
II AAG	20	30	30	25	25	15	15
I AAG	5	5	10	30	30	20	20
LANDCENT	15	15	20	25	30	30	25
TOTAL	60	70	70	85	85	65	60

(b) BAI

	D-day	D+1	D+2	D+3	D+4	D+5	D+6
III (GE) Korps	60	60	10				
II AAG			50	30	30	25	15
I AAG					20	25	15
LANDCENT		25	20	75	50	30	60
TOTAL	60	85	80	105	100	80	90

(c) CAS

	D-day	D+1	D+2	D+3	D+4	D+5	D+6
III (GE) Korps	100	150	150				
II AAG		150	250	350	250	250	200
I AAG				50	100	100	150
LANDCENT	100	50	70	50	100	50	50

TOTAL	200	350	470	450	450	400
400						

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

Sustainment, although a national responsibility, must be organized to support a rapidly shifting battlefield that will be highly mobile. Logistic support must be available both out of sector and on an area basis. Sustainment operations will be conducted by national authorities through the rapid establishment of lines of communication into the theater of war and the establishment of adequate stockage levels and supporting transportation assets to support each phase of the campaign. Logistic support remains a national responsibility Inter-Allied support conducted IAW bilateral agreements NATO Mutual Support Act and NATO declared logistic emergency procedures remain in effect

a Sustainment priorities by phase

(1) Phase I-II AAG

(2) Phase II-III (GE) Korps

(3) Phase Ill-I AAG

(4) Phase IV-I AAG

(5) Phase V

(a) Returning all units in theater to highest possible levels of preparedness

(b) Preparing for redeployment of reserves and reinforcements

(c) Providing all possible assistance to the conduct of civil-military operations in all areas

b Declaration of Operational Emergency in War will be IAW SHAPE ATP and MSC standard procedures

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command

(1) Command Relationships COMLANDCENT exercises operational control over all NATO command forces, all NATO assigned forces, and all NATO earmarked forces in the LANDCENT AOR when national forces are declared to be in combat ready status by national authorities.

(2) Succession of Command. COMLANDCENT, DCOMLANDCENT, CDR, II AAG, CDR, I AAG.

(3) Headquarters Locations (Initial).

(a) AFCENT-BRUNSSUM, NETHERLANDS.

(b) AFCENT Allied War Headquarters-MAASTRICT, NETHERLANDS.

(c) LANDCENT-HEIDELBERG, GERMANY

(d) LANDCENT Allied War Headquarters-RUPPERTSWEILLER, GERMANY

(e) II AAG-WIESBADEN, GERMANY.

(f) I AAG-OSNABRUECK, GERMANY

(g) AIRCENT-RAMSTEIN AB, GERMANY

(h) III (GE) Korps-POTSDAM, GERMANY

b. Signal Annex F (Signal)

Acknowledgement

VAN RYKSDAL
General (NLA)

SCHMIDT
BG, ACOS (OPS)
(GEA)

Annexes;

Annex A -Task Organization
Annex C-Operation Overlay (Omitted)
Annex F -Signal (TBP)

DISTRIBUTION:

LANGCENT COP 31201 (CRASHING FIST)

SACEUR
CINCNORTHWEST
COMAIRCENT

COM I AAG (Designate)
MOD, Paris (for 1st (FR) Armee)
CDR, 1 (BE) Corps
CDR, LANDJUT Corps
CDR, 2d (US) Corps
CDR, I (GE) Korps (Nord)
CDR, Ill (GE) Korps (Ost)

CINCENT
COMBALTAP
COM II AAG (Designate)
MOD, BONN
CDR, 1st (NL) Corps
CDR, 10th (US) Corps
CDR, CFE
CDR, ARRC
CDR, II (GE) Korps (Sud)

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to LANDCENT CONTINGENCY OPERATION PLAN (COP) 31201 (CRASHING FIST)

II Allied Army Group

NOTE: All units listed here are OPCON to this army group

1st (NL) Corps
- 4th (NL) Div
- 2d (GE) Pz Gren Div
- 23d (US) Armd Div (available T+15)

10th (US) Corps
- **4th (GE) Pz Gren Div**
- **52d (US) Mech Div**
- **25th (US) Armd Div (POMCUS)**
- **4th (CA) CMBG**
- **209th (US) ACR**

II (GE) Korps
- 5th (GE) Pz Gren Div
- 6th (GE) Pz Gren Div

I Allied Army Group

NOTE. All units listed here are OPCON to this army group

I (GE) Korps
- 1st (NL) Mech Div
- 3d (GE) Pz Gren Div

I (BE) Corps
- 20th (BE) Mech Bde
- 21st (BE) Armd Bde
- 30th (BE) Armd Bde
- 31st (BE) Armd Bde
- 313th (US) Sep Mech Bde

III (GE) Korps: 00, OPCON II AAG for phase II battle handover only
- 7th (GE) Pz Gren Div. 00 OPCON II (GE) Korps
- 8th (GE) Pz Gren Div

Available for planning only until completion of mobilization and deployment and release from national control.

ANX A (TASK ORG) to LANDCENT COP 31201 (CRASHING FIST)

2d US Corps (M+30)
- 53d (US) Mech Div
- 54th (US) Mech Div
- 55th (US) Mech Div
- 208th (US) ACR

On political determination by FRANCE, the following units may become available for employment in LANDCENT AOR.

1st French Armee

1st (FR) Corps
- 7th (FR) Armd Div
- 10th (FR) Armd Div
- 12th (FR) Lt Armd Div
- 14th (FR) Lt Armd Div

2d (FR) Corps
- 1st (FR) Armd Div
- 3d (FR) Armd Div
- 5th (FR) Armd Div

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. European Operational Situation

Appendix 4 to Advanced Sheet, Lesson 2. Air Operations in NATO

This appendix will help you quickly grasp the important points about how air support works in NATO. There are two reasons to read and understand the following information. First, even thought the US military has a standardized doctrine for employment of air power, one must recognize that there are other ways to effectively organize, direct, and employ air power. This situation is no different from land combat which has several effective methods of employing ground combat elements (note the difference between US and Krasnovian doctrine) and each system has advantages and drawbacks. What must be understood is that during a military career, one may encounter differing air operations doctrines. This is especially true if a national unit is employed in a multi-national force, such as NATO. To succeed as a planner and to efficiently and effectively integrate air power into the theater combat plan, one must learn and understand the doctrine being applied Understanding the appropriate doctrine leads to the next reason for reading this appendix.

A more immediate reason for reading this appendix is to understand key differences between air operations in NATO and the US air support doctrine studied in earlier tactics courses. M320A focuses on tactical employment at division level and below, however, this appendix focuses on echelons above corps because this is where the process is performed that dictates the numbers of offensive air support [close air support (CAS) and battlefield air Interdiction (BAI)] sorties that can be flown against the enemy in response to the requests and needs of ground forces To better understand the scenario for the following lessons, knowledge of the various types of aircraft that might support US ground units, how these aircraft might be employed, and how best to build a plan to ensure air power is available at the proper place at the proper time must be studied

TYPE AIRCRAFT

A US division receiving NATO air support may see different aircraft flying offensive air support (OAS) missions. In addition to US-built F-4 Phantoms, the German Luftwaffe operates European-built Tornados, primarily for air interdiction (AI), electronic combat and reconnaissance (ECR), and OAS; and the former Soviet-built MIG-29 Fulcrum, normally for counter-air missions. They also have a slightly different tactical airlift plane: the C-160 Transall, (looks like a two-engine version of the US C-130 Hercules). The United Kingdom's Royal Air Force (RAF) operates the British-built Jaguar for OAS and tactical air reconnaissance; the British-built Harrier for CAS; and also the European-built Tornado for Counter air, AI and OAS. The RAF also flies the VC-10 cargo aircraft to supplement their C-130 tactical airlift fleet. The Belgians and Dutch use mostly US-built F-16s in multi-role missions. Most NATO members, except the Dutch, maintain at least some type of tactical airlift capability.

US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), employs the F-15C Eagle and F-16 Falcon for Counter air, the F-15E Strike Eagle and F-16 for AI and OAS, and the A-10 Thunderbolt II for CAS. USAFE also has the C-130 and other tactical airlift aircraft for theater airlift operations. USAF Special Operations Command (AFSOC) base and operate MC-130s and MH-53s in Europe. NATO operates E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft as well as the United Kingdom (UK), the US, and France (currently not an active military member of NATO) for theater surveillance. In addition, the UK and the US operate air refueling platforms (UK: VC-10s and L-1011s; US: KC-135s). In the time of crisis, other US-based aircraft such as the E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS), C-5, C-141, C-17, B-1, B-2, B-52, F-117, and other AFSOC aircraft may deploy and/or operate within the theater.

DOCTRINE

The NATO allies - through annual conferences - have developed a theater-specific air employment doctrine. Though it is similar to the US doctrine studied in M310A, lesson 3, there are sufficient differences to warrant a quick contrast with US national doctrine. US air-ground doctrine is formulated in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publications and then amplified by Army and Air Force doctrinal publications. In Europe, tactical doctrine is found in Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs). Primarily, the differences between NATO and US doctrine are found in three areas: the definition of missions, the tasking of air resources, and air command and control procedures.

NATO has its own theater-specific air employment doctrine. Some key publications are ATP-35 (A), Land *Force* Tactical Doctrine (contains ground combat doctrine); ATP-40, Doctrine ***and Procedures for*** *Airspace Control in* a *Combat Zone* (contains procedures for governing airspace; i.e., air defense procedures and weapons control zones), and ATP-27B, *Offensive Air* Support *Operations* (governs the bulk of Offensive Air Support employment doctrine)

Some key differences between NATO and US tactical air support doctrine include:

Air command and control (C^2) procedures (beyond the scope of this appendix)

Definitions of missions

Allotment and allocation of air resources.

NOTE: The term Reconnaissance and Interdiction Planning Line (RIPL) is no longer a ***Central Region or NATO doctrinal term or planning aid.***

TACTICAL AIR ROLES

This review uses terms very similar to those studied in M310 Remember, in NATO, theater tactical airpower roles differ slightly from US and USAF doctrine, particularly in what constitutes OAS. Here is a list of various NATO airpower roles that are applicable to this course of study (primarily from AAP-6, dictionary of NATO terms):

Counter air (CA) - Directed against the enemy's air offensive and defensive capability in order to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority includes.

Offensive Counter air (OCA) - Destroys, disrupts, or limits enemy air power as close to its source as possible.

Defensive Counter air (DCA) - All measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) - Neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy air defensive systems in a specific area by physical attack and/or electronic warfare.

Air Interdiction (AI) - Delays, disrupts, diverts or destroys an enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required,

Theater Airlift - Used within the theater and support theater objectives by the rapid and responsive movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies by airborne operations, air logistic support, special missions, and aeromedical evacuation missions.

Offensive Air Support (OAS) - Includes'

Close Air Support (CAS) - Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) - Air action against hostile surface targets which are in a positron to directly affect friendly forces and which requires joint planning and coordination. While BAI missions require coordination in joint planning, they may not require continuous coordination during the execution stage

NOTE: US doctrine does not subscribe to the term/concept of BAI (USA reservation* listed *in all NATO publications* relating *to BAI).

NOTE: Tactical *Air Reconnaissance (TAR) is no longer an OAS mission. TAR is now part of Air Reconnaissance and as such is tasked separate/y from OAS.*

AIR TASKING ORGANIZATION

The overall (joint, operational-level) commander of the Central Region, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT). has two immediately subordinate commands - Air Forces, Central Europe (AIRCENT) and Land Forces, Central Europe (LANDCENT) - which share the same area of responsibility To ensure coordinated operations during wartime1 AIRCENT and LANDCENT collocate to a single underground facility Ail wartime air operations are jointly planned at this underground facility by members of the Joint Planning Cell (JPC) This graphic shows the details of how the ClNCENTs subordinate commands are organized and communicate



LANDCENT

AIRCENT is the headquarters responsible for the overall planning and execution of tactical air operations in the Central Region and in the Baltic Sea approaches. The Interim Combined Air Operations Centers (ICAOCs) execute AIRCENTs plan for offensive and defensive tactical air operations. ICAOCs are comparable to unilateral US Air Operations Centers (AOCs) they are multi-national headquarters that actually task individual aircraft where to fly and what target to hit These ICAOCs are called “Interim" because the Central Region is scheduled to convert to a new Air Command and Control System (ACCS) after the year 2004 Three of the ICAOCs are geographically oriented within the Central Region and are normally assigned an area of responsibility associated with a single corps area however, depending upon the situation an ICAOC can support more than one corps: the fourth IS deployable An important point to remember is that even though an ICAOC is an Air Force headquarters, all tasking decisions and orders are coordinated with the land forces they support The ICAOC has an Army coordination detachment. the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) from LANDCENT, to help process requests for tactical air support This liaison element monitors and interprets the land battle to keep the ICAOC Informed as the land battle develops

To understand how the air effort is synchronized with the land effort to support the campaign plan, you need a basic understanding of the process You should know who decides what relative weight of aircraft fly for the different major NATO commands, what proportion of the aircraft fly what type of missions. and the flow of the directives that communicate the daily decisions. While you do not need to be an expert in the air tasking process, a quick description of the process and its decision makers will enhance your understanding of the system

TASKING

In NATOs Central Region, there are four procedures that occur during the air tasking process' apportionment, allotment, allocation, and distribution The Illustration below shows a simplified view of the NATO air tasking process. Note the two elements subordinate to the ICAOC the Wing Operations Center (WOC) - controls the aircraft and the Air Defense Ground Environment (ADGE) - a NATO term, controls the components of air defense (such as the radar and surface-to-air missile batteries)



A quick comparison/equivalence between unilateral US and NATO Central Region air operations

Joint Force Commander -- CINCENT
Joint Force Air Component Commander - AIRCENT
Joint Force Land Component Commander -- LANDCENT

- Apportionment
  - Decision maker - Recommendation at the JPC by LANDCENT and AIRCENT for CINCENT approval
  - Process - Decision is based on guidance and priorities of CINCENT. and on missions and tasks The apportionment decision is broken into three categories (CA, AI, and OAS) with their associated weights of effort usually by percentage (unlike the *preferred priority method in unilateral US operations)*
  - Actions - AIRCENT forwards his Air Operations Directive (AOD) which contains CINCENTs apportionment decision, his allotment decision, and the OCA targets to be attacked to the ICAOCs
- Allotment
  - Decision maker - AIRCENT uses CINCENTs Direction & Guidance to determine the allotment between the geographically focused ICAOCs

- Process - The tasking authority of one ICAOC is given for a specified time to task airframes from another ICAOC to accomplish those assigned missions (i.e., an ICAOC has been assigned interdiction missions but has insufficient deep strike capable airframes to execute those missions; AIRCENT could allot an F-15E squadron, normally under the taking authority of another ICAOC, for the next 48 hours to assist this ICAOCs interdiction tasking).

- Actions - AIRCENT transfers tasking authority from one ICAOC to another ICAOC to assist in the accomplishment of assigned missions.

NOTE: In US operations, tactical air *support generally falls under one Numbered Air Force (NAF) which operates* the *AOC. The NAF ordinarily does* not have *air support divided by region within a theater of operations and, therefore, does not* have *to move* assets *from one area command to another. Therefore, planners in US unilateral operations are not required to allot*

- Allocation

  - Decision maker - Air commander at the ICAOC determines number of sorties available by type aircraft.

  - Process - Based on apportionment and allotment decision; ICAOC determines which wings can perform which mission The Air Tasking Order (ATO) is developed to disseminate the decisions.

  - Actions - ICAOCs distribute ATOs to tasked air wings by mission.

- Distribution

  - Decision maker - LANDCENT distributes OAS-allocated sorties to subordinate units

  - Process - Based on scheme of maneuver and sortie allocation for OAS; LANDCENT determines the percentage of allocated OAS sorties for either CAS or BAI. Forwards expected distributed decision to corps after the Joint Campaign Meeting. ICAOCs will coordinate with Air Operations Coordination Centers (AOCCs) during planning and tasking of OAS into the Air Tasking Order (ATO).

  - Actions - Subordinate units may further sub-distribute



An expanded view of the NATO air tasking process

As described above, air tasking in NATO is similar to the US unilateral tasking process The NATO planning process takes time; 78 hours from conception to execution The Central Region air tasking process begins with the apportionment decision by LANDCENT and AIRCENT planners at the JPC jointly recommending to CINCENT how best to Integrate the land and air effort CINCENT then publishes the jointly agreed decision in the Direction & Guidance at the start of the zulu day. Ordinarily, the apportionment decision is made and the Operation Order published at 1600Z on the same day; 63 hours in advance of planned execution If battle conditions change prior to execution, the system retains sufficient flexibility to retask aircraft

The major exception to unilateral US air operations is the allotment process. AIRCENTs allotment decision is based upon CINCENTs Direction & Guidance which also contains the daily apportionment decision. Aircraft allotted to an ICAOC do not physically move but are assigned missions by the ICAOC to which they are allotted Allotment is generally performed using squadron-sized organizations Allotment decisions are provided to the ICAOCs by way of AIRCENTs Air Operations Directive (AOD) by 0900Z the following day; 45 hours prior to execution. During the night, the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP), Prioritized Target List (PTL), Air Coordination Order (ACO), and the refined AOD are completed and published by 10002; 20 hours prior to execution This concludes 58 hours of deliberate planning

The ICAOC commander performs the next element of the tasking process, allocation The ICAOCs produce and publish the ATO as the primary means of tasking the allocated air sorties by 2000Z the night prior to execution: 12 hours before the first time-on-target (TOT) at 0600Z. The ATO tasks air wings to provide specific aircraft with specific munitions or capabilities for specific TOTs. The wings then plan for their assigned missions before the ATO-day begins (at 06002) and continue, if required, for the remainder of that ATO day. At any given time, an ICAOC is involved with three different ATOs; each ATO covering a 24-hour time block Also, each wing is involved with two different ATOs. one is being planned upon ATO reception and continues until the planning is completed for the last tasked mission of the ATO-day; and the other starts with ATO execution at 0600Z and continues for the remainder of their tasked missions on that ATO-day

The remaining concept in the planning process is called distribution. It is the process of deciding where to use the OAS sorties provided by the ATO. NATO OAS distribution is very similar to unilateral US CAS distribution. The exception here is that OAS also includes BAI. LANDCENT and his subordinate commanders determine how best to utilize their apportioned OAS sorties. It is at this point in the tasking process that corps and division commanders divide their OAS sorties into CAS or BAI. It should be remembered that this process is happening in conjunction with AlRCENTs tasking and planning process

OAS REQUEST FLOW

The NATO air-ground operations system used to identify tactical air mission requirements, request tactical air support for ground forces, and execute tactical air missions is virtually identical to the system studied in M310, TACS / AAGS interface AAGS combines S/G3 Air and Fire Support Element (FSE) personnel, organizations, equipment, communications, and procedures, from battalion to corps to plan and request tactical air support TACS includes Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs), Air Liaison Officers (ALOs), and ICAOC personnel, organizations, equipment. and procedures to plan, direct, and control tactical air operations.

Requests for preplanned OAS missions flow through Army S/G3 FSE channels to the division FSE Requests are reviewed by the G3 Air, Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD), and ALO for suitability as targets for air attack. The FSE may recommend attacking the target with another means which will terminate the OAS request. The request is then forwarded to the G3 Air at corps. The corps G3 Air evaluates the request in conjunction with the FSCOORD and the AOCC and can approve CAS requests that do not exceed those already distributed as preplanned OAS sorties Approved requests are sent to the corps AOCC and tasked by the ICAOC for execution. Each day, the air commander at the ICAOC publishes an ATO that links airframes to preplanned missions.

Unlike preplanned OAS sorties, immediate OAS is generally only CAS sorties. Once the request for an immediate mission reaches the TACP, it is sent directly to the AOCC at corps over the Air Force Air Request Net (AFARN). The TACPs at each Army echelon monitor the request transmission Silence by an intermediate TACP indicates approval by the associated Army echelon. Because tasking is carried out at the ICAOC, a AOCC would contact the supporting ICAOC for immediate air support Unlike the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) in a unilateral US operation, the AOCC does not have tasking authority to fill immediate CAS requests. When required to fill immediate air requests, the ICAOC supplements the ATO by transmitting an Air Tasking Message (ATM) directly to the specific unit tasked to fly the sortie(s) As a reminder, immediate missions are executed in response to requests from supported ground units to fulfill urgent requirements that could not be foreseen. Immediate missions involve using ground or air alert sorties or diverting aircraft from other missions. In NATO air operations, details of the immediate request mission are usually worked out while the aircraft are airborne. This is key - the urgency of need for an immediate mission requires an unencumbered system. However, the ability to influence events on the battlefield requires the effective direction and controlling of those air support assets which is done through airspace management and Army Airspace Command and Control (A^2C^2) system.

This was a quick overview of a complicated topic, but for our purpose in this course, it is sufficient. Proper synchronization of airpower is crucial to success on the modern battlefield. Remember to properly plan for OAS during the initial stages of the Tactical Decision-Making Process (TDMP) or Deliberate Decision Making Process (DDMP).

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 2. European Operational Situation

Appendix 6 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 2. Solution to Practical Exercise

Krasnovian planners will tend to follow their doctrine more closely than will U S planners because of their use of a scientific-based doctrine Answers to questions posed in the practical exercise in appendix 1 to the lesson guide are described below

TYPE OF OPERATIONAL MANEUVER. In this situation, given that he anticipated surprise. believed he had overwhelming combat power, and perceived success of operations, the commander of the 2 Krasnovian Front would select to attack on a broad front using multiple axes

- A front offensive is intended to destroy enemy military forces and to achieve operational missions in support of strategic political and economic goals Krasnovian military doctrine recognizes two broad categories of operational maneuver the broad_ front multiple axis attack and the encirclement. Either method can be employed, or

  even a combination of the two. but encirclement operations are preferred whenever possible.

- The encirclement requires fewer forces than the broad front multiple axis attack, and surprise only enhances its effectiveness The broad front multiple axis operation generally requires either significant surprise or overwhelming forces

- The attack across a broad *frontage* on multiple *axes* lends itself to situations in which they enjoy a considerable numerical advantage over an enemy Krasnovian commanders may also use this form of maneuver when they have achieved considerable operational surprise

ARMY BOUNDARIES. In an offensive, the zone of advance is the sector assigned to the front or army commander He conducts offensive operations within this sector The width of the sector depends on a number of factors Including the mission, nuclear threat, correlation of forces. terrain, weather, and enemy disposition In an attack against a defending enemy, a commander would not distribute his forces evenly across the entire zone of advance Instead, he would designate primary (main) and secondary operational axes, with the desired correlation of forces to achieve the missions in the designated time

- The Krasnovlans would attack on selected strike sectors within the fronts to create the initial penetrations They would form rapidly, create the penetrations, and then disperse to avoid vulnerability to nuclear and improved conventional strikes The goal would then be to maintain a rapid tempo of advance into the depths of the enemy.

- Probable army boundaries are depicted on the sketch map on the following page.

IMMEDIATE AND SUBSEQUENT MISSION LINES FOR THE ARMY. These mission lines are also depicted on sketch map 2-2. For discussion of how the Krasnovians place these lines, review pages 2-3-8 and 2-3-9 of appendix 3 to the lesson guide.



The commander of the 2 Krasnovian Front attack would weight his main attack in the north by echeloning his four division and independent motorized rifle regiment within a narrow zone. He would probably have both motorized rifle divisions (MRDs in the first echelon followed by the two tank divisions The IMRR would be the army reserve. The 16 GTA (supporting attack) would have a wide front so he would probably keep all three divisions on line.

Sketch map 2-2 illustrates one solution. As an equally plausible solution if the commander of the 2 Krasnovian Front thinks he will encounter stiffer resistance he might configure this main attack in the north with three divisions in the first echelon and a single division' in the second echelon.

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 3. Division Movement Planning

SCOPE

This lesson is designed to reinforce and expand your knowledge of large unit movement planning. From this lesson, you will gain an understanding of the movement management responsibilities of the major players at theater, corps, and division levels; the common terminology used in movement planning; and the tactical and logistical considerations of moving large units. You will also be given a practical exercise that will allow you to apply tactical and logistical considerations and road movement planning factors to moving a large unit in a European environment.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

A.40 TASK: Describe the primary responsibilities of the key players in movement management of a large unit.

CONDITION, Given a written requirements with references

STANDARD. Description must include the responsibilities of the theater army movement control agency (TAMCA), the corps support command (COSCOM) movement control center (MCC), the division transportation officer (DTO), and the division support command (DISCOM) movement control officer (MCO).

LEVEL: Knowledge

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVES. 1a and 1b

A.41 TASK: Apply movement planning considerations to a large unit movement

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references, a tactical scenario, and a practical exercise, with references.

STANDARD: Correctly apply the planning considerations for a movement of a heavy division, to include task organization, priority of movement, logistical considerations, and road movement planning factors, must be applied correctly.

LEVEL: Application

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: 1a and 1b.

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use this lesson guide to help you achieve the lesson objectives, Follow the instructions and read the material listed below at the suggested time. Key to learning is the active thinking you must do for each reading.

READINGS:

a. Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3. Extract from FM 55-10, Movement Control in a Theater of Operations, Chapter 1, "Overview of Army Movement Doctrine" (5 pages).

b. Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3. Extract from FM 71-100, Division Operations, Chapter 3, Control of Tactical Movement (4 pages).

c. Appendixes 3 to 5 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3. Planning Movement, Strip Map, and 25th Armd Div Troop List (5 pages).

LESSON GUIDE

Introduction

In this lesson, you will study the topic of movement planning, specifically, movement planning for a heavy division. On the surface, planning a movement does not seem like a complicated event. After all, what's hard about planning to move from point A to point B? We all do it every day going to and from work, taking vacations, or even going to the lake. In reality we don't think much about it But, you are only concerned with one vehicle, moving on one or two routes to get to your destination To make this a little more complicated, add an additional 5,000 vehicles to your one vehicle and what do you have? Right, a massive traffic jam of unbelievable proportion if you have not planned and coordinated for the move. Movement of heavy forces doesn't happen by chance. Just as you plan for a vacation by doing such things as laying out the route, checking motels and places to stop for gas and food, and requesting a trip report from your local automobile club, division movement planners must plan and coordinate up and down the chain of command to ensure a successful road march. Therefore, as a future senior leader, it is imperative you understand how to plan a large unit movement The example will be a division, but the same procedures and techniques apply to all large units.

This lesson builds on the principles you learned in S410, Lesson 2, "Reception, Onward Movement, and Sustainment." In this lesson, you will consider the players involved in moving a heavy division, factors involved in moving a heavy division, and, finally, you will have a chance to complete a practical exercise dealing with moving a heavy division in Europe.

OVERVIEW

To get started, read appendix 1 to this lesson guide and then come back to this point. Pay particular attention to the four principles of movement. (If you have access to the FM 55 10 version dated Dec 1992, it will contain similar information but its chapters and sections are organized differently.)

FM 55-10, chapter 1, gave you a brief overview of transportation movement management. During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, we successfully moved divisions and corps fully capable of going to war, from both CONUS and OCONUS, into a theater of operations. However, the Army's movement planning didn't stop there. Once in theater, our divisions and corps continued planning and executing large scale movements. For example, on the night of 26

February, the 1st Cavalry Division, having been released from U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) reserve, moved almost 200 kilometers in 24 hours into a position to attack the Iraqi Republican Guard. Divisional moves such as this one don't just happen by accident. They are a result of sound doctrinal management, careful planning, and coordination at all levels. This lesson will give you a better understanding of what was actually involved in moving units like the 1st Cavalry Division.

Begin by trying to get a mental picture of the magnitude of moving a heavy division. During Desert Storm, the 3d Armd Division formation was moving with approximately 6,800 vehicles on a 15-kilometer front (9 miles) that was 25 kilometers (15 miles) deep. The vehicle density was 18 vehicles per kilometer. Most people can't picture what that looks like. But if you picture all the vehicles in a single line with the last vehicle sitting on Missouri's western border, the lead vehicle would be somewhere past the eastern border of Missouri, or approximately 380 miles across the state into Illinois. Now you can get some perspective of the number of vehicles and the magnitude of moving a force this size But how do you move a division from point A to point B, ensure it is protected, supported, and arrives where and when it is supposed to? Who makes that happen and how it happens is not a matter of luck or coincidence, but rather a well thought out, carefully coordinated movement plan orchestrated by a variety of theater, corps, and division staff planners.

MOVEMENT PLAYERS

Remaining chapters of FM 55-10, Movement Control in a Theater of Operations, discuss in detail the major agencies and players in movement management from theater down to division. Rather than have you spend your time reading the chapters, the following paragraphs summarize the key agencies and players involved in transportation management

Theater Army

At the theater army level, the agency responsible for centralized movement management for the entire theater is the theater army movement control agency (TAMCA). This unit provides movement management services and highway traffic regulation for the entire theater. Various divisions within the TAMCA are responsible for all types of movement-from freight movement to passenger movement. The organization within the TAMCA that you are most interested in is the highway traffic division (HTD) The HTD coordinates all highway movement within the communications zone (COMMZ) and between the COMMZ and the corps areas The HTD regulates the highway net by planning, routing, scheduling, and directing movements based on the theater army commander's priorities. The bottom line here is, if you are even thinking about moving within the COMMZ, you must have approved clearance or you are not going to get very far Now move down a level and take a look at the major players in the corps.

Corps

Movement planning within the corps area is divided into two major categories: combat movement and noncombat movement The G3 planning cell in the main command post (CP) plans and directs the bulk of combat movement. Combat movement emphasizes security and is designed to support maneuver. Noncombat movement is designed to maximize the effective use of transportation assets. The COSCOM is responsible for the execution of movement. The primary player within the COSCOM is the movement control center or the MCC. The MCC determines, coordinates, and analyzes transportation movement requirements within the corps area. Its functions are basically the same as those of the TAMCA, but they are limited by the echelon of command, geographic area, and resources available. The last level you need to look at is the division.

Division

At the division level, two primary players perform transportation functions. These two players are the division transportation officer (DTO), a special staff officer who plans and coordinates transportation, and the division support command (DISCOM) movements control officer (MCO), who manages the division's transportation assets and coordinates with the movement control team(s) for assets not organic to the division. In essence, the DTO is a planner and the MCO is a manager. The DTO plans ands coordinates with the general staff, brigades, combat support units, and DISCOM elements. He or she coordinates transportation priorities with the division G3 and G4 and, upon approval by the commander, provides the priorities to the DISCOM MCO. The MCO then plans, coordinates, and controls the allocation and use of the division transportation assets to meet these priorities. During the practical exercise in this lesson you will have the opportunity to play the division G3, G4, and the DTO.

Summary

A division in a theater army staging area with the mission to move to a forward assembly area in a corps sector would submit through the DTO a road movement request to the movement control center (MCC) of the COSCOM. The COSCOM, in turn, would forward the request to the theater army movement control agency (TAMCA) for final approval. That's it in a nutshell The point you need to remember is that units don't just pack up and move when and where they want to. Movement must be coordinated and approved up and down the chain of command. Speaking of movement, take a few minutes to move around and get the circulation moving back to your brain before you continue with planning

PLANNING

Now that you have a general overview of the major transportation players from theater to division, turn your attention to planning a unit movement. Put yourself in the position of a G3 who has the mission to plan a division's road march of 200 kilometers from point A to point B. What are some of the factors you need to consider in planning the movement?

Regardless of whether it is an administrative move or a tactical move, as a minimum, planners must consider the following factors:

- Unit organization
- Assembly and transportation means (ground, air, rail, water, and pipeline)
- Control, coordination, and combat service support (CSS) for the movement and at the destination point.
- Deception measures before and during the movement and at the destination point.
- Enemy situation, geographic conditions, and weather

Here are some other factors you might have considered in answering the question.

- Movement priorities
- Reporting procedures.

- Start points and release points
- Order of movement,
- Route security
- Number of routes required.
- Time and distance factors
- Transportation assets available (talk with the G4)

Now focus your attention on task organization and logistical considerations This WiII help prepare you to do the requirements in the practical exercise

Task Organization

In S410, you studied large unit moves in terms of march columns, serials, and march units. Does this sound familiar? Take a few minutes to think, in general terms, how you would go about task organizing a march column for a tactical move. Write them down and then continue.

Now spend a few seconds thinking about task organization in general. The task organization depends on the anticipated tactical situation at the destination. The same elements evaluated in planning combat operations are considered in movement planning. Remember. in S410, you learned that an administrative move IS task organized for efficiency. If the movement is a tactical move, the organization must be combat loaded or organized. Although FM 71-100, Division Operations, does not specifically give a standard task organization. it does provide some general guidelines for task organizing. See how these compare to what you came up with.

- Organize a division into serials consisting of march units of uniform size
- The MP company, ADA elements, engineer, reconnaissance elements, selected CSS units, GS artillery military intelligence, collection, jamming teams, TAC CP, and liaison parties normally move before the main body to ensure coordinated execution.
- Brigades and battalions march in formations that provide all around (and overhead) security. CS and CSS units are interspersed in the column where they can support the force without hindering movement.
- Mortars and scouts must march in positions that facilitate prompt support of the force.

The diagram on the following page depicts a brigade task organization for movement. An ADA unit, an Ml team, and an MP platoon would be sliced to the brigade for the move. In thus example, a division cav troop leads. Ml and signal elements (node center) are up front. The brigade itself consists of seven serials followed by artillery, aviation brigade, and the remaining divisional troops. Again, this is only an example, each brigade will be organized somewhat differently within a division.

Logistical Considerations

Based on the commander's guidance, priorities, and concept of the movement, the G4 coordinates the move closely with the G3 and the DISCOM. Coordinating and planning movement of a heavy division is no small task. What logistical considerations face the G4 and the DISCOM in planning to move a heavy division?

The following list is not all Inclusive, but it does cover a majority of the logistical considerations If you came up with more than these take a break.

- Mode of transportation-air, rail, land, water, or a combination thereof.
- Movement of outsized equipment.
- Movement of overweight vehicles
- Technical assistance to the G3-selection of rest halts, maintenance points, refuel points.
- Capabilities of the existing road network to handle traffic
- Resolving transportation shortfalls with Corps/COSCOM.
- Bridge classifications/height of overpasses/road classifications.
- Selection of division support area (DSA).
- Refuel-on-the-move (ROM) requirements.
- Vehicle recovery/evacuation/maintenance collection points.
- Medical evacuation.
- Host nation support

Summary

Up to this point, you have looked in general terms at the intricacies of moving a heavy division. Needless to say, every facet of movement planning was not covered. However, what you should take away from this part of the lesson is that large unit moves are a complex operational undertaking requiring detailed planning and coordination throughout the chain of command.

GENERAL SITUATION

The political situation in Europe has continued to deteriorate. Problems resulting from economic and political pressure within the Russian republic and former satellite countries have contributed to Increasing civil strife and food riots. Requests from Russian political leaders for Western aid have proven fruitless. Due primarily to the economic woes of the former Soviet republic, hard-liners have successfully led a coup and gained control of the Russian government as well as its military forces. NATO negotiations with the hard-liners have been unsuccessful. The primary concern for the West is the hard-liners' control of former Russian nuclear weapons and forces that were scheduled for destruction in the recent START agreements With tensions mounting, it has become apparent that some type of military action on the part of the United States and its allies is highly probable. In response to the increasing threat, the President of the United States Invoked the 200 K call-up, then declared partial mobilization CONUS-based units are at an Increased readiness posture in keeping with our National Military Strategy of force projection.

PRACTICAL EXERCISE

During this part of the lesson, you will do a practical exercise which will give you a chance to do some movement planning However, before you start, turn to appendixes 1 and 2 of this lesson guide and reread the couple of pages on tactical movement After you finish, read appendix 3 thoroughly This Will give you the background you need to work through the practical exercise Appendix 4 provides a strip map for the practical exercise Appendix 5 provides the 25th Armd Div troop list.

Background

This practical exercise places you as a member of the 25th Armd Div staff which has recently deployed from CONUS to Germany You have already drawn POMCUS and are currently in the staging area awaiting commitment to a corps Your mission is to begin contingency planning for a tactical move to a forward assembly area in the 10th (U S.) Corps sector. The division commander has tasked the staff for specific Information.

- Since this will be a tactical road movement and not a administrative movement (one deigned for efficiency), in general terms, how would you task organize the division for the move over each of the four routes?

- Maintaining current brigade integrity, what is your recommendation for priority of movement over each of the four routes depicted on the strip map?

- What logistics support will be required along the routes of march?

- Using the planning information provided below, calculate in general terms how long it will take the division to move and close into the assembly area using the four routes depicted on the strip map.

First Requirement: Place yourself as a member of the operations cell and answer the division commander's questions on task organization and priority of movement. Hint, don't get down in the weeds on this requirement, task organize by brigades (you don't have to list each battalion in the brigades). Look at where you want to place your DIVARTY, cavalry, and engineer assets. Remember, the possibility of enemy action is slight. Go ahead and look at the strip map and the 25th Armd Div troop list. Now, take out a pencil and see what you can come up with for a task organization and priorities in the space provided.

Task Organization/Priorities

OK, how did you do? Remember, there is no one correct way to task organize. Each brigade and division is different and each situation is different. What follows is one solution but there are others Theater has allocated the division four routes on which to move to their assembly area In the example, the 1st Bde is on route Dallas, the 2d Bde is on route Maverick, the DIVARTY (-) is on route Houston and the 3d Bde is on route Odessa. As you will see in a minute this organization allows for our combat forces to protect the "softer" units in the middle on route Houston As our eyes and ears we put a cavalry element as the lead on each route Accompanying the 1st Bde on Dallas is a company since from the DIVARTY and the engineer brigade. In addition, the 1st Bde would also have its forward support battalion with it. The 2d Bde on Maverick and the 3d Bde on Odessa would be task organized in the same manner. The command and control on Houston would belong to the DIVARTY (-). Besides the DIVARTY(-), route Houston is tasked organized with the aviation brigade and the DISCOM (-) and the remaining divisional troops. This may be a little clearer if you study the following diagram.

RoutesDallas/Maverick/Odessa

CAV

BDE TAC

MI CO

BDE (BNS)

FA BN

ENGR CO

FSB

Route Houston

CAV

DIVARTY TAC

MI CO

DIVARTY (-)

AVN BDE

DIV TRPS

DISCOM (-)

In your readings, FM 71-100 stated, “Brigades organize differently. If expected to deploy and fight, they (brigades) need at least two routes, even when marching in the rear area. A division with two brigades on the move needs at least four routes for security and for rapid deployment at its destination.” Does the sample violate this principle? The answer is “no” for two reasons First, anticipation of enemy contact during the move is minimal. Second. we are moving into a forward assembly area, not deploying for contact once we reach the assembly area As you can see from the example, the priority of movement was to place one brigade on each route. Had you (and your solution might have), tasked organized the brigades to move on two routes (task force configuration) then you would have had to determine which brigades moved in what order and when. If your solution was to move the brigades on two routes, and you put the units in order, your solution is as good as ours. Now, move on to the second requirement.

Second Requirement: Acting as a member of the logistics cell, answer the division commander’s question on what logistical support will be required. Remember, this is a tactical move, meaning that track vehicles will be on the road rather that on lowboys or rail. Go ahead and take some time to jot down what logistical considerations you need to plan for during this move.

Logistical Considerations

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Some of the logistical considerations are pretty obvious, so let's begin with them. Anytime you are moving this many vehicles there are going to be breakdowns. Therefore, you must plan for vehicle recovery. evacuation, and maintenance collection points Another fairly obvious consideration is medical evacuation. ambulance support, aeromedical evacuation procedures, location of medical facilities, routes for evacuation, and so on. Refuel points are another rather obvious consideration. The logistician must plan where to locate the refueling points along each route. One of your considerations might have been to set up a refuel-on-the-move (ROM) point A ROM in this scenario is not required. Had the division been moving to contact and you wanted to ensure the vehicles were topped off prior to the line of departure, then a ROM would have been a very valid consideration. Other considerations which are not so apparent include: (1) the effect civilian vehicles and refugees will have on the move, (2) the extent the move will disrupt normal resupply activities, (3) echelonment of assets to best support the follow-on operation, (4) route maintenance, (5) availability of host nation support to support the move, and (6) logistical support required from corps (such as transportation assets).

Now that you have completed the second requirement, you need to switch hats one more time. This time, you are a member of the movements cell. Go back and review the terminology and movement formulas contained in appendix 3 to this lesson guide.

Third Requirement: You are now a member of the movements cell. Using appendix 3 to this lesson guide, calculate how long it will take the 1st Bde to close on the assembly area (road clearance time). Use the planning information listed below to help you compute the time. Before you begin your calculations, you need a couple of hints. In computing the pass time (PST) for a serial, you are calculating for only one serial. Pay attention to the number of serials in the 1st Bde. Also, don't forget to figure in the gap times between serials. Good luck.

PLANNING INFORMATION

Use the following planning information as you work through this portion of the practical exercise See the strip map (appendix 4) for the routes to the assembly area This movement calculation is to demonstrate the procedure. Ordinarily, the convoys would be cross-organized,

but for simplicity, calculate only four convoys: 1st, 2d, 3d Bdes, and a combined DIVARTY and Avn Bde convoy.

a. Speed: 40 kph
b. Rate of march: 32 KMIH
c. March unit: 30 vehicles per march unit
d. Vehicle density: 20 VPK
e. Serial: 3-7 march units
f. Time between serials: 15 min.
g. Time between march units: 5 min.
h. 1st Bde: 5 serials / 30 march units / 904 vehicles (Route DALLAS, 128 km)
i. 2d Bde: 5 serials / 30 march units / 904 vehicles (Route MAVERICK, 130 km)
j. 3d Bde: 6 serials / 37 march units / 1,131 vehicles (Route ODESSA, 180 km)
k. Avn Bde: 2 serials / 7 march units / 222 vehicles (Combine with DIVARTY on Route HOUSTON, 160 km)
l. DIVARTY: 4 serials / 24 march units / 726 vehicles (Combine w/Avn Bde, above)
m. HHC/Div TRPS: 4 serials / 22 march units / 664 vehicles
n. Cav Sqdn: 1 serial / 5 march units / 163 vehicles
o. DISCOM: 3 serials / 16 march units / 502 vehicles
p. Sig Bn: 1 serial /6 march units / 144 vehicles
q. MI Bn: 1 serial / 3 march units / 68 vehicles
r. FSB: 3 serials / 7 march units / 161 vehicles
s. ADA Bn: 1 serial / 7 march units / 150 vehicles

MOVEMENT CALCULATIONS

1. Time distance:

2. Pass Time of MU:

3. Pass time of a serial:

4. Time gap between serials:

5. Total PST:

6. Road clearance time:

7. Total PST:

Using the formulas in appendix 3 to this lesson guide, you should have determined that you need three formulas to compute the road clearance time (from when the first vehicle of a convoy hits the start point (SP) till the trail vehicle of the convoy clears the release point (RP): Time distance (TDIS), pass time of the march unit, and pass time of a serial.

The following example should help in your computations

1st Bde - Route DALLAS

1. The first step is to determine the formula for road clearance time (time distance + pass time) Given this formula, the next step is to calculate time distance:

Time distance = distance / rate
= 128 km / 32 kph = 4 hrs (240 min)

2. Calculate the pass time (PST) of a march unit (MU) (an MU is normally a company-sized unit):

PST of an MU = (# of veh x 60) / (density x speed)
= (30 veh x 60 min/hr) / (20 veh/km x 40 km/hr)
= (1800) /(800)
= 2.25 min

Add the EXTAL time (2 min (from S410)) to the PST (2.25 min + 2 min = 4.25 min).

PST of a single march unit = 4.25 min (round off to 4 min)

3. Calculate the PST of a single serial (normally a battalion-sized unit):

PST of a serial = (# of MU x PST of a single MU) + (# of MU gaps x time between march units (MU gap))

= (6 MUs x 4 min (pass time per MU)) + (5 gaps x 5 min between MUs)
= (24 min) + (25 min)
= 49 min

4. Factor in the number of serials (five serials (given in planning situation)):

= PST x # of serials
= 49 min (from step 3) x 5 serials
= 245 min

5. Determine time gap between serials (# of gaps = # of serials - 1) (5 serials = 4 gaps):

= (# of gaps x serial time gap (from planning info))
= (4 gaps x 15 min per gap)
= 60 min

6. Determine the convoy total PST (add steps 4 and 5):

= (PST + total of serial time gaps)
= (245 min + 60 min)
= 305 min

7. Determine the road clearance time:

= (Time Distance (from step I)+ Pass Time (from step 6))
= (240 min + 305 min)
= 545 min

8. Convert minutes to hours:

= (road clearance time (step 7) / 60 min/hr)
= (545 min / 60 min/hr)
= 9.1 hrs (road clearance time for 1st Bde)

In this example, it would take the 1st Bde a little over 9 hours to move the 128 kilometers from the SP to the RP. Remember that this figure does not include planned time delays for rest halts, maintenance halts, and the like. However, it does give a ballpark figure for planning purposes.

Using the same method to calculate the time it would take the remainder of the division to move on the other three routes, we calculated the following times. Note, for simplicity sake, route Houston was calculated using the DIVARTY and aviation brigade only (use total numbers of veh (948), MUs (31), and serials (6).

2d Bde - (Route MAVERICK - 130 KM) = 9.1 hrs

3d Bde - (Route ODESSA -180 KM) = 11.8 hrs

DIVARTY (-) - (Route HOUSTON - 160 KM) = 10.25 hrs

Your computations could vary significantly depending on how you task organized for the movement. The point to understand is how to calculate the time it takes for a unit to move a certain distance. Remember, these times are from SP to RP and are only for the major maneuver

elements of the division. DISCOM and some other vehicles were not included. You would follow the same procedure for these units. Also, planners must allow additional time for units to move from their original assembly areas (AA RODEO) to the SPs, and then move to their new assembly areas (AA COWBOY) after clearing the RP before declaring the division to be closed.

Conclusion

In this lesson, you have looked at the major transportation players from theater to division, studied in general terms movement planning considerations for a heavy division, and worked through a practical exercise. By now, you should appreciate the complexity of moving a heavy division Movement is essential to success on the battlefield. We proved that during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In upcoming lessons, you will have an opportunity to examine in more detail how a division moves on the battlefield.

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 3. Division Movement Planning

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3. Extract from FM 55-10, Movement Control in a Theater of Operations. Chapter 1, Overview of Army Movement Doctrine

1-1. INTRODUCTION

a. This chapter provides a broad doctrinal overview of transportation movement manage ment. The overview explains the movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment, commencing with the outbreak of war; early movement of prepositioned troops, equipment, and supplies; and mobilization of continental United States (CONUS) Active and Reserve forces and their movement overseas and subsequent movement within a theater of operations. Movement control, terminal service, and each mode of transport are discussed as they would be employed.

b. Transportation movements is the management of the movement capability to ensure maximum accomplishment of movement requirements. The term “movement management” as used in this manual refers to those functions performed by transportation movement control personnel of a command. It implies consideration of all ‘available technical transportation data as well as operational information.

1-2. PRINCIPLES OF MOVEMENTS

Four basic principles of transportation movements provide a basis for all transportation operations. These are centralized control, regulation, fluidity and flexibility, and maximum use of carrying capacity.

a. Centralized Control. Control of movements will be centralized at the highest level at which it can be adequately exercised: that is, by the commander charged with providing integrated logistical support.

b. Regulated Movements. The need and capability for regulating movements have greatly increased beyond that experienced in the past. This is due to the introduction of automatic data processing (ADP) equipment into supply and transportation operations and the requirements to support highly mobile forces. Extensive regulation and coordination are required to prevent congestion and conflict of movements over lines of communication (LOC). It is probable that in future conflicts US forces will have to share the available airfield, road. rail, water terminal, and inland waterway capabilities with allied forces and civil commerce.

c. Fluid and Flexible Movements. The transportation system must be able to provide an uninterrupted flow of traffic and to adjust to changing situations. All transport capability must be used effectively. This cannot be done unless the capability exists to divert or reroute traffic to ensure continuous movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment.

d. Maximum Use of Currying Capacity. This principle involves more than just loading each transport vehicle to its maximum carrying capacity. Transport capability that is not used one day cannot he stored to provide an increase in capability for subsequent days. Similarly, fully loaded transport equipment sitting idle is just as much a loss of carrying capability as is a partially loaded vehicle moving through the system. While allowing for adequate equipment maintenance and personnel rest, transport equipment should be kept loaded and moving. However, tactical situations may not always permit complete adherence to this principle. For example, vehicles or aircraft may be held for special missions or movement of special weapons. Such use, when directed by the commander, is considered an appropriate use of transport equipment.

1-3. OTHER PRINCIPLES

Three other principles of transportation movements must be considered. They are host nation support (HNS), transportation management and movement control organizations, and standardization agreements.

a. HNS will be used to the limit of its assured availability in providing transportation support to the US forces in a theater or area of operations when such modes of transport and water terminals are available and support agreements exist between the US and the host nation.

b. The transportation management and movement control organizations will function in peace as they will in war or periods of conflict.

c. When operating in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or quadripartite (American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) countries there are certain standardization agreements between the participating nations by which the US is obligated to abide. These agreements are called Standardization agreements (STANAGs) in the NAT0 arena and quadripartite standardization agreements (QSTAGs) in the ABCA arena.

(1) DA Pamphlet 310-35 lists all standardization agreements, both of a material and a nonmaterial nature, binding upon the United States. US military operations are governed by various agreements when US forces are employed within the geographical areas over which treaty organizations exercise jurisdiction. Thus, while operating in a European country which is a member of NATO, US forces comply with the provisions of applicable STANAGs.

(2) Although STANAGs do not apply to military operations in CONUS, those that may concern a unit--in this case, those with a move ment control impact -must be considered in training and operational phases to permit military personnel to become acquainted with their provisions. This is particularly true for units or groups of personnel earmarked for oversea assignment.

1-4. WARTIME MOVEMENT PROGRAM

a. Prior to discussing actual transportation movement management doctrine, it is important to explain the wartime movement program. In theaters of operations where US forces are stationed, the wartime movement program is the focal point around which initial transportation support is designed and provided to the theater. This program is constantly being updated to provide for the orderly transition from a peacetime to a wartime posture. The program calls for the forward movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment from pre-positioned sites in the areas of operation to deployed forces by all means available in the theater.

b. US Army transportation assets may be augmented by allied and host nation transportation assets.

1-5. MOBILIZATION OF CONUS-BASED FORCES

a. Prior to the actual mobilization order, it is expected that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will determine that a crisis situation is developing in an area of United States interest. They would recommend that DOD use the Defense Production Act of 1950 as the legal authority to obtain priority use of CONUS commercial motor and rail assets prior to the declaration of a national emergency.

b. Once an executive order is given to mobilize our CONUS-based forces. the CONUS transportation effort will be directed toward moving Active and Reserve component units from their installations, home stations, and staging areas to predesignated aerial and water ports of embarkation. This same period will see increased movement of replacement personnel, equipment, and supplies needed to sustain the oversea theater.

c. A combination of all available transportation, both civilian and military, will be used to transport DOD wartime personnel. equipment, and supplies to the oversea theater. These movements are considered to be a portion of the defense transportation system and are managed by the various agencies of the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

d. Transportation is a system of related but different functions that operate together to form a cohesive movement chain. The key links in the movement chain are movement management, traffic regulation, mode operations, terminal operations, and terminal transfer operations. A shortfall in any of these elements will cause a shortfall for the entire transportation system.

e. The system can easily be divided into strategic and tactical aspects. Strategic transportation is that portion that involves CONUS inland transportation movement through embarkation ports, and the sea or air movement to the theater of operations. Arrival or discharge at an oversea terminal is the interface point between strategic and tactical transportation. Tactical transportation is that portion of the system that occurs wholly within the theater of operations.

(1) Strategic transportation.

(a) Strategic transportation is accomplished by transportation operating agencies (TOAs) using both commercial and military transport resources. MTMC is responsible for planning and regulating CONUS surface movements and movements through CONUS water terminals. MTMC also plans and regulates ocean shipping through common-user ocean terminals. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) procures vessels. The TOAs will continue to perform during wartime as they do during peacetime.

(b) During the transition to war phase, the primary emphasis of strategic transportation will be on air deployment of high-priority units. These will be airlifted by the Military Airlift Command (MAC) using military and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) aircraft. Deployment airlift is scheduled by MAC in coordination with both MTMC and the TAMCA, corps movement control center (MCC). joint movement center (JMC), or combined movement control center (CMCC), whichever is deployed or activated in the theater of operations. The preplanned time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) is used. as modified by availability of aircraft and receiving air terminal capacities. Deploying units will be united with their equipment and will then deploy to designated assembly areas, with tactical movement planned and coordinated by the theater movement manager.

(12) Simultaneously, the other TOAs (MTMC and MSC) will be concentrating on the ocean shipping to be used in establishing a sea line of communications (SEALOC). The SEALOC will be the sustaining strategic transportation system for movement of bulk supplies, equipment, and follow-on unit deployments.

(2) Tactical transportation. Movements within a theater of operations will be coordinated by TAMCA or by other movement control activities. TAMCA will coordinate for the use of US, allied. or host nation transportation resources as required and will develop plans for use and stationing of US Army transportation units within the theater.

1-6. RECEPTION IN THE OVERSEA THEATER

a. MTMC is responsible for receiving and processing personnel. equipment, and supplies at CONUS water ports. It coordinates with MSC for time and space allocations. The theater's highest level movement control activity is responsible for coordinating reception and processing through the theater's aerial and water ports.

b. As CONUS deployment begins, the war plans for reception of deploying units are being implemented within the theater of operations. As in CONUS, both civilian and military ports of debarkation will be used. The theater's highest level movement control activity will have reception teams located at major aerial and ocean terminals to ensure a smooth flow of personnel, equipment, and supplies through the terminals and onward.

1-7. TERMINAL CLEARANCE

a. Air and seaports of debarkation are the most critical facilities within the transportation system supporting a developing theater of operations. Through these facilities must pass ail personnel and logistical support from outside the theater.

(1) Personnel and high-priority, air-transportable material may enter through the air terminals. However, massive tonnages of

ammunition; petroleum. oils, lubricants (POL); and heavy war material will be moved by SEALOC through ocean terminals.

(2) Developed ports. if available, will be used in the theater for both forward and retrograde movement. These ports will nor. mally remain under host nation control. and MTMC elements will coordinate their use and the cargo throughput Normally these MTMC elements will be placed under the operational control of the TA commander.

b. At currently established MTMC-controlled ports. the local national employees are expected to be retained during war. Additional wartime port operations may be established using host nation contract assets or Army transportation terminal units or a combination thereof.

c Many areas of potential future conflict (contingency areas) exist that are underdeveloped and have no fixed ports or have small, dispersed port facilities. In some of these areas the existing port facilities may be either destroyed or denied to military use in either case there may be no on-site capability to bring ashore the large quantities of military personnel. equipment, and suppiles needed to support a combat operation. Some areas may require the use of logistics over-the-shore operations (LOTS). These operations will be conducted by deploying military transportation units.

d. Army terminal operations may be established to support a military force deployed in a region of the world that have large, fixed-port complexes. In this case the operations will be carried out by Army terminal units organized specifically for the type of port at the location. Channel and pier-side water depths cannot accommodate the fast. oceangoing ships that are the mainstay of the free world commercial fleet. Therefore, terminal commanders will depend on in-the-stream and offshore discharge of ships in conjunction with lighterage operations. A terminal operation planner must therefore consider all aspects in developing his terminal plan.

e. As the theater matures, the demand on available ports will increase. This will increase the need for water and aerial terminal clearance capability. Efficient terminal clearance will permit continuous discharge of ships and aircraft which would otherwise be hampered by congested terminals. The vulnerability of all terminals to hostile action requires the well-coordinated and supervised efforts of all concerned. Active physical security measures and a well-developed port security plan are essential for protecting the terminal and its cargo.

1-8. MOVEMENT CONTROL IN THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE (COMMZ)

The Theater Army Movement Control Agency (TAMCA) provides theater-wide movement control services for all US forces and coordinates with allied and host nation forces as applicable and necessary. As the central US movement management organization, TAMCA prepares movement and port clearance plans and programs. It conducts liaison with higher and lower movement control elements, including host nation movement control elements, and supervises the activities of subordinate movement control teams (MCTs). It provides technical supervision to the corps MCC and ensures proper use of available host nation and military transport assets. For a detailed discussion of the mission and functions of the TAMCA, see Chapter 4.

1-9. MOVEMENT THROUGH THE COMMZ

a. During the early stages of transition to a wartime environment. all available transportation (US Army. allied, and host nation) will be used to move personnel, equipment. and supplies forward in the theater. As the theater matures and CONUS- based transportation units begin arriving in the theater, US Army transportation units will perform a greater share of the US transport requirements. However. the theater will continue to use available host nation transportation assets as required.

b. As cargo and equipment move through the COMMZ. a change in transportation mode may be necessary. This is particularly true for rail movements. At each location where the mode of transportation is changed, a terminal transfer unit or host nation equivalent is needed to make the transfer. The operation of

terminal transfer points is a transportation function. Terminal transfer points provide for the continuous movement and positive control of personnel. equipment. and supplies through the transportation net. These terminal transfer units or teams are also responsible for transferring retrograde cargo and transportation equipment (such as containers and trailers).

c The principal Army transportation mode operator for the theater is the transportation command (TRANSCOM). For a detailed discussion of the mission and functions of TRANSCOM, see Chapter 5

1-10. MOVEMENT CONTROL IN THE CORPS

a. Centralized movement management and highway regulation are provided by the MCC. Movement control functions in the corps are similar to those provided by TAMCA in the COMMZ. The MCC is under the staff supervision of the COSCOM assistant chief of staff (ACofS) for transportation. The MCC provides transportation control throughout the corps and supports both logistical and tactical transportation requirements

b. All movements from the COMMZ into the corps area must be coordinated by TAMCA with MCC to obtain clearance to enter the corps. Movements from the corps to the COMMZ must also be coordinated by MCC with TAMCA. This coordination is designed to prevent overloading of any segment of the transportation system.

1-11. MOVEMENT THROUGH THE CORPS

a. As personnel. equipment. and supplies enter the corps. transportation will be provided by a combination of modes and operators as coordinated between TAMCA and MCC.

b. Throughput of supplies and equipment will be used in the corps as in the COMMZ. Throughput is delivering cargo directly to the ultimate consignee. bypassing one or more intermediate supply points. The amount and type of throughput cargo will depend on the tactical situation and the ability of the receiving unit or agency to unload the vehicles and containers with assigned material handling equipment (MHE). Containerized cargo will be delivered into the corps support area (CSA). However, since some containers may move into the division support area (DSA), receiving and unloading capability for container handling must be assured before the division is burdened with them. Normally. containers will not be grounded forward of the CSA during combat operations.

c. The corps support command (COSCOM) provides combat service support (CSS) to the corps. A transportation brigade is the principal transportation operating headquarters in the corps. A transportation composite group will perform that function in contingency operations. Additional information on the organization and functions of the motor transport brigade is provided in FM 55-30.

1-12. MOVEMENT IN THE DIVISION

a. The division transportation officer (DTO) and the division support command (DISCOM) movement control officer (MCO) manage the division transportation system

b. Transportation equipment organic to the division is limited in number Therefore, the division gets transportation assets beyond its own capability from the corps by request from the MCO, through the DTO, to the MCC.

c. FM 55-2 discusses in great depth the role of transportation movement management within the division.

1-13. AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING (ADP)

The use of ADP equipment in connection with movement control will gradually enhance *or* replace manual operations over a period of several years. The Cargo Movement Module (CMM), a part of the Department of the Army Movement Management System (DAMMS), is currently in operation in one theater of operations. Ultimately. DAMMS-Redesign (DAMMS-R) will support the operational and management functions of each echlon of the theater of operations transportation system. DAMMS-R will interface with supply and deployment automated systems to provide information to wartime movements control and to ensure a responsive physical distribution system.

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 3. Division Movement Planning

Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3. Control of Tactical Movement (Extract from FM 71-100, Division Operations, Chapter 3,)

CONTROL OF TACTICAL MOVEMENT

The success of tactical marches is fundamental to division operations. The division commander cannot concentrate his forces to fight. maneuver to avoid combat, or benefit from successful tactical actions unless the division can move quickly, securely. and efficiently. The division is prepared for moves within the local theater area, movement from one part of a theater to another, and administrative movements from ports *or* equipment sites to staging areas.

Retaining the flexibility to execute a variety of attack plans until late in the enemy's planning cycle is a goal of movement planning. Detailed and practiced division movement SOPs and standard task organizations simplify march planning, provide flexibility and greater responsiveness, and provide a smoother cooperation through habitual relationships. However, the use of standard divisional task organization precludes having carefully tailored organizations for each contingency.

For tactical movement, planners must understand the size of units and the related time and space factors for most movement operations. Changes in unit strength because of maintenance failures and repairs or small-scale combat losses arc unpredictable Planners should not try to keep up with these normal fluctuations. They should know the time it takes the division to pass on multiple routes at a designated speed (a division normally will move on at least four routes). general pass times. column lengths, and fuel requirements of corps elements. They must also appreciate the effects of weather and the engineer effort necessary to move a division over different types of roads.

For efficient movement, the division is organized into a serial of march units that are of uniform size. A standard march unit normally corresponds to the size of a maneuver company or team or matches the unit's rapid refueling capability This is a manageable-sized element for CSS commanders, movement planners, and traffic controllers.

The MP company; ADA. engineer, reconnaissance, and MI collection elements: select CSS units; division-controlled artillery; Jamming teams: liaison panics. and TAC CP move before the main bode to synchronize and coordinate the division‘s movement. They identify problems in advance. control march units. provide communrcations while the main body moves, clear and repair the route, and ensure smooth movement in and out of positions at either end of the route.

Not all of the division's units can move at once. CSS battalions are not loo-percent mobile and require multiple lifts (or transportation augmentation). The aviation brigade's movement requires special consideration since forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) or support areas are established prior to commitment of the brigade‘s helicopters.

In a corps movement that schedules one division behind another on the same routes. displacing the division's support areas and coordinating multiple routes are complicated. Traffic control. area responsibilities. air defenses, communications. and fire support are meticulously coordinated.

While on the move, the division must be ready to meet threats from any direction and to attack from the march if necessary. To retain this flexibility, brigades and battalions march in formations that provide all-around (andoverhead) security. Accompanying CS and CSS units are interspersed in the column where they can support the force without hindering its maneuver. Protecting CS and CSS

units is important to armored and mechanized divisions that depend on almost continuous support for their own mobility.

When the entire division marches. leading brigades should move on multiple routes Battalions optimally march on single routes in column formstion. Battalion commanders arrange their march order to secure their trains while moving and to drop their trams quickly if ordered to attack from the march. Mortar platoons and scouts march in positions that allow prompt support of the force Other combat units of a battalion or task force move in a standard order that permits fast actions on contact: and rapid movement onto and off of designated routes.

Deployment to and from the column should be a well-rehearsed battle drill. Forward of their attack positions, committed battalions or task forces should have at least two routes to deploy quickly. As a rule. the time allowed for deployment should not be less than the pass time of the leading companies or teams that must bring their trail platoons on line to support the leading units.

Brigades organize differently. If expected to deploy and fight. they need at least two routes. even when marching in the rear area. A division with two brigades on the move needs at least four routes for security and for rapid deployment at its destination CS battalions may march on separate routes even during approach marches, but need standardized internal arrangements within the division to



A division on the move must be ready to meet threats from any direction and to attack from the march if necessary.

simplify planning, to routinize coordination, and to speed up movements.

In a crisis a division in reserve. unencumbered with forces in contact or other missions. should be able to stage its units forward from assembly areas to attack positions over a period of hours. By prepositioning some of its critical C^2 elements and CS units ahead of its combat forces, the division can deliver a coordinated attack with just a few hours' notice.

In a deliberate attack, a division commander can reasonably expect 24- to 48-hour advance notice prior to his commitment. With this much notice. he can send brigade CPs forward in advance. He can also arrange for division-controlled artillery and crucial CS and CSS elements to be in place before moving his brigades, main support forces, and CPs forward. Multiple routes are necessary to move an attacking division from an assembly area to its attack positions with acceptable speed and security In planning the move from snack positions to the line of departure (LD). operations officers consider travel time from assembly areas to attack positrons. numbers of routes required per battalion. deployment times. and movement times from attack positions to the LD. Instructions for brigade movements from assembly areas through attack positions to the LD must be specific. They normally include locations of all march objectives, routes, contact points. passage lanes, and friendly units. The staff also supplies information about the support that the defending units whose rear areas must be traversed will provide. Brigades, division artillery, and aviation brigade staffs refine this initial coordination further, arranging the final details of their movement from attack positions to the LD with the in-place unit.

Because road space and support areas are usually limited around the LD, the division can expect access to the minimal routes necessary for movement. Everyone in the division must move in strict accordance with published march tables. This requires a strong organization and a high level of training and discipline in small units.

Depending on the situation, the march from the TAC CP may be controlled by the division G3; the operations cell of the division main CP; or an ad hoc movement control headquarters consisting of representatives from the G4, DTO, PM, division signal

officer, division engineer, and other staff sections. No matter who controls it, march planning must include the following minimum requirements:

- Reconnaissance of primary and alternate routes and assembly areas.
- The prompt dispatch of liaison teams to other headquarters.
- Standing teams of communicators, traffic controllers. and quartering elements.

When rerouting units becomes necessary, suitable alternate routes must be available Rerouting may be unavoidable, but it usually affects arrival times in forward areas and can also change the order of march into attack positions or assembly areas Alteration of the movement plan will be of immediate interest to the commander since he may have to reconsider timing or dispositions.

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 3. Division Movement Planning

Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3. Planning Movement

During this lesson, you will revisit large unit movement planning. During S410, you learned what information is needed to adequately plan a road march and how to obtain (calculate) that information. To refresh your memory some of the terms and formulas provided in that earlier subcourse are repeated below.

MOVEMENT TERMS

Arrival time-when the lead vehicle reaches a designated point

Clearance time-when the last (tail) vehicle passes a designated point

Completion time-when the last vehicle passes the release point (RP).

Pass time (PST)-time between the moment the first vehicle passes a given point and the moment the last vehicle passes the same point.

Road clearance time-total time required to travel over and clear a section of road. Equals sum of TDIS and PST.

Time distance (TDIS)-time required to move from one point to another at a given rate of march Normally represents the movement of the lead vehicle from the SP to the RP.

Extra time allowance (EXTAL)-added to account for Murphy's Law: 1 minute per 25 vehicles in column up to 600 vehicles and 2 minutes per 25 vehicles in column of more than 600 vehicles.

MOVEMENT FORMULAS

Rate = distance / time (remember the triangle from S411 and you can figure TDIS)

PST of a march unit = (# of vehicles X 60) / (density X speed) then add EXTAL and round off to nearest minute.

PST of a serial = (# of march units X PST of march unit)) + (# gaps X time gap)

Completion time (CT) = arrival time + PST

You will be planning the conduct of a tactical road march, not a tactical maneuver; therefore, use road march organization and control methods/procedures.

MARCH ORGANIZATION

March column-all elements using the same route for a single movement under the control of a single commander. Used to maintain unit integrity and task organization. Each column has a head (sets the pace), a main body, and a trail element Major elements of the main body are called serials.

Serial-major subdivision of a march column Single unit under one commander for planning, regulation and control A battalion-sized unit normally forms a serial.

March unit (MU)-subdivision of a serial, usually a company-sized unit. Moves/halts under the control of a single commander

Trail party-follows the march column Performs emergency vehicle repair and recovery, medical aid and evacuation, and unscheduled emergency refueling

MARCH COLUMN CONTROL

Start point (SP)-common (and recognizable) point for starting movement Must be far enough from assembly area to allow units to be at prescribed rate of march when they cross

Release point (RP)-common (and recognizable) point where march unrts revert to control of their parent unit It should allow for rapid dispersion

Checkpoint (CP)-used as a reference for providing instructions or places where timing may be critical

Critical point-determined from route reconnaissance or map study Actions must be taken to ensure uninterrupted movement may use road guides or signs

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 3. Division Movement Planning

Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3, Strip Map



REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 3. Division Movement Planning

Appendix 5 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 3. 25th Armd Div Troop List

1st Bde
- HHC
- 2-91 Mech (M2)
- 2-10 Armor (M1A1)
- 2-11 Armor (M1A1)

2d Bde
- HHC
- 2-92 Mech (M2)
- 2-12 Armor (M1A1)
- 2-13 Armor (M1A1)

3d Bde
- HHC
- 2-93 Mech (M2)
- 2-94 Mech (M2)
- 2-14 Armor (M1A1)
- 2-15 Armor (M1A1)

25th Avn Bde
- HHC/25th Avn Bde
- 1-25 Atk Hel Bn (AH-64/0H-58)
- 2-25 Atk Hel Bn (AH-64/0H-58)
- 2-22 Cav
  - HHT
  - Trps A&B (M3/M1A1)
  - Trps D&E (OH-58D/AH-1S)

25th Armd DIVARTY
- HHD
  - G/20 FA (Tgt Acq)
- 2-50 FA (155, SP)
- 2-51 FA (155. SP)
- 2-52 FA (155, SP)
- C/53 FA (MLRS)

1-440 ADA
- HHB
- Btrys A-C (BSFV)
- Btty D (Avenger)

25th Cml Co
- 1st-4th Plts (Decon)
- 5th Pit (Smoke) (Mech)
- 6th Pit (Recon) (Fox)

25th Armd DIVEN Bde
- HHC/25th Armd DIVEN Bde
- 461st Engr Bn (1st Bde)
- 462d Engr Bn (2d Bde)
- 463d Engr Bn (3d Bde)
  - HHC/463d
  - Cos A-C

25th MI Bn
- HHC
- Co A ,B,C (DS)
- Co D (GS)

25th MP Co
- 1st-3d Plts (DS to Bdes)
- 4th-6th Plts (GS)

25th Sig Bn
- Co A (Sig Spt)
- Cos B&C (Area Sig)

25th Armd DISCOM
- HHD/MMC
- 25th Div Avn Spt Bn (DASB)
- 251st FSB (1st Bde)
- 252d FSB (2nd Bde)
- 2534 FSB (3d Bde)

- 254th Spt Bn (Main)
  - HHD
  - Co A (S&S)
  - Co B (TMT)
  - Co C (Lt Maint)
  - Co D (Hv Maint)
  - Co F (Med)

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Division Offensive Planning Exercise

SCOPE

This lesson places you in the plans cell of a heavy division (25th Armd Div) that has recently deployed to Europe and moved into its tactical assembly area as part of the X Corps. You will use deliberate decision making procedures (DDMP) (one of three methods of tactical decision making) to solve a division tactical problem and develop selected portions of a division operation plan (OPLAN)

You will analyze the X Corps mission, write a restated division mission statement, develop and analyze (war game) courses of action, compare COAs, and determine a COA to recommend. You will also consider some intelligence and logistics issues related to the 25th Armd Div mission and the tactical scenario. Finally, you will make a decision as the commanding general, develop a task organization, and write a portion of a division OPLAN on the worksheet provided (see appendix 10 to this lesson guide).

The lesson contains a series of sequential practical exercises that increase your proficiency in applying the tactical decision making process at the division level and will prepare you for the S320A exam. You should have FM 71-100. FM 101-5-1. and ST 101-5 available as references.

LEARNING OBJECTIVE

A.30 TASK: Analyze a corps plan

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references, a scenario, and a corps plan.

STANDARD: Analysis must-

- Comply with higher commander's intent
- Synchronize the tactical battlefield operating systems.
- Include consideration of the five elements of the battlefield framework.
- Comply with employment doctrine as described in FM 71-100 and FM 100-5.

LEVEL: Analysis

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: la, lb, lc, ld, le, 2a, and 3a

A.50 TASK: Develop a tactical plan

CONDITION: Acting as a staff officer of a heavy division. given a tactical situation, the corps plan, appropriate references, enemy and friendly status. and a requirement to plan offensive or defensive operations.

STANDARD: The plan must-

- Apply doctrine and justify its application as described in FM 63-20, FM 71-100, and FM 100-5.

- Be tactically feasible and derived using the decision making methods described in FM 101-5 (FD) and the course material.

- Employ terminology and symbology IAW FM 101-5-1

LEVEL: Synthesis

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: la, lb, Id, le, and 3a.

B.11 TASK: Describe the conduct of Soviet-style army- and front-level offensive operations

CONDITION: Given a scenario with a Soviet-style front-level offensive operational plan and a written requirements, with references.

STANDARD: The description must address primary forms of operational maneuver; missions and planning consideration: and echelonment of army- and front-level units in the Soviet style. It must also address consideration of the preparedness of enemy defenses, the mission and composition of operational-level forward detachments, and deep attack capabilities in Soviet-style operations. The description must be IAW ST 100-7, student notes, and assigned readings.

LEVEL: Application

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVES. lb, 2b, and 3a.

A.51 TASK: Communicate a tactical decision.

CONDITION Given a tactical situation: appropriate maps, other references, and the commander's restated mission and intent: the coordinating staff's estimates; the G2's and G3's war gaming notes; a recommended course of action, the commander's decision; and a requirement to write parts of a division operation plan.

STANDARD: The plan must---

- Communicate the commander's decision and set priorities that subordinate commanders will need to comply with his intent

- Justify the order IAW the doctrine in FM 63-2. FM 63-20. FM 63-21. FM 71-100, FM 100-5, and FM 101-5 (FD)

- Employ terminology and symbology IAW FM 101-5-1 and must employ effective writing style as described in ST 22-2.

LEVEL: Application

PJE PHASE I OBJECTIVES:

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use this lesson guide to achieve the lesson learning objective. The lesson contains a series of directed readings and specific learning activities that require application of the deliberate decision making procedures taught in previous tactics courses Doing these scenario-based requirements at the appropriate times and actively thinking are the keys to solving the division tactical problem. It is also essential that you become familiar with the 10th Corps OPLAN and the scenario as you work through this lesson. The remainder of the course continues with this European scenario

REFERENCES:

a. FM 71-100, *Division Operations.*

b. FM *101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols.*

c. ST *101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes.*

MAPS:

Maps, Series M648, Edition 1-DMA (1: 100,000)

Series M648, Germany, sheet C4326 (Gostar), edition 1-DMG, 1:100,000.
Series M648, Germany, sheet C4330 (Halberstadt), edition 1-GSGS. 1:100,000.
Series M648, Germany, sheet C4334 (Bernburg), edition 1-DMA. 1:100,000.
Series M648, Germany. sheet C4338 (Dessau), 1 -DMA. 1:100,000.
Series M648, Germany. sheet C4722 (Kassel), edition 1-DMG, 1: 100,000.
Series M648, Germany, sheet C4726 (Muhlhauscn), edition 1-DhlG. 1:100,000.
Series M648, Germany, sheet C4730 (Nordhausen), edition 1-DMA, t : 100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C4734 (Halle), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C4738 (Leipzig), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C4742 (Wurzen). edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany. sheet C5122 (Bad Hersfed), edition 1-DMG, 1:100,000
Series M618, Germany. sheet C5126 (Eisenach). edition 1-DMA. 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C5130 (Erfurt), edition 1 -DMA, 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C5134 (Jena), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C5138 (Gera), edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C5142 (Karl-Marx-Stadt). edition 1-DMA, 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C5522 (Fulda), edition 1-DMG, 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C5526 (Meiningen), edition 1 -DMG, 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C5530 (Hildburghausen), edition 1-DMG, 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C5534 (Saalfeld), edition 1 -DMA. 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C5538 (Zwickau), edition 1 -DMA, 1:100,000
Series M648, Germany, sheet C5542 (Aue), edition 1-DMA. 1:100,000

Assemble map sheets in the following sequence:

	C4326	C4330	C4334	C4338	
C4722	C4726	C4730	C4734	C4738	C4742
C5122	C5126	C5130	C5134	C5138	C5142
C5522	C5526	C5530	C5534	C5538	C5542

OVERLAYS:

4-1 (Sheets 1 through 4 of 4) 25th Armd Div Combined Obstacles Overlay
4-2 (Sheets 1 through 4 of 4) 25th Armd Div Area of Operations

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LESSONGUIDE

INTRODUCTION

Lesson 4 continues with the scenario introduced in the previous lesson and picks up with the 25th Armd Div having just moved into its tactical assembly area (TAA). Before you proceed, find an area on a wall (or sliding glass door) and assemble the 1:100,000 map sheet sections in the sequence indicated above. Then come back here.

This lesson is the culmination of everything you have learned in your first year of Command and General Staff College; it will give you the opportunity to practice all the tactics instruction you have received so far. This lesson provides the opportunity to employ a modem U.S. Army division as part of a multinational corps in a joint and combined offensive operation. Thus is a difficult task, but one that will give you a sense of accomplishment upon completion. This may be the best opportunity so far in your military career to practice and understand the staff and planning skills neccssary to the art of employing forces to accomplish a combat mission.

There is considerable ground to cover in this one lesson (no pun intended)! You will USC the deliberate decision making procedures to develop a doctrinally sound division combat plan that meets the mission assigned to you by your higher headquarters. Additionally, you will develop some key parts of an OPLAN that will clearly communicate your commander's tactical decision (how your commander intends to accomplish the mission). One more thing, You will get to wear several hats, including the division commander's hat (and think about the problem from different perspectives).

If you conscientiously complete the series of embedded exercises. you will gain considerable insight into the S320A scenario that continues through the exam. By now, you arc familiar with how the supporting material works with the lesson guide There is a lot of material in lesson 4. Here is a brief description of what is here and how it contributes to the lesson.

Appendix 1, X Corps OPLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG). This is the corps commander's plan. intent, scheme of maneuver. task organization, and supporting details for the defeat of 2 GTA. It provides the basis for the 25th Armd Div plan that you will develop and write.

Appendix 2, Service Support Plan 1, which tells how the command will be supported

Appendix 3, intelligence Estimate No. 1, which provides information regarding terrain, weather, and enemy.

Appendix 4. Combat Service Support Status of the 25th Armd Div, tells you what you have and the effective personnel strength of each unit.

Appendix 5. Sample Restated Mission, is for reference.

Appendix 6. Sample Course of Action Sketch and Statement-also for reference.

Appendix 7, Sample War gaming Products, gives examples of recording techniques.

Appendix 8, Sample Decision Tables, shows examples of different comparison methods.

Appendix 9. Overview of Deliberate Decision making Procedures

Appendix 10 is the 25th Armd Div OPLAN Worksheet. which you will use to record selected portions of the 25th Armd Div OPLAN you develop.

Now, get started. You are looking forward to returning to the division headquarters. You were sent to corps headquarters to temporarily fill in for the 25th Armd Div's liaison officer to X (U.S.) Corps who will return today. The assistant corps G3 has just given you a copy of the X (U S.) Corps OPLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG) The corps commander has personally discussed the plan with your division commander, but the corps G3 wants to ensure the division G3 gets a perspective of how corps planners envisioned the plan unfolding. He has summoned you to the corps plans van and told you to listen to the following briefing and take detailed notes. He knows that you arc returning to the division to help develop the division's plan. The corps plans officer starts

"X Corps is preparing for offensive operations. In Phase III of the X (US) Corps OPLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG). 25th Armd Div. attacks as the corps main effort. The attack is tentatively scheduled to begin, on order. or when the enemy crosses PL BARIUM. After departing from their assembly areas, 25th Armd Div will face a 100 km tactical road march, probably conduct a X Corps supported refueling just before crossing the line of departure (LD) (PL MASS), and then attack in one (approximately 100 km in length). The intent of the attack IS twofold First to destroy the lead regiments of the enemy division that is using the southern avenue of approach. and then, subsequently, to destroy the lead regiments of the enemy division using the northern avenue of approach

"The 4th Panzer Grenadier Div (corps supporting attack) destroys the training regiments of these two divisions at the same time that 25th Armd Div is accomplishing its mission. The 25th Armd Div and the 4th Pz Gren Div. must destroy the southern regiments rapidly, without giving the northern division enough time to establish a hasty, defense or change direction of attack. Upon successful completion of its mission, 25th Amrd Div occupies assembly area (AA) EINSTEIN and conducts reorganization operations before 10th Corps continues the offensive IAW LANDCENT's plan, CRASHING FIST.

"There arc several tactical considerations for the 25th Armd Div. Phase I of the corps OPLAN presents little challenge to the 25th Armd Div. At some time during Phase II, on order, the 25th Armd Div will attack from its tactical assembly area (TAA). This will probably be around H+96. This action begins Phase III of the corps OPLAN. The initial concern facing the 25th's planners should be the move to the LD. Movement through the Thuringer Wald presents the only terrain restriction. The division will have engineers, some combat service

support (CSS), and some security forces already in its zone as they will be constructing obstacles in the barrier zones prior to the attack. Threat of interdiction is small.

"The division should plan for corps to support a refuel on the move (ROM). Given the great distances involved in the movement to the LD, the attack to kill the first set of targets, and then the movement to engage the second set of targets, followed by a consolidation into assembly areas, the 25th needs all the refueling it can get. This should not be planned as a tactical refuel. The division must keep all of its tactical refuel assets full for support during the attack. To support this operation, corps is prepared to use its 5,000-gallon tankers and railcar assets. The division must specify fuel requirements and identify proposed refuel locations, Initial corps analysis indicates the best positioning for the ROM vvould be along the line Amstadt (PB3734), Stadtilm (PB4727), Rudolstadt (PB6422).

"The next critical point in the plan is contact with the southern division in the vicinity of PL XENON. The corps G2 plans cell situationally templated the Krasnovian division in march formation so the 25th could develop a plan that will quickly destroy these regiments.

"From this point, 25th Armd Div continues its attack around H+110. 25th Armd Div should make contact with the northern threat division near the line Sagerhausen (PC6005) to Halle (QC0509). Recommend the division G2 estimate threat location and situation, develop appropriate situation templates, and the G3 develop a plan to destroy the threat. The corps G2 has templated the threat division in the north in march formation. If, by the time the 25th Armd Div arrives. the northern division has organized a hasty defense (which it probably vvould not do unless a significant portion of its combat power is destroyed), the 25th Armd Div will not have sufficient combat power to destroy the lead regiments. So, corps recommends that the division exericse care in planning deep operations so as not to cause the northern division to into a hasty defense. Once the threat is destroyed. the division will being occypying AA EINSTEIN.

"Terrain in 25th Armd Div's zone is generally favorable for mechanized operations. Major obstacles to maneuver include the Thuringer Wald (hill mass southwest of the Amstadt to Stadtilm to Rudolstadt line), Jena (PB8145), Weimar (PB6351), Hohe Schrecke (PB6084), Forst Ziegelroda (PS7388), the Halle industrial one, and the Salle River.

"The corps G2 thinks the Krasnovians have three branches available to affect the success of the corps plan:

The first: the southern Krasnovian division might turn southwest to conduct a meeting engagement iwth either the 25th Armd Div or the 4th Pz Gren.

The second: the southern Krasnovian division arrives late or 25th arrives in zone early to find the Krasnovian division now set to attack into the 25th's right flank.

The third: the southern Krasnovian division is able to successfully delay its demise long enough to let the northern division establish hasty defensive positions. The 25th would then have to attack through a hasty defense, significantly increasing friendly losses."

As you, listen to this briefing, you start to think about developing a plan and how the division might fair in this attack.

The 25th Armd Div has three ground maneuver brigades and an aviation brigade available. The aviation brigade has two attack battalions (AH-64), an assault helicopter company. and the command assault aviation company. The division can support both a main and a supporting attack. Phase Line (PL) BARIUM, found on the corps Phase II graphics is critical as an aid to determining the start time of the 25th Amid Div attack. The determining factor if the advance of the 2 GTA's two remaining divisions (22 TD and 57 GTD) along the southern and northern avenues of approach. You think some of the most difficult issues for the planners to consider include employing the maneuver brigades, aviation brigade, and division cavalry squadron to obtain mutual support; front and flank security; how to organize for combat: and what would be the best possible maneuver scheme against the enemy.

You think about what fire support is available. Currently, the division artillery (DIVARTY) target acquisition battery (Tgt Acq Btry) TPQ 37 radars (two each) arc OPCON to 70th FA Bdc (see Phases I and II of corps plan). In Phase III, 66th FA Bdc reinforces 25th DIVARTY (see troop list for 66th FA Bdc composition). The 25th has priority of fires until the 22 TD and 57 GTD arc destroyed. Additionally, 67th and 68th FA Bdes (ATACMS configured) can range the entire 25th area of operations to provide support as required (see LANDCENT OPLAN CRASHING FIST for more details).

You think about command and control for the fires. The FA Bdc HQ could be used to control suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and counterbattery fires The DIVARTY HQ could be used to control the fires supporting divisional units In the offense. you generally decentralize FA control to allow responsiveness to the supported brigades. It is possible to use DIVARTY HQ to control preparatory and on-call fires as well as interdiction of deep targets. You recognize that other units. the 52d Mech, 4th Pz. Gren, and 200th ACR, arc going to be close to any fires you plan You make a note to watch for synchronization and fire control measures.

There appear to be lots of close air support (CAS) sorties available when the 25th Armd Div attacks. You know that you will have to think carefully to develop a plan that will use them where they do the most good. You think to yourself. "Look for armor columns moving on the battlefield, try to mass the CAS assets. Don't piecemeal the assets by trying to give a little to everyone." You know that the main attack brigade doesn't automatically get the priority for CAS. For example. a planner might allocate the CAS priority to help balance a risk assumed on a flank.

South of the Thuringer Wald, routes seem adequate to support a tactical road march. Routes supporting movement through the Thuringer Wald are limited. Routes again improve north of the Thuringer Wald and arc generally supporting of the offense throughout the rest of the zone. The Ilm, Unstrut, and Salle Rivers arc the major water obstacles To support its mobility and survivability operations, the division has an engineer brigade. The 25th also has an additional corps engineer battalion (wheeled) and two ribbon bridge companies augmenting the division. This should provide enough engineer assets for mobility and survivability.

As you remember what X Corps. 4th Pz Gren, 52d Mech Div, and 209th ACR arc doing, you recognize that airspace management will be critical. This is a G3 function that involves coordination with the Air Force. Army aviation. and ADA. ADA assets are adequate for protection of the main attack. Identification of ADA priorities will be tough; these should be based on criticality, vulnerability, recuperability and likihood that the Krasnovians will expend aircraft against a potential target.

You see that X Corps retains the bulk of its intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets. They arc tracking the advance of the 22 TD and 57 GTD. The division staff will need to use input from X Corps, 4th Pz Gren. 209th ACR J-STARS. AWACS, and 25th Armd Div LRSDs to monitor battalion and larger threat forces.

You see no logistical war stoppers, but terrain management and route/movement control pose some

serious problems. ROM, displacement of the FSBs and DISCOM, repetitive refuel and rearm while the division moves and fights its way north are all concerns that the staff should address. Movement planning is essential and must be a part of the wargame process. The brigades may have to fight for as long as 12 hours without resupply. Sustainment must be preplanned.

Organization and the ability to synchronize the combat, combat support, and combat service support over the long lines of communication (LOCs) will require detailed planning. Coordination with adjacent and higher units is critical. Fire control measures arc important in this operation: they are key to preventing fratricide; they must be simple and clear.

You let your mind wander over initial 25th Armd Div offensive battlefield framework. Relate the deep, close, and rear battle to one another, and to the enemy, in terms of time. space. and purpose. Ensure the entire battlefield is covered by a unit mission that states a specific task and purpose. Corps **deep operations** should initially delay threat regiments or separate the division's close operation and establish the conditions for decisive maneuver. Later in the attack. in the north. the deep operations should focus on finding and fixing or destroying the reserves of the northern division regiments in zone (and in close coordination with 4th Pz Gren Div for any assistance they can possibly provide).

Close operations must be based on the Krasnovian plan. Templating will provide an estimate of the threat's location and movement. Thus will help determine where division forces should encounter the Krasnovians. While frontal attacks will be the easiest COAs to synchronize. more innovative. less direct approaches might be more effective.

You think about **security** to the north and eask. Think about your area of interest (AI) that may impact your operations. Because the 25th is doing what is essentially a movement to contact, you arc concerned about how to detect the southern division and how to maneuver forces into the fight. You think about how to observe named areas of interest (NAIs) and decision points and the C^2 link to security elements. The 25th's eastern flank is vulnerable. The same issues apply to the attack against the northern Krasnovian division Speed and violent offensive action may provide a degree of security.

The division **reserve** should be tailored to handle the size threat force it will most likely encounter. Considering what is know about the enemy, a small reserve may be sufficient.

In the division's **rear area,** control of the routes and management of terrain will be a big problem. Some points you should consider include the number of usable routes, the number of units on the routes. and start locations of supporting operations (time and distance factors for support). Timelines and assembly areas for all combat and combat support units attached or OPCON to 25th Armd Div and the follow-on units assigned to the 25th Armd Div must be considered in the movement control plan.

The 25th has an MP Bn in DS; its best use will be battlefield circulation control. The **tactical combat force (TCF),** organized based on the threat analysis, must have sufficient mobility and firepower. This will probably be battalion size or less. Congestion on the roads may require air movement of the TCF. Sustainment is a tough part of the operation. It must be addressed, especially in wargaming, to ensure adequate support and synchronized effort. X Corps planners said not to plan on any support by rail and theater airlift until after the attack is completed.

Do you now have a basic understanding of what is going on? If not, return to the end of lesson 2 and read the scenario overview section again. Then review the preceding section. What you should now know is that you will develop a tactical plan on the scenario provided by LANDCENT OPLAN CRASHING FIST and X Corps OPLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG). It is very important that you understand the introductory scenario. If you do not, you will not master the learning objectives for this lesson. Additionally, if you do not understand what is going on in the beginning, it will take you a lot longer to go through the lesson. Read appendix 1, X Corps OPLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG) and appendix 2, Service Support Plan 1.

When you are comfortable, proceed with the lesson.

First put on your G2 hat. Look at the "sandbox" in which X Corps will operate. Now look at Map 4-1. Note the operational configuration of the corps area of operations. Take some tic to orient this sketch map with the maps you mounted on the wall. Locate the prominent terrain features.



Map 4-1. Operational Terrain within the Corps AOR

Now look at Map 4-2. How many avenues of approach (AAs) do you see? What size force can they accomodate: What direction? You'll be able to answer these questions in a few minutes after you read the corps intelligence estimate



Map 4-2. Avenues of Approach within the Crops.

As you probably noted, there were quite a few avenues of approach; most run east to west. There are roughly four division-sized AAs with several good cross-over options.

The first part of Intelligence Estimate No.1 (appendix 3 to this lesson guide) describes the terrain. It also tells you about precipitation and temperatures. Refer to intelligence estimate No. 1 as often as you need to for additional details regarding terrain in the area of operations. What you need to focus on is on page 6--a discussion and analysis of the avenues of approach you saw on Map 4-2. **Take about 10 minutes and turn to page 5 in appendix 3. Read the discussion of movement and maneuver and avenues of approach on page 5 through 8. Do this now.**

Now look at how the Krasnovians might fare against the X Corps deep operations. **Turn to page 10** in **appendix 3 and read about the capabilities and possible courses of action (COAs) of the Krasnovian 2 GTA. This should take you about 5 minutes.**

Done? Good. Your understanding of the terrain and enemy sets the stage for understanding the X (US) Corps plan and 25th Armd Div's role in it.

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Here is a brief overview of the three-phased corps plan to set the stage for you. You will read more about the corps plan in just a moment.



Phase I has the forward elements of the 25th Armd Div arriving in its tactical assembly area in the X Corps rear area. While the X Corps units are arriving in assembly areas and moving to initial defensive positions, German Territorial Forces delay the enemy (2 GTA) as it attacks west across the German-Polish border (forward of PL XRAY). The 209th ACR and 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade (CMBG) move forward and establish covering forces in sector. To help you understand how the corps disposition in Phase I relates to the terrain, look at the sketch of the X Corps covering force in Phase I.

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

During **Phase II,** the 209th ACR and 4th CMBG begin to withdraw to the west as the 25th Armd Div and 4th Panzer Grenadier Div (4 PzGren) continue preparations to attack to the north. When the two remaining divisions of 2 GTA reach PL BARIUM, the 25th Arrnd Div and 4 PzGren Div attack and Phase III begins.



In **Phase III,** 25th Armd Div attacks as the corps main attack to sequentially (destroy the lead regiments of the two attacking divisions with a flank attack. The 4th PzGren Div (corps supporting attack) destroys the trailing regiments of these two divisions at the same time that 25th Armd Div is accomplishing its mission, The 25th Armd Div and the 4th PzGren Div must attack in zone to destroy the southern regiments rapidly, without giving the northern division enough time to establish a hasty defense or change direction of attack. Upon successful completion of its mission, 25th Armd Div occupies assembly area (AA) EINSTEIN and reorganizes before X Corps continues the offensive IAW LANDCENT's plan, CRASHING FIST.

Reflect for a moment about the tactical decision-making process (TDM). Do you remember the four major steps that take place when soving a problem') In S310B, you studied and worked through a brigade defensive tactical problem in which the TDM process described in ST 101-5 was explained. In this lesson, you will use the deliberate decision-making methodology, that, as you recall, is one of three methods that make up the TDM, to solve a division-level offensive problem. A concise overview of the TDM is at appendix 9 to this lesson guide. **Take about 10 minutes to turn to appendix 9 and review the process.** After you become comfortable, return to the lesson guide.

You will approach solving this division offensive problem the same way that you did in S310B. This should be almost "second nature." You will begin by conducting a mission analysis. A review of the key commander and staff activities that take place during this first part of the DDMP procedure is highlighted on the following chart.



Requirement: You are a 25th Armd Division staff planner. Turn to appendix 1 in your lesson guide and review 10th (U.S.) Corps OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG. Focus on Phase III of the plan and begin your analysis of the 25th Armd Div must accomplish. A worksheet is provided on the following page for your convenience to notify the specified, implied, and essential tasks.

Figure 4-3 of appendix 9 illustrates where we arc starting in the DDMP. You can also refer to paragraph 1-4 of ST 101-5. First be sure that you understand the LANDCENT commander's intent, If you need to review it, you have a copy of the LANDCENT Plan (CRASHING FIST; appendix 4 to lesson 2). Also, the X (U.S.) Corps OPLAN (DEPUTY DAWG) gives you the corps commander's intent. Focus on any constraints affecting the 25th Armd Div and the specified, implied, and essential tasks. A sample showing the format of a restated mission is provided in appendix 5 to your lesson guide. Mission analysis here is no different from what you did during S310B. Only the factors of METT-T have changed. Refer to figure 4-4 of appendix 9 and ST 101-5 to ensure your mission analysis is complete. **Come back to the lesson guide when you are through.**

In the space provided, write in the tasks you identify as you think about the operation that the 25th Armd Div must plan to conduct. **A word of caution:** Try not to take any shortcuts in the process. This should take you

about 2 hours. Do it just as the lesson guide describes. You will be required to do similar events on the exam. If you skip these practical exercises, you will not prepare yourself for success.

Specified tasks:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Implied task:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Essential tasks:

_____

_____

_____

_____

Now write YOUR PROPOSED RESTATED MISSION FOR 25th Armd Div:

_____

_____

_____

Are you finished? Did you write a clear, concise statement that includes the elements WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY? Good.

After completing your review of the X (U.S.) Corps OPLAN. you should have culled the specified and implied tasks to the following essential tasks:

- Attack to destroy lead regiments of the southern Krasnovian divisbn and northern Krasnovian division sequentially.

- Complete the destruction of the 2 GTA

As you recall, determining which of the specified and implied tasks arc essential tasks requires military judgment and experience. If you included other tasks, you are not absolutely wrong but run the risk of diffusing the division's focus from the two truly essential tasks that will achieve the conditions required by the corps commander. Using the above essential tasks as a basis for mission success, your restated mission statement should be close to this one:

On order, 25th Armd Div attacks to destroy threat forces in zone to complete destinction of the 2 GTA.

The rest of this lesson uses the restated mission as a starting point. You may use either this restated mission or the one you developed.

Take a short break Then return here for the CG's initial planning guidance.

By design, from this point on there are no "canned solutions." You must become thoroughly familiar with corps OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG and this scenario from the perspective of a division plans officer solving the 25th Armd Div tactical problem. Your continued active thinking as you complete selected parts of the two remaining major tasks of the DDMP process is a necessary ingredient for your success and confidence.

Where is the 25th Armd Div? This is a quick sanity check in case you took a long break! You are now in the tactical assembly area in the vicinity of Bad Neustadt. Unfortunately, you don't have time for delays!

At this point in the decision-making process, you can complete paragraph 2 and part of paragraph 1 of your draft 25th Armd Div OPLAN. There is nothing magic about this. You will see that this isn't as difficult as you might think,

Requirement: Turn to appendix 10 (25th Armd Div OPLAN Worksheet) and enter your mission statement as paragraph 2 of the division OPLAN on the worksheet provided. Then take no more than 5 minutes and complete the enemy situation part of paragraph 1 as best you can at this point. Review ST 101-5 if you have an OPLAN format question. Keep working with the OPLAN worksheet during the rest of this lesson. When you are saltistied with your efforts on paragraphs 1 and 2, come back here.

Now it's time to give you some initial planning guidance to focus your efforts before you proceed with your staff estimate. If you haven't yet put up your map set, do so now. Then post overlays 4-1 and 4-2. Relate the commander's guidance to the map. Figures 4-5 to 4-14 of appendix 9 contain the points a commander might address in his initial guidance. Certainly, all of these points will not be covered. In fact, some points might rarely be covered. But it gives you an idea of what you might get. Note that this is called initial guidance. The commander provides additional guidance later in the DDMP.

COMMANDER'S INITIAL PLANNING GUIDANCE

(your CG's Guidance): "I think by the time the Krasnovian commander crosses PL ROD, he will be down to two *MRDs. I suspect corps deep operations will have destroyed the 13 IMRR and the remnants of the initial divisions. I also suspect that if the latest corps intelligence estimate is correct, the two remaining motorized rifle divisions will attack abreast into our zone with their regiments in a two-up, twoback configuration. Use this as the base enemy COA but don't ignore his other potential schemes.

"You have all seen the division's restated mission. The purpose of this attack is to destroy the 2 Krasnovian Front. I intend to destroy the two leading regiments of the southern Krasnovian division and then move northward to engage and destroy the two leading regiments of the northern Krasnovian division, We will complete this operation by consolidating in AA EINSTEIN prepared to continue the attack northward. Krasnovian forces in zone will be incapable of operations above platoon-level.

"I want you to consider COAs that emphasize security from speed. There is too much real estate out there for us to keep a trooper on every hilltop. I see this attack planned as a continuous operation from leaving our TAA and crossing the LD to destroying the northern division regiments. I think that the corps commander has a 'full plate,' so don't plan on getting any resources from corps that haven't already been identified. We must rely on corps deep operations to slow the advance of the northern division until we get there. I'm also concerned about our flank security with 4th Pz Gren Div. We must establish close liaison with them and carefully synchronize our maneuver to ensure mutual support.

We must stress simplicity, speed, and flexibility in our close operations. Don't design any plan that will cause us to lose momentum. I want you to kill the enemy on the move Roll through and keep on going, I see this as a single-phased operation.

"Let's keep things simple by using the control measures and phase lines that corps has given us to the maximum extent possible. As you develop COAs, look at a movement to contact formation when we cross the LD. In addition to the other control measures you come up with, I want you to design several engagement areas (EAs) to synchronize our ground forces, attack helicopters, fires, and offensive air support to hit the enemy when he is most vulnerable. Take a look at planning an EA in the vicinity of PB9660 in the south and two EAs in the north-one east of the Saale River just north of Halle, and one ust south of Bernberg (PC9032). I want some detailed planning done on how to best use our engineers in a mobility role. Establish and maintain close coordination with the 4th Pz Gren. We don't want to expose our right flank, if we get ahead of their attack. Finally, I want you to carefully consider the necessary tire control and maneuver control measures to simply let everyone know who's in charge of each piece of terrain during our attack. Remember that friendly fires usually aren't!

"Another consideration: our plan must not violate the corps deception plan. Remember. let's not make any preparations that scare the Krasnovians north. This is important when staging supplies. Don't portray a division getting ready for a long distance strike."

"Logistically, I am concerned about the vulnerability of our LOCs as we extend northward. I don't think there will be many combat units available to secure them. I want you to develop COAs that take this into consideration as you plan for sewing our LOCs and the probable threat of interdiction from bypassed forces in our zone. Also be thinking of where and when we should displace the DSA after our attack. We will not be able to resupply all units to the degree that we would like, so ensure fuel and ammo get to the brigades moving up to attack the northern Krasnovian regiments."

"G3, I want a written OPORD out in sufficient time for the brigades to do some quality planning. There is sufficient time to do this right, but we must keep it simple."

"We have the key role to play as the corps main effort. As a minimum, plan on a map rehearsal at the main CP; if time permits, we will do something more realistic. Let's get to work."

Now that's a mouthful! It's also fairly explicit in directing you to incorporate some specific tactics into the courses of action you develop. This is probably because there isn't much time to finish planning before the attack kicks off.

Now review a couple of areas the CC touched on. What's the difference between an engagement area (EA) and an objective? Look up the definitions in FM 101-5-1. The key aspect for an EA (page 1-29) is "an

area in which the commander intends to trap and destroy an enemy force with the massed fires of all available weapons. " This is clearly force-orientcd and planned in an area that canalizes the enemy while providing some terrain masking and good fields of fire for attack helicopters or CAS aircraft. There is no plan to put forces on the ground to physically seize or secure the area identified as an EA. although this terrain may be secured later in subsequent operations. On the other hand. an objective (pages 1-50 and 1-51) IS a physical piece of terrain a "definite terrain feature. the seizure and/or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan, or, the destruction of an enemy force without regard to terrain features." Objectives then can be either terrain or force-oriented. However, most planners intend terrain objectives to be either seized or secured by maneuver forces accompanied by fires. You should have a general understanding of these definitions before you begin your planning. **Always look up any unfamiliar tactical terms in appropriate doctrinal manuals when you encounter them.**

Did X Corps assign the 25th Armd Div any EAs or objectives? No This is somewhat unusual. Think about why corps didn't assign division objectives. The division was assigned a zone of action and a proposed assembly area for consolidation after the attack (AA EINSTEIN) Here is a possible reason It IS likely that the corps planners felt that the actual locations of EAs or objectives woub best be planned at division level. This is another example of the art of the tactician rather than a 'cookie cutter' solution!

How many phases should we plan for attack ? Why? The 25th Armd Div attack should be planned in a single phase for several reasons. The first is the CG's guidance that the attack be a continuous operation. Phases tend to introduce operational pauses, and when you stop a large unit and start it again, you may have coordination problems. You also increase the unit's vulnerability.

Take a minute to look up the definition of a phase (page 1-55, FM 101-5-1)--"a specific tic part of an operation that IS different from those that precede or follow" The FM further states that a phase is "normally associated with operations of larger units ..." but does not specify how large. It is clear from X Corps OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG that corps may phase their operations. The key question is Uarc we doing the same thing throughout our operation?" From a division perspective, when you attack during corps phase III you are doing one thing--an attack For these reasons, try not to phase the 25th Armd Div attack. Remember that phases have c nothing to do with phase lines.

Understand that the 25th Amid Div is the highly mobile offensive force that attacks in Phase III of the corps mobile defense. Remember that mobile defenses focus on *destroying* the attacking force by drawing him into a position that exposes a flank to counterattack Phases I and II of the corps OPLAN shape these conditions Refer to the CG's planning guidance as you develop your COAs.

What would a G3 planner do next? You guessed it! Now that you have the mission and a better understanding of the corps OPLAN and the tactical setting in which the 75th Armd Div must operate, you must develop courses of action (COAs) to accomplish the mission. You are beginning the second major part of the *DDMP--course of action development.* The part you will complete next is part of the G3's staff estimate. This is a good time to remind you that even though you are doing this process alone. when the DDMP is used. there arc several staff officers from the various areas of staff functions working together. The G3 does not develop a course of action in a vacuum, he has several specialists working with him. This makes sense when you think of the interrelated nature of combat operations The absolute worst turn of events is for the maneuver planner to be working in isolation while the logistics planner IS off counting numbers from FM 101-10-1. COA development is a coordinated staff project.

There are times when a single commander, or a commander aided by a small number of planners, must develop a plan in a hurry, but that is something you will learn later. This lesson is about the DDMP, and the DDMP is coordinated.

Here is a tip for you It does matter how you arc organized to accomplish the steps of COA development. Do you have a visual method for recording the analysis of relative combat power (step 1 on figure 4-18)? Without this, you cannot fully appreciate the full range of maneuver available to you. There is also a good chance that you will fail to use some element of combat power. Make sure you faithfully and carefully conduct and record these steps. If you skip a step or do not do it properly, you may well be dooming your plan to failure. Almost as bad, you will probably have to go through the entire process again. This is the step to determine if a plan is workable or not, not later when the commanders do a rehearsal! The highlighted area on the following chart (figure 4-15 of appendix 9 to the lesson guide) shows where you are.



First, quickly review what COAs must include. Turn to appendix 9. Figures 4-16 to 4 22 outline this procedure. Take about 2 minutes to review them. A more detailed discussion of this process is found in chapter 3, ST 101-5. Even though you have developed courses of action before in S310B, if the procedure isn't fresh in your mind, you might want to take some time to read ST 101-5 again. In any event, when you are ready to start, *here are some of the basic things you must keep in mind:*

- Does the COA comply with the CG's planning guidance?

- Does the COA adequately communicate the scheme of maneuver?

- Do not specify ground maneuver units yet--no 1st, 2d, or 3d Bde-the CG will determine this later in the DDMP. However, you have only one divisional cavalry squadron and one aviation brigade. so these may be specified if depicted.

- Keep control measures to the minimum necessary and ensure graphics and symbols comply with FM 101-5-1 and PT 100-1.

Now you are ready tor the second practical exercise: COA development.

Special Situation

The 25th Armd Div CG has approved the restated mission and provided his initial planning guidance. You are back at the G3 plans van where the G3 tells you and the other planners. "I want you to develop two COAs based on the CG's guidance. I will return later to discuss the COAs you have come up with."

Requirement: Follow the procedure you learned in S310B to develop your COA sketch and statement. Try to draw your COA sketches first before you write accompanying statements. Take no more than an hour to develop two different COAs for the 25th Armd Div attack. You may find it useful to review FM 71-100, Chapter 1, "Offensive Operations." Use the outline of the division area of operations provided on the following pages (two worksheets). An example of a COA statement and sketch is provided in appendix 6 to your lesson guide. A detailed discussion is in chapter 3. ST 101-5.

COA 1

Statement

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
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_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

When you are ready, go to the next pages and sketch out your two COAs. Then continue in the misson guide.

COA 1


PL LIGHT
PL URANIUM
PL BLAST
PL ORBIT
PL BLAST
AA EINSTEIN
52 MECH
X
X
25 AD
PL ORBIT
PL GAMMA RAY
PL GAMMA RAY
PL XENON (LC)
PL MASS (LD)
PL XENON (LC)
25 AD
X
X
4 PzG
PL URANIUM
PL MASS (LD)
PL LIGHT
25 AD
XX
10 (US)
25 AD
FRANKFURT

COA 2


PL LIGHT
PL URANIUM
PL BLAST
PL ORBIT
AA EINSTEIN
PL BLAST
52 MECH
X X
25 AD
PL ORBIT
PL GAMMA RAY
PL GAMMA RAY
PL XENON (LC)
PL MASS (LD)
PL XENON (LC)
25 AD
X
X
4 PzG
PL URANIUM
PL MASS (LD)
PL LIGHT
25 AD
XX
10 (US)
25 AD
DIAGRAM NOT DRAWN TO SCALE
FRANKFURT

Statement

Welcome back! Were you able to develop two signficantly different COAs? Check these basic points before proceeding (Remember these? They arc important.):

- Do your COAs comply with the CG's planning guidance (that is. EAs at locations specified. and proper scheme of maneuver)?
- Do your COAs adequately communicate the scheme of maneuver?
- Specific ground maneuver units identifie? (no 1st, 2d, or 3d brigade . ...)
- Minimum necessary control measures and valid graphics?
- Do the COAs include the following elements?:

  -Type of action (What)
  -Time (On order)
  -Location of the action (Where)
  -Use of available means (How)
  -Purpose of the action (Why)

- Does your COA address the battlefield framework (deep, close, rear, reserve and security)?
- Does your COA account for all enemy and friendly forces'?

- Is your COA feasible, acceptable, suitable, and complete (ST 101-5)?

If you didn't completely write COA statements, at least take a moment now to think through the items listed above.

You will refine further details in the developed COAs during wargaming. Move on now to the analysis portion of the DDMP. Turn to figure 4-23 in appendix 9. It shows that you have reached the analysis and comparison step of the deliberate decisionmaking methodology. Figures 4-25 to 4-29 concisely describe the steps of analysis and comparison as described in ST 101-5 Pay close attention to figure 4-26; it provides good guidance for your analysis of each of the two COAs. Each COA will be wargamed from start to finish. Do most of your analysis against the enemy situation template you consider most likely, but also do a quick analysis against a second enemy COA.



COA ANALYSIS

Course of action analysis consists ot three main parts: wargaming, operational analysis, and risk assessment. it is followed by a comparison between (among if more than two) the COAs to see which is better (best). An often overlooked product from war gaming is the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). These are bits of information the commander needs to execute his plan and accomplish his mission. Identifying CCIR allows planners to focus intelligence collectors and to ensure plans do not depend on information that will not be known

Here is some guidance for your analysis of the two COAs. This will primarily be a mental process for you as you think through each of your COAs from start to finish. Follow the movement of units over the terrain on your 1: 100,000 map sheets. This will be critical to refining your COAs and planning the best locations for your EAs and other control measures. Use a blank sheet of paper and any recording technique to record the results of your analysis. Appendix 7 in your lesson guide contains some other examples of wargaming recording techniques and products.

Begin your analysis for your first COA against the enemy situation template you considcr most likely

Requirement: Turn to the Intelligence estimate in appendix 3 to this lesson guide. Take a few minutes to scan it, particularly the 2 GTA Order of Battle. Then continue here.

Are you finished? Keep things simple. How many options can you think of for how the four regiment Krasnovian divisions both in the north and the south could commit into our zone of action? These were the two trailing divisions of the attacking2 GTA until X (U.S.) Corps deep operations. the 209th ACR, and 4th CMBG wiped out the two lead divisions.

Take a few moments and return to part II of appendix 3 in your lesson guide (Krasnovian doctrine). Reread the discussion about how a division would dispose its regiments for a movement to contact or when attacking an unprepared enemy. It might be "2 up and 2 back," or "3 up and I back." Look at the terrain on the map. is there room for "3 up"? Think about how the Krasnovian division commander would read the situation. This is part of your analysis. Make your "best guess." It is likely that each of the divisions might be arrayed in a "2 x 2" regimental configuration.

What would be more dangerous for the 25th Armd Div? Think about this for a minute. On reflection, you should agree that an array with three regiments in a first echelon and only one in a second echclon would pose more problems for the 25th Armd Div.

Why? This would leave a total of six regiments for 25th Armnd Div to attack sequentially and only. two regiments for 4th PzGren Div to contend with. Other variants exist, but they would be less probable. Enough of this for now. **Make your own judgment regarding how you situationally template the two attacking enemy division-and proceed with your analysis.**

Use something like yellow "Post-it" stickers or some other means to help you visualize the movement of both friendly and enemy units throughout the operation You may wish to have someone play the role of the Krasnovian commander. Remember that the 25th Armd Div CG will task organize the force before leaving the TAA after he decides on a COA. Use the basic action-reaction-counteraction process. Consider the enemy reaction to your COA throughout this interactive process.

Which wargaming method should you use? There is no absolute right or wrong answer, since analysis depends heavily on experience. Any method that stimulates thought, provides insight, and facilitates the planners' visualization of the operation may be used. Both the avenue-in-depth and the belt method could be used in this operation. You have considerable flexibility at this point. Try different methods. You should be aware of the examples of some of the wargaming products and recording techniques provided in chapter 4, ST 10l-5.

Modify your COAs as you obtain more insight from war gaming. These initial sketches arc not "etched in stone." Remember your CG's guidance not to plan on asking X Corps for additional assets. You should briefly

war game your COAs against a second enemy COA to check flexibility and identify any problems. If you considered having only two enemy regiments to contend with in both the south and north, briefly analyze your COAs also against an enemy situation template in which the Krasnovian divisions attack with three regiments leading (for 25th Armd Div to deal with) and only one trail regiment (which the 4th PzGren Div will handle). Remember that the enemy will not necessarily attack as predicted (therefore multiple options should be anticipated).

When you have wargamed your two COAs, take a break before resuming here.

Now check on some of the details that you should have considered in your analysis.

What is the disposition and orientation of forces at the end of the operation? You should get this answer from where the yellow post-its are found on your map sheets and also from your record of wargaming. You should have been able to derive the internal force composition of each brigade down to battalion level by type, not specific battalions. Remember, a COA accounts for units two levels down. As a division planner, you array battalions. What you should have in front of you nou (in some form) IS a display of SIX tank and four mech maneuver battalions, two attach helicopter battalions, and the division cavalry squadron with a generic command and control arrangement overlaid. What you have, in effect, is each brigade configured as you think the brigade commander would do it to meet the factors of mission, enemy. terrain and weather, troops, and time available (METT-T). You are not stepping on the brigade commander's toes when you do this: you are evaluating the fcasibility of force allocation to make sure that you arc not giving him an impossible mission. If you didn't do this, take a few minutes and complete this now. It fill be difficult to proceed unless you do this.

What is your concept for capturing key bridges in zone intact, and where do you plan to emplace your limited bridging assets?

What is the proposed location and when should you displace the division support area (DSA)?

If you planned EAs, check to see if you placed them where the enemy would be canalized or restricted. The commander gave some examples in his planning guidance.

What is your estimate of the time it will take for 25th Armd Div to complete the destruction of the lead regiments of the southern division? The northern division? There IS no stock answer from the "school house" for this question. Obviously, the answer depends on the scheme of maneuver selected. A single, high-speed thrust would get you to the northern division faster than a broad-front clear-in-zone scheme. Rather than look for a single answer, think of the variables that either speed up or delay mission accomplishment. If you were doing this in an actual situation, you would want to take the time to develop an accurate time estimate because logistical requirements depend on the duration of the operation.

What is your estimate of the percent effectiveness (both friendly and enemy) at the conclusion of the attack? FM 101-10-1. volume 2, provides estimates of equipment usage but the level of detail is beyond the level of this course. If you had a full staff to help with the analysis, you would be able to do it. Given the amount of time you have to work. broadly estimate the results by using the information contained in the tables of chapter 4, ST 101-5.

Now think about these questions that fall into the second major part of course of action anlaysis: the category of operational analysis and risk assessment. This is where you review the course of action to get

the "details"–the times, the quantities, the distances, all of these kinds of answers. Risk assessment is a fairly recent addition to analysis: it is an effort to reduce fratricide and unnecessary loss of personnel and equipment. Paragraph 4-7 of ST 10l-5 provides information for analyzing whether a risk is acceptable and who makes the decision.

What advantages and disadvantages are apparent in each of your COAs? Write them on your COA sketch worksheets. This is the third part of course of action analysis: comparison. The amount of detail you can provide on the items above is a measure of how well you understand the tactical problem. You have been successful if you were able to get a good visualization of the operation from start to finish, examine the operation in a logical action– reaction–counteraction sequence, and obtain some insights that would otherwise not have been possible. Up to this point, you should not have compared one course of action to another.

COA COMPARISON

This is the point in the process where the staff compares the COAs still under consideration and determines the COA to recommend to the CG. The G4 planners have done a supportability analysis of the COAs. The G3 would identify other comparison factors (key criteria from the CG's guidance and other criteria). Remember the CG's earlier planning guidance–don't forget the basics of simplicity. and flexibility. Hopefully the COA you recommended has these key components! Figure 4-29 of appendix 9 describes the procedure. Paragraph 4b, ST 10l-5 contains more details.

CRITERIA	**COA 1**	**COA 2**
ADVANTAGES		
DISADVANTAGES		

S320C-4

Requirement: Use the table above and develop your criteria for comparing your COAs. Construct your own decision table. Some examples of decision tables are provided in appendix 8 to your lesson guide. Then use the decision table or COA comparison format you prefer to objectively compare the COAs you developed. As you may recall from S310B, you can use pluses and minuses to assess each factor. This should take you about an hour.

Once you have done this, take another break and let the ratings settle for a while. Come back after you have rested.

You have been going through a series of steps that are collectively called the staff estimate. The commander goes through a parallel sequence, called the commander's estimate process. The commander's decision marks the transition from the end of the planning process to the beginning of the directing process. Focus on the decision first. Refer to figure 4-31 from appendix 9.



Done? Now you're really going to earn your pay! Play the role of 25th Armd Div CG and make your decision (hint-it will probably be the COA that rated better in the key areas).

Now spend a few minutes thinking about the 25th Armd Div commander's intent and concept of operation.

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After the CG decided on a COA, he would clearly communicate his intent for the operation. He would elaborate on the purpose; desired end state in terms of friendly forces, enemy forces, and terrain; and generally how the force as a whole will achieve this. He would personally explain to his subordinate commanders what results arc expectcd (destroy lead regiments of both attacking divisions in our zone and be positioned to subsequently attack north); clarify, the purpose (why) of the operation (to complete the destruction of the 2 GTA, thereby defeating the 2 Krasnnovian Front); and generally how he visualizes achieving the end state. He would also frame his intent within the contest of the 10th Corps commandor's intent. Figure 4-1-31 and 4-32 in appendix 9 outline the possible commander's amplifcation to his COA selction.

Think about the COA you selected. How would you articulate your intent as the CG, 25th Armd Div? You would probably include some of the following thoughts:

- The attack must stress speed.

- The plan must apply violent combat powcr in Successive decisive blows : against the lead regiments of both the south and north Krasnovian divisions.

- The plan must be flexible to work against multiple enemy options. particularly the most dangerous branch that has us handling three lead regiments in each division.

- Success in the end state is measured by having destroyd the enemy in our zone, thereby completing the destruction of the 2 GTA.

Now do another commander action and decide who will be the main attack, supporting attack, and reserve (designate these as 1st Bde, 2d Bde, 3d Bde as appropriate) After the commander outlines his intent for the operation, *he determines the specific subordinate units to accomplish each part of the operation* (main effort, reserve. and so on). The staff needs these decisions to complete the OPLAN. The CG would claborate on his concept regarding-

- Task organization.
- Control measures.
- Employnent of major maneuvcr elements.
- Command and control arrangements.
- Scheme of tire support.
- Contigency plans (at this point, the only sequel after the attack is to be prepared to attack to the north).

Requirement: Turn to appendix 10 to your lesson guide and complete the section ot paragraph 3 labeled "INTENT" **in the 25th Armd Div OPLAN Worksheet. If you can, also complete the maneuver subparagraph, 3a(1). Then take a break and return here.**

You're almost finished. but the job isn't done till the paperwork is complete. If you do a great job of planning, you must also do a great job of paperwork if you are to succcssfully get the word out. Actually, high technology IS making available a few other ways to get the word out. tactical facsimile machines, satellite confcrences, and so forth. But that is subject matter for a different class. The overall name for this stage is directing. **Turn to figure 4-33 in appendix 9 for a quick update of where you are in the overall process.**

At the risk of being too basic, planning consists primarily of figuring out what you want the subordinate units to do. Directing is all the work and effort that goes into telling them what to do, and controlling is what the command does to ensure subordinate units are doing what the direction told them to do. A simple explanation, but it gets the main point across.



CONCEPT OF SUPPORT

Before you proceed with the OPLAN, take a few moments to focus on subparagraph a (concept of support) to paragraph 4, Service Support. Time to put yourself in the role of a G4 planner. **Your next requirement is to write the concept ot support for your OPLAN based on the COA you selected.** This will become paragraph 4a of the division OPLAN. **Take a closer look at developing a concept of support and writing the** logistics **portion of an OPORD or OPLAN.**

What's the difference between the complete plan of support and paragraph 4a of the OPORD or OPLAN? There is a difference. The complete plan of how the operation will be supported is like an iceberg. Paragraph 4a (the concept of support) can be compared to just the part that shows above the waterline. The complete details aren't all written in paragraph 4a. Here are a couple of other points.

The complete plan consists of the various support plans for each tactical function and the applicable orders or annexes. The annexes may include SOP information and all other related information. It is the flow of logistical actions and responsibilities that the logistics planner visualizes as he or she war games the COA and integrates logistics units and support operations with the operational missions and tactical maneuver of the combat force (the concept of the operation).

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On the other hand, paragraph 4a (concept of support) is a written summary of logistical support before, during. and after operations. It is a concise visualization of how the maneuver units will be supported on the battlefield. It is written primarily for the non-CSS commanders and staff. It does not include the technical and/or numerical information and detailed instructions to CSS units. This is usually included in the service support annex. Neither does it include routine, doctrinal, or constant information that can be found in the SOP.

You might even think of paragraph 4a as a model concept of support since the definition of a model is a "small representation of the real thing." Paragraph 4a is similar to the frosting on the cake. Selecting the ingrcdients, mixing the proper proportions, then baking and serving the cake is the real work-the concept of support.

Paragraph 4a should be concise, yet comprehensive, so how do we determine what should be included? A good start point is to consider all six functions in the context of actions accomplished before, during, and aftcr the operation-then include only those that arc critical, non-SOP. or unusual. They should include the commander's priorities support for before, during, and after the operation. Priorities should include personnel replacements, maintenance repair and evacuation (by unit or by system), fuel and ammunition, road network use by unit or commodity, and any resource subject to competing demands or constraints. operation is phased (and yours shouldn't be---given the CG's guidance) the "during" portion of the concept should also be phased.

When allocating priority of maintenance support, what should get first priority, tanks or attack helicopters? This question is designed to bring out a point. Some say that it depends on the mission or the current maintenance status or Some other discriminator. The point to be made here is that the two arc not in competition for maintenance support. Each is supported by a different and distinct type of maintenance unit so one would never need priority over the other. Priorities arc established to let everyone know who gets what first. If there is no anticipated conflict or competition, you don't need to assign prioritics.

What are the sources of information for developing a concept of support? Information is found in many locations: for example, in higher commanders plans or parts of ST I01-5 or ST 101-6. Another source is the completed logistic estimate including the results of wargaming.

During mission analysis, the CSS planner determines the unit's current material and personnel posture before the operation begins. This, with the commander's priorities, determines which units and items of equipment should receive priority before the operation.

War-gaming information sources should include-

- Commnander's intent.
- Concept of the operation.
- Higher headquarters concept of support. service support annex, service support order or plan (if applicable), and service support overlay.

The S4/G4 responsible for developing the concept of support must also coordinate with the S 1/G1, S5,/G5, support command organization. and other special staff officers to determine their significant information (if any) that should be included in the concept of support.

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Open ST 101-5 to Appendix C to find information about the service support overlay. This information and the format for paragraph 4a found in appendix C, ST 10l-5, will provide the guidance you need to fill out paragraph 4 in your OPLAN worksheet.

After you have written the concept of support paragraph, what questions should you ask yourself to ensure it is sound?

- Is it easily understood, comprehensive, and concise'?

- Does it provide a word picture of the overall concept of support so the non-CSS commanders and their primary staffs can easily visualize how they will be supported without having to wade through a lot of technical details?

- Is it synchronized with and does it support the concept of operations?

- Does it consider and address as required all six tactical logistics functions in the contest of before, during. and after the operation (or by phase for phased operations)?

- Does it establish priorities of support for before, during, and after the operation. and do these priorities correlate with the priorities established in the commander's intent. paragraph 3, and other directives from higher headquarters?

- Does it address all critical, non-SOP, or unusual aspects of support?

As you can see, there is a lot of information on the concept of support provided in ST 101-5. Keep It handy and refer to it often. It will make your job a little easiler.

FINALIZE YOUR 25TH ARMD DlV OPLAN

There were several good reasons for advising you to draft the required portions of the 25th Armd Div OPLAN as you proceeded through the steps of this tactical problem. One reason is to gain experience in understanding all the interacting pieces that contribute to the plan and when this information can be determined in the TDM process. A second reason is that the task is much more manageable in little pieces-like eating an elephant one bite at a time. If you have been conscientious in completing the series of practical exercises to this point, you should have gained considerable insight into the S320A scenario that continues through the exam.

Requirement: Continue with your partially completed OPLAN where you left off. When it is complete, return to the lesson guide. Focus on the following key areas as you develop the remaining few parts of the 25th Armd Div OPLAN:

- Did you consider using the western portion of the 25th Armd Div zone in your CSS planning (for DSA or for LOCs) because of the risk in the east'?

- Did the plan comply with the CG's guidance and intent?

- Did you correctly plan the division attack in a single phase?

- Does the end state faciliate subsequent offensive operations (or will subordinate units be strung out all over the place)?

- Is the plan simple? flexible? audacious?

- Did you use correct operational terms and graphics?

- Does your task organization of the 25th Armd Div subordinate units make sense, and were the **proper** command and support relationships used? Pay particular attention thinking about this area. Did you weight the main effort? Giving one third of an asset to each brigade is seldom the best approach. Artillery, should not be kept in reserve. If a brigade is the division reserve, its habitually associated DS artillery battalion should be reinforcing someone else-perhaps the main effort!

Carefully review the protocol in FM 101-5 (FD) before completing your task organization (annex A in your OPLAN Worksheet). Then draw your operation overlay (annex C) directly onto your paper copy of overlay 4-2 to your set of maps. Take care to label the subordinate units you depict, and show the main effort. Take time to think about where you put your brigade boundaries. Why did you draw them where you did? Will they be discernible? Do they split an avenue? Think about where you would place the division TAC, main. and rear CPs during and after the attack (you may want to show initial locations solid. and proposed locations using dotted lines). You may also use the operation overby worksheet in your OPLAN worksheet.

Are you done? Now wrap things up. Take a few minutes to reflect on how you did in tactical problem. In what areas should you have spent more time? What degree of confidence do you have in your plan? How important would the X Corps deep operations and monitoring of the named areas of interest (NAIs) to the east be to the success of the 25th Armd Div plan?

During this lesson, you have used the deliberate decisionmaking process to solve a fairly complex division tactical problem. Your active involvement and thinking was key to learning. Through completing the series of command and staff actions In this lesson, you have gained additional staff experience. honed your written communications skills. and learned some new tactical concepts. You should have a high level of confidence in your ability to determine a mission, estimate the situation. recommend a solution, and prepare a division operation plan or order. In the next lesson, you will continue with this same scenario and some new information. Take a well-deserved break and come back for some “late breaking news.”

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Division Offensive Planning

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. 10th (US) Corps OPLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG)

This appendix provides the 10th Corps commander's guidance and tasks to subordinate commands.

In the scenario for S320A you will work with the three plans shown in bold print below. The AFCENT Contingency Operation Plan (COP) CHESHIRE CAT was not provided for this subcourse. LANDCENT COP 31201 (CRASHING FIST) was presented in lesson 2, and, as you recall from lesson 2, II Allied Army Group (II AAG) did not develop a separate plan

10th (US) Corps OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG provides the overall plan that guides the 25th Armored Division plan.

AFCENT– (COP CHESHIRE CAT)

LANDCENT– COP CRASHING FIST)

II Allied Army Group (AAG)

10th (US) Corps - (OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG)

25th Armored Division – (OPLAN "Your Plan")

10th (US) Corps OPLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG) IS presented on following pages. To aid you in focusing on essential information in the plan (and to save you time), the portions of the OPLAN marked **in bold type identify key information.** A series of asterisks (** *) indicates that material has been intentionally omitted.

OPLAN 6099-10th (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

copy_ of_ c o p i e s
10th (US) Corps
GERSFELD (NA6589), GE
150001A Jul 199-
AZ 14

OPERATION PLAN 6099 (DEPUTY DAWG)

References: Sketch Maps for Phases I, II, and III (see Annex C)

Time zone used throughout the Plan. ALPHA

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) (Omitted)

10th (US) Corps is opposed by the 2 GTA, which is expected to make the main attack for the 2 Krasnovian Front. The 2 GTA is expected to move quickly into eastern GERMANY with immediate missions west of the ELBE River and subsequent missions west of the THURINGER WALD toward KASSEL, FULDA, and COBERG. The 2 GTA will most probably attack with two MRDs in the first echelon, two tank divisions in the second echelon, and the IMRR in reserve.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) LANDCENT Commander's Intent: The purpose of this operation is to defeat the Krasnovian TVD. I intend to destroy the 1 Krasnovian Front which is making the TVD main attack, while defeating the 2 Krasnovian Front, which is making the TVD supporting attack. To accomplish this, LANDCENT will defend well forward in sector, significantly reducing the combat capabilities of the first operational echelon. Forward units will identify and contain the enemy main effort. When sufficient operational reserves are built up, we will counterattack to destroy the enemy's second operational echelon army. I will accept risk along our southern flank and by maintaining a small reserve. Upon conclusion of this operation, we must have secured the LANDCENT sector, the enemy must be incapable of regimental or higher operations, the borders with POLAND and the CZECH republic must be restored, we must have prepared a coherent defense, and our forces must be disposed for future defense in support of AFCENT plans.

(2) 1st (NL) Corps defends in sector along a line from MURITZEE to BRANDENBURG to WITTENBERG.

(3) II (GE) Corps defends in sector along the GERMAN-CZECH border from TR970660 to UQ690430 to defeat the 16 TA

(4) Military District Command VIII (8th Pz Gren DIV) defends and delays in sector along the GERMAN-POLISH border forward of 1st (NL) Corps.

(5) Military District Command VII (7th Pz Gren Div) defends and delays in sector along the GERMAN-POLISH border forward of 10th (US) Corps

(6) LANDCENT reserve is 1st (BE) Corps

(7) Elements of AIRCENT support 10th (US) Corps. AIRCENT provides continuous J-STARS support

(8) German Korps South provides assistance for rear area operations and/or host nation support

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization)

d. Assumptions

(1) Only Krasnovian forces will initiate a ground invasion of NATO territory

(2) Krasnovian forces may use chemical weapons but are expected to use tactical nuclear weapons only in retaliation.

(3) The NATO indications and warning system will provide a minimum of 180 days warning of Krasnovian preparations for attack and 72 hours warning of attack into NATO territory.

(4) Deployment prior to D-Day cannot be east of the former national boundary (PL QUASAR) or into CZECH Republic. After D-Day maneuver forces cannot cross the GERMAN-POLISH border

(5) German Korps East will be mobilized and defending in position along the POLISH border on D-Day

(6) Local air superiority be achieved on or about D+3

2. MISSION

On order, 10th (US) Corps defends in sector to destroy the 2 GTA to cause the defeat of the 2 Krasnovian Front.

3. EXECUTION

INTENT. Our purpose is to defeat the 2 Krasnovian Front by destroying the 2 GTA as it attacks into our sector. This will allow LANDCENT to restore the borders and prepare to conduct offensive operations in support of the AFCENT campaign plan. I intend to destroy the 2 GTA by using a mobile defense. We'll establish conditions for the decisive operation by using a firepower-oriented force positioned well forward. Then, using the majority of the corps' maneuver

forces positioned farther back, we'll attack to destroy remaining forces in the corps AO. Our success will be measured by having destroyed the 2 GTA, being positioned to attack north, and establishing the conditions to allow German Korps East to attack to restore the GERMAN-POLISH border.

a. Concept of Operation. Annex C (Operation Overlay) (See sketches for Phases I - Ill).

(1) Maneuver. This is a three-phased operation. During Phase I, the corps will move to initial defensive positions while 7th Pz Gren Div delays the 2 GTA forward of PL X-RAY. After assuming the sector from 7th Pz Gren Div, the corps will conduct deep operations with 10th Avn Bde; 68th and 67th FA Bdes; and BAI, CAS, and IEW. They will destroy the two first-echelon divisions of the 2 GTA forward of PL NEUTRON. 4th CMBG and 209th ACR establish a cover along PL NEUTRON. During Phase II, 209th ACR (main effort) will delay the northern threat second-echelon division, and the 4th CMBG will screen the southern threat second-echelon division. This will allow the corps to shape the movement of the second-echelon divisions so that the southern division will be forward (west) of the northern division as Phase Ill starts. During Phase Ill, 52d Mech Div will defend in sector while corps deep fires and Army aviation continue to shape the enemy. The 25th Armd Div, as the main effort, and 4th Pz Gren Div, attack into the flanks of the remaining Krasnovian divisions within their zones. This will complete the destruction of the 2 GTA. The corps will then reconstitute in AAs along its north boundary in preparation for future operations to the north. No reserve is planned in Phases I and II. 4th CMBG becomes 10th (US) Corps reserve in Phase Ill.

(a) Phase I. On order, elements of 10th (US) Corps move from TAAs into defensive positions. 7th Pz Gren Div, German Korps East, already forward in the corps sector, delays the 2 GTA forward of PL X-RAY until H+24. This will allow time for the 10th (US) Corps deep operations assets to occupy positions behind PL NEUTRON. 10th (US) Corps will accept responsibility for the sector from 7th Pz Gren Div at H+24. 7th Pz Gren Div will then conduct passage through 4th CMBG and 209th ACR and occupy AA SOLAR. 4th CMBG and 209th ACR cover along PL NEUTRON to destroy all reconnaissance and forward detachments to protect forces in AOs CHARM and STRANGE and deny the threat intelligence regarding our plans and dispositions. 67th FA Bde occupies AO CHARM. 68th FA Bde occupies AO STRANGE. 10th Avn Bde occupies AA ONE in AO STRANGE and AA TWO in AO CHARM. Corps aviation, artillery, CAS, BAI, and IEW, as the corps main effort, will conduct operations to destroy the southern lead division of the army prior to its arrival at PL NEUTRON while delaying the northern division. After corps destroys the southern division, it will destroy the northern division Both divisions will be destroyed east of PL NEUTRON. 52d Mech Div establishes an area defense in its sector. 25th Armd DIV and 4th Pz Gren Div occupy TAAs and prepare for offensive operations. 52d Mech Div provides one ground brigade (two battalion TFs) as the TCF. Priority of TCF commitment is to protect forces sustaining the deep operations along PL NEUTRON. The corps will accept risk on its north and south flanks. Flank security will be provided by corps and EAC IEW between PL QUASAR and PL NEUTRON. There is no corps reserve

(b) Phase II. This phase begins when the 4th CMBG and 209th ACR start to withdraw from PL NEUTRON. 209th ACR delays the northern threat division in sector as the main effort, allows no penetration of PL PROTON until H+120 or OO, and then defends along PL BLAST to force the threat

northern division to move south. 4th CMBG screens the southern threat division in sector and OO withdraws screen to TAA ELECTRON west of PL QUASAR. 52d Mech Div continues to prepare defenses in sector as in Phase I. 25th Armd Div and 4th Pz Gren Div remain in TAAs and prepare for offensive operations. 52d Mech Div continues to provide one ground brigade (two battalion TFs) to the rear area operations center (RAOC) as the TCF. TCF priority of commitment is to protect withdrawing forces in support of the deep operations. 4th CMBG assumes corps reserve after reconstitution in TAA SOLAR. The corps will accept risk on its flanks as in Phase I.

(c) Phase III. This phase will begin when the lead regiments of the southern threat division have crossed PL BARIUM or OO. The 25th Armd Div and 4th Pz Gren Div will then move to and attack in zone. 25th Armd Div, as the corps main effort, destroys first-echelon regiments of the second-echelon divisions. 4th Pz Gren Div, supporting attack, will destroy second-echelon regiments of the second-echelon divisions. 52d Mech Div, supporting effort, continues to defend in sector to blunt any penetrations. 10th Avn Bde will fix the northern threat division north of PL GAMMA RAY and the southern threat division south of PL GAMMA RAY to allow the 25th Armd Div and the 4th Pz Gren Div to destroy the southern division and then the northern division sequentially. OO, 10th Avn Bde will assist destruction of remaining 2 GTA forces north of PL GAMMA RAY. No change in corps TCF. TCF priority for commitment is to protect forces sustaining the main and supporting attack and then to forces being reconstituted. 4th CMBG continues as corps reserve with priority of counterattack planning to 52d Mech Div. At the completion of the destruction of the 2 GTA, 52d Mech Div, 25th Armd Div, 4th Pz Gren Div, 209th ACR, and 4th CMBG occupy AAs HAWKINGS, EINSTEIN, FERMI, CURIE, and GRAVES respectively. OO, 52d Mech Div, 25th Armd Div, and 4th Pz Gren Div establish screens along boundary between 10th (US) Corps and 1st (NL) Corps. Phase Ill ends when the corps completes the destruction of the 2 GTA, has secured its north boundary and east flank, and is in assembly areas ready for reconstitution.

(2) Fires. Annex E (Fire Support). Corps fire support (in conjunction with BAI, IEW, and attack helicopters) will disrupt the 2 GTA attack, delay arrival of follow-on echelons in support of the scheme of maneuver, and shape the 2 GTA's advance to established engagement areas. Lethal and nonlethal fires will disrupt or destroy high-payoff targets (HPTs) during each phase of the operation, thus defeating the army in detail. Targets will be attacked IAW the attack guidance matrices developed for each phase of the operation and each preplanned aviation brigade mission.

(a) Phase I. From H to H+20, the corps will position two GS artillery brigades forward and will use the aviation brigade to support deep operations NLT H+24. During this time, corps WiII delay and disrupt the first-echelon divisions and supporting army CS and CSS with limited BAI, EAC assets, and IEW east to the RIPL, and SOF special reconnaissance and direct action missions east of the border (see PIR for Phase I). After 10th (US) Corps assumes responsibility for the sector, corps army aviation, artillery IEW, and BAI will be the corps main effort and will destroy the southern lead division of the army forward of PL NEUTRON while continuing to delay and disrupt the northern lead division. The main effort will shift to the destruction of the northern division after the southern division is destroyed.

(b) Phase II. Priority of fires IS to 209th ACR to delay and disrupt the follow-on divisions in the north to prevent penetration of PL PROTON until H+120 or OO. Corps deep fires will also limit the southern second-echelon division to continuing west along avenue of approach E. Priority of fires will then shift to 4th Pz Gren Div to prevent the southern division from attacking south along avenue of approach G. The intent of the corps fires during this phase is to delay the second-echelon divisions by limiting the 2 GTA's advance to facilitate our two-division attack into his flank during Phase III. Corps deep fires Will focus on the disruption of the army's fire support army-level surveillance, ADA fire control radars, and CSS.

(c) Phase III. Priority of fires to 25th Armd Div and 4th Pz Gren Div, in order. On destruction of the follow-on divisions, priority shifts to 4th CMBG and 4th Pz Gren Div to block any remaining 2 GTA Forces west of PL ROD. Corps fires will then focus on destroying any army reserve and reducing any encircled enemy forces. At the end of Phase III, the corps artillery must be in a position to support a corps counterattack to the north

(3) Counterair operations. Annex F (Air Defense). The concept for counterair operations will be to initially weight the protection of deep operations forces and their sustainment operations during Phase I During Phases II and Ill, the priority is to protect the 25th Armd Div and 4th Pz Gren Div and their sustainment operations. Throughout all phases, critical CSS assets and operations must be protected During Phases II and III, 209th ACR will require additional protection as well. To meet these competing priorities, we will accept risk to the bulk of the corps combat and CSS assets by providing area coverage using Hawk and Patriot assets. Positioning of counterair assets will be to deep operations elements and critical CSS assets and operations during Phase I: 67th and 68th FA Bdes, 209th ACR, and critical CSS assets and operations, in order, during Phase II; and 25th Armd Div, 4th Pz Gren Div, 68th FA Bde, 209th ACR, and critical CSS assets and operations, in order, during Phase III. Incidental coverage to 7th Pz Gren DIV during Phases I and II as HIMAD assets allow.

(4) Intelligence. Annex B (Intelligence). Priority of tasks throughout each phase is to nuclear and/or chemical indicators and warnings, identification of threat main effort, response to corps deception plan, deep operations targeting, commitment of front AASLT Bde and 2 GTA AASLT Bn, and identification of rear area threats in order. During Phase I, intelligence must identify the main effort, determine if 2 GTA attacks with two or three divisions in the first echelon, and conduct battle damage assessment of Phase l operations. Monitoring corps NAls forward of PL NEUTRON is essential. During Phase II, intelligence must continue to identify 2 GTA main effort, maintain the locations of first- and second-echelon regiments the IMRR, and the army reserve. During Phase III, intelligence monitors the location of the threat regiments, detects follow-on forces moving toward the corps zone, and supports IPB for future operations.

(5) Electronic warfare. Corps EW will augment implementation of the corps deception plan through all phases of the operation. During Phase I, EW assets will assist in the delay of the northern and destruction of the southern threat divisions. Targeting priorities are to disrupt ADA and artillery C2 and RSTA HPTs in order. Phase II operations will assist the 209th ACR delay of the northern division Targeting priorities are to disrupt division and army ADA and artillery C2 HPTs, and artillery HPTs, in order. Phase III priority is to support the attack of the 25th Armd Div and 4th Pz Gren Div. Targeting priorities to disrupt division and army ADA and artillery C2 HPTs, and artillery HPTs. in order

(6) Engineer. Annex G (Engineer). Phase I priority is initially to mobility, movement of deep operations forces, and CSS forward of PLs LIGHT and XENON, then to countermobillty and constructron of obstacles to support the disengagement of 7th Pz Gren Div. Phase II priority is to countermobility to delay the advance of the northern division and then to mobility to support the operations of 209th ACR and the 4th CMBG. Phase lll priority is to mobility to support the attacks of the 25th Armd Div and the 4th Pz Gren Div. OO, priority shifts to mobility in support of 4th CMBG; OO to re-establishment of road, rail, and air LOCs to division assembly areas, OO to countermobility to protect the corps during reconstitution efforts.

(7) Deception. Annex l (Deception). The target of the corps deception plan is the 2 GTA commander. The objective of our deception is to get the 2 GTA to attack in two echelons with two divisions in its first echelon and to attack directly to the west instead of the south or northwest. The corps deception story is that 10th (US) Corps defends forward of the former IGB with its main effort in the south and with a heavy covering force located well forward.

b. Tasks to Maneuver Units.

(1) 52d Mech Div.

(a) Phases I, II and III.

1. Defend in sector to block, threat second-echelon divisions from advancing beyond PL LIGHT to prevent the threat from escaping the corps attack in Phase III.

2. Provide a brigade (two battalion TFs) to form the corps TCF.

3. Construct obstacles in barrier zones D26, D25 D27. F02, F03, F05, F04 and F06 in order.

(b) Phase III.

1. OO, occupy AA HAWKINGS to prepare for an attack north.

2. Screen the corps northern flank between PL QUASAR and PL LIGHT while occupying A4 HAWKINGS.

3. Be prepared to attack in 25th Armd Div and 4th Pz Gren Div zones to clear threat forces from the corps sector.

4. Be prepared to become the corps reserve after commitment of 4th CMBG if threat situation dictates a reserve requirement.

(2) 25th Armd Div.

(a) Phases I and II

1. Occupy AA and prepare for offensive operations.

2. Construct obstacles in barrier zones D24 and C08.

(b) Phase III.

1. OO, attack in zone to destroy threat forces to cause the destruction of 2 GTA.

2. OO, occupy AA EINSTEIN and prepare to attack north.

3. Be prepared to attack into 4th Pz Gren Div zone.

(3) 4th Pz Gren Division

(a) Phases I and II.

1. Occupy AA and prepare for offensive operations

2. Construct obstacles in barrier zone D23.

(b) Phase III

1. OO, attack in zone to destroy threat forces in zone to cause the destruction of 2 GTA.

2. OO occupy AA FERMI and prepare to attack north.

3. Be prepared to attack unto the 25th Armd Div zone.

4. Be prepared to attack east to occupy defensive positions along PL ARGON or as a supporting attack for 7th Pz Gren DIV Phase III attack

(4) 4th CMBG

(a) Phase I.

1. Cover along PL NEUTRON to prevent threat forward detachments, advance guards, or recon forces from penetrating PL NEUTRON to protect forces in AO CHARM

2. Assist the passage of the 7th Pz Gren DIV.

3. Construct obstacles in barrier zones B02, B01, B/A05 (with support from 7th Pz Gren Div), C06 and C05 in order.

(b) Phase II

1. Screen in zone forward of PL PROTON to obtain intelligence on southern threat division and destroy reconnaissance forces.

2. OO, withdraw screen, occupy AA ELECTRON, reconstitute, and assume corps reserve mission.

(c) Phase III

1. Priority of counterattack planning is to 52d Mech Div.

2. OO, move to and occupy AA GRAVES

3. OO, screen along PL ROD from PL ORBIT to PL BLAST.

(5) 10th Avn Bde.

(a) Phase l.

1. Occupy AA ONE in AO STRANGE and AA TWO in AO CHARM.

2. Be prepared to assist 7th Pz Gren Div withdrawal along PL X-RAY.

3. OO, attack in corps designated TAls to destroy the first-echelon divisions of the 2 GTA to establish the conditions for the corps attack in Phase III.

4. OO, or when 209th ACR and 4th CMBG begin to delay and displace from PL NEUTRON, occupy assembly areas THREE and FOUR.

(b) Phase II.

1. OO, conduct operations forward of 209th ACR. Priority for operations planning is delaying the northern threat division, locating and destroying the IMRR and 2 GTA reserve, then supporting the blocking of the threat along PL BLAST, in order.

2. Assist 4th CMBG in withdrawal of screen; then maintain contact with the southern second-echelon division. Protect 25th Armd Div and 4th Pz Gren Div by destroying enemy ground recon elements south of PL GAMMA RAY.

(c) Phase III

1. OO, attack to fix the lead regiments of either second-echelon divisions until the 25th Armd Div and 4th Pz Gren Div can close with and destroy them while simultaneously locating and destroying the 2 GTA reserves.

2. Be prepared to support screens along the corps northern boundary

(6) 209th ACR

(a) Phase l.

1. Cover along PL NEUTRON to prevent threat forward detachments and recon forces from penetrating PL NEUTRON to protect forces in AO STRANGE.

2. Assist the passage of 7th Pz Gren Div.

3. Construct obstacles in barrier zones B03, B04, C02, B06 in order.

(b) Phase II.

1. Delay the northern threat division forward of PL PROTON until H+120 or on order.

2. Construct obstacles in barrier zones C07, C11, C01 and C09 in order.

3. OO, defend along PL BLAST to limit the threat to avenue of approach E.

(c) Phase III

1. Defend along PL BLAST to limit northern threat division to avenue of approach E to position threat forces for attack by 25th Armd Div and 4th Pz Gren Div.

2. OO, occupy AA CURIE, reconstitute, and prepare to continue the attack north.

C Tasks to Combat Support Units.

(1) Fire support.

(a) Air support.

1. BAI and TAR. Corps WiII retain control of all BAI and TAR allocations. Corps anticipates 25 BAI and 10 TAR sorties dally from D-day through D+3, 40 BAI and 10 TAR sorties dally from D+4 through D+6. BAI missions allocated after D+3 will be used to Isolate the 2 GTA from other front assets and supplies.

2. CAS (allocations for planning purposes)

OPLAN 6099-10th (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

	D-day	D+1	D+2	D+3	D+4	D+5	D+6
52d Mech Div	0	0	0	0	0	0	30
4th Pz Gren Div	0	0	0	0	40	60	20
25th Armd Div	0	0	0	0	90	100	30
4th CMBG	0	10	30	30	0	0	0
10th Avn Bde	0	50	50	70	20	0	0
209th ACR	0	10	30	70	30	0	0
Corps control	0	30	40	3 0	2 0	4 0	40
TOTAL	0	100	150	200	200	200	120

(b) Chemical * * *

(c) FA Support.

1. General.

(a) 67th and 68th FA Bde MLRS launchers will be configured for ATACMS and will remain that way for the operation.

(b) Organization for combat. Annex A (Task Organization).

2. Phase I.

(a) 68th and 67th FA Bdes will move to AOs STRANGE and CHARM respectively. Be prepared to conduct operations NLT H+24.

(b) Fires will be planned in corps-designated TAls. The decision to implement these fires will be based on actions at corps NAls and DPs as reflected on corps DST.

(c) 67th and 68th FA Bdes will fire required SEAD for 10th Avn Bde.

(d) 52d Mech DIVARTY will clear all fires south of PL XENON and forward of PL LIGHT with 25th Armd Div.

3. Phase II.

(a) 68th FA Bde will occupy AO SPACE, GS to 10th (US) Corps.

(b) 67th FA Bde GS to 10th (US) Corps positioned within 4th CMBG AO; OO, position south of PL MASS to be coordinated directly with 4th Pz Gren Div and 25th Armd Div.

(G) 52d Mech DIVARTY will clear all fires south of PL XENON and east of PL URANIUM with 25th Armd Div.

4. Phase III. OO, PL GAMMA RAY or PL ORBIT will be an RFL between the 209th ACR in the north and the advancing 25th Armd Div and the 4th Pz Gren Dlv in the south.

(d) Nuclear Fire Support ***

(e) Miscellaneous.

1. Coordinating Instructions ***

2. CSR***

3 Unexpended ordnance WiII be jettisoned into corps free fire areas

(2) Air Defense. ***

(3) 53d Engr Bde. ***

(4) 10th ADA Bde. ***

(5) 40th Cml Bde. ***

(6) 20th Ml Bde. ***

(7) 20th MP Bde. ***

(8) 70th Sig Bde. ***

(9) 200th PYSOP Bn.***

(10) 10th CA Bde. ***

(11) 110th Press Camp HQ. ***

d. Coordinating Instructions

OPLAN 6099-10th (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

(1) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and implementation on order.

(2) CCIR. What are the 2 Krasnovian Front commander's opportunities and capabilities to secure crossings over the ELBE and MULDE Rivers? How can 10th (US) Corps deny him?

(a) PIR.

1. Phase l.

(a) Where are the lead threat divisions and regiments?

(b) How are the threat divisions echeloned?

(c) How is the threat reacting to the corps deception plan?

(d) Is the threat preparing to use chemical or nuclear weapons?

2. Phase II.

(a) Where are the lead threat divisions' reconnaissance battalions or forward detachments?

(b) What is the disposition and strength of the two first-echelon divisions?

(c) What is the location and disposition of the 13 IMRR?

(d) Where are the two independent helicopter regiments, the 37 lndep AASLT Bn, and the heavy lift regiment?

(e) Where are the 2 GTA's two ponton bridge regiments, two assault crossing battalions, and the engineer brigades?

3. Phase III.

(a) Where are the lead and trail regiments of the second-echelon divisions?

(b) Where are the 13 IMRR and the 2 GTA reserve?

(b) EEFI.

1. The attack plans of 25th Armd Div and 4th Pz Gren Div.

2. Composition and disposition of forces in AOs STRANGE and CHARM.

(c) FFIR. Will the maneuver forces of the corps be configured and postured to rapidly transition to offensive operations?

(3) Antiterrorist actions. Barricade all high speed avenues of approach into rear area facilities to reduce entering traffic to a maximum speed of 10 kmph. All entry points will be manned by armed guards.

(4) Air defense weapons status Per TSOP.

(5) MOPP.

(a) Phase l. Level 1: 209th ACR, 4th CMBG, 10th Avn Bde, 68th and 67th FA Bdes. Level 0: Remainder of corps

(b) Phase II/III. Level 1.

(6) Troop Safety

(a) Phase I: negligible risk to unwarned exposed personnel.

(b) Phase II: negligible risk to warned exposed personnel.

(7) When the 25th Armd Div crosses the LD, its north boundary will be extended to PL XENON.

(8) When the 25th Armd Div crosses PL XENON, its north boundary will be extended to PL GAMMA RAY.

(9) When the 25th Armd Div crosses PL GAMMA RAY, its north boundary will be extended to PL ORBIT.

(10) Counterfratricide measures. All leaders will minimize the potential for fratricide by complying with all procedural and positive (p2) controls and countermeasures specified by TSOP.

(11) Priority of road movement Initially to deep operations forces (Phase I), then corps reserve on commitment.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Concept of Support. 10th (US) COSCOM must accept risk with support units to provide continuous support to 10th (US) Corps deep operations. Support operations will require extensive use of rail and highway transportation modes and emergency augmentation by aerial resupply with 10th (US) Corps aviation assets. 10th (US) COSCOM will coordinate use of rail assets with TAMCA and host nation. German Territorial Forces have primary responsibility for support of 7th Pz Gren Div and 4th Pz Div. 10th (US) COSCOM will coordinate integration of host nation support forces into traffic circulation plans and provide fuel, medical, and limited ammunition support on an as required basis. 10th COSCOM

will provide combat service support with the 20th Corps Support Group (REAR), 13th Corps Support Group (FWD), 14th Corps Support Group (FWD), and the 80th Medical Brigade.

(1) Support Before the Operation. On M-day or OO, 10th (US) COSCOM GS units will deploy to wartime locations east of PL QUASAR to distribute supply shortages to deploying corps units. Division, sep bde, ACR units, and DSUs deploy to wartime positions and draw remaining basic load and DS stocks from designated forward storage sites. COSCOM will retain combat vehicles received from theater for reconstitution activities. Initial priority on MSRs is to unit movements to assembly areas east of PL QUASAR, then to movement of supplies and equipment. Priority of COSCOM transportation assets to movement of classes I, III, V, and IV. Initial priority of support is to ACRs, avn bdes, and artillery brigades of the covering force. COSCOM will form 15th CSG (Prov), under command of deputy COSCOM commander, to provide DS to covering force operations east of PL NEUTRON and deep operations conducted by FA and avn bdes. 13th CSG (FWD) priority of support to 25th Armd Div; 14th CSG (FWD) priority to 52d Mech Div, corps TCFs, and 313th Sep Mech Bde in order. 313th Sep Mech Bde supported via supply point distribution while in reserve.

(2) Support During Phase I. 10th (US) COSCOM priority of support during this phase IS to the 15th CSG (Prov) which will deploy with covering force units to support locations VIC MERSEBURG (QB090970). COSCOM will forward supplies to CFA via rail assets of 714th Railway Bn. Priority of shipments is CL V, III, IV, and IX in order. Unit distribution of supplies will be made to RSAs, AAs ONE and TWO, and AO CHARM and AO STRANGE. Initial priority of support to 209th ACR, 68th and 69th FA Bdes, then to 10th Avn Bde in order. CF units WiII limit repairs to 24 hours or request evacuation of reparable equipment to railhead at MERSEBURG. Priority of rail evacuation to attack helicopters, MLRS, howitzers, and tanks in order. Air evacuation of URGENT patients to 85th MASH; all other medevacs WiII be to medical facilities in corps rear. 14th CSG (FWD) WiII provide DS to corps TCF units operating between PL PROTON and PL NEUTRON. The 15th Spt Group (Prov) has backup support responsibility for the 7th Pz Gren Div during passage of lines. ACRs will provide required assistance with maintenance and evacuation and area medical support. Priority of support then shifts to ACRs, FA bdes, and aviation bdes in order.

(3) Support During Phase II. 10th (US) COSCOM initial priority of support during this phase is to 15th Spt Group (Prov) with priority to the 209th ACR, 68th FA Bde, and 10th Avn Bde in the north, At H+55 or OO, 15th CSG (Prov) will echelon support forces to vic NORDHAUSEN (PC240070) to provide priority support to 68th FA Bde and 10th Avn Bde as they move to AO SPACE and FAA 3 respectively. 13th CSG (FWD) will prepare to pick up support of the 209th ACR and 69th FA Bde as they move to positions on 10th (US) Corps southern flank. 15th CSG (Prov) element vic MERSEBURG will continue priority support to 209th ACR. At H+84, or OO, 13th CSG (FWD) assumes support of 209th ACR, 69th and 70th FA Bdes, at which time 15th CSG (Prov) will complete its move to vic NORDHAUSEN. OO, 15th CSG (Prov) will move to designated area in the corps rear to continue support to 209th ACR, 10th Avn Bde, and 68th FA Bde in order.

(4) Support **During Phase III. Priority of support during this phase is to 25th Armd Div and 10th Avn Bde. Due to anticipated destruction of railways immediately west of PL PROTON, the primary transportation support mode for the attack will be highway with augmentation by emergency aerial resupply. 13th CSG (FWD) must be prepared to provide continuous fuel and**

ammunition support to 25th Armd Div with priority to resupply immediately after the destruction of the southernmost second-echelon division. Bypassed threat elements will continue to remain a threat to COSCOM elements operating in 25th Armd Div zone until cleared. Medical and maintenance evacuation has priority on southbound traffic. Evacuations will continue southward until 25th Armd Div is in AA EINSTEIN. 13th CSG (FWD) will coordinate protection of convoys with 25th Armd Div until zone is secure and provide support to 209th ACR as it screens the corps east flank. 14th CSG (FWD) will continue support to 52d Mech Div and prepare to assume primary support of units reconstituting in assembly areas north of PL BLAST. 15th CSG (Prov) will detach subordinate battalions to 14th CSG (FWD).

(5) Support After the Operation. OO after attack completed, 13th CSG (FWD) will assume support of 52d Mech Div and 209th ACR as these units continue screening missions. 14th CSG (FWD) will assume support mission for corps units reconstituting north of PL MASS. Priority of reconstitution effort is to 209th ACR, 25th Armd Div, and avn bde in order. Priority of effort is to prepare to support continued offensive operations to the north.

b. Materiel and Services Service Support Plan 1.

c. Medical evacuation and hospitalization Service Support Plan 1.

d. Personnel Service Support Plan 1.

e. Civil-military cooperation. Annex S.

5 COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command.

(1) Phase I

(a) Rear CP wiII control the movement of the corps from its assembly areas into positions forward of PL QUASAR Rear CP at WURZBURG (NA660170).

(b) TAC CP will control the battle forward of PL LIGHT and north of PL XENON. TAC CP at GRIMMA (US4278); alternate at ALTENBURG (US2050).

(c) Main CP Will control the units west of PL LIGHT and south of PL XENON. Main CP at GOTHA (PB199459); alternate at SONDERHAUSEN (PB3092).

(2) Phase II.

(a) Rear CP at WURZBURG (NA650150).

(b) TAC CP will control the battle forward of PL LIGHT and north of PL XENON. TAC CP location initially at GRIMMA (US4278), OO, TAC CP will move to RUDOLSTADT (PB6521).

(c) Main CP Initially at GOTHA (PB2045). After TAC CP has completed its move to RUDOLSTADT, the main CP will move to SONDERHAUSEN (PB3092).

(3) Phase III.

(a) Rear CP at WURZBURG (NA650150).

(b) TAC CP Initially at RUDOLSTADT (PB6521), OO, TAC CP will move to ZORBIG (UT0025).

(c) Main CP Initially at SONDERHAUSEN (PB3092). After the TAC CP has completed its move to ZORBIG, the main will move to LEIPZIG (US1997).

(4) Succession of Command deputy corps commander, 52d Mech Div Cdr, 25th Armd Div Cdr, 4th Pz Gren Div Cdr, in order.

b. Signal.

(1) 10th (US) Corps SOI INDEX 1-2 in effect.

(2) Commanders and staff at battallion level and above Will maximize the use of MSE communications and minimize use of FM communications to higher and lateral headquarters.

Acknowledge

CHASE
LTG

OFFICIAL.
SAGE
G3

Annexes A-Task Organization
B-Intelligence (TBP)
C-Operation Overlay
E-Fire Support (TBP)
F-Air Defense (TBP)
G-Engineer (TBP)
I - Deception (TBP)
S-Civil-military Cooperation (omitted)

* * *

Phase III

52d Mech Div (-)
- 3-606 FA (155, SP) (R) 52d Mech DIVARTY
- 413th Cml Co (Decon) (DS)
- 62d Engr Gp (Cbt) (DS)
  - 501 st Engr Bn (Whl) (Corps)
  - 572d Engr Bn (Cbt Hvy)
  - 5055th Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)
  - 5080th Engr Cbt Spt Equip Co
  - 5081st Engr Cbt Spt Equip Co
- 706th Area Slg Bn (DS)
- B/200th PSYOP Bn (DS)
- A/55th CA Bn (DS)

4th PzGren DIV (4th (GE) Mech DIV)
- 2-635 FA (155, SP) (R) 4th PzG DIVARTY
- A/1-434 ADA (Chap) (OPCON)
- 5052d Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon) (OPCON)
- 705th Area Sig Bn (DS)

25th Armd DIV
- 66th FA Bde (R) 25th Armd DIVARTY
  - 2-633 FA (155, SP)
  - 2-634 FA (155, SP)
  - 2-662 FA (MLRS)
- B/1-434 ADA (Chap) (OPCON)
- 401st Cml Bn (OPCON)
  - 411st Cml Co (Decon)
  - 421st Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)
  - 422d Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)
- 503d Engr Bn (Whl) (Corps) (DS)
  - 5050th Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon) (OPCON)
  - 5051st Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon) (OPCON)
- 232d MP Bn (DS)
- 707th Area Sig Bn (DS)
- G/200th PSYOP Bn (DS)
- B/55th CA Bn (DS)

4th CMBG (Cdn Mech Bde Gp)
- 403d Cml Bn (OPCON)
  - 414th Cml Co (Decon)
  - 423d Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)
  - 424th Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mtz)
- 273d MP Co (DS)
- C/55th CA Bn (DS)

10th Avn Bde (Corps)
- 402d Avn Regt (Atk Hel)
- 1/402d Atk Hel Bn
  - 2/402d Atk Hel Bn
  - 3/402d Atk Hel Bn
- 403d Avn Regt (Atk Hel)
  - 1/403d Atk Hel Bn
  - 2/403d Atk Hel Bn
  - 3/403d Atk Hel Bn
- 404th Avn Regt (Atk Hel)
- 1/404th Atk Hel Bn
  - 2/404th Atk Hel Bn
  - 3/404th Atk Hel Bn
- 400th Avn Regt
  - 1/400th Aslt Hel Bn (UH-60)
  - 2/400th Aslt Hel Bn (UH-60)
  - 3/400th Aslt Hel Bn (CH-47)
  - 4/400th Cmd Avn Bn (OH-58/UH-60)
- A/1-435 ADA (Avenger) (OPCON)
- 416th Cml Co (Decon) (OPCON)
- 277th MP Co (DS)

209th ACR
- 65th FA Bde (DS)
  - 2-631 FA (155. SP)
  - 2-632 FA (155, SP)
  - 2-661 FA (MLRS)
- 402d Cml Bn (OPCON)
  - 412th Cml Co (Decon)
  - 441st Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)
  - 442d Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mtz)
  - 443d Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mtz)
- 502th Engr Bn (Mech) (Corps) (DS)
- 270th MP Co (DS)
- D/55th CA Bn (DS)

Tactical Combat Force (TCF)

* * *

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to OPERATION PLAN 6099 - I0TH (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

10th Corps Arty
- 67th FA Bde (GS)
  - 2-636 FA (155, SP)
  - 2-663 FA (MLRS)
  - 2-664 FA (MLRS)
- 68th FA Bde (GS)
  - 2-665 FA (MLRS)
  - 2-666 FA (MLRS)
  - 2-667 FA (MLRS)
- B/1-435 ADA (Avenger) (OPCON)
- 233d MP Bn (DS)

10th ADA Bde
- 1-500 ADA (Patriot)
- 1-461 ADA (Hawk)
- 1-434 ADA (-) (Chap)
- 1-435 ADA (-) (Avenger)

40th Cml Bde
- 404th Cml Bn (GS)
  - 415th Cml Co (Decon)
  - 444th Cml Co (Smoke Genr) (Mech)
- 451st Cml Co (Recon) (FOX)

53d Engr Bde (Corps)
- 5001st Engr Topo Co (GS)
- 5053d Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon) (GS)
- 5059th Engr Mdm Girder Brg Co (GS)
- 5060th Engr Mdm Girder Brg Co (GS)

61st Engr Gp (Cbt Hv) (GS)
- 500th Engr Cbt Bn (Corps) (Mech)
- 570th Engr Cbt Bn (Hv)
- 571st Engr Cbt Bn (Hv)
- 573d Engr Cbt Bn (Hv)
- 5054th Engr Fltbrg Co (Ribbon)

20th Ml Bde
- 200th MI Bn (Aerial Xplt)
- 210th Ml Bn (Tac Xplt)
- 220th Ml Bn (Op)
- 286th UAV Det (Prov)

20th MP Bde
- 230th MP Bn (-) (GS)
- 231st MP Bn (-) (GS)

70th Sig Bde (MSE)
- 700th Sig Bn (GS)
- 708th Area Sig Bn (GS)
- 730th TACSAT Co (GS)

10th Civil Affairs Bde
- 55th CA Bn (-)

200th PSYOP Bn (-)

2d Finance Group

664th Pers Group

110th Press Camp HQ (PCH)

10th (US) COSCOM

Theater Army Units Providing DS to 10th (US) Corps

- 714th Trans Railway Bn
  - 7411th Trans Ry Engineer Co
  - 7416th Railway Train Operating Co
  - 7417th Railway Train Operating Co
  - 7418th Trans Ry Equip Maint Co

Other Direct Reporting Units

2191st RAOC
2192d RAOC
2193d RAOC
2194th RAOC

101st MiI Hist Det

1151st Army Band

ANNEX C (OPERATION OVERLAY SKETCHES) to OPERATION PLAN 6099 - 10th (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

PHASE I



ANNEX C (OPERATION OVERLAY SKETCHES) to OPERATION PLAN 6099 - 10th (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

10th (US) Corps Covering Force (Phase I) and Avenues of Approach



ANNEX C (OPERATION OVERLAY SKETCHES) to OPERATION PLAN 6099 - 10th (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

10TH (US) CORPS COVERING FORCE (PHASE I) &AVENUES OF APPROACH



ANNEX C (OPERATION OVERLAY SKETCHES) to OPERATION PLAN 6099 - 10th (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)



REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Division Offensive Planning

Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. Service Support Plan 1

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

Copy no_ of _copies
10th (US) Corps
GERSFELD (NA6589),GE
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SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US) COSCOM

RELATED OPERATION PLAN: OPLAN 6099-10th (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: ALPHA

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization).

1. SITUATION

See OPLAN 6099-10th (US) Corps (DEPUTY DAWG)

2. MISSION

O/O 10th (US) COSCOM provides combat service support (CSS) for deep and covering force (CF) operations along PL NEUTRON, defense in sector, and corps attack to destroy the 2 GTA. Plan for reconstitution of CF and corps maneuver units in preparation for continued offensive operations to the north IAW the AFCENT campaign plan.

3. GENERAL

a. 10th COSCOM provides CSS, less classified maps, communications security (COMSEC), and personnel services. At M-day, GS supply and ammunition units will deploy stocks to designated storage sites and continue to receive and distribute stocks as directed by the CMMC. On order (00), remaining COSCOM units deploy to wartime locations and prepare for combat operations. COSCOM units will not conduct support operations or deploy units west of PL QUASAR until commencement of hostilities on D-day. Corps units will draw their basic loads and DS stockages of cl I, III, and V from COSCOM storage sites located in the corps sector as listed in annex B.

(1) 20th Corps Support Group (REAR). Provides GS supply and reinforcing DSM to forward CSGs. Provides DSM and DS/GS supply support on an area basis to units employed in or passing through the corps rear area. Provides corpswide support of petroleum, ammunition, transportation, AVIM, airdrop, and mortuary affairs.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

(2) 13th Corps Support Group (FWD). Prior to D-day, supports 25th Armd Div, 68th FA Bde, and all nondivisional units on an area basis. Priority prior to D-day to 209th ACR and units designated to conduct deep operations. On D-day priority shifts to and remains with 25th Armd Div and Its attached and OPCON nondivisional units through completion of Phase III. Support for 10th Avn Bde, 67th FA Bde, and 68th FA Bde resumes during Phase II. After completion of Phase III, pnority of support shifts to 52d Mech Div and 25th Armd Div as these units screen the corps north boundary. Provides emergency fuel, medical, and limited ammunition support to 7th Pz Gren Div and 4th Pz Gren Div as required.

(3) 14th Corps Support Group (FWD). Prior to D-day supports 52d Mech DIV, 209th ACR, and all nondivisional units on an area basis. Priority prior to D-day to 209th ACR and units designated to conduct deep operations. Priority shifts to 52d Mech Div and the corps TCF through completion of Phase III. After completion of Phase III priority of support shifts to reconstitution of 209th ACR 25th Armd Div, the corps aviation brigades and the 67th FA Bde for continued offensive operations to the north. Provides AVIM to all nondivisional units and backup AVIM to division aviation maintenance companies. Provides throughput of supplies to corps TCF.

(4) 15th Corps Support Group (Provisional). Prior to D-day conducts corps deep and CF operations during Phases I and II. On D-day conducts movement of supplies and equipment to VIC MERSEBURG (QB090970) and continues to receive and distribute supplies to deep operations and covering forces. lnitial priority of support during Phase I is the ACR, corps artillery brigades, and aviation brigades in order. Priority of support during Phase II IS to 209th ACR and supporting corps artillery brigades in order. Conducts movement to support location VIC NORDHAUSEN (PC240070) during Phase II. OO conducts movement to designated location in corps rear and continues to support covering force Priority of support to 209th ACR 67th FA Bde, and 10th Avn Bde and supporting units in Phase III After completion of Phase III be prepared to detach subordinate units to 14th CSG (FWD) to assist in the reconstitution of 209th ACR and 25th Armd DIV. Provides emergency fuel and medical assistance to 7th Pz Gren DIV as required during passage of lines

(5) 55th Ammo Bn.

(a) Provides DS/GS conventional ammunition supply to the corps.

(b) Operates ammunition transfer points (ATPs) to support 25th Armd DIV attack of threat second-echelon divisions.

(c) In coordination with 15th Spt Gp (Prov), provides DS ammunition company to issue ammunition from forward railheads and to provide ATPs to support corps artillery conducting deep fires and support of covering forces.

(d) Positions ammunition supply points (ASPS) within local haul distance of units in the main battle area (MBA).

(e) Maintains prerigged ammunition packages for emergency air delivery Priority to ATACMs. MLRS, Hellfire, tank, and TOW ammunition, in order.

(f) On order operates ATPs for corps artillery units in support of corps attack.

(6) 80th Med Bde.

(a) Provides health services to the corps.

(b) In coordination with 15th Spt Gp (Prov) provides a MASH and aeromedevac companies to support deep and CF operations.

b. 2d Finance Group (Corps) and 644th Personnel Group (Corps) provide personnel services to the corps on an area basis.

c. 714th Trans Railway Bn provides rail transportation to 10th (US) Corps sector. Unit has four diesel locomotive engines to offset major loss of electrical power on Bundesbahn railways. Initial priority of support to deep operations and CF units.

d. Coordinating instructions.

(1) CSS task organization at Annex A.

(2) Supply point locations at Annex B (omitted).

(3) CSS locations and support boundaries at Annex C (omitted).

(4) Highway main supply routes (MSRs) at Annex D (omitted).

(5) Railway MSRs at Annex E (omitted).

4. MATERIEL AND SERVICES

a. Supply.

(1) Class I

(a) Units deploy with 3 days of MRE in basic load.

(b) Issue cycle to DSUs IS 3/2/3.

(c) Ration mix IS two MREs and one T-ration with sundry packs.

(d) B-rations available from GSUs on request.

(2) Classes II and IV.

(a) Command regulated.

(b) Unit defensive packets and corps barrier materials released at M+2.

(c) Units deploy with 15 days of general supplies, two NBC protective overgarments per individual, and unit defensive packets.

(d) DSUs maintain stockage of one set per individual of NBC protective overgarments for supported unit strength.

(3) Class III.

(a) Units deploy with 15 days of packaged products and all bulk fuel tankers topped off.

(b) DSUs deploy with bulk fuel tankers topped off. Unit distribution from GSUs to fill collapsible bags.

(c) Throughput distribution to 1st FSB, 52d Mech Div, while designated as the corps TCF.

(4) Class V.

(a) Units deploy with basic loads. Shortages filled from GS stocks prior to D-day. Munitions for barrier plans available at M+2. CSR/CCL stocks not available until D+1.

(b) CSRs:

D+1 through D+3:

DODIC	Ammo Type	52 Mech	25th Armd	Avn Bde	ACR	FA Bdes
C786	120-mm APFSDS	0	0	0	30	0
D509	155-mm RAAMS	0	0	0	10	10
D510	155-mm CLGP	0	0	0	3	1
D563	155-mm DPICM	0	0	0	140	115
D563	155-mm RAP	0	0	0	10	10
H104	MLRS, LP/C	0	0	0	0	4
PA79	GM, Hellfire	0	0	20	15	0
PA93	GM, TOW	0	0	0	10	0

SSPLAN 1--10th (US) COSCOM

D+4 through D+6

DODIC	AMMO Type	52d Mech	25th Armd	Avn Bde	ACR	FA Bdes
C786	120-mm APFSDS	0	30	0	20	0
D509	155-mm RAAMS	5	10	0	5	0
D510	155-mm CLGP	2	2	0	1	1
0563	155-mm DPICM	70	140	0	100	115
D579	155-mm RAP	5	10	0	0	0
H104	MLRS, LP/C	3	5	0	0	12
PA79	GM, Hellfire	10	15	15	10	0
PA93	GM, TOW	5	8	0	5	0

(5) Class VI. Suspended at D-day Health and comfort sundry packs issued with class I. Post exchange services commencing about D+5.

(6) Class VII.

(a) All GS stocks are command-regulated.

(b) GS stockage limited to combat vehicles-40 M1A1, 50 M2. Priority to reconstitution effort after completion of Phase III.

(c) Aircraft and tactical vehicle replacements available from GS maintenance returns after D+4.

(d) Aircraft and combat vehicle replacements controlled through weapon systems replacement operations.

(7) Class VIII TSOP.

(8) Class IX.

(a) Command-regulated items:

1. All aircraft engines.

2. M1A1 tank engines.

3. M2/M3 transmissions.

4. 5-ton engines.

5. M109 howitzer final drives.

6. M1A1 tank track.

(b) Shortages of electronic repair parts exist for fire control and surveillance equipment.

(c) Cannibalization authorized at DSU level.

(9) Class X Limited food stocks available for CM0 companies to assist refugees.

(10) Maps Unclassified maps available at DSUs. Classified maps requested/distributed through S2/G2 channels.

(11) Water.

(a) Use of local water sources WiII be coordinated through supporting CM0 companies.

(b) DSUs provide bulk water supply at ration distribution points.

b. Transportation and Movements.

(1) MSRs and traffic circulation.

(a) All MSRs are controlled routes requiring movement credits. Priority for eastbound traffic is to class V and III shipments. Priority for westbound traffic is to medical and maintenance evacuation, in order

(b) Highway MSRs at Annex D, railway MSRs at Annex E.

(c) Traffic circulation and control overlay at Annex F (TBP).

(2) Terminals.

(a) Air.

1. Corps art-field VIC GIEBELSTADT (NA700000).

2. Alternate vic KITZINGEN (NA850110) and SCHWEINFURT (NA840450).

(b) Rail.

1. ASCHAFFENBURG (NA100370).

2. BAD HERSFELD (NB500370).

3. GIESSEN (MB765040).

4. NORTHEIM (NC690290).

5. KASSEL (NB350870).

6. MERSEBURG (QB050950).

7. NORDHAUSEN (PC240070).

8. WURZBURG (NA690180).

(c) Water

1. BAMBERG (PA3602901).

2. LOHR (NA420390).

3. SCHWIENFURT (NA880440).

(d) Pipeline GIESSEN (MB780020).

(3) Movement management.

(a) CMCC located at HQ, 10th (US) COSCOM.

(b) Regional movement control teams (MCTs) locations: (TBP)

c. Services.

(1) CEB.

(a) Augmentation not available for divisions and ACR.

(b) COSCOM field service companies provide CEB to division, ACR, Sep Mech Bde, and nondivisional units. Priority to 209th ACR and corps FA and avn units after completion of Phase III.

(2) Mortuary Affairs (MA).

(a) Graves registration subprogram in effect at D-day.

(b) Emergency burial authorized at corps level.

(c) 20th Collection Company (MA) will establish corps collection point VIC GRUNDAU (NA070600).

(3) Other.

(a) Request EOD support through RAOCs.

(b) Host nation labor not available forward of division rear boundaries.

d. Maintenance.

(1) DS maintenance companies deploy maintenance support teams with supported ADA, engr, and FA battalions.

(2) Maintenance timelines.

(a) DS-24 hours.

(b) Reinforcing-48 hours.

(c) GS-96 hours.

(3) Reinforcing priorities. (TBP)

(4) Priority of maintenance evacuation is to MLRS, attack helicopters, tanks, BFVs, and howitzers, in order.

5. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. Evacuation.

(1) Corps evacuation policy IS 15 days.

(2) Theater evacuation policy IS 30 days.

(3) Air evacuation restricted to URGENT pnority patients.

(4) MASF located at KITZINGEN Army Airfield.

b. Hospitalization.

(1) Hospital locations. (TBP)

(2) Other services.

(a) Dispensary, dental, veternary, and psychiatnc services located at CSHs.

(b) 827th Med Bn Log (Fwd) located vic BAD KISSINGEN (NA770630).

SSPLAN 1--10th (US) COSCOM

6. PERSONNEL

a. Maintenance of Unit Strength.

(1) Submit personnel status reports IAW TSOP.

(2) 110th and 111th Replacement Companies provide area support to the corps.

b. Personnel Management.

(1) Personnel administration provided by designated personnel services battalions.

(2) Requirements for civilian labor submitted through supporting civil affair companies.

(3) Theater stockade located vic MANNHEIM supports all US personnel confinement.

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale.

(1) Finance battalions collocated with personnel service battalions.

(2) Postal service provided on an area basis.

d. Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order.

(1) Civilian establishments off-limits except for official business.

(2) Civilian curfew is 2000 to 0600 hours.

(3) Report stragglers to nearest MP element.

7. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

Initially, civil affairs companies provided on mission-tasking basis through RAOCs.

8. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Area Support Boundaries. Annex C.

b. Protection. ***

c. Special Reports. None.

d. Statement This plan to be implemented at M-day.

9. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command.

SSPLAN 1--10th (US) COSCOM

(1) 10th (US) Corps main CP initially located vic GOTHA (PB199459).

(2) 10th (US) Corps rear CP located VIC WURZBURG (NA661070).

(3) 10th (US) COSCOM CP located at corps rear CP.

b. Signal. Current SOI index 1-2 in effect.

Acknowledge.

MG
GROOM

Official:

/s/ Johnson
JOHNSON
ACofS, SOTI

Annexes A--CSS Task Organization.
B-Supply Point Locations (TBP)
C--CSS Locations and support boundaries (Omitted)
D-Highway MSRs (Omitted)
E-Railway MSRs (Omitted)
F-Traffic circulation and control overlay (Omitted)

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US) Corps

Unit	TOE
10th Finance Group	14-402L
131st Fin BN	14-403L
132d Fin BN	14-403L
133d Fin BN	14-403L
134th Fin BN	14-403L
10th Pers Group	
110th Repl Co	12-402L
111th Repl Co	12-407L
170th Pers BN	12-407L
171st Pers BN	12-467L
172d Pers BN	12-467L
173d Pers BN	12-467L
174th Pers BN	12-467L
175th Pers BN	12-467L
176th Pers BN	12-467L
177th Pers BN	12-467L
178th Pers BN	12-467L
179th Pers BN	12-467L
180th Pers BN	12-467L
181st Pers BN	12-467L
155th Postal Co (DS)	12-413L
156th Postal Co (DS)	12-413L
160th Postal Co (GS)	12-423L
110th Press Camp HQ (PCH)	45-500H(AE)
111th PA Tm	45-500H(FB)
112th PA Tm	45-500H(FB)
116th Mobile PA Det (MPAD)	45-7H
10th Corps Support Command	63-431 L
2005th MMC Co	63-433L
2421st DPU	
4104th MCC	55-604L
789th Mov Con Tm	55-580L (LA)
790th Mov Con Tm	55-580L(LA)

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US) Corps

Unit	TOE
797th Mov Con Tm (Air Tml)	55-580L (LF)
798th Mov Con Tm (Air Tml)	55-580L (LF)
7071st Mov Con Tm (Hwy Reg Tm)	55-580L (LH)
7072d Mov Con Tm (Hwy Reg Tm)	55-580L (LH)
7073d Mov Con Tm (Hwy Reg Tm)	55-580L (LH)
7074th Mov Con Tm (Hwy Reg Tm)	55-580L (LH)
7075th Mov Con Tm (Hwy Reg Tm)	55-580L (LH)
7076th Mov Con Tm (Hwy Reg Tm)	55-580L (LH)
13th Corps Support Group (Rear)	29-102H
20th S&S Bn	42-446L
270th QM Sup Co (DS)	42-447L
271st QM Sup Co (DS)	42-447L
293d Fld Svc Co (DS)	42-414L
291st Fld Svc Co (DS)	42-414L
292d Fld Svc Co (DS)	42-414L
21st S&S Bn	42-446L
236th Hvy Mat Sup Co (GS)	42-427L
239th Gen Sup Co (GS)	42-418L
248th Rep Parts Sup Co (GS)	42-419L
250th Rep Parts Sup Co (GS)	42-419L
253d Acft & Msl Rep Parts Sup Co	29-129H
33d Petrl Sup Bn	10-426L
257th Petrl Sup Co (GS)	10-427L
258th Petrl Sup Co (GS)	10-427L
723d Trans Mdm Trk Co (Petrl)	55-428L
724th Trans Mdm Trk Co (Petrl)	55-428L
298th Petrl Prod Lab Tm (Mbl)	10-560H
90th Maint Bn	43-436L
9012th Maint Co (DS)	43-209L
9013th Maint Co (DS)	43-209L
9017th Maint Co (DS)	43-209L
932d Svc Co (Coil & Class)	29-139H
14th Corps Support Group	29-102H
22d S&S Bn	42-446L
272d QM Sup Co	42-447L
237th Hvy Mat Co (GS)	42-414L
238th Gen Sup Co (GS)	42-418L
249th Rep Parts Sup Co (GS)	42-419L

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US) Corps

Unit	T O E
251st Rep Parts Sup Co (GS)	42-419L
294th Fld Svc Co (DS)	42-414L
295th Fld Svc Co (DS)	42-414L
71st Acft Maint Bn (AVIM)	55-456H
700th TAMC (AVIM)	01-947L
701st TAMC (AVIM)	01-947L
702d TAMC (AVIM)	01-947L
91st Maint Bn	43-436L
9015th Maint Co (DS)	43-209L
9016th Maint Co (DS)	43-209L
9018th Maint Co (DS)	43-209L
933d Svc Co (Coll & Class)	29-139H
34th Petrl Sup Bn	10-426L
259th Petrl Sup Co (GS)(-)	10-427L
260th Petrl Sup Co (GS)	10-427L
721st Trans Mdm Trk Co (Petrl)	55-428L
722d Trans Mdm Trk Co (Petrl)	55-428L
15th Spt Gp (Prov)	
791st Mov Con Tm	55-580L (LA)
7077th Mov Con Tm (Hwy Reg Tm)	55-580L (LH)
7078th Mov Con Tm (Hwy Reg Tm)	55-580L (LH)
7079th Mov Con Tm (Hwy Reg Tm)	55-580L (LH)
7080th Mov Con Tm (Hwy Reg Tm)	55-580L (LH)
23d S&S Bn	42-446L
273d QM Sup Co (DS)	42-447L
9011th Maint Co (DS)	43-209L
9014th Maint Co (DS)	43-209L
583d Ord Convl Ammo Co (MOADS) (DS)	9-483L
1/259th Petrl Sup Co (GS)	

Unit	TOE
55th Ammo Bn (Convl)	9-066J
580th Ord Convl Ammo Co (MOADS) (DS)	9-483L
581st Ord Convl Ammo Co (MOADS) (DS)	9-483L
582d Ord Convl Ammo Co (MOADS) (DS)	9-483L
590th Ord Convl Ammo Co (GS)	9-488L
591st Ord Convl Ammo Co (GS)	9-488L

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US) Corps

70th TMT Gp	55-12H
771st TMT Bn	55-12H
707th Lt Trk Co (5-ton)	55-718L
709th Mdm Trk Co (Cntnr/Cgo)	55-728L
712th Mdm Trk Co (Cntnr/Cgo)	55728L
713th Mdm Trk Co (Cntnr/Cgo)	55-728L
729th Hvy Trk Co (HET)	55-729L
734th Lt-Mdm Trk Co	55-719L
753d Trans Cgo Trf Co	55-817L
780th Trlr Trf Pt Op Tm	55-540L (LE)
782d Trlr Trf Pt Op Tm	55-549K (LE)
772d TMT Bn	55-16H
710th Mdm Trk Co (Cntnr/Cgo)	55-728L
711th Mdm Trk Co (Cntnr/Cgo)	55-728L
730th Hvy Trk Co (HET)	55-729L
733d Lt-Mdm Trk Co	55-719L
754th Trans Cgo Trf Co	55-817L
781st Trlr Trf Pt Op Tm	55-540L (LE)
783d Trlr Trf Pt Op Tm	55-540L (LE)
80th Med Bde	8-122H
82d Med Gp	8-112H
84th MASH	8-863L
850th Med Air Amb Co	8-137H
87th MASH	8-863L
851st Med Air Amb Co	8-137H
809th CSH	8-823L
855th Med Co (Ambulance)	8-449L
856th Med Co (Ambulance)	8-449L
8058th Psychiatric Svc Tm	8-620H (OM)
8152d Dental Svc Det	8-670H (HA)
8162d Vet Svc Det (Small)	8-680H
834th Evac Hosp	8-883L
835th Evac Hosp	8-883L
836th Evac Hosp	8-883L
8900th Area Support Med Bn	8-455L
83d Med Gp	8-112H
86th MASH	8-863L
854th Med Air Amb Co	8-137H
85th MASH	8-863L
853d Med Air Amb Co	8-137H
852d Med Air Amb Co	8-137H

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) to SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN 1-10th (US) Corps

Unit	TOE
810th CSH	8-823L
857th Med Co (Ambulance)	8-449L
811th CSH	8-823L
858th Med Co (Ambulance)	8-449L
8103d Neurosurgical Tm	8-630H
8163d Vet Svc Det (Small)	8-680H (JA)
8868th Ento Svc Tm	8-620H (LO)
8057th Psychiatric Svc Tm	8-620H (OM)
837th Evac Hosp	8-883L
838th Evac Hosp	8-883L
839th Evac Hosp	8-883L
801st Area Support Med Bn	8-455L
845th Med Bn Logistics (Fwd)	8-485L
8858th Med Equip Maint Tm (Mdm)	8-620H (EB)
8866th Spectacle Fabrication Tm	8-610H (GB)
8880th Blood Proc Tm	8-620H (NA)
8881st Blood Proc Tm	8-620H (NA)
8883d Blood Proc Tm	8-620H (NA)
8884th Blood Distr Tm	8-620H (NC)
8115th Lab Tm	8-630H (MM)
530th EOD Con Cen Tm	9-527L (LA)
534th EOD Tm	9-527L (LC)
535th EOD Tm	9-527L (LC)
536th EOD Tm	3-527L (LC)

TA Units Providing DS to 10th (US) Corps

571st Ammo Bn (Sp Ammo)	9-686L
5513th Ord Sp Ammo Co (DSIGS)	9-688L
5514th Ord Sp Ammo Co (DSIGS)	9-688L
1200th MP Hvy Scty Co	19-197L
1201st MP Hvy Scty Co	19-197L
714th Trans Railway Bn	55-226H
7411th Trans Ry Engineer Co	55-227H
7417th Railway Train Operating Co	55-229H
7418th Trans Ry Equip Maint Co	55-228H
7416th Railway Train Operating Co	55-229H
7412th Railway Terminal Team	55-520H (LB)
7413th Railway Terminal Team	55-520H (LB)
7414th Rail Yard Operating Team	55-520H (LF)
7415th Rail Yard Operating Team	55-520H (LF)

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Division Offensive Planning

Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. Intelligence Estimate No 1

A series of asterisks (* * *) indicates that material has been omitted intentionally.

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Copy no _ of ___ copies
10th (US) Corps
GERSFELD (NA 6589), GE
05 Jun 19_

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. 1

References: * * *

1. MISSION

On order, 10th (US) Corps defends in sector to destroy the 2 GTA

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Weather

(1) Existing situation

(a) General. Climate in the operational area is primarily maritime in nature but modified at times by drier continental influences. Maritime air masses, more frequent in winter than other air masses, dominate the area of interest from 10 to 20 days a month, often without interruption. There is relatively little regional variation in climate, but terrain features, such as mountains, steep escarpments, and winding river valleys, do affect certain climatic elements to some extent.

(b) Precipitation.

1. Mean annual precipitation ranges from 584 to 889 millimeters (23 to 35 inches). Precipitation is abundant in all seasons, and serious droughts are rare. Altitude and exposure to prevailing winds are important factors in the amount of precipitation. Local geographic influences on precipitation are considerable, and all the major mountain ranges are regions of heavier precipitation. Regions shielded from both westerly and southwesterly winds receive smaller amounts of precipitation. (For purposes of discussion, winter is defined as December, January, and February; spring as March, April, and May; summer as June, July, and August; and autumn as September, October, and November,)

2. Winter. * * * * * * *

Table IV. Precipitation (Inches)

Month	LEIPZIG (396)	FULDA (892)	KLEINER FELDBERG (2622)	DRESDEN (721)	NEUWEID (220)
Aug	2	2	2	2	2
Sep	2	2	2	2	2
Oct	2	2	2	2	2
Nov	2	3	3	2	2
Dec	3	4	4	3	2
Jan	3	4	4	4	2
Feb	4	4	4	4	3
Mar	2	2	3	4	2
Apr	3	5	6	4	3
May	7	8	9	8	7
Jun	8	9	10	9	7

3. Maximum precipitation occurs in summer, with 203 to 304 millimeters (8 to 12 inches) of rain in most locations. Thunderstorms often occur in the afternoon and are occasionally accompanied by hail They occur more frequently in the southern area of the sector.

4. In spring, precipitation is light, ranging from 25 to 76 millimeters (1 to 3 inches) at most locations. The frequency of showers peaks in April. In May, as summer approaches, the frequency of showers decreases, while their intensity increases.

5. In autumn, due to less solar heating, there is a resultant decrease in convectional shower activity There is generally a decrease in the amount of precipitation from summer to autumn.

(c) Temperature

1. Temperatures are seldom extreme because of the frequent flow of warmer air from the west or southwest and the lack of any nearby source of extremely hot or cold air.

2. Daily minimum temperatures occur just before sunrise, and maximum temperatures occur 1 to 3 hours after the sun has reached its zenith. Exceptions to this pattern may occur when there is an airmass change during the day. The daily variation is observed in all seasons but IS most pronounced in summer and least pronounced in winter.

* * * * * * *

4. In summer, mean maximum temperatures range between 18°C (65°F) and 24°C (75°F) over the area. The daily range of temperature is the greatest in this season. Minimum temperatures of 0°C (32°F) have been recorded at all stations. Maximum temperatures of at least 30°C (86°F) occur 1 to 3 days per month at locations below 1,500 feet.

5. Spring and autumn provide a transition in temperatures from winter to summer and from summer to winter. Autumn is slightly warmer than spring with fewer days of freezing temperatures.

(d) Relative humidity

* * * * * * *

2. During the summer, with its moist northwesterly airflow, the air has a higher moisture content than it does in winter, but because of higher temperatures and longer days, the relative humidity is lower. It ranges from 65 to 80 percent.

3. Spring, especially during May, has the lowest recorded relative humidity. Autumn has higher humidities than those in summer but not as high as those in winter.

(e) Winds. The low-level airflow over the area is most often westerly in all seasons-southwesterly in winter and northwesterly in summer. Surface winds reflect this flow pattern; however, terrain differences cause many local deviations. Calms are frequent due to the sheltering effect in the valleys Some valleys, if close to the major axis of windflow, channel the wind, changing its direction and increasing its velocity. There is a daily variation of windspeed in all seasons, but it is most pronounced in summer. Windspeeds reach maximums in the afternoon in association with maximum solar heating.

* * * * * * *

2. Windspeeds in summer are not as great as they are during winter. By summer, the low-pressure region around ICELAND has disappeared, while the Atlantic high-pressure system has moved northward with a ridge extending into the European Continent. The result is a more northwesterly circulation of airflow over the area. Gale-force winds are infrequent in summer, and at low elevations, winds above 40 knots are rare. The highest windspeeds are recorded during the afternoon, and calm, light, variable winds are frequent during the night and early morning

3. Early spring and late autumn, like winter, can be quite stormy, but spring generally has the highest windspeeds. Gusty winds from the north accompany shower activity, particularly during April. By late spring, the prevailing wind direction has shifted to west and northwest. During both spring and autumn, winds equal to or greater than 28 knots occur less than 3 days per month.

(f) Fog. Fog is the primary restriction to visibility. Smoke and haze restrict visibility less. Fog has a marked seasonal pattern. Throughout the year, particularly in regions of complex terrain, considerable local variation can take place within short distances. In all seasons, visibility is at a minimum just before, at, and a little after sunrise.

1. Most of the fog is radiation fog and, as such, is at a maximum near sunrise during the winter. The area, with its relatively high latitude, has long nights in late autumn and winter. This provides the necessary radiational cooling to lower visibilities to less than 4 kilometers. Visibility is reduced below 4 kilometers between 20 and 50 percent of the time at lower elevations and more often in cloud-enshrouded higher elevations.

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2. During summer, fog is infrequent and generally confined to hours around sunrise. As a result, visibility is better than it is in winter. There are some departures from this average, notably at mountain locations where peaks may remain cloud-enshrouded and at smoke-producing industrial concentrations. On the whole, however, this IS the season of best visibility. Visibility less than 4 kilometers occurs only 2 to 10 percent of the time in summer.

3. During spring, the average occurrence of days with poor visibility is rather low. In March, there is a rapid decrease in the frequency of days having visibility less than 4 kilometers. By the end of this season, days having visibility less than 4 kilometers are experienced only 2 to 5 percent of the time

Table V. Light Data (14 August 19_to 21 Sep 19_)

Date	BMNT	BMCT	EECT	EENT	Moonrise	Moonset
14 Aug	0324	0413	2014	2102	1041	2044
16 Aug	0326	0415	2009	2057	1313	2130
18 Aug	0332	0420	2005	2052	1526	2243
20 Aug	0337	0424	2000	2047	1700	2334
22 Aug	0341	0428	1956	2042	1759	0140
24 Aug	0345	0431	1951	2037	1837	0402
26 Aug	0350	0435	1947	2032	1906	0635
28 Aug	0354	0438	1940	2027	1937	0851
30 Aug	0358	0442	1938	2021	2020	1127
01 Sep	0403	0445	1933	2016	2125	1402
03 Sep	0404	0447	1928	2011	2334	1602
05 Sep	0410	0452	1924	2005	0111	1714
07 Sep	0414	0456	1919	2000	0406	1757
09 Sep	0417	0459	1914	1955	0653	1831
11 Sep	0421	0503	1909	1950	0934	1908
13 Sep	0425	0506	1904	1945	1205	2002
15 Sep	0428	0509	1859	1940	1410	2127
17 Sep	0432	0513	1855	1935	1534	2327
19 Sep	0436	0518	1848	1928	1624	0035
21 Sep	0439	0519	1845	1925	1659	0257

4. Autumn, particularly late October and November, is the foggiest part of the year, though not necessarily the period of poorest visibility. Many of the characteristics of winter fog also apply to autumn fog; however, lighter winds permit increased fog from radiational cooling at night. Late autumn shows the greatest daily variation in low visibility experienced any time during the year, with most of the poor visibility occurring within 1 or 2 hours of sunrise.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action

(a) Precipitation may hinder cross-country movement.

(b) Westerly winds may affect threat employment of nonpersistent chemical agents.

(c) Good visibility will not favor threat attack

(3) Effect on own courses of action.

(a) Precipitation may hinder cross-country movement

(b) Westerly winds will not affect our use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons.

(c) Good visibility will favor our defense.

b. Terrain

(1) Existing situation

(a) General. The 10th (US) Corps area contains several key terrain features. Major hill masses are the SPESSART, THURINGER WALD, TAUNUS, HARZ, ERZEBIRGE, and DECINSKE STENZ mountain areas. The HARZ is in the north, the ERZEBIRGE and DECINSKE STENZ are in the southeast, and the SPESSART Mountains are to the south The TAUNUS Mountains dominate the corps rear area. The major terrain feature forward of the 10th (US) Corps IS the THURINGER WALD. The primary drainage systems are the FULDA and WERRA Rivers in the west; in the center are the UNSTRUT, MULDE, BODE, and the SAALE Rivers, all feeding into the ELBE; the lower MAIN plain includes the MAIN, KINZIG, NIDDA, and NIDDER Rivers in the south.

(b) Movement and maneuver

1. Cross-country movement for tracked vehicles in the 10th (US) Corps area of operations is generally poor Dominant rugged, hilly, and mountainous landforms restrict cross-country movement in some areas. Some of the most important of these are the THURINGER WALD Mountains near the MAIN River, the HARZ Mountains to the north, and the rugged hills of the ERZGEBIRGE and DECINSKE STENZ Mountains on the southeastern boundary Even the few valleys that form the limited natural maneuver corridors in this region are dotted in many places with a dense pattern of built-up areas that hinder cross-country maneuver. This is particularly true in the lower MAIN lowland and central plains.

2. The restrictive nature of the terrain in offset by an excellent road system throughout the area of operations. This system includes major autobahns, highways, secondary roads improved forest and field roads, and unimproved trails. Roads capable of supporting mechanized forces exist in even the most restrictive terrain. The road nets in and around the numerous urban areas will permit rapid movement.

3. Seasonal conditions alter the quality of cross-country movement, mainly by changes in soil moisture content. Weather is most favorable for cross-country movement from midspring to late autumn (mid-April through November). Heavy rains cause deep mud for periods of a few hours to a few days in areas of fine-grained soils

* * *

4. Cross-country movement conditions for individual terrain areas are as follows-

(a) FULDA Valley. The FULDA Valley generally hinders cross-country movement. The steep slopes of the valley, combined with dense forests, normally preclude off-road movement of tanks. The valley bottom, which rarely attains a width of 2 kilometers, is generally wet and unsuitable for cross-country movement except during the late summer and autumn The river is unfordable north of BAD HERSFELD but may be forded at selected sites south of this point

(b) FULDA-WERRA Hills. In the FULDA-WERRA Hills, off-road movement is limited to scattered smooth valleys and low hills, generally surrounded by forest-covered sandy ridges. These rugged forested ridges constitute obstacles to off-road movement of tanks, but in places, they are smooth and can be crossed using the numerous lanes that normally traverse forested areas. Floodplains along many of the streams are wet and untrafficable except during the late summer and fall. Although most are narrow, the poorly drained floodplains along the WERRA River attain a width of about 3 kilometers The WERRA is unfordable throughout its course in this sector.

(c) HARZ. In this region of high hills that tower visibly over the surrounding area, there are numerous dams and many pools created by quarries around densely settled CLAUSTHAL-ZELLERFELD, otherwise, the area is sparsely populated. Cross-country movements are almost impossible due to extensive forests and local terrain.

(d) THURINGER WALD. This major mountainous area forward of the 10th (US) Corps sector significantly hinders rapid movement. The area is heavily forested with steep valleys, narrow winding roads, and numerous defiles and potential chokepoints.

(e) ERZGEBIRGE. Rugged hills in most places make cross-country mobility generally unsuitable. Off-road movement is possible on rolling hills, mainly in the center and northwest areas, but it is difficult because of dense forest. Many small tracts in the center can be bypassed; large tracts in the northwest can be penetrated on forest lanes oriented mainly east to west.

(f) DECINSKE STENZ Movement through this mountainous area is restricted by steep slopes, large heavily forested areas, and a dense concentration of built-up areas

(g) KNULLGEBIRGE. Movement is generally poor but IS feasible in the valleys Forested hills are a severe hindrance. Soils are seasonally muddy.

(h) LOWER MAIN LOWLAND. This area is passable most of the time. Principal hindrances include the unfordable MAIN River, forests and areas of loose sand. This area is most apt to be unsuitable in late winter and early spring.

(i) ELBE River. This river is the major drainage point for the UNSTRUT, MULDE, BODE, and SAALE Rivers and is not fordable within this sector. This will hinder cross-country movement.

(j) SPESSARTS. The eastern two-thirds is unsuitable for off-road movement, except locally, because of steep, forested slopes. In the west, off-road movement is possible, but local hindrances may cause delays. Floodplains along streams are trafficable only during summer. Scattered forests restrict movement, except along forest lanes.

(k) TAUNUS. Generally unsuitable in the steep, rugged, and forested hills toward the west. Off-road movement on rolling plains in the center and north is difficult because of large tracts of dense forest Logging lanes oriented in northeast-southwest and northwest-southeast directions permit limited forest penetration. Numerous narrow floodplains are wet and untrafficable except during summer.

(l) VOGELSBERG. Suitability of this area is limited. Off-road movement is compartmentalized by tracts of dense forest; numerous lanes permit some forest penetration Deep radial valleys hinder movement. Many floodplains are untrafficable except in summer The NIDDA River is fordable at only certain locations.

(c) Avenues of approach Overlay 4-1, Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay (Map, JOG Series 1501, Germany, 1:250,000) Avenues of approach available to the threat that are suitable for cross-country maneuver entering or adjacent to the 10th (US) Corps sector

1. Avenue D starts at ZARY (WT1020) to COTTBUS (VT5535) to JUTERBOG (UT7062) to MAGDEBURG (PC8080) where it could divide into two corridors, swinging north into the NORTHAG sector or continuing west to HILDESHEIM From there, it could swing north to BURGDORF (ND6910), dividing into maneuver corridors, continuing northwest crossing the WESER River north of MINDEN, or continuing west to PADERBORN (MC8330)

2. Avenue E starts at GORLITZ (VS9969), moving west to DRESDEN (VS1555) where it divides into two maneuver corridors and then merges back into Avenue E and continues to LEIPZIG (US2090). It then continues west, and crosses the WERRA River just north of the THURINGER WALD Mountains, swinging southwest to GIESSEN (MB8005)

3. Avenue G follows the same route as Avenue E to LEIPZIG where it swings south to PLAUEN (TR9999) or continues west as Avenue E, crossing the WERRA River at the same location north of THURINGER WALD It then swings south to WURZBURG (NA6818) or southeast to BAYREUTH (PS8638). This avenue suffers from significant terrain and urban restrictions that hinder cross-country maneuver.

4. Avenue C starts from the north and follows the same route as Avenue D at LUBBEN (VT2355).

5. Avenues F, H, and J all enter the 10th (US) Corps sector from locations on the southern boundary

6. Avenue B starts at BERLIN moving south into sector

7. Avenue A enters 10th (US) Corps area from the north and also follows the Avenue D route to the objective.

(d) Cover and concealment

1. Numerous forests and built-up areas provide cover from small-arms fire and concealment from aerial and ground observation. Large areas of forests cover most of the hilly and mountainous regions, about half are coniferous, and half are deciduous; in some areas, the two are mixed. Urban areas larger than 0.25 square kilometers are moderately to densely distributed in most of the area The most densely populated urban areas are the cities of LEIPZIG, DRESDEN, and FRANKFURT AM MAIN Other significant urban areas are KARL-MARX-STADT, HALLE, ERFURT, and KASSEL.

2. The forests are mainly planted in blocks separated by access lanes, Interspersed openings are common The coniferous stands, mainly spruce, are up to 80 feet high. regularly spaced up to 10 feet apart, with trunks periodically pruned up to 10 feet from the ground The mature coniferous stands provide year-round concealment from aerial observation and some concealment from ground observation The deciduous stands, primarily beech, are 20 to 100 feet high, 6 inches to 3 feet in diameter. and irregularly spaced Concealment from aerial observation is available only when these trees are in leaf from May through September Some concealment from ground observation is available. The coniferous and deciduous stands have numerous trees that dismounted troops can use for cover from small-arms fire.

3. The best areas for cover and concealment are within the larger built-up areas. Numerous heavily built masonry and concrete buildings provide cover from flat-trajectory fire and concealment from ground and aerial observation

4. Only limited cover and concealment are available **in** the remainder of the region, which is largely cultivated with small grains, vegetables. hay, and some fruit orchards Stone walls, farm and rural village buildings, embankments and concrete railroad and road bridges afford some cover and concealment

(2) Effects on enemy courses of action Terrain favors the threat attack using Avenue E. Several major gaps through this built-up area are large enough to accommodate significant military forces Although initially the terrain canalizes the attacker and favors the defender, once an attacking force breaches the built-up areas, a high-speed advance IS likely

(3) Effects on own courses of action. Terrain favoring our defense of the area **IS** the ELBE Valley. This terrain provides great friendly observation and fields of fire.

c Other Characteristics

(1) Existing situation Local nationals throughout the area favor friendly military operations Large numbers of refugees can be expected to pass through friendly lines

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action The threat can be expected to insert infiltrators as refugees

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(3) Effect on own courses of action. Refugees can be expected to provide valuable intelligence

3. ENEMY SITUATION

a. Disposition. See map of general situation.

b. Composition. See Krasnovian Order of Battle (Appendix 4 to M/S314 Staff Planning Book).

c. Strength. All units within the 2 GTA are between 96- and 98-percent strength in personnel, weapons, and equipment.

d. Recent and Present Significant Activities. Threat mobilization activity provides indications of offensive operations. The basic pattern of exercises resembles what was observed 5 or 10 years ago

e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses

(1) Personnel. The Krasnovian forces are at 96 to 98 percent of their authorized personnel strength. Morale, esprit. health, discipline, and political reliability are fairly high among the 90 percent of the forces made up of ethnic Krasnovians The remaining 10 percent is Interspersed among the units so that any reluctance can be readily overcome

(2) Intelligence Krasnovian intelligence organizations continuously conduct major Intelligence operations against NATO forces to determine NATO's wartime plans. In the AFCENT region, that effort is thought to focus on the corps' general defense plans. The primary means of collection are signals intelligence and agents. Threat doctrine emphasizes the need for accurate and complete all-source intelligence to support the preparation of its own plans. Its planning is only as good as its intelligence.

(3) Operations The threat can be expected to execute its plans in accordance with its offensive doctrine. That doctrine emphasizes surprise and speed. It can be expected that the threat has prepared several offensive plans, each based on different assumptions concerning its own and NATO's degree of mobilization and the state of NATO's defensive preparations.

(4) Logistics. Technical and logistical support throughout the front is combat ready Support units are in place. The total days of supply for POL, ammunition, and supplies is 21 days contained in materiel support units from front to regiment. The threat's major problem is in moving stocks forward from depots to maneuver units during combat operations.

(5) Civil-military operations. The general populations of POLAND and the CZECH REPUBLIC are openly hostile to Krasnovian troops as a result of previous occupations and/or stationing of Krasnovian troops. However, the native populations of both countries do not have the necessary power to adversely affect the Krasnovian plans, except for the expected partisan activities directed at rear area support units and ground lines of communication.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Enumeration. In the event of an attack by the 2 Krasnovian Front, committed forces facing the 10th (US) Corps would probably be the 2 GTA, consisting of two motorized rifle divisions (MRDs)

(BMP-2/T-80), two tank divisions (T-80), and one Independent motorized rifle regiment (IMRR), supported by normal division and army artillery and combat support units. The 2 GTA is expected to make the main attack for the 2 Krasnovian Front The 2 GTA would move quickly into southeastern GERMANY with immediate missions west of the ELBE River and subsequent missions west of THURINGER WALD toward KASSEL, FULDA, and COBERG. The 2 GTA would probably attack with two divisions in the first echelon and would not likely make extensive use of forward detachments. The following courses of action represent the capabilities of the 2 GTA

(1) The army will likely attack with two MRDs in the first echelon, two tank divisions in the second echelon, and the IMRR in reserve. The army's main attack would be on the northern avenue of approach with one MRD followed by a tank division

(2) The army could attack with three divisions in the first echelon. one tank division either as a second-echelon force or as an operational maneuver group (OMG), and the IMRR in reserve. The army's main attack would be on the northern avenue of approach with two divisions

(3) Same echelonment as in 4a(1) above but with the army's main attack on the southern avenue of approach

(4) Same echelonment as in 4a(2) above but with the army's main attack on the southern avenue of approach with two divisions.

(5) The army could conduct defensive operations in or out of contact with the 10th (US) Corps at any time or place

(6) The army could conduct retrograde operations at any time

(7) The army could employ chemical weapons in three ways

(a) Using nonpersistent agents mixed with smoke to break through the covering force and establish artillery positrons to support the main attack

(b) Using persistent agents to block 10th (US) Corps counterattacks if the army fails to achieve mission depths, immediate or subsequent

(c) Using nonpersistent and persistent agents in combination with smoke to further protect exposed flanks during its offensive operations

b Analysis and Discussion

(1) 2 GTA is considered to be fully combat effective and capable of conducting offensive operations against 10th (US) Corps as part of a Krasnovian strategic offensive. 2 GTA would likely be the main attack force for the 2 Krasnovian Front, reinforced by the front's combined arms reserve, air assault forces, fixed-wing air support and *spetsnaz*

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(2) Capabilities 4a(1) or 4a(2) above are considered most likely for 2 GTA in a Krasnovian attack against NATO. Capability in 4a(7) is also likely in any offensive

(3) The 2 GTA commander would probably prefer to attack with two MRDs in the first echelon and his exploiting force, two tank divisions, in the second echelon This battlefield structure provides the depth necessary to retain offensive tempo and momentum, and it permits the retention of the IMRR as a valid combined arms reserve.

(4) Either avenue of approach could support the army's main effort and the commitment of a second echelon. The northern avenue is considered more likely as it is more open terrain and would better support the theater main offensive into northern GERMANY

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. Effects of Intelligence Considerations on Operations. The mission IS supportable from the standpoint of military intelligence operations

b. Effects of the Area of Operations on Own Courses of Action The most defensible terrain lies along the THURINGER WALD and HARZ Mountains in the 10th (US) Corps area of operations The northern avenue of approach into the corps defensive sector IS the most dangerous due to the open terrain and excellent lines of communication

c. Probable Enemy Courses of Action

(1) In a Krasnovian attack against NATO, 2 GTA would likely make the main attack for the 2 Krasnovian Front in the 10th (US) Corps sector The 2 GTA would move quickly into southeastern GERMANY with Immediate missions west of the ELBE River and subsequent missions west of the THURINGER WALD toward KASSEL, FULDA, and COBERG. The 2 GTA would likely attack with two divisions in the first echelon, with a main attack in the northern sector, and with a supporting attack in the southern sector.

(2) The IMRR would serve as the army's combined arms reserve force to protect the commitment of second-echelon forces and to reinforce any successful penetrations of enemy defenses

(3) The attack by 2 GTA would be supported with fixed-wing air and NBC weapons and would likely be reinforced with front-level assets in the form of artillery air defense, combined arms reserves, air assault, and spetsnaz.

d. Enemy Vulnerabilities

(1) The Polish people are openly hostile to Krasnovian forces and wiI probably conduct partisan activities to disrupt rear area support and lines of communication.

(2) A prolonged conflict would greatly increase the disaffection and disruptive effects of ethnic minorities within Krasnovian forces.

INTEL EST 1-10th (US) Corps

(3) Krasnovian forces are not well equipped for night fighting; they must rely on massive battlefield illumination to sustain 24-hour operations.

/s/
JOHNSON
G2

Annexes: A-Krasnovian Front Line Trace
B-2 GTA Order of Battle
C-2 GTA Strength Assessment
D-Krasnovian Training Status
E-Krasnovian Combat Effectiveness
F-Biographies

ANNEX A (KRASNOVIAN FRONT LINE TRACE) to INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 1--10th (US) Corps



ANNEX B (2 GTA ORDER OF BATTLE) [EXTRACT from 10th (US) Corps ASPS Workbook]

2 GTA

Unit	System	No
Division-Level Units		
3 MRD		
118 MRR		
1181 MRB	BTR-80	50
1182 MRB	BTR80	50
1183 MRB	BTR-80	50
1184 TB	T-80	31
118 SP Arty Bn	2S1	18
118 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
118 AT Bn	AT-5	9
	MT-12	6
188 MRR		
1881 MRB	BTR-80	50
1882 MRB	BTR-80	50
1883 MRB	BTR-80	50
1884 TB	T-80	31
188 SP How Bn	2S1	18
188 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
188 AT Bn	AT-5	9
	MT-12	6
194 MRR		
1941 MRB	BMP-2	45
1942 MRB	BMP-2	45
1943 MRB	BMP-2	45
1944 TB	T-80	31
194 SP How Bn	2S1	18
194 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
194 AT Bn	AT-5	9
	MT-12	6
196 TR		
1961 TB	T-80	31
1962 TB	T-80	31
1963 TB	T-80	31
196 SP How Bn	2S1	18
196 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
25 Gds Arty Regt		
1 SP How Bn	2S3	18
2 SP How Bn	2S3	18
3 SP How Bn	2S3	18
25 MRL Bn	BM-21	18
55 SAM Regt	SA-8	20
3 Recon/REC Bn	BMP-2	17
	BRDM	13
	BRM-1K	7
3 AT Bn	AT-5	9
	MT-12	12
17 GMRD		
151 GMRR		
1511 MRB	BMP-2	45
1512 MRB	BMP-2	45
1513 MRB	BMP-2	45
1514 TB	T-80	31
151 SP Arty Bn	2S1	18
151 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
151 AT Bn	AT-5	9
	MT-12	6
153 GMRR		
1531 MRB	BMP-2	45
1532 MRB	BMP-2	45
1533 MRB	BMP-2	45
1534 TB	T-80	31
153 SP How Bn	2S1	18
153 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
153 AT Bn	AT-5	9
	MT-12	6
156 GMRR		
1561 MRB	BTR-80	50
1562 MRB	BTR-80	50
1563 MRB	BTR-80	50
1564 TB	T-80	31
156 SP How Bn	2S1	18
156 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-6	6
	SA-13	6

ANNEX B (2 GTA ORDER OF BATTLE) [EXTRACT from 10th (US) Corps ASPS Workbook]

Unit	System	No
156 AT Bn	AT-5	9
	MT-12	6
161 GTR		
1611 TB	T-80	31
1612 TB	T-80	31
1613 TB	T-80	31
161 SP How Bn	2S1	18
161 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
119 Gds Arty Regt		
1 SP How Bn	2S3	18
2 SP How Bn	2S3	18
3 SP How Bn	2S3	18
119 MRL Bn	BM-21	18
81 SAM Regt	SA-8	20
17 Gds Recon/ REC Bn		
	BMP-2	17
	BRDM	13
	BRM-1K	7
17 Gds AT Bn	AT-5	9
	MT-12	12
22 TD		
52 MRR		
521 MRB	BMP-2	45
522 MRB	BMP-2	45
523 MRB	BMP-2	45
524 TB	T-72	31
52 SP How Bn	2S1	18
52 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
52 AT Bn	AT-5	9
	MT-12	6

Unit	System	No
39 TR		
391 TB	T-72	31
392 TB	T-72	31
393 TB	T-72	31
394 MRB	BMP-2	45
39 SP Arty Bn	2S1	18
39 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
44 TR		
441 TB	T-72	31
442 TB	T-72	31
443 TB	T-72	31
444 MRB	BMP-2	45
44 SP How Bn	2S1	18
44 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
87 TR		
871 TB	T-72	31
872 TB	T-72	31
873 TB	T-72	31
874 MRB	BMP-2	45
87 SP How Bn	2S1	18
87 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
11 Arty Regt		
1 SP How Bn	2S3	18
2 SP How Bn	2S3	18
11 MRL Bn	BM-21	18
59 SAM Regt	SA-6	20
22 Recon/REC Bn	BMP-2	27
	BRDM	13
	BRM-1K	7

ANNEX B (2 GTA ORDER OF BATTLE) [EXTRACT from 10th (US) Corps ASPS Workbook]

Unit	System	No
57 GTD		
33 GMRR		
331 MRB	BMP-2	45
332 MRB	BMP-2	45
333 MRB	BMP-2	45
334 TB	T-80	31
33 SP Arty Bn	2S1	18
33 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
33 AT Bn	AT-5	9
	MT-12	6
41 GTR		
411 TB	T-80	31
412 TB	T-80	31
413 TB	T-80	31
414 MRB	BMP-2	45
41 SP How Bn	2S1	18
41 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
85 GTR		
851 TB	T-80	31
852 TB	T-80	31
853 TB	T-80	31
854 MRB	BMP-2	45
85 SP How Bn	2S1	18
85 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6
87 GTR		
871 TB	T-80	31
872 TB	T-80	31
873 TB	T-80	31
874 MRB	BMP-2	45
87 SP How Bn	2S1	18
87 AD Bn	2S6	6
	BMP-2	6
	SA-13	6

Unit	System	No
10 Gds Arty Regt		
1 SP How Bn	2S3	18
2 SP How Bn	2S3	18
10 MRL Bn	BM-21	18
76 SAM Regt	SA-8	20
57 Gds Record		
REC Bn	BMP-2	17
	BRDM	13
	BRM-1K	7
13 IMRR		
131 MRB	BMP-2	45
132 MRB	BMP-2	45
133 MRB	BMP-2	45
134 TB	T-80	31
37 Indep		
AASLT Bn	BMD	17
41 Arty Bde		
1 Gun Bn	2A36	18
2 Gun Bn	M-46	18
3 How Bn	2S3	18
4 How Bn	2S3	18
47 Rkt Lchr Regt		
1 MRL Bn	BM-21	18
2 MRL Bn	BM-21	18
3 MRL Bn	BM-21	18
36 SSM Bde		
361 SSM Bn	SS-21	6
362 SSM Bn	SS-21	6
363 SSM Bn	SS-21	6
11 SAM Bde		
111 SAM Bn	SA-4	9
112 SAM Bn	SA-4	9
113 SAM Bn	SA-4	9

ANNEX B (2 GTA ORDER OF BATTLE) [EXTRACT from 10th (US) Corps ASPS Workbook]

Unit	System	No
42 SAM Bde		
421 SAM Bn	SA-4	9
422 SAM Bn	SA-4	9
423 SAM Bn	SA-4	9
Army-Level Units, PGTA		
2 Indep Hel Regt		
1 Atk Hel Sqdn	Mi-24	20
2 Atk Hel Sqdn	Mi-24	20
3 CS Hel Sqdn	Mi-8a	20
17 Indep Hel Regt		
1 CS Hel Sqdn	Mi-8a	20
2 CS Hel Sqdn	Mi-8a	20
3 Atk Hel Sqdn	Mi-24	20
20 Cml Prot Bn		
31 Engr Bde		
4 Ponton Brg Regt		
21 Sig Regt		
10 Rdo Recon Bn		
36 Early Warning Bn		
20 Mat Spt Bde		
39 Hv Lift Regt		
Various other CS/CSS units		
Miscellaneous <u>Front-Level</u> Units		
10 Arty Div		
22 Gun Bde		
1 Gun Bn	2S5	18
2 Gun Bn	2S5	18
3 Gun Bn	2S5	18
14 How Bde		
1 How Bn	2S3	18
2 How Bn	2S3	18
3 How Bn	2S3	18
17 How Bde		
1 How Bn	2S3	18
2 How Bn	2S3	18
3 How Bn	2S3	18
29 How Bde		
1 How Bn	2S3	18
2 How Bn	2S3	18
3 How Bn	2S3	18
37 Rkt Lchr Bde		
1 MRL Bn	BM-22	18
2 MRL Bn	BM-22	18
3 MRL Bn	BM-22	18
41 AT Bde		
1 AT Bn	MT-12	12
	AT-5	9
2 AT Bn	MT-12	12
	AT-5	9
3 AT Bn	MT-12	12
	AT-5	9
4 AT Bn	MT-12	12
1 High-Powered Arty Bde		
1 Hv Arty Bn	2S7	12
2 Hv Arty Bn	2S7	12
3 Hv Arty Bn	2S7	12
4 Hv Arty Bn	2S7	12
21 AASLT Bde		
1 AASLT Bn	BMD	34
1 Para Bn		
2 Para Bn		
3 Para Bn		
21 Arty Bn	D-30	12
	BM-21 V	6
Air Forces of the <u>Front</u>		
8 Ftr Div		
157 Ftr Regt		
1571 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15
1572 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15
1573 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15

ANNEX B (2 GTA ORDER OF BATTLE) [EXTRACT from 10th (US) Corps ASPS Workbook]

Unit	System	No
191 Ftr Regt		
1911 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-21	15
1912 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-21	15
1913 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-21	15
220 Ftr Regt		
2201 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-21	15
2202 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-21	15
2203 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-21	15
23 Ftr Div		
133 Ftr Regt		
1331 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-29	15
1332 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-29	15
1333 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-29	15
154 Ftr Regt		
1541 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15
1542 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15
1543 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15
156 Ftr Regt		
1561 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15
1562 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15
1563 Ftr Sqdn	MiG-23	15
6 Ftr-Bmr Div		
177 Ftr-Bmr Regt		
1771 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	Su-25	15
1772 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	Su-25	15
1773 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	Su-25	15
179 Ftr-Bmr Regt		
1791 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	Su-25	15
1792 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	Su-25	15
1793 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	Su-25	15
181 Ftr-Bmr Regt		
1811 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	MiG-27	15
1812 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	MiG-27	15
1813 Ftr-Bmr Sqdn	MiG-27	15
15 Trans. Hel Regt		
151 Hv Lift Sqdn	Mi-26	12
152 Hv Lift Sqdn	Mi-26	12
153 Mdm Lift Sqdn	Mi-17	16
154 Mdm Lift Sqdn	Mi-17	16

Unit	System	No
10 Indep Recon Regt		
101 Indep Recon Bn	MiG-25	15
102 Indep Recon Bn	MiG-25	15
103 Indep Recon Bn	YaK-28	15
21 Hel ECM Sqdn	Mi-8J/K	20
76 GP Hel Sqdn	Mi-8T	30
19 SSM Bde		
191 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
192 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
193 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
48 SSM Bde		
481 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
482 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
483 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
67 SSM Bde		
671 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
672 SSM Bn	Scud-B	6
673 SSM Bn	Scud-6	6

ANNEX C (2 GTA STRENGTH ASSESSMENT) to INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 1--10th (US) Corps

In the event of an attack by the 2 Krasnovian Front, committed forces facing the 25th Armd Div would probably consist of two first-echelon motorized rifle divisions of the 2 GTA. These two divisions would consist of a total of 18 motorized rifle battalions and 12 tank battalions, supported by normal regimental, division, and army artillery and combat support units. All units within the 2 GTA are between 96 and 98 percent strength in personnel, weapons, and equipment.

Reinforcing forces considered capable of closing with the 25th Armd Div would probably be two tank divisions of the 2 GTA (consisting of a total of 20 tank and 12 motorized rifle battalions) and an independent motorized rifle regiment (IMRR) of the 2 GTA (consisting of three motorized rifle battalions and one tank battalion). which would probably be assigned the mission of the army reserve or army-level forward detachment.

Another possible reinforcing force capable of closing with the 25th Armd Div would be elements of the 16 TA, which consists of two motorized rifle and two tank divisions. This army would probably orient to the southwest initially and be located southeast of the 25th Armd Div eastern boundary.

The 16 TA would probably attack with three divisions in the first echelon because of its extremely wide zone of attack One of the tank divisions would probably be designated the front reserve. We could expect the possible commitment of only one first-echelon division against the 25th Armd Div.

ANNEX D (KRASNOVIAN TRAINING STATUS) to INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 1--10th (US) Corps

Individual training for Krasnovian soldiers has been thorough and comprehensive. Recruits receive 1 month requisite basic training on conscription, either in April or October of each year They hold subsequent multilevel individual training annually. The winter cycle begins in December, where most training is conducted in garrison. The summer cycle begins in June and involves considerable field training. Training is scheduled at least 6 hours each day, 6 days a week. Individual training has emphasized nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection, NBC protective masks and clothing are frequently worn for long periods during training. The Krasnovians conduct chemical training with live chemical agents for realism and practice decontamination under actual conditions. Almost all noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers have attended the appropriate military schools for their rank and experience.

Unit training is also thorough and realistic. Units at battalion level and below conduct extensive training in battle drills and are proficient in executing them. Division-level exercises, conducted through winter and summer training cycles, include tactical live fire supported by artillery and helicopter assets and night training. The Krasnovians consider this realistic and tough training imperative for the mental conditioning necessary for soldiers to cope with battlefield conditions and to perform well in combat Additionally, to create the proper attitude in the minds of all personnel, unit political officers conduct political training at least 5 hours per week.

Krasnovian training also has its negative aspects, including the stifling of the initiative of young leaders by overbearing and sometimes incompetent supervisors Only senior leaders (generally division commanders and above) have any recent combat experience from former Soviet Army operations in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Since the various Krasnovian ethnic groups speak several languages and/or dialects, the army has some difficulty training the non-Russian-speaking conscripts who make up approximately 10 percent of the armed forces. An additional problem exists because the government can divert conscripts to complete economic tasks, such as working on construction projects and planting and harvesting crops. This is not yet a significant weakness in producing well-trained soldiers. The conscript cycle results in a significant 25-percent personnel turnover each April and October as new recruits enter the service and those who have completed their 2-year obligation leave. Despite recent recruiting shortfalls, the Krasnovian Army has filled personnel shortages largely by forces withdrawn from other countries Despite all this, the Krasnovian Armed Forces are still a professional and well-trained military organization.

ANNEX E (KRASNOVIAN COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS) to INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 1--10th (US) corps

The 2 GTA and the 16 TA of the 2 Krasnovian Front have been determined to be fully combat effective after an analysis of the following factors:

1. Personnel strength is initially between 96 and 98 percent of authorized personnel.

2. Status of weapons and equipment is also between 96 and 98 percent on hand and combat ready

3 Status of training. See Annex D, Krasnovian Training Status.

4 The NCO and officer corps are highly efficient

5 Leaders from army to battalion levels are highly efficient and generally combat tested

6. The units have not been committed to combat heretofore

7 The traditions and past performance of the 2 GTA and 16 TA since the Great Patriotic War and In recent training exercises have been of the highest standards.

8 Present unit commanders, at least at the division level and above, are the best from the Krasnovian command selection and training systems. They all have followed the exclusive command career track with attendant experience and formal training.

9. The geographic area of projected commitment for both armies of the 2 Krasnovian Front is quite similar to that in which they have trained and will present few unexpected problems for rapid maneuver

10 Morale, esprit, health, discipline, and political reliability are fairly high among the 90 percent of the forces made up of ethnic Russians. The remaining 10 percent is interspersed among the units so that any reluctance can be readily overcome.

11 Technical support and logistic support throughout the front are combat ready Support units are in place. Materiel support units from front to regiment contain 21 total days of supply for POL, ammunition, and supplies.

12. The general populations of POLAND and the CZECH and SLOVAK REPUBLICS are openly hostile to Krasnovian troops as a result of previous occupations and/or stationing of former Soviet troops. However, the native populations of both countries can adversely affect Krasnovian plans only with partisan activities directed at rear area support units and ground lines of communication.

ANNEX F (BIOGRAPHIES) to INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 1--10th (US) Corps

1. 2 GUARDS TANK ARMY

The commander of the 2 GTA, Lieutenant-General Pavel Sergeyovich Bogdanovskiy, is in his early to mid-forties. He was born in Gorkiy, Russian Soviet Socialist Republic. His father, who died in 1953, served in the Great Patriotic War, reaching the rank of colonel before his discharge in 1945 as a result of severe war wounds. He received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for his actions during the VISTULA-ODER campaign. At age 15, LTG Bogdanovskiy attended the Moscow Suvorov Military School. After graduation, he entered the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School He was commissioned a motorized rifle lieutenant in 1969

His initial assignment was to the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (later, Western Group of Forces), where he commanded a reconnaissance platoon and later a reconnaissance company. In the Transcaucasus Military District, he commanded another reconnaissance company, served as a reconnaissance officer for a tank regiment, and commanded a motorized rifle battalion. He then attended the Frunze Military Academy, where he graduated with a gold medal He was promoted to major about the same time His research thesis on troop control in the forward detachment was published that same year

LTG Bogdanovskiy has been a member of the Communist Party since 1972. He was selected as People's Deputy of the USSR in 1989. A recent interview in Red Star revealed that he is a widower with two teenaged sons His wife died while he was attending the Voroshilov Academy One son lives with him, and the other is attending a military School,

ANNEX F (BIOGRAPHIES) to INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 1--10th (US) Corps

2. 3 GUARDS TANK DIVISION

Colonel Alexander lvanovich Garin assumed command of the division on the departure of LTG Bogdanovskly. He had been the division chief of staff, He graduated from the Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command School in 1977 and the Frunze Military Academy in 1985. He has commanded maneuver units from platoon to regiment. He has served three previous tours of duty in the Western Group of Forces, serving in former East Germany He has written several articles on the employment of motorized rifle forces in heliborne operations. including one dealing with using heliborne troops as forward detachments in offensive operations

3. 17 GUARDS TANK DIVISION

Major-General Valdrmir Petrovich Rassinovskly has been the commander of the 17 GTD for less than two years. He is in his late thirties or early forties He was commissioned from the Kiev Higher Combined Arms School in 1971 MG Rassinovskly has commanded at all levels through division Before he assumed command of the 17 GTD, he was the division chief of staff He has served in both the Southern Group of Forces (Hungary) and two previous tours in the Western Group of Forces (former East Germany). He is a graduate of the Frunze Military Academy (1979-82), and the Voroshilov General Staff Academy (1985-87). He has been awarded the Order of Lenin, among other awards

4. 22 TANK DIVISION

Major General Lev Abramovitch Semyanov has commanded the 22 TD for almost five years At fifty-six, he IS one of the senior division commanders in the 2 GTA He has commanded maneuver units at all levels through division. Before assuming command of the 22 TD, he was chief of staff of the 41 TD in the Carpathian Military District, where he commanded both a tank battalion and a tank regiment Indications are that his superiors consider him to be a leading thinker in tank operations Before attending the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, he spent two years at the Malinovskly Military Academy of Armored Forces, an unusual assignment for an officer apparently designated for the command track In that assignment, he was the chief author of the revision of the manual Combat Use of Tank Troops in the Great Patriotic War. He is a graduate of the Kharkov Guards Higher Tank Command School and the Frunze Academy

5. 57 GUARDS TANK DIVISION

Colonel Ivan Andreyevich Pavlovskly has commanded the 57 GTD for less than a year. He is a recent graduate of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy (1988-90). His assignments immediately prior to attending the general staff academy were as a regimental commander and chief of staff in the 14 TD, Northern Group of Forces (Poland), He is in his mid-thirties and is the only grandson of the former commander of the Malinovskly Tank Academy, Marshal of Tank Forces, O.A. Losik. MG Pavlovskly is thought to be one of the “golden boys” of the Krasnovian tank forces. He is extremely aggressive and bold. He was highly decorated during two tours of duty in Afghanistan in the early 1980s He is listed as one of the coauthors of the manual The Operational Maneuver Group in Combat and has published numerous other articles relating to the employment of tank forces in offensive operations.

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Division Offensive Planning

Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4 Combat Service Support Status of the 25th Armd Div

1. GENERAL. This document provides initial data on the current logistical situation of the 25th Armd Div as of D-3.

2. PERSONNEL

a. Personnel status of 25th Armd Div as of D-3.

Unit	Auth	Asgd	Asgd %	PDY*	PDY %
1st Bde	2,038	2,061	101	2,003	98
2d Bde	2,038	2,053	101	2,011	99
3d Bde	2,846	2,874	101	2,817	98
25th Avn Bde	613	621	101	578	94
2-22 Cav	624	626	100	595	95
25th DIVARTY	2,516	2,519	100	2,467	98
2-440 ADA	625	614	98	592	95
25th Cml Co	145	133	92	125	86
25th Engr Bn	889	874	98	839	94
5th Ml Bn	313	297	95	277	88
25th MP Co	148	148	100	136	92
25th Sig Bn	681	675	99	647	95
25th DISCOM	3,515	3,489	99	3,415	97
Total	17,027	16,990	99	16,501	97

*Assume initial asgd but not PDY strength is 55-percent hospital, 40-percent administrative hold, and 5-percent confinement.

b. 25th Armd Div estimated daily replacements (starting on D-day)

CA	CS	CSS
85	15	10

(1) Assume all PCS and ETS stop at D-day.

(2) 90 percent of leaves, passes, and TDY will return before D-day. AWOL, confinement, and hospitalization will remain constant through D-day.

c. The following MOSS are significantly understrength and are projected to remain so for the duration of this campaign:

MOS	Title	Asgd %	PDY %
12B	Combat engineer	89	84
45K	Tank turret repairman (MI)	99	67
54B	Chemical ops sp	84	80
98C	EW/SIGINT analyst	82	77

d. Enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). Anticipate capture of 200 EPWs per day during offensive, consolidation, and redeployment operations (Phase III).

e. Morale. Morale, unit cohesiveness, and esprit de corps are high throughout the division.

3. MATERIEL

a. Current equipment status (Auth/OH/MC)

Type Equipment	1st Bde	2d Bde	3d Bde	Avn Bde	DIV-ARTY	DISCOM	Div Cav	Div Total
Tank, M1A1	116/116/110	116/116/109	116/116/112	0	0	0	0	348/348/331
APC, M2	54/54/51	54/54/51	108/108/105	0	0	0	0	216/216/207
CFV, M3	18/18/15	18/18/14	24/24/18	0	0	0	40/40/34	100/100/81
ITv, M901	12/12/10	12/12/11	24/24/22	0	0	0	0	48/48/43
Can, mtr mortar	18/18/17	18/18/14	24/24/23	0	0	0	0	60/60/54
Hel, atk AH-64	0	0	0	36/36/30	0	0	0	36/36/30
Hel, atk AH-1S	0	0	0	0	0	0	8/8/7	8/8/7
Hel, util UH-60A	0	0	0	22/22/18	0	2/2/2	0	24/24/20
Hel, utll UH-1H	0	0	0	6/6/4	0	0	0	6/6/4
Hel, ECM EH-60A	0	0	0	3/3/3	0	0	0	3/3/3
How, 155-mm	0	0	0	0	72/72/67	0	0	72/72/67
MLRS	0	0	0	0	9/9/8	0	0	9/9/8
Trk, 5-tn tractor	0	0	0	0	6/6/6	240/240/224	0	246/246/230
Trlr, 221/2-tn	0	0	0	0	0	115/115/105	0	115/115/105
Trk, 5-tn cargo	0	0	0	0	0	103/103/101	0	103/103/101
Tanker, 5,000-gal	0	0	0	0	0	64/58/55	0	68/58/55

b. Current status of supplies.

(1) Unit basic loads of classes I, Ill, and V are at 100 percent.

(2) Unit PLL zero-balance average is 5 percent.

(3) Maintenance unit ASL zero-balance average is 10 percent.

(4) Status of supplies by class.

Type	DISCOM
(a) Class I	
T-ration	67,240 meals
MRE	182,000 meals
(b) Class II	
General supplies	111 STON
Chemical protective overgarments	0 suits
(c) Class III	
Packaged	22 STON
MOGAS	5,000 gal
DF-2	445,000 gal
JP-4	50,000 gal
(d) Class IV	172 STON
(e) Class V	0
(f) Class VI	21 STON
(g) Class VII	0
(h) Class VIII	38 STON
(i) Class IX (less DS ASL)	390 STON
(j) Class X	0

(5) Class I stockage based on a ration cycle of MRE-T-MRE.

(6) Classes II and IV are command-regulated.

(7) Class-controlled items.

(a) All combat vehicles.

(b) All combat support vehicles.
(c) Truck, 5-ton, track.

(d) Trailer, fuel-dispensing, 5,000-gallon

(e) All radar end items.

c. Maintenance.

(1) Cannibalization authorized at DS level.

(2) Maintenance Timelines:

(a) On-site - 10 hours.

(b) DS - 24 hours.

(c) DS (reinforcing) - 72 hours

(3) Class IX command-regulated items:

(a) All aircraft engines.

(b) M1A1 full-up power packs (FUPPs).

(c) M109 final drives.

(4) Priority of collection and classification effort to tanks, BFVs, IFVs, CFVs, field artillery cannons, and medium trucks.

d. Services

Mortuary affairs.

(a) Location of remains of allied civilian and military personnel and threat personnel will be reported through CMO channels for disposal.

(b) Emergency burial authorized only by division commander. If at all possible, remains will be evacuated to COSCOM collection points.

e. Medical. Corps evacuation policy is 15 days

f. Transportation. All main supply routes are designated controlled routes commencing D-Day

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Division Offensive Planning

Appendix 5 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. Sample Restated Mission

When Who What Where What
On order,_____ Div conducts a passage of lines through ____Div, attacks to

Why Where
defeat enemy in zone, and establishes blocking positions along Phase Line JEFF

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Division Oftensive Planning

Appendix 6 to Lesson Guide. Lesson 4. Sample Course of Action Sketch and Statement



D-day. H-hour. the division attacks with one brigade conducting a supporting attack in the north to penetrate first defensive position and fix second defensive position forces in the vicinity of Objective LARRY. When supporting attach reaches PL BILL. one brigade conducts the main anack to penetrate both first and second defensive positions and seize Objective PAUL. A tank-heavy brigade. in reserve. follows the main attack Aviation brigade conducts deep operations in EA CHET to defeat threat counterattack force during the main attach Rear operations commander conducts rear operations with a company team as tactical combat force (TCF) OO. div cav squadron screens the southern flank

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Division Offensive Planning

Appendix 7 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. Sample War-Gaming Products



Time	-14 hr	-12 hr	-10 hr	-8 hr	-6 hr	-4 hr	-2 hr	H-5 hr	H hour	+6 hr	+10 hr	+12 hr	+14 hr	+22 hr
Enemy Action			threat monitors movements continue def prep					counter btry		hghts from 1st bde asn	defend in 2d bde RAG dir fire	res moves to atk/block main atk		
Decision Points											|1| launch deep atk			|2| cont atk
MANEUVER: Deep												avn bde atk res vic EA A		
MANEUVER: Security	recon routes secure fwd areas				sqdn moves 3d on rts 3 & 4	(refuel)			cav sqdn moves		prep to screen rt flank		screen rt flank	
MANEUVER: Close			bdes move rts 1 & 2 (refuel) 3 & 4			lead bdes move to LD/LC			cross LD/LC		secure obj LARRY bde penetrate 2d bde pass res		atk obj PAUL	secure obj PAUL
MANEUVER: Reserve				bde moves 2d on rts (refuel) 3 & 4			bde moves				continue atk to obj PAUL			continue atk or def
MANEUVER: Rear	avn bde Level III response									risk in rear area avn bde prep deep atk				
Air defense	wpns HOLD			wpns TIGHT	protect rts & refuel areas		Protect move to LD/LC	protect lead bde	wpns FREE					spt def
Fire support		move to fwd fire asn			coord w/support arty			fire prep	provide DS/GS spt		atk RAG Fire SEAD			spt atk on obj PAUL
IEW					latest threat LOC			fwd RAG & threat res		confirm loc threat res	confirm move of threat res			loc threat beyond obj PAUL
Engineer				mount rts				spt to lead bde mob on axis			mount on MSR			prep def or atk
Sustainment		Refuel & mount units move			refuel & fix in atk pos			refuel & mount units to MSB			resupply bde on obj LARRY			resupply obj PAUL
C2		coord cross LD/LC main AA Rose		TAC CP with lead bde						main opens cont atk	main prep to move			main CP moves

Sample synchronization matrix: division offensive course of action



NARRATIVE WAR GAME

CORPS DEFENSE

CRITICAL EVENT: Covering Force Battle -Belt 1

Sequence	ACTION	REACTION	COUNTERACTION	ASSETS	TIME	REMARKS
1	Move into positions Remain dispersed for max protection Monitor enemy nets Locate CPs and FA units	Conduct recon to find BPs and gaps in covering force units Threat TAR from front and army	Conduct counter-recon activities. Strip away army, div & regt recon elements Maintain listening silence. Emphasis on deception, building BPs and FA positions for counterfire. Corps BAI program out to RIPL* slow 2d ech forces	ACR maneuver bde target acq btry, 6 FA bns, MI, ADA engr assets	H - 36 to H - 7	CFA must be portrayed as MBA. FCS to ACR & DIVARTY priority fires to MRLs. DAG, RAGS engr OPCON CF
2	Prep for ground assault Alert ADA systems for fixed wing & hel CAS ID enemy air atk ave	Conduct FA prep on BPs, CPs, FA locations. Jam cmd fire nets, and ADA warning system. Atk with fixed and hel CAS. Counter air program with air and ADA	Loc FA firing position and nets CF and jam Employ CA and ADA	Tgt acq btry, MLRS & FA bns. ADA Plt per bde/sqdn. TAR counterair	H - 7 to H-hour	Priority fires to MRLs. DAG, RAGs ADA OPCON to CF ADA coord w/regional AD plan
3	Threat atks with 1 regt on ave A, 2 regts on ave B, 2 regts on ave C, 2 regts on ave D although sometimes forced to 1 regt Threat main atk on aves B & C	ACR hold on ave A, fight main fight on aves B & C Maneuver bde hold ave D Must force lead divs to commit 2d-ech regts to ID main effort	Economy of force on aves A & D, continued atks on aves B & C Heavy FA, CAS & commitment of 2d-ech regts to force a breakthrough	ACR maneuver bde & FA bns CAS	H - hour to H + 10	CF must hold on aves A & D Strong fight on aves B & C cause threat to deploy 2d ech regts
4	Threat commits 2d ech regts of 1st ech div on aves B & C Cont economy of force on aves A & D	ACR fights main fight on aves B & C Corps control of CF fight difficult. Must now allow exposed flank between the 2 CF units. MBA units prep for handover	Threat presses hard to force breakthrough Attempt to find handover and disrupt transition to MBA fight Attempt to break seam between ACR and maneuver bde	ACR maneuver bde & FA bns CAS spt from MBA units	H + 10 to H + 15	MBA units prep for battle handover FA plans for displacement of MBA

*reconnaissance and interdiction planning line (RIPL)—A phase line which defines the corps area of responsibility. The RIPL is drawn on the operations map to delineate the area forward of the corps fire support coordination line into an area for the corps to target BAI missions short of the RIPL, and an area for the army group-allied tactical air force to target air interdiction (AI) missions beyond the RIPL. (This is a NATO term only.)

Sample war game worksheet: corps defensive course of action

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Division Offensive Planning

Appendix 8 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. Sample Decision Matrix and Decision Tables for Two Courses of Action

Course of Action	Advantages	Disadvantages
COA 1	Simplicity. Fewer control measures. Reserve positioned with flexibility to commit in either sector.	Increased coordination for reserve brigade cdr and staff required to plan more than 1 option.
COA 2	Defense from BPs allows greater control in shaping enemy's penetration.	BDE cdrs have less say in positioning their battalions. Less flexible plan for committing the reserve.
COA 3		

Criteria Decision Table Example

CRITERIA	COA 1	COA 2	COA
SIMPLICITY	+	-	
FLEXIBILITY	+	-	
SEIZES THE INITIATIVE	0	+	
DEFEATS THE ENEMY WELL FORWARD	+	+	
FACILITATES FUTURE OPERATIONS (transitioning to the offense)	+	0	
LOGISTICAL SUPPORTABILITY	+	0	

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Division Offensive Operations

Appendix 9 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 4. Overview of Deliberate Decision-Making Procedures;

You learned deliberate decision-making procedures in S310B. Lesson 4 of S320A requires you to apply these procedures to solve a tactical problem The following overview is a guide designed to supplement, not replace, the FM 101-5 (FD) description found in ST 101-5, Command and *Staff Decision Processes.* Keep this appendix open as you complete Lesson 4. It will assist you in applying the process and help you remember the proper considerations for each step.

The tactical decision-making process has four major steps: identify the problem, develop various solutions, determine the relative advantages and disadvantages of the competing solutions, and then decide. That, briefly, is the tactical decision-making process as shown in figure 4-1.



Figure 4-1

Although the four steps of the tactical decision-making process remain constant, there are three methods of application: the deliberate, the combat, and the quick. Figure 4-2 illustrates where the three methods fall on the planning continuum and associates how some major planning variables align with the methods. Each has its place and purpose.



Figure 4-2

Lesson 4 of S320A will allow you to employ the deliberate decision-making procedures (DDMP) that you 'earned in S310B. Later, in Lesson 5, you will employ the more streamlined combat decision-making procedures (CDMP). Figure 4-3 shows the steps of the DDMP and the relationship between the commander and staff



Figure 4-3

As you recall, the first step in solving a tactical problem is to completely understand the mission; this is called mission analysis. FM 101-5 (FD) divides mission analysis into eleven steps (Figure 4-4), although some of these steps may be nothing more than informal mental checks

I. Mission Analysis (11 possible steps)

1. Commander reviews commanders' intent of one and two levels up.
2. Staff reviews AO, higher's concept of operations, and task organization.
3. Staff identifies specified and implied tasks.
4. Staff develops list of essential tasks (it defines success and shapes the restated mission).
5. Staff reviews available assets (including attachments and detachments from task org).
6. Staff determines limitations (restrictions and constraints).
7. Staff determines broad command and control warfare (C2W) considerations to maximize lethal and nonlethal fires.
8. Staff proposes acceptable risk for commander's approval.
9. Staff determines critical facts and assumptions which can and will affect successful accomplishment of the mission
10. Staff analyzes available time (balance planning detail vs. speed and surprise).
11. Staff (G3 & CofS) prepare restated mission for Commander's approval (contains the WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, & WHY).

Figure 4-4

The commander uses the restated mission to focus subsequent planning (Figure 4-5)

Following mission analysis, the commander must:

- Specify the organization's essential tasks.
- Approve the unit's restated mission.
- Issue a warning order that disseminates the **restated mission** that was developed during the mission analysis process.

The commander will normally provide guidance to his staff for their use during the remaining portions of the decision-making process.

Figure 4-5

Commander's guidance is an art. It should contain specifics to prevent wasted staff effort but leave sufficient latitude to preclude stifling initiative. Figure 4-6 illustrates purpose and content.

Commander's Guidance

Purpose:
- Implant the commander's vision into the staffs' mind.
- Focus the staffs' efforts by specifying or eliminating options for/from analysis.
- Will normally focus on close operations
- Will provide broad guidance for deception operations and sustainment priorities.

Either broad or restrictive but might provide guidance in nine areas:

1. Enemy course (s) of action
2. Restated mission
3. Intent
4. Concept of operation (with scheme of maneuver)
5. Deception objective
6. Priorities
7. The time plan
8. The type of order to issue
9. The type of rehearsal to conduct

Figure 4-6

The content of commander's guidance will vary extensively based upon time available, staff proficiency. mission constraints personalities, and many other factors Possible areas of guidance **are** detailed in the figures 4-7 to 4-14

Possible Areas of Guidance

1. Enemy course(s) of action:

Commander may specify specific enemy COA(s) to review and might place them in order of priority

2. Restated mission:

Commander must understand and use precise terms and explain missions as tasks and purposes that translate into specific actions for assigned units

3. Intent: (Mandatory for all orders):

Commander must personally develop and deliver his intent in writing except in the most extraordinary case where it may be issued verbally

4. Concept of operation (with scheme of maneuver):

Used by the commander to focus his staff in broad terms of where, when, and how he will concentrate his combat power to attain mission accomplishment

Address the battlefield through battlefield organization elements and outlines as considered necessary to develop the scheme of maneuver.

Figure 4-7

Concept of Operation for Offensive Operations

- Concept must permit rapid transition between offensive phases.
- Corps and division commanders must organize the following elements for complementary functions when conducting an attack:

  - Main attack
  - Reserve
  - Reconnaissance and security operations
  - Deep operations
  - Rear operations

  } Commanders of brigade and lower do not normally do these operations but they-

  * look for uncommitted enemy forces
  l provide all-around security (including logistics trains)

Concept of Operation for Defensive Operations

- The five defensive elements for organizing the battlefield:

1. Security forces
2. Main battle area
3. The reserve
4. Deep operations
5. Rear operations

Figure 4-8

Scheme of Maneuver

A scheme of maneuver is central to the commander's concept for close operations. It --

- Outlines the movement of forces.
- Identifies objectives or areas to be retained.
- Assigns responsibility for zones, sectors, or areas
- Prescribes formations or dispositions when necessary.
- Identifies maneuver options which may develop during an operation
- Requires the uninterrupted support of FA, AD, Air Spt, Engr, MI, comms, and service support.
- Determines allocation of forces and design of supporting plans or annexes.
- Guides effort to coordinate tires, obstacles, air defense priorities, electronic warfare, deception efforts and CS & CSS arrangements.

Figure 4-9

Possible Areas of Guidance (cont.)

5. The Deception objective

- What the commander wants the enemy to do.
- The concept of how to cause the enemy commander to commit to to a COA that friendlies can exploit
- Later developed into a story, target, and events in the decision-making process.
- Must be planned at the same time as a course of action.
- Commander issues a mission statement detailing what he desires the enemy to do. He must consider --
  - What forces and materials he is willing to dedicate to the effort
  - How he expects the enemy to behave
  - How he expects to exploit enemy behavior.

Tactical-level deception objectives must be coordinated with operational-level deception plans.

Figure 4-10

Possible Areas of Guidance (cont.)

6. Priorities

- Commander must specify any initial priorities he envisions for CS and CSS to preserve freedom of action and ensure continuous support
- Must outline defense against enemy deep operations.
- Rear operations priorities include limits for deception operations
- Commander must establish key sustainment priorities for:
  - Manning
  - Arming
  - Fueling
  - Moving
  - Sustaining soldiers and their systems
  - Fixing

Figure 4-11

Possible Areas of Guidance (cont.)

7. The Time Plan. The Commander Must Consider:

- Availability of time (reverse planning).
- Complexity of the mission.
- Position of forces.
- Planning requirements necessary to develop and synchronize mission execution.
- Combat preparation:
  - Subordinate unit planning
  - Movement.
  - Logistical preparation.
  - Reconnaissance.
  - Rehearsals.
  - Combat inspections.
- Ambient light for mission execution and combat preparation
- How and where to issue the order.

Figure 4-12

Possible Areas of Guidance (cont.)

8. The Types of Orders

There are five general forms of orders; the preferred method of distribution is written followed by a verbal briefing

1. The fragmentary order (FRAGO)
2. The oral order.
3. The overlay order.
4. The open (fill-in-the-blank) order.
5. The five paragraph written order

Figure 4-13

Possible Areas of Guidance (cont.)

9. **Rehearsals. The commander conducts rehearsals to--**

- Gain agility
- Ensure coordination of events
- Enhance mutual support

An effective rehearsal will-

- Identify problem areas and omissions.
- Indicate required contingencies.
- Determine movement or reaction times
- Enhance coordination
- Refine the plan
- Increase confidence of leaders and soldiers

Figure, 4-14

After the commander provides his guidance, the staff will develop multiple courses of action that satisfy the restated mission (Figure 4-15).



Figure 4-15

The total number of COAs developed depends upon several factors: available time, ratio of combat power, desires of the commander, and so forth. In any event, if the COA does not meet the tests described in Figure 4-16, it must be rejected. Figures 4-16 to 4-22 highlight the key points staffs must consider while developing courses of action

Course of Action Development

After receiving guidance, the entire staff (usually led by the CofS (XO)) develops COAs to identify and retain for analysis ways to achieve the mission. Initially, while the G3 (S3) formulates potential conceptual possibilities, other staff officers (including FS, engineer, AD, chemical, communications, and transportation officers) consider integration of their BOS. Each COA must meet several tests:

- Suitability
- Feasibility
- Acceptability
- Distinguishability
- Completeness

Figure 4-16

Suitability: Each COA must accomplish the mission and comply with the commander's guidance

Feasibility: Can the unit accomplish the mission in terms of--
- Time
- Space
- Means (resources available at proper time and place)

Acceptability: All COAs developed must pass a subjective test--
Does the cost (in terms of time, soldiers, equipment, or position losses) justify the advantages gained by its execution?

Distinguishability: COAs must significantly differ in terms of--
- Use of reserves
- Task organization
- Main effort
- Scheme of maneuver
- Day or night execution

Completeness: A complete COA includes--
- Who (what type forces) will execute the mission
- What action is contemplated (attack, defend, and so forth)
- When the action begins (on order, D-Day, H-Hour)
- Where (sectors for defense, zones for offense)
- How the commander will employ his assets (should Indicate two levels down)

Figure 4-17

Steps in the Course of Action Development Process:

1. **Analyze relative combat power*.** Gain insights into-
   - Friendly capabilities pertaming to the operation
   - What type operations might be possible (enemy and friendly)
   - How and where the enemy might be vulnerable.
   - Comparison at two levels down (corps at brigade, div isionat battalion, and so forth).

* *Not like the former Soviet mathematical correlation of forces, rather, a largely subjective* estimate *using factors from Tables* E-7, E-2, and E-3 of *FM 101-5 (FD)*

2. **Generate conceptual possibilities** by brainstorming
   - Commander decides the number of COAs to develop.
   - Commander decides which enemy COAs to consider (and the priority)
   - Don't develop a good COA and several "throwaways."
   - Staff may later develop feasible COAs into branches of the base plan

3. **Array initial forces** to provide a basis for scheme of maneuver. Must first consider--
   - Unit's restated mission
   - Avenue(s) of approach, both friendly and enemy
   - As many enemy COAs as possible given available time (start with the most probable)

Figure 4-18

4. **Determine the ratio** of friendly units required (for COAs only, not combat)
   - Tools to use for determining the ratio from FM 101-5 (FD) Table E-3 Examples are:

     - Historically 50-50 probability of defender succeeding with 1:3 ratio given cover, selection of ground, sited weapons. obstacles. and so forth Attacker needs 5:1 or 6:1 ratio.

     - As a starting point attempt to defend each AA with a 1:3 ratio. Express friendly units against enemy units of the next higher level (for example friendly battalions against enemy regiments)

     - Operations such as pursuit use different ratios (possibly 1:1)

   - These are starting points; planners adjust ratios as they develop the COA

5 **Determine a proposed FEBA** (defense) or LD/LC (offense).

6. **Develop the deception story** (deception story might Influence the positioning of forces so deception must be Integrated at this point)

7. **Make the initial array of friendly forces** (array generic forces two levels down on generic ground without regard to task organization or the mission of the arrayed unit)

   Defense: Array against avenues of approach; along the forward edge of the CFA. along the FEBA, and in depth throughout the AO.

   Offense Array by allocating forces to all avenues of approach from LC to the objectives after visualizing how the enemy might defend

Figure 4-19

Steps in the Course of Action Development Process (cont.)

8. **Develop the scheme of maneuver(SOM)** to describe how the arrayed forces accomplish the commander's intent. It is expressed in terms of defeating the enemy or accomplishing the mission through maneuver.

- The SOM provides--
  - How the organization will achieve the end state.
  - A means for actually employing forces
  - The basis for analysis.
- Planners should develop several SOMs for each enemy COA
- Develop various SOMs in relation to the battlefield framework by--
  - Reevaluating the terrain and the enemy
  - Reevaluating the force ratio and accepting risk
  - Considering the Impact of shortages or use of uncommitted forces
  - Evaluating use of other operations given relative combat power
  - Determining the defeat mechanism
  - Determining the location of objectives or counterattack objectives
  - Determining the location of the main effort and supporting efforts
  - Integrating obstacles with maneuver and fires

Figure 4-20

9. **Determine the C^2arrangement.** This requires three separate actions
   - Determining C^2 means over maneuver units by allocating C^2headquarters.
   - Determining maneuver control measures to synchronize combat power, to minimize fratricide, and to maximize subordinates' initiative.
   - Determining fire support control measures (FSCMs) to balance the need for permissive measures with protection against fratricide.

10. **Prepare COA statements and sketches.**
   - The G3 prepares a COA statement and supporting sketch for each COA which collectively state:
     - The operation's purpose.
     - The main effort or attack.
     - The scheme of maneuver, defeat mechanism, and any significant risk.
     - How each major subordinate maneuver unit will execute the mission.
     - Portray (in terms of deep, close, and rear) how units will defeat the enemy.

Figure 4-21

Steps in the Course of Action Development Process (cont.)

- For clarity, the sketch can be enhanced with identifying features such as cities, rivers, and major terrain features
- As a minimum, the sketch should Include.
  - -Planning headquarters and MSC boundaries
  - - Allocated forces
  - - Control measures such as:
    - * Phase lines
    - * Axes of advance
    - * Zones or sectors
    - * Engagement areas
    - * Objectives
    - * The FEBA or LD/LC
    - * Assembly areas
    - * Strongpoints
    - * Battle positions
    - * Major obstacles
    - * Fire support coordination
    - * The main effort (offense)

Figure 4-22

After developing multiple courses of action, the staff evaluates the competing alternatives to determine advantages and disadvantages of each. Figures 4-23 to 4-29 illustrate this procedure

Deliberate Decision-Making Procedure



Figure 4-23

Course of action briefing should include:

- The updated IPB.
- Possible enemy COAs (situation templates)
- The restated mission.
- The commander's and higher commander's intent.
- The COA statement and sketch.
- The rationale for each COA, including--
  - Considerations that might affect enemy COAs.
  - Deductions resulting from relative-combat power analysis.
  - Why the staff arrayed units as shown on the sketch.
  - Why the staff used selected control measures.
- Planning headquarters and unit boundaries.
- Allocated forces.
- Control measures.

Figure 4-24

Course of action analysis and comparison consist of:

- War gaming (determining the strengths and weaknesses of a COA)
- Operational analysis and risk assessment (determining ways to reduce personnel and equipment losses).
- Comparison of COAs to determine which best accomplishes the mission.

A staff may conduct a quick initial analysis in each of their respective fields of interest to identify COAs that are infeasible. . . After discarding such COAs the staff, led by the <u>CofS (XO).</u> begins detailed analysis.

FM 101-5 (FD), p4-28

Figure 4-25

Course of Action Analysis-War Gaming

- **War gaming has several general rules:**

  1. Remain unbiased; don't allow others' desires to influence the outcome of analysis.
  2. Accurately record advantages and disadvantages.
  3. Continually assess feasibility; reject any COAs that prove infeasible.
  4. Avoid premature conclusions.
  5. Avoid comparing one COA with another during war gaming

- **Steps in war gaming:**
  - Gather the tools
  - List all friendly forces
  - List assumptions
  - List known critical events and decision points (DPs)
  - List significant factors
  - Select war-gaming method (belt, box, or avenue in depth)
  - Select a recording technique (narrative or sketch-note method)
  - Conduct the war game (action-reaction-counteraction) and assess the results

Figure 4-26

War-game results might include:

- A modified COA
- Insights into flow, duration, risks, branches, and possible sequels
- Requirements for deception and surprise
- Nuclear or chemical effects, or both
- Prospective task organization and organization for combat
- Identification of subordinate units tasks and priorities
- Refinement or identification of critical events and decision points
- Projection of enemy losses during critical events and overall
- Projection of FLOT location and relative positions of friendly and enemy forces
- Knowledge of advantages and disadvantages
- Assessment of CS and CSS implications

War Game and CCIR:

After completing the war game for a COA, staff members will know where the DPs are, what critical information they will need to support the DPs, and how they will collect and send the information. The information then becomes the commander's CCIR for that COA.

War Game—A visualization, not a prediction:

In all likelihood, the enemy will not react exactly as the war game predicts. Also, subordinate units may develop their own concepts of operations from those used in the war game

War gaming COAs and The synchronization matrix:

During the war game, the war gamers might make a synchronization matrix, which is the staff record of the result of the war game

Figure 4-27

Operational Analysis and Risk Assessment/Management

The purpose of operational analysis and risk assessment/management is to determine where loss of personnel and equipment might occur in the operation and to manage loss to minimum levels. The staff then develops a combination of p^2 controls to balance the COA's strength against its risks.

FM 101-5, p 4-31 (DRAFT)

Operational Analysis and Risk Assessment Process

1. Identify risks and major events (developed and recorded during the war game)
2. Assess risks (staff divides an operation into major events to see where risk can be reduced or eliminated)
3. Examine events, looking for places where p^2 controls would be appropriate to synchronize and protect the force

Figure 4-28

Course of Action Analysis—Comparison

After war gaming each feasible friendly COA against each feasible enemy COA, assessing its risks, and yielding p^2 control options, the staff compares the results of all feasible COAs. They determine the best probable friendly COA against the enemy COA of most concern to the commander . . . . The staff may concentrate on significant factors or a combination of various criteria deemed most critical to the operation. One tool that they can use is a decision matrix which weights various factors.

FM 101-5 (FD), p 4-32

Weighting Decision Criteria

When developing a decision matrix, the commander should advise his staff of the criteria he considers important. In his absence, his staff develops criteria which reflect either his planning guidance or unique aspects of the operation. Weighting for each criterion is a subjective evaluation . . .

FM 101-5 (FD) p 4-32

Figure 4-29

Following the comparison, the staff makes a recommendation to the commander, who makes the decision. See Figures 4-30 through 4-32.



Figure 4-30

The staff prepares a decision briefing for the commander

It must--

- Outline each COA (to include all advantages and disadvantages).
- Present each COA in a neutral manner (to include all identified branches and sequels)
- Discuss all unresolved issues or dissenting opinions with the commander.
- CofS (XO) tells the commander which COA the staff recommends.

The commander makes a selection

It might be--

- The recommended COA.
- An alternative one.
- A modified COA.
- A completely new COA.

Once the commander makes his selection, he refines the chosen COA into a clear, concise statement of his intent, the general scheme of maneuver, and what supporting fires the operation will need. The decision should include the elements of what, when, where, how, why, and possibly who. If the who has not been previously identified, the commander will do so at this time.

FM 101-5 (FD), p 4-34

Figure 4- 31

The commander decides what risk is acceptable for mission accomplishment

and then gives his decision and concept of operation.

- He expands the wording of the selected COA into a concept of operation statement and outlines this concept to the staff.
- The concept amplifies the previously given intent statement. It includes--
  - Actions within the elements of organizing the battlefield.
  - A clear designation of the main effort.
  - How the commander intends to defeat the enemy.

The commander also specifies operational command and support relationships.

Task organization: The initial allocation of available forces. The commander of the supported C^2 headquarters has command authority over them.

Organization for combat Priorities and allocation of GS assets. The commander of the supported C^2 headquarters has control over them as the higher commander specifies.

Figure 4- 32

Once the commander makes the decision, the formal decison-making process is complete. However, he still must ensure that his decision is executed as designed. Figure 4-33 illustrates the relationship between planning, directing, and controlling from the time the initial tasking is received to when the mission is completed.



Figure 4- 33

Developing and publishing some form of order is a key step in directing. Figures 4-34 and 4-35 describe this step



Figure 4- 34

An OPORD is a key element of control (cont.)

- The staff prepares the OPORD or OPLAN based on--
  - The commander's concept.
  - The commander's decisions.
  - Established SOPs.
- The staff might also incorporate approved branches and sequels in the body or as annexes.
- The G3 (with help from the G2) produces the commander's DST.
- The G3 issues a second warning order to subordinate and supporting commands that:
  - Outlines the next operation
  - Provides other needed information (such as time for orders briefing)
  - May provide special requirements for a particular unit
  - Publishes the commander's CCIR

Figure 4- 4-35

This completes the overview of the DDMP necessary for Lesson 4. Remember, this document is designed as a review checklist, not as a primary teaching tool. This appendix covered deliberate decision-making procedures. You will find a similar document that explains combat decision-making and quick decision-making procedures in lesson 5.

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 4. Division Offensive Planning

Appendix: 10 to Lesson Guide. Lesson 4.25th Armd Div OPLAN Worksheet

This worksheet provides an extract of the OPLAN format. Use it to record those portions of the 25th Armd Div OPLAN you complete as you work through the tactical problem using the MDM process. Theportions where you supply information from your estimates are indicated in bold type. You are not required to complete an entire OPLAN. A line of asterisks denotes omitted portions of the standard OPLAN format.

EXTRACT

Copy 1 of ___ copies
25th Armd Civ
BAD NEUSTADT, GE
_____ 199_
UR12

OPERATION PLAN _____(_____)
(provide name)

References: * * * * * *

Time zone used throughout the Plan: Alpha

Task Organization: **Annex A (Task Organization)**

1. SITUATION

a. **Enemy forces.**

b. Friendly forces.

(1) 10th (US) Corps Commander's Intent: My intent is to defeat the 2 Krasnovian Front by destroying the 2 GTA as it attacks into our sector. This will allow LANDCENT to restore the borders and prepare to conduct offensive operations in support of the AFCENT campaign plan. I intend to destroy the 2 GTA by using a mobile defense. We'll establish conditions for the decisive operation by using a firepower-oriented force positioned well forward. Then, using the majority of the corps maneuver forces positioned farther back. we'll attack to destroy remaining forces in the corps AO. Our success will be measured by having destroyed the 2 GTA, being positioned to attack north, and establishing the conditions to allow German Korps East to attack to restore the German-Polish border.

* * * * * * * * *

2. **MISSION**

3. EXECUTION

INTENT

a. Concept of Operation. **Annex C (Operation Overlay)**

(1) **Maneuver.** This is a single-phased operation.

(2) **Fires.**

* * * * * * * * *

b. Tasks to Maneuver Units.

(1) **1st Bde.**

(2) **2d Bde.**

(3) **3d Bde.**

(4) **25th Avn Bde.**

(5) **2-22 Cav Squadron**

* * * * * * * * *

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Concept of Support.

(1) Support Before the Attack.

(2) Support During the Attack.

(3) Support After the Attack.

* * * * * * * * *

OFFICIAL:

G3

ANNEX A (Task Organization) to 25th Armd Div OPLAN ——————

(Draft the way you would task organize the 25th Armd Div to accomplish the mission in your OPLAN.)

ANNEX C (Operation Overlay) to 25th Armd Div OPLAN_____



REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 5. Division Defensive Planning

SCOPE

Lesson 5 picks up from where the lesson 4 OPLAN would have put you after the division conducted the attack. The same scenario employed in the previous lesson picks up with the 25th Armd Div having just consolidated in the various objectives after destroying the lead elements of the 22 TD. You will use the same friendly forces in lesson 5 that you used during lesson 4. You will also work with many of the same Krasnovian units. You will discover that this lesson will go much faster than the last one.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

A.30 TASK: Analyze a corps plan.

CONDITION: Given a written requirement with references, a scenario, and a corps plan

STANDARD: Analysis must-

- Comply with higher commander's intent.
- Synchronize the tactical battlefield operating systems.
- Include consideration of the the elements of the battlefield framework.
- Comply with employment doctrine as described in FM 71-100 and FM 100-5.

LEVEL: Analysis

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2a, and 3a

A.50 TASK. Develop a tactical plan.

CONDITION: Acting as a staff officer of a heavy division, given a tactical situation, the corps plan, appropriate references, enemy and friendly status, and a requirement to plan offensive or defensive operations.

STANDARD: The plan must-

- Apply doctrine and justify its application as described in FM 63-20, FM 71-100, and FM 100-5.

- Be tactically feasible and derived using the decision-making methods described in FM 101-5 and the course material.

- Employ terminology and symbology IAW FM 101-5-1.

LEVEL: Application

PJE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: 1a, 1b, 1d, 1e, 2a, and 3a.

B.12 TASK: Describe the conduct of Soviet-style army- and front level defensive operations.

CONDITION: Given a scenario with a Soviet-style front level offensive operational plan and a written requirement, with references.

STANDARD: Description must address the reasons for assuming the defense, transition to the defense, organization and composition of Soviet-style operational-level defense, and allocation of assets at the operational-level defense IAW ST 100-7, student notes, and assigned readings.

LEVEL: Knowledge

PIE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: 1b, 2b, and 3a.

A.51 TASK. Communicate a tactical decision.

CONDITION. Given a tactical situation, appropriate maps, other references, and the commander's restated mission and intent, the coordinating staffs estimates; the G2's and G3's wargaming notes; a recommended course of action, the commander's decision; and a requirement to write parts of a division operation plan.

STANDARD The plan must-

- Communicate the commander's decision and set priorities that subordinate commanders will need to comply, with his intent.

- Justify the order IAW the doctrine in FM 63-2, FM 63-20, FM 63-21, FM 71-100, FM 100-5, and FM 101-5.

- Employ terminology and symbology JAW FM 101-51 and must employ effective writing style as described in ST 22-2.

LEVEL Application

ASSIGNMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Use the lesson guide to achieve the learning objectives. The lesson guide contains a series of directed readings and specific learning activities that require you to apply various decisionmaking procedures taught in previous tactics courses. If you do these scenario-based requirements when directed and actively think about what you arc doing and why, you are doing it, you will be able to master the overall learning objectives of S320A. Additonally, you will be able to complete the exam requirements quickly.

This lesson is sequential; it builds on previous lessons in this subcourse. Therefore, all references used previously in S310B and S320A are required for this lesson. The maps and overlays remain the same as for lesson 4.

Maps, Series M648, Edition 1-DMA (1 :100,000)

C4326	C4330	C4334	C4338		
C4722	C4726	C4730	C4734	C4738	C4742
C5122	C5126	C5130	C5134	C5138	C5142
C5522	C5526	C5530	C5534	C5538	C5542

Lesson 4 gave you the opportunity to practice all the tactics instruction you have received so far. You were able to employ a modem U.S. Army division as part of a multinational corps in a joint and combined offensive operation. Lesson 5 will provide the same opportunity but with a few new twists: first, the mission is defensive; second, the scenario will not allow you the same amount of planning time that you had before. This is by design, You will develop a FRAGO rather than an OPLAN.

As with lesson 4, you must conscientiously work through the series of practical exercises. This work will pay off in several ways. In addition to gaining knowledge, you will also gain considerable insight into the S320A scenario that continues through to the exam. By now, you are familiar with the lesson guide format. The appendixes to this lesson guide will help you with your study and are described below.

Appendix 1 contains a sketch map of the X Corps situation following its attack of the two 2 GTA lead divisions (the 57 TD and the 22 TD) by the 25th Armd Div and the 4th PzGren. (If you have been away from lesson 4 for awhile, you might want to take some time now to refresh your memory of the situation.) This map shows the location of the friendly and enemy units following the attack.

Appendix 2 is a X (U.S.) Corps Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) that communicates a new mission for the division. As you progress through this lesson, you will learn much about FRAGOs. Other examples of formats and uses are found in FM 101-5, appendix H.

Appendix 3 is an extract from the 25th Armd Div commander's situation report (SITREP) that provides details about the condition and locations of the division's maneuver units.

Appendix 4 is an extract from the 25th Armd Div CSS status that provides additional details about the personnel and equipment of the division.

Appendix 5 is an overview of combat and quick decision-making procedures that is similar to appendix 9 of lesson guide 4.

LESSON GUIDE

Introduction

The lesson begins where lesson 4 left off. Lesson 5 starts after the 25th Armd Div has defeated the lead elements of the northern Krasnovian division (the 22 TD). You will assess the current situation, analyze a new mission provided in a corps FRAGO, develop a restated mission, and then formulate a possible solution for further analysis.

You have worked through the tactical decisionmaking process before, and you applied it in lesson 4, using the DDMP methodology, to solve a division offensive operation. Here you will apply it, using the CDMP methodology, to solve a division defensive maneuver in a more time-constrained environment. Turn to appendix 5 and look over figures 5-2 and 5-3. As you can see, there are several differences between the DDMP and the CDMP. However, there are also several similarities. You were required to produce several products in lesson 4 that you will not do for lesson 5. For example, you won't write an OPLAN; you'll produce a FRAGO.

This is a simple, straight forward lesson. If you have your maps, it's time to begin. Remember, the outcome of this lesson is to produce a FRAGO, not an OPLAN. There is a big difference between these two types of orders, A staff produces an OPLAN when a new mission arrives and there is sufficient time to develop it. As you know, to develop an OPLAN takes a lot of work. Developing even the most simple order can consume the commander and his staff for days. A FRAGO is different in that it "shifts from a known point." Basically, it modifies the OPORD the unit is executing at the time. It is employed when there is insufficient time to develop a full OPORD or if the change required is an expansion of the initial plan and doesn't require a complete new order.

Another purpose for a FRAGO is that it can communicate execution instructions for a preplanned event in a basic order. For example, if a corps defensive plan had a branch to the basic plan that called for a division to conduct a counterattack if certain conditions occurred, corps would issue a FRAGO to communicate the instructions needed to commence the attack. There are other reasons for issuing a FRAGO, too, but for this lesson you will focus on issuing a FRAGO to change an on-going plan. (This is probably the most frequent use of a FRAGO.)

Before you get too deep into the FRAGO development, you should review the situation. As you read this overview, recall your S320A lesson 4 experiences as a planner in the 25th Armd Div plans section.

SCENARIO OVERVIEW

You are in the back of the G3 van reflecting over the events of the past 15 hours. As you look at the situation map, you mentally compile a summary of events that happened between the start of Phase III of X Corps plan (measured by the beginning of the counterattack by the 25th Armd and 4th PzGren) and the 25th Armd Div's consolidate on its various objectives.

The counterattack began well. Corps movement control plans enabled the 25th Armd Div to move from the assembly areas to lines of departure in a textbook manner. Line of departure (LD) passage was smooth, and the division assumed authority for fires within its zone. Last-minute intelligence reports on enemy locations were funneled to the lead brigades to aid in their movement to contact.

Last-minute coordination with X Corps established that the 4th PzGren's supporting attack would precede the 25th Armd Div's main attack by 1 hour. This was done by corps to facilitate fires distribution for corps-level long-range artillery and to allow the 4th PzGren to have some offensive air support during its initial enemy contact. This change proved to be quite appropriate and absolutely necessary.

Corps deep operations (designed to shape the flow of lead regiments of the two lead divisions of the 2 GTA to best fit the ground scheme of maneuver) did not work as planned. Either the interdiction was too effective or the southern Krasnovian division commander was late. In any event, the timing was off. Rather than attacking into the flank of the trailing regiments of the southern division, 4th PzGren units hit the flanks of the lead

regiments. The ensuing fight saw them destroy two lead regiments but then, in turn, receive a flank attack from the two trailing Krasnovian regiments. After a nip-and-tuck series of meeting engagements, attacks, and counterattacks, X Corps long-range artillery and redirected offensive air support turned the tide in favor of the 4th PzGren.

When the fighting stopped, the 4th had destroyed the two leading Krasnovian regiments and forced the two remaining regiments (both less than 60 percent combat effective) into hasty defensive positions. Even though 4th PzGren units fought four regiments (the number intended by the corps plan), the first two they fought were not the correct regiments. Therefore, rather than conducting its final engagements in the vicinity of AA FERMI, the 4th PzGren fought the final two regiments south of the Maulde River. The result was that instead of consolidating south of PL BLAST, the 4th Panzer went to ground disposed along a southeasterly line from Leipzig, following the Maulde River to Dobeln. It has insufficient combat power to proceed northward.

The 25th Armd Div benefitted from this turn of events. Since the 4th PzGren destroyed two lead regiments of the Krasnovian 2 GTA southern division (which were supposed to be engaged by the 25th) the 25th found smooth sailing from PL MASS to PL GAMMA RAY. The 25th encountered only minimal elements of the Krasnovian southern division (mostly forward detachments) and made good time moving to the engagement areas north of PL GAMMA RAY where it engaged and defeated the two lead regiments of the northern division of the 2 GTA.

Intelligence reports from corps to division indicate that the commander of the 2 Krasnovian Front recognized that his attack was unhinged and told the commander of the 2 GTA to have the remaining two regiments of the northern division to go into a hasty defense. This was not a surprise as it complied with two principles of Soviet-style operational doctrine: top-down control and units going into a hasty defense when unable to continue the attack.

Evidently, the Krasnovian Front commander was pleased with the way events unfolded. Reportedly, he analyzed the battlefield, seeking opportunities for success. He believed that the X Corps counterattack was broken and that the corps had no combat power remaining to counter another penetration. He now thought that he had a fleeting window of opportunity to penetrate II AAG defenses. Electronic intelligence reported that the commander of the 2 Krasnovian Front ordered his staff to committ the 42 TD (a division from the 16 TA that was held as front reserve) to penetrate X Corps defenses in the vicinity of Leipzig and seize crossings over the Saale River between Halle and Bemburg. These crossings would facilitate the follow-on commitment of the 37 GTA should the Krasnovian Front commander decide to swing his main effort to the south.

Remember, the LANDCENT operational-level plan was designed to deceive the Front commander into thinking the north was less well defended than allied dispositions in the south so the Front would commit its 37 GTA in the north. where a counterattack by the 1 AAG would defeat the Krasnovian offensive by destroying the 37 GTA. If the 37 GTA were to move south, the allied plan would be in jeopardy. Therefore, you were not surprised when the commander of the II AAG flew to X corps main CP to reinforce the absolutely critical requirement of quickly and decisively destroying the 42 TD attack.

The X Corps commander fully appreciated the importance of defeating the Krasnovian Front commander's attempt to penetrate and secure crossings over the Saale. He directed his G3 to issue a warning order. The WO informed the 25th Armd Div (which was consolidating and reorganizing in three different locations) that the on-order mission to continue the attack north into the 1 (NL) Corps zone was no longer probable and the division

should immediately prepare to counter and defeat an enemy attack from the direction of Dresden. An order would follow ASAP.

Your division commander and G3 departed immediately for a planning session at the corps main CP. As the G3 rushed out the door he tumed to you and said, “I will call you as soon as I get more data. While I’m gone, have the current operations section send a warning order to all affected division units, telling them what is going on and to expect a change of mission. We will provide more details as soon as we can get the FRAGO out.”

After the G3 arrived at corps, he sent by tactical facsimile machine a rough sketch showing how the corps planners assessed the current situation (the sketch map of the general situation is at appendix 1). He called a few moments later to give additional information.

“The situation in the 4th PzGren zone is still unclear. It seems that the 4th will hold its position but will not have sufficient combat power to move beyond PL FORD (a new phase line found on the sketch map from corps). Early estimates predict that it will take at least 48 hours for the 4th to reconstitute sufficient strength to move. It has approximately 50 percent of its artillery assets remaining and is capable of firing missions in support of the 25th Div if required,” The G3 cautioned you to hold the depicted brigade locations of the 4th PzGren suspect until more information arrived. He said, “The divisional SITREPs show the 5th and 34th Brigades at 65 percent strength, the division cavalry, squadron at 75 percent, and the 14th Brigade at approximately 50 percent. Most of the losses are in armored fighting systems and engineer equipment. The 4th’s ADA systems are less than 30 percent operational.”

The G3 will bring the corps FRAGO back with him. Initial indications are that 25th will fight a mobile defense in the sector shown on the sketch.

Intelligence reports place the 42 TD about 12 to 18 hours out. The corps FSO thinks he can delay it through long-range fires and OAS. Intel expects the 42 TD to be at approximately 88 percent strength in combat systems and 80 percent in artillery systems when it arrives at PL ORBIT.

The X Corps ASIC predicts that the remaining two regiments of the 22 TD that are in a hasty defense astride the Maulde River will remain in place and support the 42 TD attack by fire.

The plans NCO provides the information from the current 25th Armd Div SITREP that you requested:

Unit	**Location**	**Status**	**Combat Strength % (Pers/Equip)**
1st Bde HQ	TT9314	Reorganizing	95/90
2d Bde HQ	QB0873	Light resistance	92/88
3d Bde HQ	PC9125	Light resistance	85/77
25th Avn Bde	PB6897	Reorganizing	90/84
Div Cav HQ	UT0620	Screening	88/82
Div Main CP	QB0794	Active	99/94

As you read the numbers, think back to how the units arrived at their current locations. Obviously, the 4th PzGren mess helped the 25th. The division’s attack called for a movement to contact in zone to find and then to defeat, in turn, the lead regiments of the 57th GTD (southernmost division of the 2 GTA) and then the two lead

regiments of the 22 TD (the northernmost division). The scheme of maneuver featured two brigades abreast attacking north in zone: the 2d Bde (main effort) on the right, the 3d Bde (supporting attack) on the left. The 1st Bde trailed the 2d Bde in a follow-and-assume posture. Given the problems of coordination with the 4th PzGren, the division cavalry squadron was told to "screen and maintain contact" along PL PROTON. It was required to screen the exposed eastern flank of the division's main attack and also to maintain contact with the 4th PzGren.

This was an unusual mission for the reconnaissance elements during a movement to contact. but the division commander was very concerned about maintaining contact with the 4th PzGren and thought the division's aviation brigade would be able to perform reconnaissance. Elements of the 25th Avn Bde filled in on the reconnaissance mission, because the division commander was convinced that the wide divisional zone and unclear enemy situation required a fast-moving element with firepower. OH-58D scouts were able to designate targets for laser-guided munitions of both divisional artillery and attack helicopters. Three separate JAAT missions proved very effective against battalion-sized Krasnovian armor.

The commander also placed his artillery, engineers, and air defense assets with the maneuver brigades, In this mobile battle, he wanted these combat multipliers up where they could be used immediately rather than back with division troops. His DISCOM commander task organized additional forward logistics elements (FLEs) to travel with the maneuver brigade forward support battalions (FSBs). Given the huge distance of this attack, the G4 didn't want the brigades to run out of supplies before the divisional support could reach them.

The biggest problem was the inability, to see the battlefield, not Just at division level but also at corps and II AAG. This is why the corps attack was launched before the 57 GTD was in location. The plan had not accounted for the two divisions of the 2 GTA being on line. Corps accurately tracked the 22 TD (the northern division). Corps watched it pass through the NAls and knew exactly when to launch the 25th to catch the 22 TD in the proper EAs. You remembered that corps deep operations were designed to delay, the 22 TD and provide sufficient time for the 25th Armd Div to defeat the 57 GTD and still get to the northern EAs in time to engage the lead regiments of the 22 TD. You could not account for the incorrect identification by corps of the Krasnovian elements passing through the NAIs. Corps incorrectly identified these units as divisional main force elements, As the picture developed, it became clear that they were simply forward detachments from the 2 GTA and the 57 GTD. In any event, the attach was triggered too early.

The two lead brigades of the 25th crossed the LD on time and proceeded to make an orderly march northward. Both division and corps leaders became concerned when the 4th PzGren reported heavy contact and the 25th found merely a few reconnaissance units. The lead brigades cleared each sequential EA as they, moved northward. The 2d Bde was eventually engaged and required to deploy by a stubborn reinforced reconnaissance detachment in EA GUN. By this time. the corps had a better understanding of events. The 4th PzGren was heavily engaged. The 4th PzGren requested corps support to delay the second-echelon regiments of the 57 GTD until it had defeated the lead regiments and had time to reorient to meet the flanking attack from the cast. Corps realigned deep fire assets to help the 4th PzGren. This realignment, plus the retargeting of OAS sorties away form the northern division (moving them southward to help the 4th PzGren), allowed the 22 TD to speed its rate of march westward.

To this point, the 25th's 3d Bde had engaged no sizable enemy formations. so fortunately,. it was able to get into position to catch the regiment it was after as it tried to cross the Saale River south of Bemberg (rather than call this area an EA, the division called this an objective because it wanted the 3d Bde to secure the crossing sites). However, the 2d Bde was not progressing as well as the 3d Bde. It was still destroying Krasnovian forces

in EA GUN. This caused the 25th Armd Div commander to order the 1st Bde to pass the 2d Bde and move to objective SLAM.

So, as you survey the current unit status reports, you see that the 4th PzGren is fixed in place below PL FORD, the 3d Bde (the brigade with the most severe losses) is cleaning up the remaining forces in objective HIT, the 1st Bde is reorganizing in objective SLAM, and the 2d Bde is reducing isolated in EA GUN. The divisional cavalry squadron is screening along PL PROTON from PL BLAST to PL FORD, while the division's remaining aviation assets are engaging isolated pockets of resistance and performing reconnaissance missions in zone. The DISCOM had not yet started to displace forward and is still in the vicinity of the old concentration camp at Buchenwald (PB5854).

All in all, as you reflect on the division's past 12 hours, you wonder how you will react to the next threat that is about to hit you in a flank.

Your reflections end abruptly when the G3 walks in with a copy of the corps FRAGO. (See Appendix 2, X Corps FRAGO 3-9.. Change 1 to OPLAN 6099.) He hands you the order, sits down, and. with a sigh, tells you to prepare a couple of courses of action for his review within the hour. We don't have much time for this one; let's not blow it. However, this is too important for a mistake to be made, we will not have time to go back and fix it. Therefore, follow the steps of the combat decision-making process as closely as possible just do it more quickly."

That was a lot of information, so here are a few important points to keep in mind.

X Corps Situation

As you learned from this scenario, the X Corps counterattack did not happen exactly as the corps commander envisioned He therefore issued a change in the way the corps would employ its forces to accomplish the mission. These changes affect the 25th Armd Div. The corps staff used a FRAGO to disseminate the change



X Corps Situation

Corps deep operations failed to shape the Krasnovian approach as desired. Corps intelligence assets did not discover that the 57 TD (in the south) and the 22 TD (in the north) were on line rather than the 22 TD trailing. Consequently, the 4th PzGren attack encountered all four regiments of the southern division. The 4th PzGren survived but was unable to move north and consolidate in EA FERMI as called for by OPLAN DEPUTY DAWG. For all intents, the division is combat ineffective. It has established an area defense along a line that runs generally southwestward from Leipzig, abng the southern bank of the Maude River, to the small town of Dobeln.

25th Armored Division

The 25th Armd Div was able to make good progress in zone. It attacked with two brigades on line, the 3d Bde (supporting attack) on the left, and the 2d Bde (main attack) on the tight. The 1st Bde trailed the 2d Bde in zone with a follow-and-assume mission. Since the lead regiments of the sour-them Krasnovian division were engaged by the 4th PzGren, the 25th found only scattered forward security detachments south of PL ORBIT. The 25th plan had designated a series of sequential engagement areas from north to south, and the 2d Bde encountered some stiff resistance in EA GUN. It turned out to be from a strong Krasnovian 2 GTA forward detachment. The commander of the 25th Div instructed the 1st Bde to pass to the left and assume the main effort No other Krasnovian forces were encountered until the 1st Bde made contact with the southernmost regiment of the 22 TD in objective SLAM. Soon after that, the 3d Bde engaged the other first-echelon regiment of the 22 TD in objective HIT. Both engagements went well for the 25th, and the two Krasnovian regiments were destroyed within the confines of the objective area.



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25th Armored Division Situation

Krasnovian Disposition

The commander of the 2 GTA instructed the two trailing regiments of the 22 TD to establish hasty defensive positions astride crossing points over the Maulde River and await the commitment of the 2 Krasnovian Front's reserve division, the 42 TD. The assessed Krasnovian operational plan was to seize crossings over the Saale River. This eventuality would enable the 37 GTA of the Krasnovian Front to exploit this success and shift the main attack of the Krasnovian attack southward. Clearly, this is exactly what the LANDCENT deception plan was trying to avoid.



These are the events that set the stage for the rest of this lesson

If you have not taken a break, now is a good time to do so. After you return, you can start with your first requirement: to determine the mission. See you in a few moments.

MISSION ANALYSIS

Requirement: As a member of the 25th Armd Div planning cell, given this special situation and the information contained in appendixes 2, 3, and 4, use the combat decision-making process to develop a doctrinally restated mission for the division that meets the modified mission given to you by your higher headquarters. You have done this a number of times, so this shouldn't take long. Remember to go through the analysis of specified, implied, and essential tasks to develop the restated mission.

In the space provided, write in the tasks you identify as you think about the operation that the 25th Armd Div must plan to conduct This should take you about 20 minutes. A word of caution: Try not to take any shortcuts in the process. Do it just as the lesson guide describes. You will be required to do similar events on the exam. If you skip these practical exercises, you will not prepare yourself for success. One other point before you move on; recall that in the last lesson, you built the final product, the OPLAN, in stages--you wrote different parts of the plan at different times during the military decisionmaking process. You will do the same for this lesson. Keep

in mind that the final element of lesson 5 is a written FRAGO. Build it as you go through the process. Remember, this is an exercise in planning and communicating in a compressed time frame.

Specified tasks:

_____

_____

_____

_____

Implied tasks:

_____

_____

_____

_____

Essential tasks:

_____

_____

_____

_____

Now write YOUR PROPOSED RESTATED MISSION for the 25th Armd Div:

_____

_____

_____

Are you finished? Did you write a clear, concise statement that includes the WHO, WHAT, WHEN. WHERE. and WHY"

After completing your review of X Corps FRAGO in appendix 2, you should have a restated mission similar to this:

25th Armd Div defends in sector not later than 210600A Aug 19.. to destroy the 42 TD cast of PL PROTON.

There is room for a little variation in this statement, but not much. The mission is clear and simple: establish a defense in sector in sufficient time to destroy the 42 TD. and do it far enough to the cast that the Krasnovian commander is unable to breach PL PROTON.

In essence, the defense must be in place before the 42 TD gets too close to PL PROTON This is where military art, judgment, and tactics come together to produce a decision. The FRAGO date-time group (DTG) is 201959A Aug 19.. The Krasnovian division is between 12 to 18 hours out.

Thinking through the situation, you will need light data for 21 August The lesson 4 intelligence estimate shows BMNT at 0337, BMCT at 0424, and no moon after 2330. So, if the defenders arc to get into place by the time it gets light, the need to get moving-hence, the warning order routine. But, you don't need to tell brigade commanders to get in before daylight; they know a defense needs to go in early.

Therefore, include in the restated mission when the defense must be established in order to satisfy the essential tasks, and let the commanders figure out the details. You could designate a time from 0330 to 0700. Anything earlier is unrealistic and would hamper your ability to move in a sensible manner; an! thing later, would run the risk of the Krasnovians beating you to PL PROTON.

If you were sitting in the division plans van, the next event would be the commander approving the restated mission and giving his guidance.

COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE

"I see this as a mobile defense that relies, to a great extent, on a combination of corps and division deep operations to weaken the 42 TD before it arrives within range of our main ground defenses. We must closely coordinate our deep operations with those of corps. I don't want any disconnects. Make sure corps planners are aware of our plan so they can target the proper units. We must rely on corps deep operations to slow down the advance of the 42 TD for as long as possible. I have already told the corps planners that we need all the preparation time possible. I would rather they design their targeting plan to slow the forward movement of the division rather than trying to selectively remove one or two capabilities. G3, evaluate where our best payoff for division deep operations lies: is it with general delay of the forward movement of the 42 TD or by selectively removing a critical capability such as its gapcrossing systems?

"lt looks as though the terrain dictates some natural schemes. Even though the Krasnovians already have crossings over the Maulde River, the 42 will bunch up while crossing. Make sure we have plans to take advantage of this natural bottleneck. Make them tight to get to the western side of the Maulde. Since corps doesn't want the 42 to get near the Saale River, we should strongly consider killing the majority of the 42 generally 4 to 5 km east of PL PROTON Look at engagement areas east of the bottleneck on avenue E1 along a north-south line from Bitterfeld (UT 14230) to Delitzsch (UT1512) south to Leipzig.

"I am concerned about being flanked from the south. Units of the 4th PzGren tool a real beating yesterday. I am not sure they can hold PL FORD against a concerted Krasnovian thrust. Look at a branch to our plan that will react to an unexpected threat from the south. Don't expect anything from the 4th other than a little tire support--even then, don't rely on it. They arc in really bad shape. I'm also concerned about the difference in the lines of operation with the 4th PzGren Div units. They are defending north, and we are defending to the east. We must establish close liaison with them and carefully synchronize our maneuver to preclude fratricide. I am not willing to accept any additional risk on the east.

"Logistically, our LOCs arc vulnerable. We were unable to move most of' the DISCOM northward. See if we can get some help from corps. Maybe the 52d Mech can provide support. We will need a lot of 155 ammo--see if the CSR is going to constrain our interdiction efforts. I want the concept to plan for securing our LOCs and the probable threat of interdiction from bypassed forces in our zone. I also want you to be thinking about where and when we can get the division support area (DSA) closer to our main force location. We must shorten our LOCs. After the 42 TD is destroyed, we still need to prepare to attack northward. I think 2d Bde should get priority for combat vehicle maintenance and replacements. They took some significant damage and I need them ready for reserve missions.

"I am uneasy about the 52d TF that the corps FRAGO gives us. They have placed a constraint on using this force for anything other than reserve, and I don't think the 52d Mech has a very strong TF to give up. G3, I want you to research the 52d taskings. Corps has their battalions scattered everywhere. Actually, when you give me

your conceptual possibilities briefing, tell me how many battalions they have available to them. I don't want my left flank falling apart like my right is doing!

"We must send out a warning order as soon as we have a handle on what we should do, we don't have much time. Let's not take away brigade planning and reaction time. Remember the 1/3 - 2/3 rule. We need to issue the FRAGO as quickly as possible, certainly no later than midnight. Let's get started!

CONCEPT FORMULATION

Now it is time to start your concept formulation. This is very similar to COA development in the DDMP that you did in lesson 4. Make sure you have the sketches and accompanying statements. Take a shot at proposed CCIR too. Now is the time to prime the reconnaissance effort. Also, think about any units that must start moving before the final FRAGO is published. Don't do this unless it is absolutely necessary, though. You don't want to move any unit unless it is clear where they are going and that they will not have enough time to get into place if you don't get them on the road immediately.

Think about where you are in the development process Look at figures 5-4 and 5-5 in appendix 5; they show you what subjects to cover in your development.

This is a good time to cover a point that some find difficult to understand. Don't be confused by the fact that the 25th is going to attack to defend or that the corps is destroying the Krasnovian force by defensive actions. Even though tacticians tend to use these two titles as categories of military operations. the differences begin to blend as you get closer to the tactical action For example, in this scenario. X Corps gave the 25th Armd Div a defend mission. However, more than likely, as part of the overall defense, major elements of the division will conduct offensive operations. Is this confusing? Well, it isn't really that complicated. Think back to lesson 2 where the strategic and operational scenarios were described. Recall that NATO is defending alliance territory. LANDCENT's plan employs a three-phased campaign to eject the Krasnovians. The deception plan that the X Corps commander is so concerned about is designed to set up a major army-level offensive as part of the defense. So. as you can see, a tactical offense may well be part of an overall defense (or vice versa). The reason for highlighting this is to make you aware that, as part of your defensive concept, you may well envision an offensive operation. One of the possibilities that you consider will probably have a brigade-sized counterattack as a kill mechanism.

Use "Post-it" stickers to track allocation of your forces and to help you visualize the locations of the Krasnovians at different times as you thoroughly develop your conceptual possibility. This will take you some time Take a break and start fresh. If you have let a significant amount of time pass between lesson 4 and now, review your COA development for lesson 4.

You may find it useful to review FM 71-100. Division Operations, Chapter 5, "Defensive Operations." Use the outline of the division area of operations provided on the following pages (2 worksheets). If you need more room, use the back of the paper. Chapter 3, para 3-4 of ST 101-5 has an example of a COA statement and sketch.

At this point in the combat decision-making process, you must change your mind-set; role-play the commander. If this were being done in a unit, the commander would and clearly communicate his intent for the operation. You must think about this carefully, develop your exact words for this step. There are far too many possible concepts for this lesson guide to provide a "school" example that would fit your plan. This step is very

similar to final commanders intent which is given after the COA decision of the DDMP. If you need a review, go back to lesson 4 and see what goes into a commander's intent.

As you prepare your statement, elaborate on the purpose and the desired end state (in terms of friendly forces, enemy forces, and terrain) and generally describe how the force as a whole will achieve this. Address what results are expected (that is, destroy lead regiments as they cross the Maulde and the trail regiments forward of PL PROTON). Clarify the purpose (the why) of the operation (to destroy remaining company-sized elements of 2GTA to establish favorable conditions for a counteroffensive) and generally how you visualize achieving the end state.

Frame your intent within the context of the X Corps commander's intent. The concept sketch forms the foundation for the graphics that would be sent out with the final FRAGO. The statement forms the basis for the concept of maneuver. As in lesson 4, if you think ahead, production of the final order is much easier. As you think about the concept, address the following themes:

- The defense must appear stronger than it is. You want to annihilate the 42 TD.

- The defense must apply violent combat power and must feature violent application of massive firepower in successive decisive blows against the lead regiments and then against the trailing regiments.

- Your plan must have the flexibility to work against multiple enemy operations, particularly the most dangerous branch that take into account the rupturing of the 4th PzGren area defense south of PL FORD by Krasnovian forces.

- Success is measured by destroying the 42 TD as far cast as possible; no units should get past PL PROTON.

- This step is where you designate the specific subordinate units to accomplish each part of the operation (main effort, reserve, and so on). You need these decisions to complete the FRAGO Your commander's concept should include:

- Task organization (put specific brigade designations on the generic brigades of the concept-this is not difficult).

- Control measures (you should have planned division engagement areas, brigade sectors, and, if a counterattack is used. the appropriate control measures for the objectives, routes, boundaries, and so forth)

- Employment of major maneuver elements.

- Command and control arrangements.

- Scheme of fire support.

Look at appendixes 3 and 4 to this lesson guide. Use this data for developing your concept. Modify your concept as you obtain more insight from your examination of various staff functions. Use "Post-it" stickers as needed to keep track of force movements and combat power.

If you are confused about where you are in the CDMP or what you are supposed to do next, refer to the lower right side of figure 5-3. You are also in the top part of second box of figure 5-5. Note that the CDMP process requires a waning order once you have determined that a revise concept is required (remember the commander's guidance). For this lesson, though, you can skip this step.

When you are ready, turn the page and sketch out your concept and write the statement. Then continue in the lesson guide.

X Corps Situation

COA Sketch __



Statement_____

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Welcome back! Were you able to develop a good concept ? Did it include the following statements:

- Type of action (what)
- Time (on order).
- Location of the action (where).
- Use of available means (how).
- Purpose of the action (why).

Requirement: Turn to page 5 - 5 - 4 of appendix 5. Read the three paragraphs above figure 5-6. This will explain a little of why you are playing the role of both commander and staff officer. Depending upon the situation. the commander may do much of this process individually, or, if time permits, the staff may do much of the analysis. Remember, the purpose of what you are doing here is not quite the same as it was in the DDMP that you did in lesson 4. You aren't going to war game two COAs for later comparison. Here you want to be sure that the concept is feasible, and that it accomplishes the mission, and that it is possible to accomplish given the constraints imposed by the factors of METT-T.

SUITABILITY ANALYSIS

The first check in the CDMP is called the suitability analysis. Simply stated, this step ensures that the concept you are about to analyze will actually satisfy the mission assigned by higher headquarters. If it passes the suitability analysis, then the next requirements is to issue a warning order. This part of CDMP is illustrated at figure 5-6 of appendix 5.

There isn't sufficient time to actually write a warning order, but you read about them on page 6-6 of ST 101-5. This will set the stay for understanding how FRAGOs lit into the process.

Requirement: Take a few moments and return to Part II of Appendix 3 in your Lesson 2 Lesson Guide, Krasnovian Doctrine. Reread the discussion about how a division would dispose its regiments for a movement to contact or when attacking an unprepared enemy. It might be "2 up and 2 back," or "3 up and 1 back." Look at the terrain on the map. Is there room for "3 up"? Think about how the Krasnovian division commander would read the situation. This is part of your analysis. Make your "best guess." It is likely that each of the divisions might be arrayed in a "2 x 2" regimental configuration.

Now take a few minutes to think about the 25th Armd Div commander's intent and concept of operation. Do you think it is suitable to accomplish the mission? If so, the next step is to evaluate resources against requirements (feasibility analysis) and cost against reward (acceptability analysis).

FEASIBILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY ANALYSIS

Review figure 5-7 of appendix 5. Even though these steps have different names from the analysis steps listed in the DDMP process, they, have the same objective-make sure the plan can work. Use the same reference sources for analysis tools that you did for lesson 4. FM 34-130; ST 101-5, paragraph 1-5; and FM 101-5 (FD) tables in part 1 are good sources. Some cautions don't get too caught up in the quantitative aspects of feasibility analysis. This is not the same as the nomographs in a Soviet-style plans book. This is not a nonthinking troop control system. This is similar to functional area staff estimates found in DDMP. It is, by design, more streamlined.

You are more interested in verifying that a brigade has time to move from where it is to where it needs to be rather than defining to the exact minute how long it takes the brigade to pass a point on the ground.

As you begin, be sure your analysis works against the enemy situation template you consider most likely, but also do a quick analysis against other reasonable enemy COAs to check flexibility and identify any problems, Remember that the Krasnovian 42 TD will likely be arrayed in a “2 x 2” regimental configuration. The enemy will not necessarily attack as predicted. Therefore, multiple options should be anticipated. Remember to start sketching the FRAGO as you go through the analysis. You will send out the interim FRAGO after the concept passes the feasibility and acceptability checks.

Once you are convinced that your concept passes the two checks, you must send the FRAGO. ST 101-5, paragraph 6-5c, has the format and requirements. Don’t skip this important exercise. After this initial FRAGO is gone, you will start the process to “proof’ the concept and make sure you didn’t overlook anything.

VALIDITY CHECKS

Now that the brigades have your tentative plan, you have time to go back and make sure you developed something that will work. By nature, the validity and acceptability checks were rushed, but that is the unavoidable price to pay for adhering to the 1/3 - 2/3 rule. As pushed as you were, if this were real, the brigades would have more problems--and they are the ones who have to face the brunt of errors. To get you started and help you with your validity checks, take another look at figure 5-5 of appendix 5. You arc at the “further coordination/synchronization (war game)” step. Figure 5-9 provides a more general overview.

Take no more than an hour to complete your analysis and do the validity checks. Remember that the commander would confirm the validity checks before authorizing release of the FRAGO. Use the basic ACTION - REACTION - COUNTERACTION process. In a planning cell, the G2 planner would provide his best guess as to the enemy reaction to your plan throughout this interactive process. You would record and highlight any modifications or changes made to the concept of operation as a result of the coordination and synchronization activities.

As a minimum, as you do the validity checks, focus on questions regarding the following items.

- How much time will it take for the 25th Armd Div to get the brigades into place for the defense’?

- Estimate the 42 TD’s percentage of combat effectiveness when it crosses the Maulde and when it closes on PL PROTON (The intent of this question is to probe the thought given to the deep operations effort of the corps and division.)

- What is the anticipated disposition and orientation of divisional forces at the end of the defense’?

Think of other questions based on your observations and estimates. There is no “school solution” war-game checklist. If you planned EAs (some examples were given by the commander in his planning guidance), make sure they were located in places where the enemy would be canalized or restricted.

This part of the CDMP process should have provided insights regarding your depth of understanding of the tactical problem. Consider yourself successful if you were able to visualize the operation from start to finish,

examine the operation in a logical action--reaction--counteraction sequence. and obtain some insights that would otherwise not have been possible.

You should be working on the FRAGO while you arc doing the final analysis and validation activities

CONCEPT OF SUPPORT

Now you arc ready to product the FRAGO. You are not required to write a concept of support for your FRAGO: however, you should focus for a few moments on what you did as the G4 planner as you developed concept of support. You should have evaluated any logistical constraint on the ability to execute the revised plan and determine if the change is significant enough to go into the FRAGO.

VALIDATION

Requirement: write a final FRAGO, and produce an operations sketch. Remember, you already have compiled the content of the FRAGO as you proceeded through the CDMP. There is nothing creative left for you to do. The remaining work is simply a matter of "plug-and-chug"-take the preapproved ingredients and place them into a format that makes sense. Remember, use the FRAGO format found in ST 101-5.

A clear plan, even the best plan in the world, is of little use of it is only in the minds of a few. A good planner must be able to communicate the plan quickly and clearly. In lesson 4. you wrote an OPLAN. When the commander placed an execution time on the OPLAN, it became an OPORD. Now, you will modify the OPORD by issuing a FRAGO. Now, you are at the stage of the CDMP where you would provide a briefing to the commander for final FRAGO and DST approval. Write the final links of your FRAGO. This shouldn't take more than 30 minutes.

When you finish the FRAGO, evaluate it to see if it meets the following standard. Is it clear and concise? You know you have done well if you hear the CG say, "I approve the FRAGO for release. Good work."

SUMMARY

During this lesson, you have used the CDMP methodology of the tactical decision-making process to rapidly solve a division tactical problem. You have gained experience in using FRAGOs to disseminate a tactical decision. The selection of decision-making methods, either the complete method used in lesson 4 or the abbreviated method used in this lesson, is dictated by several factors. Often, the personality of a commander is directly responsible for the method used: at other times, the factors of METT-T will drive the selection. The importance of this lesson is that you understand that there are different ways to arrive at a decision, and all of them should follow the same process:

- Determine this mission.
- Develop a potential solution.
- Analyze the potential solution.
- Communicate the decision.

CONCLUSION

Congratulations, this is the final requirement for Phase II of the nonresident CGSOC. You should feel proud of your accomplishments thus far. Taking time at night and on weekends reflects well on your willingness to endure difficult schedules and to persevere. You will soon become a member of an elite group; not everyone earns a fifty percent completion certification. (Reservists receive a fifty percent completion certificate upon completion of Phases I and II. Active duty personnel get a pat on the back.)

If you are continuing in the CGSOC curriculum, you should move on to Phase III quickly. It should be much easier to motivate yourself now rather than at a Inter date. Again, congratulations on a job well done.

The nest event in this course is the S320A exam. You will have an opportunity to demonstrate your mastery of the subject matter that you have covered in the past five lessons. Take a well deserved break and come back refreshed and wide awake.

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 5. Division Defensive Planning

Appendix 1 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 5. Sketch Map



REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 5. Division Defensive Planning

Appendix 2 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 5. 10th Corps FRAGO 3-9 , Change 1 to 10th Corps OPLAN 6099

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

Copy No_____of____copies
10th (US) Corps
SONDERHAUSEN (PB3395), GE
201959A Aug 19__

FRAGMENTARY ORDER 3-9__

References: No change to basic order

Task Organization, See Annex A.

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. 10th Corps attack has defeated the 57 GTD and the two first-echelon regiments of the 22 TD. The two second-echelon regiments of the 22 TD (approximately 85 percent combat effectiveness) occupy hasty defensive positions astride the MAULDE River between PL FORD and PL BLAST. Commander, 2 Krasnovian Front, has committed the 42 TD, his frontal reserve. Anticipated mission for the 42 is to attack in a zone generally running along the northern side of PL ORBIT to seize crossing sites over the SAALE river between BERNBURG (PC8840) and PL ORBIT.

b. Friendly Forces. No change.

c. Attachments And Detachments. No change.

2. MISSION

No change.

3. EXECUTION

INTENT. I intend to defeat the remaining forces of the 2 GTA as rapidly and decisively as possible To continue to protect the LANDCENT deception story. I will portray a picture of more combat power than we really have. This story will be best served if we destroy the 42 well to the east of PL ROD by a combination of attack aviation, BAI sorties, and long-range missile artillery. Maneuver forces vicinity of PL PROTON will employ a mobile defense to defeat remaining forces in sector. Under no circumstances are Krasnovian forces to reach the SAALE River. Success will be achieved when all company-sized resistance of 2 GTA forces in the corps AO are destroyed and conditions are favorable for I AAG counteroffensive.

FRAGO 3-9-10th (US.) Corps

a. Concept of Operation. Annex C (Operation Overlay)

(1) Maneuver 10th Corps continues to defeat 2 GTA forces in AO. 52d Mech Div occupies AA HAWKINGS, screens corps northern boundary between PL QUASAR and PL LIGHT, and continues preparation for attack to the north. 25th Armd Div, corps main effort, employs a combination of deep operations and mobile defense to destroy 42 TD east of PL PROTON. 4 PzGren conducts an area defense to prevent Krasnovian forces from operating south of PL FORD. 4 CMBG, corps reserve, moves to AA QUARK. 209th ACR continues defense of corps northern flank and maintains contact with elements of the I (NL) Corps between PL ROD and PL LIGHT. Note change of PL BLAST to PL BLASTER and realignment of terrain vicinity of BERNBURG. 10th Avn Bde attacks 42 TD east of PL ROD priority to bridging equipment, second priority to C2 and air defense systems of trailing regiments.

(2) Fires. Priority to 10th Avn Bde, OO, 25th Armd Div.

(3) Intelligence Priority to tracking 42 TD bridging equipment, then lead regiments

(4) Electronic warfare Priority to 10th Avn Bde, OO, 25th Armd Div.

b. Tasks To Maneuver Units. No change except:

(1) 52d Mech Div

(a) Upon receipt of this order, OPCON a battalion-sized tank heavy task force to 25th Armd Div. Coordinate with 25th Armd Div for linkup location and time.

(b) Be prepared to establish an area defense along PL LIGHT between PL FORD and corps northern boundary Defense must be effective within 8 hours of instruction to execute.

(2) 25th Armd Div.

(a) Receive a battalion-sized tank heavy task force from 52d Mech Div for use as divisional reserve. Do not employ the TF in a different role without prior approval. Coordinate with 52d Mech Div for linkup location and time.

(b) OO, plan employment of two corps attack helicopter battalions for use against lead regiments of 42 TD when they cross PL ROD. Direct coordination with 10th Avn Bde authorized.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

No change

FRAGO 3-9-10th (U.S.) Corps

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

No change except: TAC CP will move from RUDOLSTADT (PB6521) to COCHSTEDT (PC6551), effective 210600A Aug 19__.

Acknowledge.

HENSEL
LTG

OFFICIAL:
GREETHAM
G3

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 5. Division Defensive Planning

Appendix 3 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 5. 25th Armd Div Commander's SITREP (Extract)

1. GENERAL: The following information was extracted from the latest Commander's SITREP, issued at 201840A Aug 19__.

Unit	Location	Combat Status Personnel	Combat Status Weapons
1st Bde	TT9314	G	G
2-91 Mech (M2A1)	TT9212	G	G
2-10 Armor (M1A2)	QC0613	G	A
2-11 Armor (M1A2)	UT0122	G	A
251st FSB	TT9416		
2d Bde	QB0873	G	A
2-92 Mech (M2A1)	US0294	G	A
2-12 Armor (M1A2)	QB6080	A	R
2-13 Armor (M1A2)	TS9667	G	A
252d FSB	QB0771		
3d Bde	PC9125	A	A
2-93 Mech (M2A1)	PC9122	R	R
2-94 Mech (M2A1)	PC9028	A	A
2-14 Armor (M1A2)	C8631	G	A
2-15 Armor (M1A2)	PC8223	A	A
253d FSB	PC8923		
25th Avn Bde	PB6897	G	G
1-25 Atk Hel Bn (AH-64)	NA	G	A
2-25 Atk Hel Bn (AH-64)	NA	G	G
2-22 Cav	QB0794	G	A
Trps A&B (M3/M1A1)	PL PROTON	G	G
Trps D&E (AH-58D)	PL PROTON	G	A
25th Armd DISCOM	PB5854	G	G
254th Spt Bn (Main)	PB5753	G	G

G - GREEN, no major limitations to combat effectiveness.
A - AMBER, significant limitation to combat effectiveness or duration of effectiveness.
R - RED, combat ineffective.

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 5. Division Defensive Planning

Appendix 4 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 5. CSS Status of the 25th Armd Div (Extract)

1. GENERAL

This extract provides a revised logistical situation of selected 25th Armd Div units following the destruction of first-echelon regiments of the 22 TD.

a. Cdr, 1st Bde, reports a green status with minor Class V shortages. He anticipates having 93 percent mission capable (MC) equipment within 8 hours.

b. Cdr, 2d Bde, reports an amber status with shortages in armored fighting systems and DS artillery He predicts reaching a green status within 6 hours and 91 percent equipment MC within 10 hours.

c. Cdr, 3d Bde, reports an overall amber status with serious fighting system losses and shortages of crewmen and Infantrymen in armored and mechanized infantry units. Additionally, he is below 1 DofS for DF-2 (fuel for tracks) and needs immediate Class V resupply. He anticipates 10 hours after Class IX arrival before reaching green status. If supplies and maintenance support arrive within 3 hours, he anticipates having 90 percent M1A2 MC within 9 hours and 87 percent M2 MC within 12 hours.

d. Cdr, 25th Avn Bde, reports a green status with no supply shortages. He anticipates having 96 percent AH-64 MC within 4 hours. He reported an amber status for the division cavalry based on 75 percent MC for their OH-58D scouts. Ground troops (A and B) are at 94 percent and 96 percent respectively.

e. The major problem is in DIVARTY. The Krasnovian counterbattery effort took a severe toll on both men and equipment. The DS battalion for 3d Bde is below 76 percent MC on its 155-mm howitzers and its overall crew status is below 76 percent.

2. PERSONNEL

a. Revised personnel status of selected 25th Armd Div units as of 201800A Aug 19__.

Unit	Auth	Asgd	Asgd (%)	PDY	PDY (%)
1st Bde	2,038	2,061	101	1,932	95
2d Bde	2,038	2,053	101	1,883	92
3d Bde	2,846	2,874	101	2,419	85
25th Avn Bde	613	621	101	550	89
2-22 Cav	624	626	100	541	88
25th DIVARTY	2,516	2,519	100	2,015	80

3. MATERIEL

Current equipment status (Auth/O/H/MC)

Type Equip	1st Bde	2d Bde	3d Bde	Avn Bde	Div Cav
Tank, M1A2	116/116/102	116/116/99	116/116/87	0	0
APC, M2A1	54/54/40	54/54/48	108/108/77	0	0
CFV, M3	18/18/12	18/18/14	24/24/16	0	40/40/29
ITV, M901	12/12/9	12/12/11	24/24/19	0	0
Hel, atk AH-64	0	0	0	36/36/27	0

REINFORCING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

Lesson 5. Division Defensive Planning

Appendix 5 to Lesson Guide, Lesson 5. Overview of Combat and Quick Decision-Making Procedures

You learned the deliberate decision-making procedures of the tactical decision-making process (time not a constraint) in lesson 4 of S320A. Lesson 5 of S320A requires you to apply the tactical decision-making process to solve an immediate tactical problem. This overview will help you follow the process. It is designed to supplement, not replace, the FM 101-5 (FD) description found in ST 101-5, *Command and Staff Decision Processes.* Keep this appendix open as you move through lesson 5. It will keep you oriented and help you remember the proper points for each step

As you learned earlier, the tactical-decision making process has four major steps identify the problem, develop various solutions, determine the relative advantages and disadvantages of the competing solutions, and then decide. That, briefly, is the tactical decision making-process as shown in figure 5-1.



Figure 5-1

Although the four steps of the tactical-decision making process remain constant, there are three methods of application the deliberate, the combat, and the quick. Figure 5-2 illustrates where the three methods fall on the planning continuum and associates how some major planning variables align with the methods. Each has its place and purpose.



Figure 5-2

Lesson 5 of S320A uses combat decision-making procedures. Figure 5-3 shows the major steps in this method of solving tactical problems.



Figure 5-3

Figures 5-4 and 5-5 show these steps in more detail.

Steps in the Combat Decision-Making Process

COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT

GOAL Anticipate:

- Outcome of current fight.
- Orders from higher headquarters to begin considering future requirements and actions.

COMPONENTS:

- Logical visualization of correct situation comparing expected battle outcome and future states of friendly and enemy forces.
- Recognition of similarities and/or differences between initial plan and current or projected situations occurring during combat.
- Consideration of friendly force posture, enemy probable actions and/or posture, and battlespace.

CCIR: Information needed to visualize the outcome of the current operation

PROCEED WITH ORIGINAL PLAN | CREATE A NEW CONCEPT | PROCEED WITH MODIFICATIONS (DEVELOPED BRANCHES)

SUITABILITY ANALYSIS
(Accomplish unit mission? Meet higher commander's intent?)

Figure 5-4

Steps in the Combat Decision-Making Process (cont)

SUITABILITY ANALYSIS
(Accomplish unit mission? Meet higher commander's intent?)

YES → PUBLISH WO

NO → Create a new concept

COMMANDER'S CONCEPT SHOULD EXPLICITLY EXPRESS

- Commander's intent
- Concept of operations
  - major elements of maneuver
  - integrate combat multipliers
- Enemy COAs to consider
- CCIR
- Limitations
- Risks

FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
(Time, space, means?)

NO → Create a new concept

ACCEPTABILITY ANALYSIS
(Gains worth costs/risks?)

YES → PUBLISH FRAGO

NO → Create a new concept

FURTHER COORDINATION /SYNCHRONIZATION
(War game)

VALIDITY CHECKS

NO → Create a new concept

PUBLISH FINAL FRAGO/SKETCH/DST FOR EXECUTION

Figure 5-5

Because of the nature of two of the selecting criteria for the CDMP, a lack of time or a lack of available, effective staff, the CDMP does not use an extensive a staff estimate process as the DDMP does. However, the commander does use the staff as much as circumstances allow. As figure 5-2 illustrates, CDMP is characterized by a wide range of employment conditions.

Think a moment about what a commander needs from a staff during time-constrained tactical decision making:

- timely advice
- creative solutions
- detection of infeasible solutions
- concise, accurate evaluation of selected course of action
- help with the details, and
- help in disseminating the decision.

To fill these needs for the commander during time constrained employment of the CDMP, the staff will often restrict analysis to one selected course of action rather than the multiple COAs found in the DDMP. Even though CDMP typically analyzes only a single COA, do not be fooled into thinking that the commander will only think of one. This is an example of art vs. science; a commander, or a combination of commander and experienced staff officers, would quickly develop competing conceptual possibilities (even if only mentally) and select one for further, more detailed analysis. This is an important point, there is an selection of a best course of action, even though it is might be less formal. Following the selection, the staff starts analysis. Figures 5-6 to 5-9 illustrate these steps.

Suitability Analysis

- **Does the concept:**
  - meet the higher commander's intent
  - accomplish the mission

  } if so, issue a Warning Order

- **Correlates to "art" of war**
- **Should explicitly express:**
  - the commander's intent
  - the concept of operation
  - enemy COAs to consider
  - CCIR
  - Limitations
  - Risks

Figure 5-6

Feasibility Analysis

The QUANTITATIVE measurement of a concept to ensure it meets the criteria of:

- **Time** (event duration). Correlated to distance, speed, and capability rates used to project enemy and friendly actions to determine if sufficient time remains toexecute the concept as designed.

- **Space** (adequate ground and air space to conduct operations). Evaluate area required for unit deployment, road requirements, depth requirements, and so on

- **Means** (adequate combat power to conduct operations). Check relative force ratios at critical events; for example, sufficient bridging assets for a river crossing

Figure 5-7

Acceptability Analysis

- **Last check before concept approval**
- **Balances risk versus desired outcome**
- **An intuitive "art"**

Figure 5-8

Figure 5-9 shows actions the staff takes to help the commander take care of the details and ensure the decision is distributed quickly.

Mission Planning and Preparation

- Plans staff publishes a FRAGO.
- Staff coordinates and synchronizes command's activities to ensure optimum execution.
- Commander and staff conduct validity checks:
  - conduct and confirm estimates.
  - conduct a personal analysis of the terrain.
  - assess impact of battlefield conditions on current operations.
  - monitor the preparation of the battlefield, which includes:
    - * sharing the results of reconnaissance.
    - * developing alternatives.
    - * confirming or adjusting the concepts.
    - * pacing themselves to do what they need to prepare for the battle.

Figure 5-9

A second method of decision making is available to the commander in a constrained environment. In addition to the CDMP, a commander who is without an effective staff or without sufficient time to use the staff might use quick decision-making procedures (QDMP). In essence, the QDMP is little more than application of troop leading procedures. Figures 5-10 and 5-11 illustrate this third method of developing a tactical decision



Figure 5-10



Figure 5-11

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