


## World Military History, 1786-1945

---



Jeffrey J. Clarke

**N**ATIONALISM, technology, and the democratic revolution have been major themes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Each has reflected a fourth phenomenon of the modern world, the acceleration or "institutionalization" of change, and together they have taken military history down roads that neither Alexander nor Frederick had ever dreamt existed. Major authors dealing with the theme of change are Carlton J. H. Hayes (*A Generation of Materialism*, 1941, and other works on nationalism), William L. Langer (editor of the "Rise of Modern Europe" series), and William McNeill (*Rise of the West*, 1963), while Robert R. Palmer and Joel Colton's *A History of the Modern World* (1971) is one of the best texts covering the entire period and boasts an excellent bibliography. Other key studies include Edmund Wilson's *To The Finland Station* (1940) and sociologist Barrington Moore, Jr.'s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966). Wilson traces the rise of socialism and emphasizes the power of individuals and ideas. Moore, from a different perspective, sees the varying growth rates of economic classes as the source of all social conflict. Both studies offer a good foundation for the comparatively short but incredibly complex period of Western development and expansion from 1786 to 1945.

Important works focusing more closely on military affairs are Theodore Ropp's *War in the Modern World* (1962), Michael Howard's *Studies in War and Peace* (1970), Gordon Craig's *War, Politics and Diplomacy* (1966), and John U. Nef's pessimistic *War and Human Progress* (1950). All would agree with Ropp's definition of war as "a complex social phenomenon" that is more than just "a tale of great states, key inventions, or great captains." Edward Mead Earle's (ed.) *Makers of Modern Strategy* (1943) is the best work on military thought and a

---

Dr. Clarke (Ph.D., Duke) is a historian with the Current History Branch of CMH and is preparing a volume on the American advisory effort in South Vietnam, 1965-73.

pioneering classic in the field. Gordon Turner's *A History of Military Affairs Since the Eighteenth Century* (1956), a source book of carefully selected readings, and J.F.C. Fuller's *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961* (1961) are also good introductions, and, for unconventional warfare, Lewis H. Gann's *Guerrillas in History* (1971) is short, but still the best study.

Two major works in the field of civil-military relations are historian Alfred Vagts' *Defense and Diplomacy* (1956) and the American political scientist Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (1957). Huntington examines the growing specialization and professionalization of the military and the ensuing change in its relationship to the state from a "subjective" one of shared goals to a more realistic "objective" one of master and servant. Vagts approaches the problem from a European point of view, the Prusso-Germanic experience, and the conclusions reached in his earlier work, *A History of Militarism* (1937). From his corner, military concerns have become almost inseparable from the domestic and foreign affairs of the national state, and the influence of military professionals has expanded accordingly. David Ralston's (ed.) *Soldiers and States* (1966) and Samuel Edward Finer's *The Man on Horseback* (1962) grapple with much the same problem. Finer, a British political theorist, complements Vagts by pointing out the danger of separating the military from society and stresses the importance of shared values and a "common political culture."

The sea and air arms have usually been treated separately. The mechanization of the former has received excellent coverage in Bernard Brodie's *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (1941), but ideas on air and naval strategy have been more partisan. The gist of the classic "command of the sea" concept, first broadcast by Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1890 and last by Brodie in *A Guide to Naval Strategy* (1942), was the overwhelming importance of the liquid medium as both the conduit and generator of national power. Since then, more modest authors have analyzed military power in terms of weapons delivery systems originating in one of the three mediums. In this respect, L. W. Martin's *The Sea in Modern Strategy* (1967), stressing the utility of "waterborne" forces, and Brodie's excellent *Strategy in the Missile Age* (1959) have much in common. Giulio Douhet made the first overstatement of airpower capabilities in *The Command of the Air* (1921, see Chapter 4), and the early chapters of *Strategy in the Missile Age* take the story from there. Other key works are Eugene Emme's (ed.) *The Impact of Air Power* (1959) and I. B. Holley's *Ideas and Weapons* (1953). Harold Lasswell's venerable *Propaganda*

*Technique in the World War* (1927) and David Kahn's *The Codebreakers* (1967) also treat specialized topics and are complemented by an almost infinite number of "nuts-and-bolts" works on military hardware. But the effort to study the interplay of history and technology is only just beginning.

### *The Age of European Revolution, 1789-1850*

The French Revolution ushered in an era of profound and often violent change in Western civilization. Louis Gottschalk's *The Era of the French Revolution* (1929), Palmer's *Twelve Who Ruled* (1941), and Crane Brinton's *A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799* (1934) introduce an event that has developed a massive audience. Underlying this attention has been the use of the French experience as a model for future revolutions by scholars and practitioners alike. All have noted the tendency of the revolution to become more radical, the problems posed by the Thermidorian Reaction and the "man on horseback," and the relationship between rapid internal change and conventional war. It was the antiquated Frederician armies parading at France's doorstep that both intensified and justified the revolution and linked the myth of the people's uprising with that of the nation-in-arms. Lazare Carnot, a middle-class engineer officer, led Palmer's twelve in organizing French resources and applying the total war concept to defend the revolutionary gains already made. Conscription (*levée en masse*), promotions by merit, food rationing, price and wage controls, and the centralization of arms production were all part of a new national system for waging war. Carnot's efforts are chronicled in Huntly Dupre's *Lazare Carnot, Republican Patriot* (1940), and the reorganization and performance of the army in Ramsay W. Phipp's *The Armies of the First French Republic* (five volumes, 1926-39) and Katherine Chorley's *Armies and the Art of Revolution* (1943). By 1789 all the critical elements of the Napoleonic system of waging war were present (Ropp outlines these elements as command decentralization, massed artillery, emphasis on pursuit, and use of mixed line and column formations).

Robespierre's successors failed to remedy France's economic ills and restrain her most ambitious general. In 1799 Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the government and by 1804 had himself declared absolute ruler of France. The upstart emperor brought internal peace to France and marshaled all her resources in an effort to achieve lasting French hegemony on the continent.

Three recent biographies are Pieter Geyle's remarkable *Napoleon, For and Against* (1949), James M. Thompson's *Napoleon Bonaparte: His Rise and His Fall* (1951), and F. M. H. Markham's *Napoleon* (1963); his string of decisive battle victories are ably discussed in W. G. F. Jackson's *Attack in the West* (1953) and David G. Chandler's *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (1966). But in Iberia, on the Atlantic, and east of the Niemen, French eagles encountered Spanish nationalism, British seapower, and some of the most barren lands in Europe. In Russia Napoleon lost a half-million men, and his failure encouraged the fourth and final coalition against France. The best firsthand account of the 1812 adventure is the Count de Segur's *Napoleon's Russian Campaign* (1825). The three-day Battle of Nations in October 1813 completed the turnabout, and the hundred days that preceded Waterloo only spooked the jittery statesmen of Vienna. Long before Bonaparte's final exile, what Liddell Hart titled *The Ghost of Napoleon* (1933) could be seen throughout Europe.

The key British military leaders were Arthur Wellesley (Duke of Wellington) and Horatio Nelson. Sir Charles Petrie's *Wellington: A Reassessment* (1956) is one of many good treatments of the duke, and the standard work on Britain's greatest sea captain is Carola Oman's *Nelson* (1946). W. F. P. Napier's *History of the War in the Peninsula* (six volumes, 1828-40) is the classic account of Britain's effort to succor Spain and Portugal, and is seconded by Charles Oman's superlative study, *Wellington's Army* (1912). *The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810* (1957) is covered by Piers Mackesy, *The Battle of the Nile* (1960) by Oliver Warner, and Nelson's decisive victory over the combined fleets of France and Spain by Dudley Pope's *Decision at Trafalgar* (1960). Michael Lewis's *A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815* (1960) is a deeper analysis of Britain's wood and sail technicians and is a gold mine of information.

Napoleon's travels into Central Europe speeded up the awakening of German nationalism. While Freiherr vom Stein "junked" much of Prussia's rigid social and economic structure, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and others sought to make the army more modern, professional, and democratic, and Hardenberg and Yorck maneuvered the small state on to the winning side of the Viennese conference table. The medley of reformers is covered by William O. Shanahan's *Prussian Military Reforms, 1786-1813* (1945) and Peter Paret's comprehensive *Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform 1807-1815* (1966). Tsar Alexander I was an eighteenth-century monarch of a medieval state, and this

may explain Russia's bizarre response to the whole affair. But both Catherine's Suvarov and Alexander's Kutuzov responded to the French military challenge and gave Russians their first national experience. In *The Art of Victory*, Philip Longworth treats *The Life and Achievements of Field Marshal Suvarov, 1729-1800* (1965), while Roger Parkinson's *The Fox of the North* (1976) covers his successor.

The Congress of Vienna restored a European balance of power and inaugurated a century without a general European war. Led by the Austrian prime minister, Prince Klemens von Metternich, the restoration of the monarchical system was approved by all the great powers, including France; liberalism, nationalism, and democracy were correctly regarded as subversive to the established order and were rigorously opposed. The best accounts are Harold Nicolson's *The Congress of Vienna* (1946) and Henry A. Kissinger's *A World Restored* (1957). The liberal cause of the 1820s is treated in Christopher M. Woodhouse's *The Greek War for Independence* (1952) and the Russian fiasco in Anatole Mazour's *The First Russian Revolution, 1825* (1937). Revolutionaries were also crushed in England, Germany, and Spain, the last with French troops, but Latin America maintained its independence when London vetoed Russian proposals for massive European intervention. For an introduction see John B. Trend's *Bolivar and the Independence of Spanish America* (1946) and Jay Kinsbrunner's *Bernardo O'Higgins* (1968).

In the early 1830s revolutions again broke out across the continent. Their success in Western Europe—a constitutional monarch for the French, independence for the Belgians, and the right to vote for the English upper middle class—was balanced by their complete failure in the east. The revolutions of 1848 repeated the same pattern. While in France socialism divided the revolutionaries and delivered the bourgeoisie to Louis Napoleon, nationalism remained the dominant theme east of the Rhine and south of the Alps. Assorted dukes and princes were booted from Italy, the Habsburg Empire temporarily disintegrated, Metternich was forced into exile, and Frederick William IV hurriedly granted a constitution to his bewildered Prussian subjects. But by the end of the spring the revolutions had run their course. In Prussia the vacillating monarch refused the imperial German crown, and to the south Austria's "counterinsurgency" generals—Benedek, Radetsky, Windischgrätz, and the Croat Jellachich—crushed the Italian and Slav rebels and, with Russian aid, destroyed Kossuth's Magyar armies.

After brushing aside the Decembrists, Alexander's brother,

Nicholas I, established the most reactionary regime in Europe, crushed the Polish nationalists in 1831 (but was unable to send expeditions to Belgium or France), and sent over 100,000 troops to aid the Austrians in 1849. But as events would prove five years later, the Russian Army was little better than a massive police force. Priscilla Robertson's *Revolutions of 1848: A Social Study* (1952) is the best book on 1848, and *The Russian Army Under Nicholas I* (1965) by John Shelton Curtiss is a trenchant work on the decline of the tsar's legions and an indispensable background to the Crimean War.

### The Rise of Nation-States, 1850-1914

As long as Britain led the industrial revolution, she also led in technological innovations, or at least was able to make the fullest use of them to uphold the *Atlantic Pax Britannica*. Throughout the nineteenth century, British yards built good ships faster than any other two powers combined and allowed London to steer a "blue water" course free from European entanglements while promoting what it considered a balance of power on the continent. The critical later period is treated by Arthur T. Marder's excellent *The Anatomy of British Sea Power* (1940), and Christopher Lloyd's *The Navy and the Slave Trade* (1949) discusses one matter that American and French revolutionaries left unsolved. For Britain's greatest challenge, see Ernest Woodward's *Great Britain and the German Navy* (1935) and Alfred von Tirpitz's *My Memoirs* (1919).

Like the French, British generals did well fighting non-European military forces abroad but never mastered the art of amphibious operations. Wellington's ghost may account for the Crimean and Gallipoli debacles. In the first case, both sides had critical supply problems, and mutual ineptitude produced a war of attrition. The best account is Col. Edward Hamley's *The War in the Crimea* (1890). Hamley, a participant, and G.F.R. Henderson were the foremost British military critics of the nineteenth century, and both are discussed in Jay Luvaas's *The Education of an Army* (1964). C. B. Woodham-Smith's *Florence Nightingale* (1951) and *The Reason Why* (1953) are probing biographies and are eminently readable, as is Donald Morris's *The Washing of the Spears* (1965), a re-creation of the tragic Zulu wars. Brian Bond's (ed.) recent *Victorian Military Campaigns* (1967), however, is all one needs on Britain's "small wars."

Late nineteenth-century European imperialism only reflected

growing continental rivalries. From 1899 to 1902 South African Dutch waged a guerrilla war against British expansion and barely managed to force what amounted to a draw. Works like Rayne Kruger's *Good-Bye Dolly Gray* (1960) are fine narratives but emphasize campaign history and tend to romanticize a "popular" war that saw the incarceration of 120,000 Boer women and children, of whom an estimated 20,000 perished through disease and neglect. For the ensuing period, John K. Dunlop's *The Development of the British Army, 1899-1914* (1938) provides background, and key figures are treated in Philip Magnus' *Kitchener* (1958) and Dudley Sommer's *Haldane of Cloan* (1960).

While Britain was ruling the seas, the "great questions" of Europe were being settled by "blood and iron." What the revolutionaries had failed to do in 1789, 1830, and 1848, great statesmen and great armies would accomplish, or so it seemed. While neither Jomini nor Clausewitz bequeathed any magic formula to the Prussian generals, the latter were the first to marry the military staff system with "higher" military education. Their most notable offspring, the "Grosser Generalstab," or General Staff, was composed of the country's brightest officers and charged with formulation of doctrine and war plans independent of the traditional chain of command. The best treatment is Gordon Craig's *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945* (1955) which emphasizes the development of German militarism and its deleterious effects on the nation's future. Although Craig sought the origins of the Nazi phenomenon in Prussia's military tradition, Barrington Moore may be closer to the truth when he explores the impact of revolutions from above and their stifling effect on Germany's social growth—*Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966).

Both Italy and Germany were unified under comparatively liberal constitutional regimes after three short, decisive wars between 1859 and 1871; Britain had received the message earlier and began granting self-governing dominion status to her most powerful possessions at the same time, but the rest of Europe had to wait until World War I. Other ingredients in the Prussian story can be found in E. A. Pratt's *The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1853-1914* (1915) and Eugene N. Anderson's *The Social and Political Conflict in Prussia, 1858-1864* (1954), while Jay Luvaas's *The Military Legacy of the Civil War* (1959) is also valuable. Napoleon III emerged intact from the Crimea, supported Count Camillo di Cavour with troops in 1859, but lost his nerve after Solferino. The emperor fared no better in Mexico, where the end of America's Civil War precipitated a rapid French

withdrawal leaving the romantic Archduke Maximilian to face the traditional Latin American music. Cavour's long struggle to unify Italy ended successfully in 1870, and John Parris's *The Lion of Caprera: A Biography of Giuseppe Garibaldi* (1962) treats his unexpected and colorful ally. To the north, Prussia's seven-week triumph over Austria is covered by Gordon Craig's excellent *The Battle of Königgrätz* (1964) and her decisive defeat of Louis Napoleon in Michael Howard's fine *The Franco-Prussian War* (1961). Behind everything seemed to be the hand of the Prussian Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck.

In France, the defeat of the Second Empire's highly paid, professional army in 1870 discredited the concept of an all-volunteer military force for the immediate future. Complications arose when Parisian republicans objected to Prussia's harsh peace terms, refused to recognize the newly elected National Assembly, and established their own revolutionary government, the Commune, to continue the war effort. But the conservative Assembly—most of its members were royalists—saw the municipal body as a threat to the existing social order and directed its remaining armies against it. While the Prussians stepped aside, French regulars crushed the Commune in some of the cruelest fighting ever seen in Western Europe. In the wake of the battle, some 38,000 suspected Communards were arrested, 20,000 put to death, and 7,500 deported to New Caledonia. The tragedy is covered in Melvin Kranzberg's *The Siege of Paris, 1870-1871* (1950).

Better known is the explosive Dreyfus Affair that divided France in the 1890s. Guy Chapman's *The Dreyfus Case: A Reassessment* (1955) is one of the better works addressing the case of a young Jewish general staff officer falsely accused of espionage and the efforts of individuals, both in and outside of the defense establishment, to protect or expose the Army's original error. But the passions of the affair were soon forgotten in the upsurge of nationalism that spread throughout Europe. Richard Challener's *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866-1939* (1955) examines the close relationships between internal politics, foreign policy, and military strategy and doctrine, including the arguments for professional and draftee armies. Although the great Socialist leader Jean Jaurès championed a short-term, defensive militia in his *L'Armée nouvelle* published in 1910 (the abridged English version is *Democracy and Military Service*, 1916), until World War I other ideas held sway. David Ralston's fine *The Army of the Republic* (1967) covers the period before 1914, and Paul-Marie de La Gorce's *The*

*French Army: A Military-Political History* (1963) sketches the story up to Algeria. By then even the French were beginning to realize that France was no longer a great power.

### *The Great European War, 1914-1918*

The First World War was essentially a continental affair. The war's origins, a point of heated debate, were also European. Popular democracy had fueled intense national rivalries which in turn had produced governments that sought national objectives through complex alliances and expanded armaments. A general war had been almost inevitable. One of the most balanced accounts is by an American scholar, Laurence Lafore, whose *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I* (1965) avoids the tangle over war guilt and concentrates on unraveling and weighing the multiple factors involved.

Perhaps even more fascinating is Dwight E. Lee's survey of the more partisan literature in *The Outbreak of the First World War: Who was Responsible?* (1963). Because the treaty of Versailles fixed the blame for the war on Germany and its allies, basic primary source material on the origins of the war became available far earlier than historians had reason to expect. Anxious to refute the Allied verdict, the Germans quickly published documents from their diplomatic archives, an act which prompted other governments to open their records in response. From a study of this evidence, one early revisionist, Harry Elmer Barnes, in *The Genesis of the World War* (1926), concluded that "direct and immediate responsibility for its outbreak" fell upon Serbia, France, and Russia, with Germany and Britain "tied for last place." Other respected historians, like Bernadotte E. Schmitt in *The Coming of the War, 1914* (two volumes, 1930), insisted that Germany had to bear the main share of the blame for the war. But in a work that has stood the test of time remarkably well, *The Origins of the World War* (two volumes, 1930), Sidney Bradshaw Fay determined that "all the European countries, in a greater or less degree, were responsible." In the 1960s the controversy was fueled by two leading German historians, Gerhard Ritter and Fritz Fischer. Ritter's *The Sword and the Scepter* (1954-70) develops his earlier analysis in the *Schlieffen Plan* (1956) and accuses Germany's war planners of ignoring political factors. Fischer, in *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (1967) and his recent expansion of the same topic, *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914* (1975), has a broader target. The author portrays 1914 as a

German war of conquest, a "Griff nach der Weltmacht," and a cruel substitute for greatly needed social and political reforms at home.

The war brought European military participation, subordination, and cohesion to a high pitch. Aspects of the home front struggle are treated in the international Carnegie Endowment series, *Economic and Social History of the World War*, edited by James T. Shotwell (150 volumes, 1921-40) which includes superior works like William H. Beveridge's *British Food Control* (1928) and Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy's *The War and German Society: The Testament of a Liberal* (1937). Frank P. Chamber's *The War Behind the War, 1914-1918* (1939) is the best general study and traces the gradual centralization of social and economic controls necessitated by the war.

The immediate benefits of "war socialism" were dubious. Each sacrifice, each political, economic, or social concession to the war effort, ran the bidding up and made it more difficult to withdraw from the game without losing everything. The deepening commitment to total military victory was never seriously questioned. In the end, the struggle took the lives of at least ten million individuals, incapacitated about twenty million more, ruined Europe's economy, and discredited a culture that would allow such a slaughter to take place. Both René Albrecht-Carrié's *The Meaning of the First World War* (1965) and editor Jack J. Roth's *World War I: A Turning Point in Modern History* (1967) address the war's significance. Histories of its conduct have been more numerous. Two excellent short studies are Cyril Falls's *The Great War* (1959) and B. H. Liddell Hart's *A History of the World War, 1914-1918* (a 1970 revision of his *The Real War*, 1930). In the latter, the British military critic exposes the failure of Allied generalship and presents his indirect approach thesis (see Chapter 4). Falls gives greater weight to strategic and tactical problems facing commanders on the Western Front and also supplies a broader coverage of the war. Of the official operational histories, Britain's *The Great War* (edited by Sir James Edward Edmonds, Wilfrid Miles, and Henry Rodolph Davies, forty-five volumes, 1927-47), although not without bias, is the best, and C. E. W. Bean's excellent *Anzac to Amiens* (1946), a semiofficial summary of the Australian effort, is the most readable (see Chapter 22).

Basic works on command and strategy within the Allied camp are Paul Guinn's *British Strategy and Politics, 1914 to 1918* (1965), Jere Clemens King's *Generals and Politicians: Conflict between France's High Command, Parliament and Government*,

1914-1918 (1951), and Sir Frederick Maurice's *Lessons of Allied Co-operation* (1942). Once the promised quick victories failed to materialize, the war councils of the western democracies were taken over by strong civilian leaders headed by France's Georges Clemenceau and Britain's David Lloyd George. On the formulation of British strategy, *Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918* (1967) by Sir Ernest Woodward is supplemented by Maurice Hankey's *The Supreme Command, 1914-1918* (two volumes, 1961) and *Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries* (1927) edited by Charles E. Callwell. The last is lively and caustic and is complemented by a sympathetic biography, Basil Collier's *Brasshat* (1961), and a harsh criticism, General Sir Hubert Gough's *Soldiering On* (1954).

The opening plays are reported in Barbara Tuchman's fascinating and popular *The Guns of August* (1962). For a more detailed review of the initial war of movement in the west, see Sewell Tyng's *The Campaign of the Marne, 1914* (1935) and John Terraine's *Mons: The Retreat to Victory* (1960). For the other end of Europe, the standard English language battle study is Sir Edmund Ironside's *Tannenberg: The First Thirty Days in East Prussia* (1925). Of all the offensives, the German came closest to success, but was thwarted by French stubbornness and German overconfidence. Thereafter, mutual exhaustion and trench warfare ended the war of movement, and the struggles described in Alistair Horne's *The Price of Glory* (1962) and Leon Wolff's *In Flanders Fields* (1958) are more typical of what followed. For a tactical overview, see P. M. H. Lucas's *The Evolution of Tactical Ideas in France and Germany During the War of 1914-1918* (1925) and, at the ground level, read Charles Carrington's *A Subaltern's War* (1929) or Charles Douie's *The Weary Road* (1929). Some of the better anthologies are Eugene Löhrke's *Armageddon* (1930) and Guy Chapman's *Vain Glory* (1937), while Arthur Marwick examines changing British attitudes toward the war in *The Deluge: British Society and the First World War* (1965).

Generalship has been hotly debated. Correlli Barnett's *The Swordbearers* (1963) and Liddell Hart's earlier *Through the Fog of War* (1938) are two of many that take up the British commander, Sir Douglas Haig. Haig came to personify the strategy of attrition, and favorable treatments include Maj. Gen. Sir John Davidson's *Haig, Master of the Field* (1953), but to Alan Clark he was just another one of *The Donkeys* (1961) whose strategy threatened Britain's chance to survive even a final victory. Other important works are Hugh M. Urquhart's angry

Arthur Currie: *The Biography of a Great Canadian* (1950) and Hubert Gough's story in *The Fifth Army* (1931); both were key subordinates to Haig.

Good studies of French generalship are few. Edward L. Spears's *Liaison 1914* (1930) and Jean de Pierrefeu's *French Headquarters, 1915-1918* (1924) complement Marshal Joseph Joffre's translated *Personal Memoirs* (1932), Liddell Hart's *Foch: The Man of Orleans* (1931), and Jan Tanenbaum's recent biography, *General Maurice Sarrail* (1974). Joffre claims credit for the Marne, Liddell Hart feels Foch was a slow learner, and there are no good histories of Nivelles, Pétain, or the mutinies of 1917. After the disastrous Nivelles offensive on the Aisne, French morale crumbled and some fifty-four divisions were affected by "collective indiscipline." There was little organized violence, disturbances were generally confined to the rear, and the Germans never realized the scope of the affair. In the end some 23,000 soldiers were court-martialed, but only 432 received death sentences, 55 were shot, and, under a more cautious commander in chief, the army was saved from total collapse.

The German generals were no more successful than their opponents. Erich von Falkenhayn, who relieved Moltke (the younger) in 1914 and was replaced two years later, gives an overview in *The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914-1916* (1920). The exploits of his successors, the Hindenburg-Ludendorff team, are discussed in Donald J. Goodspeed's *Ludendorff: Genius of World War I* (1966) and John W. Wheeler-Bennett's *Wooden Titan: Hindenburg in Twenty Years of German History* (1936). Ludendorff later supervised the German war effort but was unable to transfer his tactical genius to other areas. One of his most brilliant staff officers, Max Hoffmann, was also his worst critic in *War Diaries and Other Papers* (1929).

There is no account of the shrewd Austrian Commander, Conrad von Hotzendorff, but Russia's best leader, Alexei Brusilov, has written *A Soldier's Notebook, 1914-1918* (1930), which complements Sir Alfred Knox's standard *With the Russian Army, 1914-1917* (1921). The best study on the decline of the tsarist state is Hugh Seton-Watson's *The Russian Empire, 1801-1917* (1967), while the 1905 Revolution is examined in Sidney Harcave's excellent *First Blood* (1964) and director Sergei Eisenstein's *Potemkin* (1926), a classic silent film. Two wars showed that the Russian tsar could suppress internal dissent and wage war, but not at the same time. By the end of 1916, with "Nicky" running the ill-provisioned armies, and Rasputin and the empress heading the state, the collapse was

almost inevitable. The revolutionary period is introduced by William Henry Chamberlin's standard *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921* (1935) and Isaac Deutscher's superb biographies, *Trotsky* (three volumes, 1954-63) and *Stalin* (1949), but there are many gaps.

The collapse of the Eastern Front failed to end the war, and the naval and southern theaters were indecisive. The desert war is covered by T. E. Lawrence's classic *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1926) and Field Marshal Archibald P. Wavell's *Allenby: A Study in Greatness* (1940-43) and his earlier *The Palestine Campaigns* (1928). The latter are excellent campaign and leadership analyses, but, like the African campaigns, they have little to do with Europe, and Allied forces in Italy and the Balkans remained stalemated. In 1915 Churchill directed Britain's massive amphibious campaign against the Straits but was unable to cut the Turkish knot. The full story of the Allied disaster is told in *Gallipoli Diary* (1920) by the British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Ian Hamilton, and *Gallipoli* (1929-32), the superb official account by C. F. Aspinall-Oglander. For the defending side, there is Hamilton's opposite, Otto Liman von Sanders and his *Five Years in Turkey* (1927).

To the north, the Royal Navy kept the lid on German sea power. Arthur J. Marder's sweeping *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow* (five volumes, 1961-70) is the best account, and R. H. Gibson and Maurice Pendergast's *The German Submarine War, 1914-1918* (1931) is best on Germany's greatest threat. The German high seas admirals were unwilling to risk a major encounter and sat out the war on the wrong side of the Kiel Canal. Their one major engagement with the British Grand Fleet off the coast of Danish Jutland was accidental. Good stories of what was the largest naval encounter to that date are Donald Macintyre's fine *Jutland* (1958) and, for the German side, Reinhard Scheer's *Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War* (1920). Scheer piloted the Kaiser's fleet and matched wits with Britain's finest captains whose stories are told in A. Temple Patterson's *Jellicoe* (1969) and Admiral W. S. Chalmers's *The Life and Letters of David Earl Beatty* (1951). Moving away from the traditional biographies and battle studies is Daniel Horn's *The German Naval Mutinies of World War I* (1969), one of several recent works combining history and sociology.

Military technology offered another way to end the stalemate in the west. Defenses could be paralyzed by poison gases, shattered by armored "land battleships," or bypassed by flying machines. But these alternatives were never thoroughly

pursued—aircraft design was still primitive, gas indiscriminate, and both the submarine and tank used hesitantly by their respective employers. Most air literature is romantic, but Raymond H. Fredette's *The Sky on Fire* (1966) is sound, as is Maj. Gen. Alden H. Waitt's *Gas Warfare* (1942). The tank, or armored fighting vehicle, was more of a "felt need" than either the airplane or submarine, and its origin is well documented in Liddell Hart's excellent *The Tanks* (1959), which covers both world wars from the British point of view. But despite the massive employment of thousands of these devices, the essential nature of World War I remained unchanged.

### *World War II and the Decline of Europe, 1919-1945*

The failure of Western leaders to develop a community of interest and deal with a series of worldwide financial crises were major contributing factors to the Second World War. Laurence Lafore's recent *The End of Glory: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War II* (1970) introduces the problem with a good discussion of A. J. P. Taylor's controversial *The Origins of The Second World War* (1961). Taylor portrayed Hitler as a popular leader pursuing traditional German goals. His efforts to revise the harsh Versailles peace settlement were encouraged by the vacillating policies of London and Paris and the ensuing war was a colossal blunder that stronger statesmen could have avoided. In contrast, Taylor's opponents would agree with Ernest Nolte's *Three Faces of Fascism* (1966) that totalitarian Germany represented something new and threatening to Western culture, and the irrational use of force was implicit in its ideological underpinnings. Robert G. Waite sees *The Free Corps Movement in Post War Germany, 1918-1923* as the Vanguard of Nazism (1952) and a training ground for paramilitary politics. The German Army did not intervene openly in Weimar's political process, but its impact was heavy until subordinated by Hitler. Some fine studies are Francis L. Carsten's *The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918-1933* (1966) and Wheeler-Bennett's *The Nemesis of Power* (1953), complemented by Reichswehr chief Hans von Seeckt's *Thoughts of a Soldier* (1930).

Spain was the first real sample of Hitler's political-military methods and a warning to Russia and the West. The Western democracies were too divided to aid the Republic and, with only limited assistance from the Soviet Union and the International Brigades, the Loyalists fell to General Francisco Franco's better equipped legions after a bitter three-year struggle. Hugh

Thomas's impartial *The Spanish Civil War* (1961) and Gabriel Jackson's more comprehensive *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939* (1965) are both excellent. Gerald Brenan's *The Spanish Labyrinth* (1943) discusses the war's background, while the more exciting firsthand accounts are George Orwell's disillusioned *Homage to Catalonia* (1938) and the well-known interpretations of Hemingway and Malraux. All fought for the Republic.

General European war began in September 1939. While Britain and France expected another long war of attrition, the German dictator destroyed or intimidated his opponents with a series of quick, decisive victories. Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France fell to the mechanized blitzkrieg with surprising speed, and Churchill's England barely managed to weather the storm that followed. Unable to defeat Britain and fearing an eventual Anglo-American coalition in the west, Hitler needed military security in the east and assured supplies of food and raw materials. To secure this, he launched an invasion of Russia in mid-1941. Stubborn resistance by both Russia and Britain finally ended the Nazi war of movement and, with the American entrance, turned the struggle into a war of technological attrition in the West and manpower attrition in the East, with Germany the loser. The Western Allies made up for Gallipoli by a dazzling series of amphibious invasions more reminiscent of Foch's strategy of 1918 than of the indirect approach. Once the huge Russian armies began rolling in from the steppes, Germany was overwhelmed and Europe divided between American and Soviet spheres of influence.

The best single-volume study is Gordon Wright's *The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945* (1968). Other fine histories include Brigadier Peter Young's *World War* (1966), Basil Collier's *A Short History of the Second World War* (1967) and Fuller's *The Second World War* (1948). Official histories of the war were produced by the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and others. All are narratives based on official documents, and most are more balanced and professional than their World War I predecessors. The most comprehensive foreign series is the United Kingdom's *History of the Second World War* which includes separate civil (twenty-nine volumes), medical (twenty-one volumes), and military (twenty-nine volumes) series, although, unlike their U.S. counterparts, they are devoid of both citations and bibliographical notes (see Chapter 22). Soviet historians, not unexpectedly, have been plagued by ideological intrusions and

are currently making at least their second attempt at an officially acceptable version. Even these massive projects have been dwarfed by a vast outpouring of popular literature—paperback memoirs, biographies, small-unit operations, technical histories, many of which are based on the official histories and the sources noted in James E. O'Neill and Robert W. Krauskopf (eds.) *World War II: An Account of Its Documents* (1976).

Interwar French leaders had rejected the idea of a quick-strike, mechanized, professional army and opted for a larger draftee force with more depth. Whatever can be said of their strategy, there was no immediate invasion and France was given eight months to prepare for the expected assault. The army was lost when its commander, General Maurice Gamelin, committed his mobile reserves prematurely; the country was lost when his successors lost the will to fight. The sideshows were the deceptive Winter War between Russia and Finland, and *The Campaign in Norway* treated officially by Thomas K. Derry (1952). The standard battle studies are Col. Adolphe Goutard's *The Battle of France, 1940* (1959) and Lionel F. Ellis's official *The War in France and Flanders* (1953), with a good firsthand account by Spears in *Assignment to Catastrophe* (two volumes, 1954-55). A more searching study of France's psychological collapse is Marc Bloch's brilliant *Strange Defeat* (1949), and, for the Army's thrust into the political arena, Philip Bankwitz's *Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France* (1967) is excellent.

Weygand succeeded Gamelin and prepared the way for Pétain's armistice. But as de Gaulle predicted, France had lost a battle but not the war, and both he and Churchill were guided by their broader vistas of history. De Gaulle's *The Edge of the Sword* (1932), together with his *War Memoirs* (five volumes, 1955-60), and Churchill's *The Second World War* (six volumes, 1948-53) are autobiographical testaments to their strengths and weaknesses. Lord Hankey's *Diplomacy by Conference* (1946) and Liddell Hart's *Memoirs* (1965-66) and *The British Way in Warfare* (1932) reflect the island's prewar yearning for the "blue water" strategy which the fall of France now made inevitable. For the war, Churchill's histories are complemented by the official series and balanced by Sir Arthur Bryant's *A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff* (two volumes, 1957-59).

Britain's command of the air and sea insured her immediate survival. The development of the Royal Air Force is covered in

Philip Joubert de la Ferte's *The Third Service* (1955) and Peter Townsend's *Duel of Eagles* (1970), and operations are presented by Denis Richards and Hilary A. Saunders' *Royal Air Force, 1939-1945* (three volumes, 1953-54). The official account of Britain's *Strategic Air Offense Against Germany* (four volumes, 1961) by Charles Kingsley Webster and Noble Frankland is supplemented by the U.S. Air Force histories and Anthony Verrier's *The Bomber Offensive* (1968). The results were controversial, and indiscriminate bombing may have only stiffened resistance on both sides.

For the Royal Navy, Stephen W. Roskill's *The War at Sea* (three volumes, 1954-61) is the excellent official study and is supplemented by his shorter *White Ensign* (1960) and Samuel Eliot Morison's official histories of the American effort. Two key biographies by William S. Chalmers are *Full Cycle: The Biography of Admiral Sir Bertram Home Ramsay* (1959), which includes the Dunkirk episode, and *Max Horton and the Western Approaches* (1954), and, on the development of British amphibious warfare, Brigadier Bernard Fergusson's *The Watery Maze* (1961) is valuable.

On the ground, the larger implications are discussed in William McNeill's *America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946* (1953) and Herbert Feis's *Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (1957). Operational differences between British and American commanders are brought out in Field Marshal Montgomery's *Memoirs* (1958) and Maj. Gen. Hubert Essame's *The Battle for Germany* (1969). More balanced are the official history, *Victory in the West* (1962-68) by Ellis, and Reginald W. Thompson's recent *Montgomery, the Field Marshal* (1969).

The role of the Mediterranean theater is difficult to analyze. Trumbull Higgins explores the matter in *Soft Underbelly: The Anglo-American Controversy over the Italian Campaign, 1939-1945* (1968), but the best book is Michael Howard's *The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War* (1968). British interest "east of Suez" was hard to shake off. The Balkans and Crete are taken up in Walter Ansel's *Hitler and the Middle Sea* (1972), and the Mediterranean war is covered broadly but apologetically by Marc Antonio Bragadin's *The Italian Navy in World War II* (1957) and by Admiral Paul Auphan and Jacques Mordal's extremely biased *The French Navy in World War II* (1959). None of the avant-garde dictatorships had aircraft carriers or adequate radar. Britain's master stroke—a naval air attack against an anchored Italian fleet—is described in Don

Newton and A. Cecil Hampshire's *Taranto* (1959) and the local British sea lords in Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham's *A Sailor's Odyssey* (1951), Admiral Philip Vian's *Action This Day* (1960), and Macintyre's *Fighting Admiral: The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Somerville* (1961). The antagonists in North Africa are dealt with in Robert John Collins's *Lord Wavell* (1947), John Robertson's *Auchinleck* (1959), Alan Moorehead's *Montgomery* (1946) and Ronald Lewin's *Rommel as Military Commander* (1968), the last complementing *The Rommel Papers* (1953), edited by Liddell Hart, and all evaluated in Barnett's *The Desert Generals* (1960). See also J. A. I. Agar-Hamilton and L. C. F. Turner's *Crisis in the Desert, May-July 1942* (1952), and Dereck Jewell's (ed.) experimental *Alamein and the Desert War* (1968). On the mainland, the painfully slow advance up the Italian peninsula is plotted in General W. G. F. Jackson's *The Battle for Italy* (1967) supplemented by Field Marshal Albert Kesselring's *A Soldier's Record* (1954) and General Frido von Senger und Etterlin's *Neither Fear Nor Hope* (1964).

Allan Bullock's *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (1952) is a good introduction to the Nazi leadership, and operational decisions are taken up in Liddell Hart's *The Other Side of the Hill* (1951). Heinz Guderian's *Panzer Leader* (1952), Friedrich von Mellenthin's *Panzer Battles, 1939-1945* (1955), and Erich von Manstein's *Lost Victories* (1958) represent the younger and more energetic generals and marshals. Another new element, Germany's tactical air force, lacked a strategic capability. Good accounts are Richard Suchenwirth's *Historical Turning Points in the German Air Force War Effort* (1959) and Adolf Galland's eyewitness *The First and the Last: The Rise and Fall of the German Fighter Forces* (1954). The real fall came when Germany failed to replace her first generation of pilots and aircraft.

The neglected Navy is discussed in Admiral Friedrich Ruge's fine *Der Seekrieg* (1957, in English), and the best work on Germany's cross-channel invasion plans is Ansel's *Hitler Confronts England* (1960). In *Struggle for the Sea* (1959), German naval chief Erich Raeder describes his mistaken efforts to create a new battle fleet, while his successor, "U-boat" Admiral Karl Doenitz, related his trials in *Memoirs: 10 Years and 20 Days* (1959). German submarine production peaked in the winter of 1944/45, but by then Germany had lost the technological race.

Expecting a short war, the Nazi leaders had not begun to mobilize their economic resources until the end of 1943. The problem is discussed in Alan S. Milward's *The German*

*Economy at War* (1965); the turnabout is documented in Albert Speer's *Inside the Third Reich* (1970); and books like Rudolf Lusar's *German Secret Weapons of the Second World War* (1959) show how slim the margin of victory may have been. Other elements of the Hitlerian formula are discussed in Louis de Jong's *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War* (1956), Gerard Reitlinger's *The SS* (1956), and George H. Stein's *The Waffen SS* (1966).

On the Eastern Front, the survival of Russian military professionalism was a question mark. For the early period see John Erickson's *The Soviet High Command* (1962), D. Fedotoff White's *The Growth of the Red Army* (1944), Z.K. Brzezinski's (ed.) *Political Controls in the Soviet Army* (1954), and Robert Conquest's *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties* (1968). Germany's excursion into Russia is treated in Allan Clark's *Barbarossa* (1965), and the retreat in Earl F. Ziemke's excellent *Stalingrad to Berlin* (1968). The last is part of a three-volume series on the Eastern Front to be published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, which has also sponsored about a dozen specialized studies on the same campaign. Alexander Werth has written the best popular history, *Russia at War* (1964), and Seweryn Bialer's (ed.) *Stalin and his Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II* (1969) covers some of the internal bickering. Leon Goure's *The Siege of Leningrad* (1962) is a Rand research project that complements Harrison Salisbury's excellent *The 900 Days* (1969). To the south, Ronald Seth's informal *Stalingrad, Point of Return* (1959) treats the operational turning point marked by the loss of the entire German Sixth Army, while, behind the lines, Alexander Dallin's *German Rule in Russia* (1957) presents a broad coverage of Nazi Germany's insane occupational policies.

The underground opposition to Hitler's New Order is treated in M.R.D. Foot's *Resistance* (1977), while Charles Delzell's *Mussolini's Enemies* (1961) and Peter Hoffmann's *The History of the German Resistance, 1933-1945* (1977) cover the internal dissenters. Also falling into the "unconventional" category are Paul Leverkuehn's *German Military Intelligence* (1954) and Robert M. Kennedy's *German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans* (1954). For frustrated cryptologists, F.W. Winterbotham's *The Ultra Secret* (1974) and Anthony Cave Brown's *Bodyguard of Lies* (1975) tell how the German codes were cracked and have stirred up a lively historical controversy about both the reliability of their stories and the relative importance of this intelligence success in winning the war. Taking a broader

view, former Central Intelligence Agency Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick's *Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II* (1969) includes discussions of Barbarossa (the Russians), Pearl Harbor (the Americans), Dieppe, Market Garden and the Bulge.

### *Asia and the West, 1800-1945*

Western expansion into Africa, Asia, and South America introduced ferment and instability into what had been areas of high social, economic, and political continuity. Basic descriptions of the Far Eastern experience are O. Edmund Clubb's *Twentieth Century China* (1964), Edwin O. Reischauer's *The United States and Japan* (1950), and John K. Fairbanks's *The United States and China* (1958). In the nineteenth century, military forces opened China to economic invasion, but the Middle Kingdom was too large for Europe to swallow. Led by the crafty dowager Tz'u Hsi, the ruling dynasty managed to stave off a final collapse until 1911. Peter Ward Fay's *The Opium War, 1840-1842* (1975) introduces the period, Chester C. Tan's *The Boxer Catastrophe* (1955) tells the story of the regime's last stand, and Ralph L. Powell's *The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912* (1955) covers the final years. Once national cohesion disintegrated, power fell to local generals like Yüan Shih-k'ai, and, despite his tremendous prestige, Sun Yat-sen had little authority even within his own party. The warlord period is discussed in James E. Sheridan's *Chinese Warlord* (1966) and Donald Gillan's *Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949* (1967) (most were reformers as well as generals). Sun's successor, Chiang Kai-shek, was also a general and received the nominal allegiance of most of China by the end of 1928. The small Chinese Communist party was mismanaged by Moscow, which had little use for agrarian reformers, and Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Lin Piao, and others made their 6,000-mile Long March in 1934 to escape pursuing Nationalist armies. But once Japan occupied Chiang's coastal power base, the Kuomintang deteriorated and Mao began his guerrilla war behind both Japanese and Nationalist lines.

Key works on the 1920s are Conrad Brandt's *Stalin's Failure in China* (1958), Harold Isaac's classic *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (1938), and Benjamin I. Schwartz's *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (1951). For a feel of the revolution, read Pearl Buck's *The Good Earth* (1931), then Edgar Snow's key *Red Star Over China* (1937), and Mao's nonpolitical *Basic Tactics*

(1938). His *Selected Works* (four volumes, 1961-65) include *Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War* and *On the Protracted War*, both written in 1938. The 1945-50 period is reported by Derk Bodde in *Peking Diary* (1950), A. Doak Barnett in *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (1963), and Jack Belden in his eyewitness *China Shakes the World* (1949). For the struggle against Japan, F.F. Liu's comprehensive *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949* (1956), Graham Peck's lively *Two Kinds of Time* (1967), Harold Scott Quigley's *Far Eastern War, 1937-1941* (1942), and Belden's *The New Fourth Army* (1938) are the best accounts of a gigantic but generally undocumented struggle.

The Japanese experience was different. In 1868 Japan's leading families established a "Western" government and made the emperor the symbolic head of the new nation. Under clan leadership, the feudal Samurai system was replaced by a modern national army, the country was industrialized from above, and the small but sturdy middle class expanded. During the next forty years the islanders took Formosa, occupied Korea, and decisively defeated one of the great European powers. The Russo-Japanese war is reported in Frederick Palmer's firsthand *With Kuroki in Manchuria* (1904) and the *American Reports of Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War* (five volumes, 1906-7), but there is no good general history.

World War I made Japan the dominant power in the Far East, and Tokyo's policy makers continued to expand Japanese regional hegemony. Although conservative military leaders crushed the ultranationalist young officers' movement in 1936, they continued to exploit Chinese weakness. Manchuria had been occupied in 1931, and China was openly invaded six years later. By 1941 the Japanese had seized most of China's urban areas, including her coastal ports, shut up the remnants of Chiang's army in central China, and organized several local puppet governments. But China was too big. The Nationalists survived in Chungking, Mao expanded his control in the countryside, and all awaited the outcome of the war in the Pacific. Francis C. Jones's *Japan's New Order in East Asia* (1954) points out the absence of any master blueprint for conquest, and the army's domination of national policy is highlighted in Robert Butow's *Tojo and the Coming of the War* (1961). The earlier period is treated in Takehiko Yoshihashi's *Conspiracy at Mukden* (1963) and the young officers by Hugh Byas's journalistic *Government by Assassination* (1942), but there are hardly

any English treatments of Japanese military operations on the mainland.

Japan's Pacific offensive was tactically brilliant, operationally superb, but strategically disastrous. Good introductions are Emmanuel Andrieu-D'Albas's *Death of a Navy* (1957), Masonari Ito's *The End of the Imperial Navy* (1962), and Saburo Hayashi's *Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War* (1959). In Singapore: *The Japanese Version* (1960), Masanobu Tsuju, former Military Operations Director for the 25th Army, tells how it was done. *Midway, the Battle That Doomed Japan* (by Mitsuo Fuchida and Masataka Okumiya, 1955) occurred only six months after Pearl Harbor; Japan's best aircraft (see *Zero* by Okumiya and designer Jiro Horikoshi, 1956) remained competitive throughout the war, but her skilled aviators were slowly replaced by the suicidal pilots described in Rikihei Inoguchi and Tadashi Nakajima's *The Divine Wind* (1958). The kamikaze effort highlighted the continued singularity of what should have been the most "Westernized" culture in Asia and represented the high-watermark of the total war concept. *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* (1949), by Jerome B. Cohen, is the chief work on that subject, and all the above are supplemented by the fine volumes in the American, British, Indian, New Zealand, and Australian official histories and the host of associated memoirs and special studies. Of these, Sir William Slim's *Defeat Into Victory* (1956), treating the Burma campaign, is perhaps the best memoir by a general officer and is an excellent introduction to the field.

The war's end left both nationalism and democracy exhausted across the globe, and only technology, the third member of the trio, seemed to have emerged stronger. Whether a new balance could ever be created between the three, or whether rampant technology would tilt the world into some terrible historical chasm, remained to be seen. The explosion of two great atomic bombs in crowded urban centers did not augur well for the future. Total war had now twice almost destroyed Europe and, in the process, had reduced Western pugnacity to a shadow of its former self. Although the prognosis was bad, it was not hopeless. Yet the heady confidence that had propelled the West through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was not likely to repeat itself again.

## Bibliography

- Agar-Hamilton, John A. I., and Turner, Leonard C. F. *Crisis in the Desert, May-July 1942*. Capetown: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952.
- Albrecht-Carrié, René. *The Meaning of the First World War*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
- Anderson, Eugene N. *The Social and Political Conflict in Prussia, 1858-1884*. Lincoln: Univ. of Neb. Press, 1954.
- Andrieu-d'Albas, Emmanuel. *Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II*. Translated by Anthony Rippon. New York: Devin-Adair, 1957.
- Ansel, Walter. *Hitler and the Middle Sea*. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1972.
- . *Hitler Confronts England*. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1960.
- Aspinall-Oglander, Cecil Faber. *History of the Great War: Military Operations, Gallipoli*. 2 vols. London: Heinemann, 1929-32.
- Auphan, [Gabriel A. J.] Paul, and Mordal, Jacques. *The French Navy in World War II*. Translated by A. J. C. Sabalot. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1959.
- Bankwitz Philip. *Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967.
- Barnes, Harry Elmer. *The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt*. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926.
- Barnett, A. Doak. *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*. New York: Praeger, 1963.
- Barnett, Correlli. *The Swordbearers: Studies in Supreme Command in the First World War*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1963.
- . *The Desert Generals*. London: Kimber, 1960.
- Bean, Charles E. W. *Anzac to Amiens: A Shorter History of the Australian Fighting Services in the First World War*. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1946.
- Belden, Jack. *China Shakes the World*. New York: Harper, 1949.
- . *The New Fourth Army*. Shanghai: Post-Mercury, 1938. Reprinted from a series of articles in the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*.
- Beveridge, William Henry. *British Food Control*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1928.
- Bialer, Seweryn, ed. *Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II*. New York: Pegasus, 1969.
- Bloch, Marc L. B. *Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940*. Translated by Gerard Hopkins. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949.
- Bodde, Derk. *Peking Diary: A Year of Revolution*. New York: Schuman, 1950.
- Bond, Brian, ed. *Victorian Military Campaigns*. New York: Praeger, 1967.
- Bragadin, Marc' Antonio. *The Italian Navy in World War II*. Translated by Gale Hoffman. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957.
- Brandt, Conrad. *Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-27*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958.
- Brenan, Gerald. *The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War*. London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1943.
- Brinton, Crane. *A Decade of Revolution, 1789-1799*. New York: Harper, 1934.
- Brodie, Bernard. *A Guide to Naval Strategy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1944. First published as *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* in 1942.
- . *Sea Power in the Machine Age*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941.
- . *Strategy in the Missile Age*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959.
- Brown, Anthony Cave. *Bodyguard of Lies*. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.

- Brusilov, Alexei A. *A Soldier's Notebook, 1914-1918*. London: Macmillan, 1930.
- Bryant, Arthur. *A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff*. 2 vols. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957-59. (1) *The Turn of the Tide, 1939-1943*; (2) *Triumph in the West, 1943-1946*.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., ed. *Political Controls in the Soviet Army: A Study Based on Reports by Former Soviet Officers*. New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954.
- Buck, Pearl. *The Good Earth*. New York: John Day, 1931.
- Bullock, Alan L. C. *Hitler, A Study in Tyranny*. Rev. ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
- Butow, Robert J. C. *Tojo and the Coming of the War*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961.
- Byas, Hugh. *Government by Assassination*. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1942.
- Callwell, Charles E., ed. *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, bart., G.C.B., D.S.O.: His Life and Diaries*. 2 vols. New York: Scribner's, 1927.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. *Economic and Social History of the World War*. Edited by James T. Shotwell. Multivolume. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1921-40.
- Carrington, Charles Edmund [Charles Edmonds]. *A Subaltern's War: Being Memoirs of the Great War, etc.* London: Davies, 1929.
- Carsten, Francis Ludwig. *The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918-1933*. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1966.
- Challener, Richard D. *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms 1866-1939*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1955.
- Chalmers, William Scott. *Full Cycle: The Biography of Admiral Sir Bertram Home Ramsey*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959.
- . *The Life and Letters of David, Earl Betty, Admiral of the Fleet, etc.* London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951.
- . *Max Horton and the Western Approaches: A Biography of Admiral Sir Max Kennedy Horton*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1954.
- Chamberlin, William Henry. *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1935.
- Chambers, Frank Pentland. *The War Behind the War, 1914-1918: A History of the Political and Civilian Fronts*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939.
- Chandler, David G. *The Campaigns of Napoleon*. New York: Macmillan, 1966.
- Chapman, Guy. *The Dreyfus Case: A Reassessment*. New York: Reynal, 1955.
- Chapman, Guy, ed. *Vain Glory: A Miscellany of the Great War, 1914-1918: Written by Those Who Fought in It on Each Side and on All Fronts*. London: Cassell, 1937.
- Chorley, Katherine. *Armies and the Art of Revolution*. London: Faber and Faber, 1943.
- Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer. *The Second World War*. 6 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948-53. (1) *The Gathering Storm (1948)*, (2) *Their Finest Hour (1949)*, (3) *The Grand Alliance (1950)*, (4) *The Hinge of Fate (1950)*, (5) *Closing the Ring (1951)*, (6) *Triumph and Tragedy (1953)*.
- Clark, Alan. *Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-1945*. New York: William Morrow, 1965.
- . *The Donkeys*. London: Hutchinson, 1961.
- Clubb, O. Edmund. *Twentieth Century China*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1964.
- Cohen, Jerome B. *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction*. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minn. Press, 1949.

- Collier, Basil. *Brasshat: A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson*. London: Secker and Warburg, 1961.
- . *A Short History of the Second World War*. London: Collins, 1967.
- Collins, Robert John. *Lord Wavell, 1883-1941: A Military Biography*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1947.
- Connell, John. See Robertson, John Henry.
- Conquest, Robert. *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties*. Rev. ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.
- Craig, Gordon. *The Battle of Königgrätz: Prussia's Victory Over Austria, 1866*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964.
- . *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*. Rev. ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964.
- . *War, Politics, and Diplomacy: Selected Essays*. New York: Praeger, 1966.
- Cunningham, Andrew B. *A Sailor's Odyssey: The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope*. New York: Dutton, 1951.
- Curtiss, John Shelton. *The Russian Army Under Nicholas I, 1825-1855*. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1965.
- Dallin, Alexander. *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957.
- Davidson, John Humphrey. *Haig, Master of the Field*. London: Nevill, 1953.
- de Gaulle, Charles. *The Edge of the Sword*. Translated by Gerard Hopkins. New York: Criterion, 1960. French edition 1932.
- . *War Memoirs*. 5 vols. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955-60. (1) *The Call to Honor, 1940-1942*, translated by J. Griffin (1955); (2) *Unity, 1942-1944*, translated by R. Howard (1959); (3) *Salvation, 1944-46*, translated by R. Howard (1960); (4) *Unity, 1942-1944 (documents)*, translated by J. Murchie and H. Erskine (1959); (5) *Salvation, 1944-1946 (documents)*, translated by J. Murchie and H. Erskine (1960).
- Delzell, Charles F. *Mussolini's Enemies: The Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961.
- Derry, Thomas Kingston. *The Campaign in Norway*. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1952.
- Deutscher, Isaac. *The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954.
- . *The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-1929*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959.
- . *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky, 1929-1940*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963.
- . *Stalin: A Political Biography*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949.
- Doenitz, Karl. *Memoirs: 10 Years and 20 Days*. Translated by R. H. Stevens. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1959.
- Douhet, Giulio. *The Command of the Air*. Translated by Dino Ferrari. London: Faber and Faber, 1943. First Italian edition 1921.
- Doie, Charles. *The Weary Road: Recollections of a Subaltern of Infantry*. London: Murray, 1929.
- Dunlop, John K. *The Development of the British Army, 1899-1914: From the Eve of the South African War to the Eve of the Great War, With Special Reference to the Territorial Force*. London: Methuen, 1938.
- Dupre, Huntley. *Lazare Carnot: Republican Patriot*. Oxford, Ohio: Mississippi Valley Press, 1940.
- Earle, Edward Mead, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1943.

- Edmonds, Charles. See Carrington, Charles Edmund.
- Ellis, Lionel F. *Victory in the West*. 2 vols. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1962-68. (1) *The Battle for Normandy*, (2) *The Defeat of Germany*.
- . *The War in France and Flanders, 1939-1940*. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1953.
- Emme, Eugene M., ed. *The Impact of Air Power: National Security and World Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1959.
- Erickson, John. *The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962.
- Essame, Hubert. *The Battle for Germany*. New York: Scribner's, 1969.
- Fairbanks, John K. *The United States and China*. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958.
- Falkenhayn, Erich G. von, *The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914-1916*. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1920.
- Falls, Cyril B. *The Great War*. New York: Putnam's, 1959.
- Fay, Peter Ward. *The Opium War, 1840-1842*. Chapel Hill: Univ. of N.C. Press, 1975.
- Fay, Sidney Bradshaw. *The Origins of the World War*. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1928.
- Fedotoff-White, Dimitri. *The Growth of the Red Army*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1944.
- Feis, Herbert. *Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957.
- Fergusson, Bernard. *The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961.
- Finer, Samuel Edward. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Fischer, Fritz. *Germany's Aims in the First World War*. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967.
- . *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914*. Translated by Marion Jackson. New York: W. W. Norton, 1975.
- Foot, M. R. D. *Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism, 1940-1945*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.
- Fredette, Raymond H. *The Sky on Fire: The First Battle of Britain, 1917-1918, and the Birth of the Royal Air Force*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.
- Fuchida, Mitsuo, and Okumiya, Masatake. *Midway, the Battle That Doomed Japan: The Japanese Navy's Story*. Edited by Clark H. Kawakami and Roger Pineau. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1955.
- Fuller, J. F. C. *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961: A Study of the Impact of the French, Industrial, and Russian Revolutions on War and Its Conduct*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1961.
- . *The Second World War, 1939-1945: A Strategic and Tactical History*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1948.
- Galland, Adolf. *The First and the Last: The Rise and Fall of the German Fighter Forces, 1938-1945*. Translated by Mervyn Savill. New York: Holt, 1954.
- Gann, Lewis H. *Guerrillas in History*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Inst. Press, 1971.
- Geyl, Pieter. *Napoleon: For and Against*. Translated by Olive Renier. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1949.
- Gibson, Richard Henry, and Pendergast, Maurice. *The German Submarine War, 1914-1918*. New York: R. R. Smith, 1931.
- Gillan, Donald. *Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967.

- Goodspeed, Donald James. *Ludendorff: Genius of World War I*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966.
- Gottschalk, Louis. *The Era of the French Revolution (1715-1815)*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1929.
- Gough, Hubert. *The Fifth Army*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1931.
- . *Soldiering On*. London: Barber, 1954.
- Gouré, Leon. *The Siege of Leningrad*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1962.
- Goutard, Adolphe. *The Battle of France, 1940*. Translated by A. R. P. Burgess. New York: Ives Washburn, 1959.
- Guderian, Heinz. *Panzer Leader*. Translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon. New York: Dutton, 1952.
- Guinn, Paul. *British Strategy and Politics, 1914 to 1918*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965.
- Hamilton, Ian S. M. *Gallipoli Diary*. 2 vols. London: Arnold, 1920.
- Hamley, Edward. *The War in the Crimea*. New York: Scribner and Welford, 1890.
- Hankey, Maurice P. *Diplomacy by Conference: Studies in Public Affairs, 1920-1946*. London: Benn, 1946.
- . *The Supreme Command 1914-1918*. 2 vols. London: Allen and Unwin, 1961.
- Harcave, Sidney. *First Blood: The Russian Revolution of 1905*. New York: Macmillan, 1964.
- Hayashi, Saburo (with Alvin Coox). *Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War*. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association, 1959.
- Hayes, Carlton J. H. *A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900*. New York: Harper, 1941.
- Hemingway, Ernest. *For Whom the Bell Tolls*. New York: Scribner's, 1940.
- Higgins, Trumbull. *Soft Underbelly: The Anglo-American Controversy Over the Italian Campaign, 1939-1945*. New York: Macmillan, 1968.
- Hoffman, Max. *War Diaries and Other Papers*. Translated by Eric Sutton. 2 vols. London: Secker, 1929.
- Hoffmann, Peter. *The History of the German Resistance, 1933-1945*. Translated by Richard Barry. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977.
- Holley, Irving Brinton, Jr. *Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During World War I: A Study in the Relationship of Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of Weapons*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1953.
- Horn, Daniel. *The German Naval Mutinies of World War I*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1969.
- Horne, Alistair. *The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962.
- Howard, Michael Eliot. *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France*. New York: Macmillan, 1961.
- . *The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War*. New York: Praeger, 1968.
- . *Studies in War and Peace*. London: Temple, Smith, 1970.
- Huang Chen-hsia and Whitson, William. *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71*. New York: Praeger, 1973.
- Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957.

- Inoguchi, Rikihei, and Nakajima, Tadashi (with Roger Pineau). *The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II*. Annapolis, Md., U.S. Naval Institute, 1958.
- Ironside, Edmund. *Tannenberg: The First Thirty Days in East Prussia*. London: Blackwood, 1925.
- Isaacs, Harold R. *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1951.
- Ito, Masonari (with Roger Pineau). *The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1962.
- Jackson, Gabriel. *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965.
- Jackson, William G. F. *Attack in the West: Napoleon's First Campaign Re-Read Today*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1953.
- . *The Battle for Italy*. New York: Harper and Row, 1967.
- Jaurès, Jean Léon. *L'Armée nouvelle: l'organisation socialiste de la France*. Paris: Rouff, 1911. Abridged English translation is *Democracy and Military Service*. Edited by G. G. Coulton. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton and Kent, 1916.
- Jewell, Dereck, ed. *Alamein and the Desert War*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1968.
- Joffre, Joseph. *The Personal Memoirs of Joffre, Field Marshal of the French Army*. Translated by T. Bentley Mott. 2 vols. New York: Harper, 1932.
- Jones, Francis Clifford. *Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-1945*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954.
- Jong, Louis de. *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War*. Translated by C. M. Geyle. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956.
- Joubert de la Ferte, Philip B. *The Third Service: The Story Behind the Royal Air Force*. London: Thames, Hudson, 1955.
- Kahn, David. *The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing*. New York: Macmillan, 1967.
- Kennedy, Robert M. *German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans, 1941-1944*. DA Pamphlet. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954.
- Kesselring, Albert. *Kesselring: A Soldier's Record*. Translated by Lynton Hudson. New York: William Morrow, 1954.
- King, Jere Clemens. *Generals and Politicians: Conflict Between France's High Command, Parliament and Government, 1914-1918*. Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1951.
- Kinsbrunner, Jay. *Bernardo O'Higgins*. New York: Twayne, 1968.
- Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. *Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II*. New York: Macmillan, 1969.
- Kissinger, Henry A. *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957.
- Knox, Alfred W. *With the Russian Army, 1914-1917: Being Chiefly Extracts from the Diary of a Military Attache*. 2 vols. New York: Dutton, 1921.
- Kranzberg, Melvin. *The Siege of Paris, 1870-1871: A Political and Social History*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1950.
- Kruger, Rayne. *Good-Bye Dolly Gray: The Story of the Boer War*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1960.
- Lafore, Laurence D. *The End of Glory: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War II*. 2d ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970.
- . *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965.
- La Gorce, Paul-Marie de. *The French Army: A Military-Political History*. New York: Braziller, 1963.

- Langer, William L. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*. 2 vols. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1935.
- Lasswell, Harold Dwight. *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1927.
- Laurence, T[homas]. E[dward]. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*. London: Pike and Hodgson, 1926. Abridged version is *Revolt in the Desert*.
- Lee, Dwight E., ed. *The Outbreak of the First World War: Who was Responsible?* Rev. ed. Boston: Heath, 1963.
- Lenanton, Carola M. A. See Oman, Carola.
- Leverkuehn, Paul. *German Military Intelligence*. Translated by R. H. Stevens and Constantine Fitzgibbon. New York: Praeger, 1954.
- Lewin, Ronald. *Rommel as Military Commander*. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1968.
- Lewis, Michael A. *A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1960.
- Liddell Hart, B. H. *Foch: The Man of Orleans*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1931.
- . *The British Way in Warfare*. London: Faber and Faber, 1932.
- . *The Ghost of Napoleon*. London: Faber and Faber, 1933.
- . *Through the Fog of War*. New York: Random House, 1938.
- . *The Other Side of the Hill*. London: Cassell, 1951. Smaller edition, *The German Generals Talk*, published by William Morrow in 1948.
- . *The Tanks: The History of the Royal Tank Regiment and Its Predecessors, Heavy Branch Machine-Gun Corps, Tank Corps, and Royal Tank Corps, 1914-1945*. 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1959.
- . *Memoirs*. 2 vols. New York: Putnam's, 1965-66.
- . *A History of the World War, 1914-1918*. Enlarged ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970. Revision of *The Real War*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930.
- Liman von Sanders, Otto V. *Five Years in Turkey*. Translated by Carl Reichmann. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1927.
- Liu, F. F. *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956.
- Lloyd, Christopher. *The Navy and the Slave Trade*. New York: Longmans, Green, 1949.
- Löhrke, Eugene W., ed. *Armageddon: The World War in Literature*. New York, Cape and Smith, 1930.
- Longworth, Philip. *The Art of Victory: The Life and Achievements of Field Marshal Suvarov, 1729-1800*. London: Constable, 1965.
- Lucas, Pascal Marie Henri. *The Evolution of Tactical Ideas in France and Germany During the War of 1914-1918*. Translated by P. V. Kieffer. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1925 (?).
- Lusar, Rudolf. *German Secret Weapons of the Second World War*. Translated by R. P. Heller and M. Schindler. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959.
- Luvaas, Jay. *The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1914*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.
- . *The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959.
- Macintyre, Donald G. F. W. *Fighting Admiral: The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Somerville, etc.* London: Evans, 1961.
- . *Jutland*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1958.
- Mackesy, Piers. *The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957.
- McNeill, William H. *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946*. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1953.

- . *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963.
- Magnus, Philip M. *Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist*. London: Murray, 1958.
- Malraux, André. *L'Espoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 1937. Translated as *Man's Hope and Days of Hope*.
- Manstein, Erich von. *Lost Victories*. Edited and Translated by Anthony G. Powell. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1958.
- Mao Tse-tung. *Basic Tactics*. Translated by Stuart R. Schram. New York: Praeger, 1966. Chinese edition ca. 1938.
- . *Selected Works*. 4 vols. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961-65. Chinese edition 1951-?.
- Marder, Arthur J. *The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905*. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1940.
- . *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919*. 5 vols. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1961-70.
- Markham, Felix. *Napoleon*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963.
- Martin, Laurence W. *The Sea in Modern Strategy*. New York: Praeger, 1967.
- Marwick, Arthur. *The Deluge: British Society and the First World War*. London: Bodley Head, 1965.
- Maurice, Frederick Barton. *Lessons of Allied Co-operation: Naval, Military and Air, 1914-1918*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1942.
- Mazour, Anatole G. *The First Russian Revolution, 1825: The Decembrist Movement, Its Origins, Development, and Significance*. Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1937.
- Mellenthin, Friedrich Wilhelm von. *Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War, 1939-1945*. Edited by L. C. F. Turner. Translated by H. Betzler. London: Cassell, 1955.
- Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Albrecht. *The War and German Society: The Testament of a Liberal*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1937.
- Milward, Alan S. *The German Economy at War*. London: Athlone Press, 1965.
- Montgomery, Bernard Law. *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein*. K.G. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1958.
- Moore, Barrington, Jr. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.
- Moorehead, Alan. *Montgomery: A Biography*. New York: Coward-McCann, 1946.
- Morris, Donald R. *The Washing of the Spears: A History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation under Shaka and Its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.
- Napier, William Francis Patrick. *History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from A.D. 1807 to A.D. 1814*. 5 vols. New York: AMS Press, 1970. First edition, 6 vols. London: Boone, 1828-40; revised by author in 1856.
- Nef, John Ulric. *War and Human Progress: An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950.
- Newton, Don, and Hampshire, A. Cecil. *Taranto*. London: Kimber, 1959.
- Nicolson, Harold G. *The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity*. London: Constable, 1946.
- Nolte, Ernst. *Three Faces of Fascism*. Translated by Leila Vennewitz. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.
- Okumiya, Masatake, and Horikoshi, Jiro (with Martin Caidin). *Zero!* New York: Dutton, 1956.
- Oman, Carola. *Nelson*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1946.

- Oman, Charles William Chadwick. *Wellington's Army*. New York: Longmans, Green, 1912.
- O'Neill, James E., and Krauskopf, Robert W., eds. *World War II: An Account of Its Documents*. Washington: Howard Univ. Press, 1976.
- Orwell, George. *Homage to Catalonia*. London: Secker and Warburg, 1938.
- Palmer, Frederick. *With Kuroki in Manchuria*. New York: Scribner's, 1904.
- Palmer, Robert R. *Twelve Who Ruled: The Committee of Public Safety During the Terror*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941.
- Palmer, Robert R., and Colton, Joel. *A History of the Modern World*. 2d rev. ed. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1971.
- Pares, Bernard. *The Fall of the Russian Monarchy: A Study of the Evidence*. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1939.
- Paret, Peter. *Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966.
- Parkinson, Roger. *The Fox of the North: The Life of Kutuzov, General of War and Peace*. New York: David McKay, 1976.
- Parris, John. *The Lion of Caprera: A Biography of Giuseppe Garibaldi*. New York: David McKay, 1962.
- Patterson, Alfred Temple. *Jellicoe: A Biography*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969.
- Peck, Graham. *Two Kinds of Time*. Rev. ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967.
- Petrie, Charles Alexander. *Wellington: A Reassessment*. London: Barrie, 1958.
- Phipps, Ramsay W. *The Armies of the First French Republic and the Rise of the Marshals of Napoleon I*. 5 vols. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1926-39.
- Pierrefeu, Jean de. *French Headquarters, 1915-1918*. Translated by C. J. C. Street. London: Bles, 1924.
- Pope, Dudley. *Decision at Trafalgar*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1960.
- Powell, Ralph L. *The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1955.
- Pratt, Edwin A. *The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914*. London: King, 1915.
- Quigley, Harold Scott. *Far Eastern War, 1937-1941*. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942.
- Raeder, Erich. *Struggle for the Sea*. Translated by Edward Fitzgerald. London: Kimber, 1959.
- Ralston, David B. *The Army of the Republic: The Place of the Military in the Political Evolution of France, 1871-1914*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967.
- Ralston, David B., ed. *Soldiers and States: Civil Military Relations in Modern Europe*. Boston: Heath, 1966.
- Reischauer, Edwin O. *The United States and Japan*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950.
- Reitlinger, Gerald. *The SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945*. London: Heinemann, 1956.
- Reports of Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria During the Russo-Japanese War*. 5 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906-7.
- Richards, Denis, and Saunders, Hilary A. *Royal Air Firce, 1939-1945*. 3 vols. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1953-54.
- Ritter, Gerhard. *The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth*. Translated by Andrew and Eva Wilson. New York: Praeger, 1958. German edition 1956.
- . *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany*. Translated by Heinz Norden. 3 vols. Coral Gables, Fla.: Univ. of Miami Press, 1969-. German edition 1954-70.

- Robertson, John Henry [John Connell]. *Auchinleck: A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck*. London: Cassell, 1959.
- Robertson, Priscilla [Smith]. *Revolutions of 1848: A Social Study*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press 1952.
- Robertson, William Robert. *Soldiers and Statesman, 1914-1918*. 2 vols. New York: Scribner's 1926.
- Rommel, Erwin. *The Rommel Papers*. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. Translated by Paul Findlay. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953.
- Ropp, Theodore. *War in the Modern World*. Rev. ed. New York: Collier, 1962.
- Roskill, Stephen W. *The War at Sea, 1939-1945*. 3 vols. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1954-61.
- . *White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939-1945*. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1960.
- Roth, Jack Joseph, ed. *World War I: A Turning Point in Modern History*. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1967.
- Ruge, Friedrich. *Der Seekrieg: The German Navy's Story, 1939-1945*. Translated by M. G. Saunders. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957.
- Salisbury, Harrison E. *The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad*. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.
- Scheer, Reinhard. *Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War*. New York: Cassell, 1920.
- Schmitt, Bernadotte. *The Coming of the War, 1914*. 2 vols. New York: Scribner's, 1930.
- Schwartz, Benjamin I. *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951.
- Seeckt, Hans von. *Thoughts of a Soldier*. Translated by Ian Hamilton. London: Benn, 1930.
- Segur, Phillipe Paul de. *Napoleon's Russian Campaign*. Translated by J. David Townsend. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958. French edition 1825.
- Senger und Etterlin, Fridolin von. *Neither Fear nor Hope: The Wartime Career of General Frido von Senger und Etterlin, Defender of Cassino*. Translated by George Malcolm. New York: Dutton, 1964 German edition 1960.
- Seth, Ronald. *Stalingrad, Point of Return: The Story of the Battle, August 1942-February 1943*. New York: Coward-McCann, 1959.
- Seton-Watson, Hugh. *The Russian Empire, 1801-1917*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967.
- Shanahan, William O. *Prussian Military Reforms, 1786-1813*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1945.
- Sheridan, James E. *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1966.
- Slim, William Joseph. *Defeat Into Victory*. London: Cassell, 1956.
- Snow, Edgar. *Red Star Over China*. London: Gollancz, 1937.
- Sommer, Dudley. *Haldane of Cloan: His Life and Times, 1856-1928*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1960.
- Spears, Edward L. *Assignment to Catastrophe*. 2 vols. New York: Wyn, 1954-55.
- . *Liaison, 1914: A Narration of the Great Retreat*. Rev. ed. New York: Stein and Day, 1968.
- Speer, Albert. *Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs*. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Macmillan, 1970.
- Stein, George H. *The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1966.

- Suchenwirth, Richard. *Historical Turning Points in the German Air Force War Effort*. Translated by Patricia Klammerth. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, 1959.
- Tan, Chester C. *The Boxer Catastrophe*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1955.
- Tanenbaum, Jan Karl. *General Maurice Sarrail, 1856-1929: The French Army and Left-Wing Politics*. Chapel Hill: Univ. of N.C. Press, 1974.
- Tantum, William H., and Hoffschmidt, E. J., eds. *The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933-1945*. Old Greenwich, Conn.: WE Press, 1969.
- Taylor, A[lan]. J[ohn]. P[ercivale]. *The Origins of the Second World War*. London: Hamilton, 1961.
- Terraine, John. *Mons: The Retreat to Victory*. New York: Macmillan, 1960.
- Thomas, Hugh. *The Spanish Civil War*. New York: Harper, 1961.
- Thompson, James Matthew. *Napoleon Bonaparte*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952.
- Thompson, Reginald W. *Montgomery, the Field Marshal: A Critical Study of the Generalship of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K. G., and of the Campaign in North-West Europe 1944/45*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1969.
- Tirpitz, Alfred von. *My Memoirs*. 2 vols. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1919.
- Townsend, Peter. *Duel of Eagles*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970.
- Trend, John Brande. *Bolívar and the Independence of Spanish America*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1946.
- Tsuji, Masanobu. *Singapore: The Japanese Version*. Edited by A. V. Howe. Translated by Margaret E. Lake. Sydney: R. Smith, 1960.
- Tuchman, Barbara. *The Guns of August*. New York: Macmillan, 1962.
- Turner, Gordon B., ed. *A History of Military Affairs Since the Eighteenth Century*. Rev. ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956.
- Tyng, Sewell T. *The Campaign of the Marne, 1914*. New York: Longmans, 1935.
- Urquhart, Hugh M. *Arthur Currie: The Biography of a Great Canadian*. Toronto: Dent, 1950.
- Vagts, Alfred. *Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations*. New York: King's Crown Press, 1956.
- . *A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a Profession*. Rev. ed. New York: Meridian, 1959.
- Verrier, Anthony. *The Bomber Offensive*. London: Batsford, 1968.
- Vian, Philip. *Action this Day: A War Memoir*. London: Muller, 1960.
- Waite, Robert G. L. *Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Post War Germany, 1918-1923*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952.
- Waite, Alden H. *Gas Warfare*. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1942.
- Warner, Oliver. *The Battle of the Nile*. New York: Macmillan, 1960.
- Wavell, Archibald Percival. *Allenby: A Study in Greatness: The Biography of Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby of Megiddo and Felixstowe, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.* 2 vols. London: Harrap, 1940-43.
- . *The Palestine Campaigns*. London: Constable, 1928.
- Webster, Charles Kingsley, and Frankland, Noble. *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945*. 4 vols. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1961.
- Werth, Alexander. *Russia at War, 1941-1945*. New York: Dutton, 1964.
- Wheeler-Bennett, John W. *The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945*. New York: Macmillan, 1953.
- . *Wooden Titan: Hindenburg in Twenty Years of German History, 1914-1934*. New York: William Morrow, 1936. Republished 1967 as *Hindenburg: The Wooden Titan*.

- Wilson, Edmund. *To the Finland Station: A Study in the Writing and Acting of History*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940.
- Winterbotham, Frederick W. *The Ultra Secret*. New York: Harper and Row, 1974.
- Wolff, Leon. *In Flanders Fields: The 1917 Campaign*. New York: Viking Press, 1958.
- Woodham-Smith, Cecil B. [FitzGerald]. *Florence Nightingale*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951.
- . *The Reason Why*. London: Constable, 1953.
- Woodhouse, Christopher Montague. *The Greek War for Independence: The Historical Setting*. London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1952.
- Woodward, Ernest Llewellyn. *Great Britain and the German Navy*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935. Republished 1964.
- . *Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967.
- Wright, Gordon. *The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945*. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.
- Yoshihashi, Takehiko. *Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1963.
- Young, Peter. *World War 1939-45: A Short History*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell 1966
- Ziemke, Earl F. *Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in The East*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968.