



Turning Victory Into Success

Military Operations After the Campaign



Dr. Lieutenant Colonel Brian M. De Toy
General Editor



Combat Studies Institute Press
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**US Army Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia**

and

**Combat Studies Institute
US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

Present

***Turning Victory Into Success:
Military Operations After the Campaign***

Dr. Lieutenant Colonel Brian M. De Toy
General Editor

14-16 September 2004
Frontier Conference Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



Combat Studies Institute Press
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Foreword

The second annual military symposium took place at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas from 14 to 16 September 2004. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) sponsored the event and the US Army Combined Arms Center's Combat Studies Institute (CSI) served as its host. The symposium brought together civilian historians and military officers for the purpose of discussing a variety of historical case studies and the ways in which they can illuminate current military issues and operations.

As the title and subtitle of the symposium indicate, the topics addressed the purpose behind military operations—winning the peace. The US military and its coalition allies have proven themselves adept at achieving military victory in short, decisive, major combat operations. The critical nexus, then, is how battlefield victory translates into political success. The panelists and audience discussed the nature of war, cultural awareness, terrorism, stability operations in the Philippines, Latin America, Lebanon, and Vietnam, as well as operations in Iraq. Without exception, the presenters were thought-provoking and their presentations elicited lively discussion among the attendees.

This volume contains most of the presentations given at the symposium. The presentations can also be found at <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/CSI/research/Conference-04/ConfAnnouncement.asp>, the CSI website for the conference. The entire symposium program can be found in Appendix A of this collection. In addition, we have included some of the material from the question and answer periods following selected presentations.

The second annual military symposium was of great benefit to those who attended, and we hope the readers of this volume will find the experience equally advantageous. We at Fort Leavenworth would like to thank TRADOC's Futures Center, specifically Major General David Fastabend and Colonel Michael Starry, US Army (Retired) for providing the support that made this conference possible.

Thomas T. Smith
Colonel, Infantry
Director, Combat Studies Institute

Introduction

The second annual military symposium, held at Fort Leavenworth, brought together military history scholars, political scientists, and active and retired military and political officers. The title of the 2004 symposium was “Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign,” and it was selected in the belief that we needed to focus on the critical tasks of “Phase IV” (or stability and reconstruction) operations. These operations—occurring both simultaneously with and after high-intensity conflict (“decisive” combat operations)—are critical to achieving the desired political endstate.

The US military and its international allies have demonstrated their ability to wage modern war and achieve decisive results on the battlefield. Less successful, perhaps, have been the planning efforts, resourcing, training, and interagency coordination required of the arguably more difficult stability and reconstruction operations. Without a doubt, winning the peace is an integral part of winning the war.

I believe you will find the presentations made at this symposium both challenging and stimulating. I encourage you to read through the papers in the order they were presented at the conference. Opening-day speakers presented challenging thought-pieces that examined the entire construct of the nature of conflict and postwar planning and execution. For the most part, second-day speakers provided historical case studies, from the Philippines in the early 20th century to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) today. The speakers on the final day addressed OIF, in particular, with presentations from Soldiers on the ground at platoon level up through the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. The results of the entire three-day symposium are impressive and will go far to assist those civilians and military officers charged with this daunting, yet imperative mission.

William S. Wallace
Lieutenant General, US Army
Commanding

Acknowledgements

The second annual TRADOC/CSI military symposium, and the publication of its proceedings, would not have been possible without the tremendous efforts of a number of individuals. First, I wish to thank TRADOC Futures Center, and specifically Major General David Fastabend, for their support. Without their resources this symposium would not have been held. Second, I would like to recognize those leaders at Fort Leavenworth who provided support and guidance throughout the process—Colonel Lawyn C. Edwards, Director of the Command & General Staff College, Colonel Thomas T. Smith, Director of the Combat Studies Institute, and Dr. William G. Robertson, the CAC Command Historian and Deputy Director of CSI. Third, the other members of the CSI Research & Publications Team performed yeomen’s service in ensuring the symposium went off without a hitch. Dr. Lawrence Yates, Mr. Ken Gott, Ms. Robin Kern, Mr. John McGrath, and Ms. Patricia Whitten assisted in all aspects of preparation and execution of a really first-class conference.

I was also very fortunate to have the expertise of two CSI editors. Mr. Phil Davis provided the technical editing for this collection and Ms. Catherine Shadid Small completed its layout and finishing touches; they have done a superb job. In addition, I was blessed to have found an absolutely first-rate transcriptionist in Ms. Lorna Frojd. Finally, a humble thanks to all who contributed in every way to making the second symposium a resounding success—administrative staff, audio-visual personnel, conference presenters, and audience members who asked the tough questions.

Dr. LTC Brian M. De Toy
General Editor

Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won

Conrad C. Crane

Actions in Iraq since March 2003 have highlighted the importance and complexity of what military planners categorize as “Phase IV Operations,” activities conducted after decisive combat operations to stabilize and reconstruct the area of operation. This phase is often described as “postconflict operations,” but that is a very misleading term. Phase IV usually starts very soon after the advent of combat in Phase III, and the two overlap. Additionally, as in Iraq, there can be significant fighting in Phase IV. “Transition operations” is probably a better descriptive term, as military forces try to position the area of operation to move back to peace and under the control of civilian government.

Historically, American commanders have often conducted detailed planning for Phase IV while Phase III was ongoing, such as in World War II, but with modern warfighting concepts such as “Rapid Decisive Operations” and schemes of maneuver designed to speedily defeat adversaries, such an approach is no longer wise or feasible. Even the separate phasing itself might be worth rethinking, as the construct can stovepipe planning and hamper the holistic vision necessary to properly link combat to the end state that accomplishes national political objectives. Planning, as well as execution of Phase III and Phase IV must occur simultaneously, not sequentially. And we should also train that way. Too often exercises ignore Phase IV operations or conveniently delay them until the conclusion of major combat operations. Real life is not that neat or simple.

When Lieutenant General John Yeosock took command of Third Army in Operation DESERT STORM, he could get no useful staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues like hospital beds, prisoners, and refugees, complaining later that he was handed a “dripping bag of manure” that no one else wanted to deal with.¹ Neither the Army nor the Department of Defense had an adequate plan for postwar operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencies were even more unprepared. The situation was only salvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineers and civil affairs personnel and the dedicated efforts of Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi Arabian government.²

Some of the deficiencies in postwar planning for DESERT STORM can be attributed to the fact that Third Army was the first American field army in combat since the Korean War. Postconflict planning has historically been a function of headquarters at echelons above corps, and continuing problems with more recent operations are at least partly attributable to the generally small scale of American interventions. Difficulties also result from the fact that for at least the latter half of the 20th century, US military leaders and planners focused predominantly on winning wars, not

on the peacekeeping or nation building that comes afterward. The unpleasant result of the war in Southeast Asia magnified this shortcoming, as the services developed doctrines, force structures, and attitudes designed to fight major conventional war and avoid another experience like Vietnam.³ But national objectives can often be accomplished only after the fighting has ceased; a war tactically and operationally “won” can still lead to strategic “loss” if transition operations are poorly planned or executed. The ironic truth about Phase IV operations is that the American military would rather not deal with them, or would like to quickly hand them off to other US government agencies or international organizations, who in turn argue that the tasks associated with nation building are rightfully within their sphere of responsibility. However, while there is universal agreement about who should ideally be rebuilding states, the harsh historical reality is that the world’s greatest nation-building institution, when properly resourced and motivated, is the American military, especially the Army. And as much as military forces would like to quickly win wars and go home, there has rarely been any accomplishment of long-term US policy goals from any conflict without an extended American military presence to ensure proper results from the peace.

Historical Overview of American Occupations

The United States has had much experience with postconflict or transition operations since its founding. In the 19th century the Army had such missions in Mexico, the post-Civil War South, and the American West. These experiences were generally extremely unpleasant and helped motivate military reformers at the end of the 19th century who focused on building an American military establishment worthy of a great power that was designed to win major conventional wars. They agreed with the philosophy of the influential Prussian general and theorist Count Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who believed that the primary role of the modern military was simply to successfully conclude major combat operations once the diplomats had gotten the nation into war, and then quickly withdraw while the diplomats resolved the aftermath.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the United States has conducted generally successful efforts with reconstruction and nation building in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Germany, Italy, Japan, Austria, South Korea, Panama, and Kuwait. Some successes were the result of good planning like in World War II; others came from adept scrambling as after DESERT STORM. Notable failures of nation building and stabilization occurred in Haiti, Nicaragua, Somalia, and Vietnam. Ongoing efforts continue in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Recent history provides a number of useful examples to illustrate the missions and challenges involved in postconflict operations. Though recent cases have more often involved restoring regimes instead of changing them, there are still many

valuable insights to be gained from careful analysis.

Panama

Operations in Panama leading to the overthrow of the General Manuel Noriega regime have been touted as a model use of quick and decisive American military force, but postconflict activities did not go as smoothly.⁴ The crisis period was exceptionally long, beginning with public revelations about Noriega's nefarious activities in June 1987 and culminating with the execution of Operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989. Planning for military intervention began as early as February 1988.⁵ When Noriega annulled the election of May 1989, sent his paramilitary thugs to assault opposition candidates, and increased his harassment of Americans, the United States executed Operation NIMROD DANCER. This show of force, executed by US Southern Command, was designed to demonstrate further American resolve in the hope that it would pressure Noriega to modify his behavior. When there was no obvious modification, the president directed the execution of Operation JUST CAUSE. A textbook example of the quality of the new armed forces and doctrine developed in the United States, it encompassed the simultaneous assault of 27 targets at night.⁶

Due to a focus on conducting a decisive combat operation and not the complete campaign, the aftermath of this smaller-scale contingency did not go as smoothly, however. Planning for the postconflict phase, Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, was far from complete when the short period of hostilities began. Missions and responsibilities were vague, and planners failed to adequately appreciate the effects of combat operations and overthrowing the regime.⁷ Though guidance from SOUTHCOM on posthostility missions was fairly clear, tactically oriented planners at the XVIII Airborne Corps in charge of the joint task force carrying out the operation gave postconflict tasks short shrift. For instance, the plan assigned the lone MP battalion the responsibility for running a detention facility, conducting security for all of the numerous convoys, and providing security for many key facilities, as well as for being prepared to restore law and order.⁸ Though the battalion was mainly concerned with a relatively small geographic portion of the country, it was quickly overwhelmed by its responsibilities.

With the elimination of the Panamanian Defense Forces, the task of restoring law and order became particularly demanding, as looting and vandalism spread throughout the country. This is a common occurrence in situations where national security forces are removed, thus creating instability and a security vacuum. Chaos reigned as American forces scrambled to restore some semblance of order.⁹ Military policemen trained in law and order missions did not perform well in unfamiliar combat operations, and were inadequate in numbers to deal with the problems they faced in the aftermath.¹⁰ They also could not handle all the POWs

and refugees for whom they were now responsible. Similarly, there were not enough civil affairs personnel or engineers for the rebuilding effort. This seems to be a common occurrence in American transition operations. Personnel deficiencies were exacerbated by slow and disorganized Reserve call-ups relying on volunteers. Political-military interagency cooperation was also poor, as many agencies were excluded from DOD planning and the embassy was severely understaffed.¹¹

Senior commanders admitted afterward that they had done poorly in planning for postconflict operations and hoped the Army would remedy that situation in the future.¹² Despite these deficiencies, the United States Military Support Group, activated in January 1990 to support the growth of independent Panamanian institutions, could be deactivated just one year later in a much more stable country, though whether it or Panamanian leaders deserved most credit for this success was unclear to observers.¹³

Haiti

Like Panama, this was another smaller-scale contingency in response to a long-festering crisis. It began with the military overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras in September 1991. On 1 April 1993, the JCS sent the first alert order to CINCUSACOM to begin planning for contingency operations in Haiti. Planning for active intervention intensified in October of that year after armed protesters in Port-Au-Prince turned away a ship loaded with UN peacekeepers. During the next year, international pressure on the military leaders of Haiti increased and was intensified even further by obvious American preparations for an invasion. The decision of the Haitian government in September 1994 to return President Aristide to power was to a large extent because they knew Army helicopters and 10th Mountain Division soldiers aboard the USS *Eisenhower*, along with elements of the 82d Airborne Division deployed from Fort Bragg, were heading for Haiti.¹⁴ In fact, General Cedras did not begin to negotiate seriously with the American diplomatic delegation until he had confirmed that the 82d Airborne contingent was in the air. The overwhelming force deployed in the initial occupation and the soldiers' professional and disciplined conduct and appearance in continuing operations did much to deter and control the actions of potential troublemakers.¹⁵ Generally, it is always better to begin occupations with a very strong and pervasive ground presence to control and intimidate looters as well as potential resistance. This was not the case in Iraq in 2003. Even Ambassador Paul Bremer has conceded that "we never had enough troops on the ground" there to adequately control the postwar environment.¹⁶

The long lead time between the beginning of the crisis and actual military intervention, combined with lessons learned from operations such as those in Panama and Somalia, greatly facilitated planning for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.¹⁷

USACOM prepared operational plans for both forced and unopposed entry, while the DOD conducted extensive interagency coordination.¹⁸ Its Haiti Planning Group, with the assistance of other government agencies, prepared a detailed “Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services.” The lead agency for all major functional areas was USAID, with DOD support (mostly from Army units) in re-establishing public administration, conducting elections, restoring information services, assisting the Department of Justice with setting up and training a police force, disaster preparedness and response, running airports, and caring for refugees. Military units did have primary responsibility for security measures, such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), protecting foreign residents, and demobilizing paramilitary groups. These were mostly Army functions, and that service provided 96 percent of deployed military forces.¹⁹

These plans and their execution were affected by the desire of military leaders to avoid getting involved with “nation-building” missions such as those that had led to so much grief in Somalia. Army lawyers wrestled with interpreting humanitarian requests for reconstruction to classify them as related to the mission or as nation building. Those requests that fell into the former category were approved, while those interpreted as nation building were denied.²⁰ Medical units were told to focus on supporting the JTF and not humanitarian assistance, as leaders were concerned about not replacing the medical facilities of the host nation.²¹ This reluctance to embrace peacekeeping or nation building had its most regrettable result on 20 September 1994, when restrictive rules of engagement prohibited American forces from intervening as Haitian police killed two demonstrators. The next day, American officials expanded the rules of engagement to allow more military involvement in restoring and maintaining law and order.²²

Such “mission creep” should be expected, and it has been a part of virtually all American involvement with complex Phase IV operations. Similar expansion of Army roles and missions happened in most other areas of the restoration efforts in Haiti.²³ The attorneys eventually rationalized that any action that made Americans look good lessened security risks and could therefore be approved as mission-related.²⁴ Other government agencies were slow to arrive or build up resources, so the military picked up the slack. Generally, the other departments had not done the detailed planning that DOD had and often wanted more support than DOD had expected to provide.²⁵ A typical example was when the ambassador to Haiti asked for military advisers to help new government ministries get established until efforts from USAID and the State Department could be established. The result was the hasty deployment of a ministerial adviser team from the 358th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade, “The first large scale implementation of a civil administration effort since World War II.”²⁶ The scope and pace of CA missions increased so rapidly that they threatened to get out of control and raised fears that such actions would only

heighten Haitian expectations that US forces could fix all the nation's problems and thus set the people up for great disappointment later.²⁷

These expanded missions caused many other problems, to some extent because CA units are relatively small organically and require considerable support from other organizations. Engineer planning, equipment, and personnel were inadequate for their required civil affairs and reconstruction projects. Soldiers had to develop new policies and procedures to help set up internal security forces and expend funds. This often required "working around" Title 10, US Code, restrictions. They assumed expanded roles in maintaining law and order, including manning and operating detention facilities and developing new crowd control techniques. Items such as latrines and police uniforms were in short supply. Doctrine and personnel were not available to establish proper liaison with the myriad civilian organizations working in the country. Intelligence assets were severely taxed, and the force in Haiti had to rely heavily on theater and national intelligence assets to make up for deficiencies.²⁸

However, the military in general, and the Army in particular, received much praise for its performance in Haiti. Nonetheless, once the last American troops left the island in April 1996, the situation there deteriorated to conditions approaching those in the early 1990s. Without long-term military involvement, most US policy goals were frustrated. The civilian agencies that replaced military forces did not have the same resources available, and persistent flaws in the Haitian economy, judicial system, and political leadership obstructed reform. American officials decried the results of subsequent elections, and admitted the failure of their policies. Even the secretary general of the UN recommended against renewing the mission there.²⁹ One key lesson from that frustrating experience is that the redeployment of military forces should be predicated on the achievement of designated measures of effectiveness and not based on time limits. Another is that follow-on civilian agencies must be capable of maintaining those standards as well as achieving new ones.

The Balkans

The US Army has picked up its usual predominant load of postconflict tasks, requiring several thousand troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, and seems resigned to a long-term commitment in the region. Rotational schedules have been prepared through 2005, and there have been discussions in Washington about establishing a "permanent presence" there.³⁰

Current American operations in the Balkans again reveal how force and mission requirements change during the postconflict phase. Eighteen months after the signing of the agreement between NATO and the Yugoslav Army over Kosovo,

US Army troops there were still engaged in “peacekeeping with an iron fist.” They were primarily focused on establishing a safe and secure environment under the rule of law, with patrols backed by armored vehicles and detention centers to control troublemakers. The UN-NATO justice system has been heavily criticized, and a Judge Advocate General Legal Assessment Team found the UN mission in Kosovo so severely short of facilities and personnel to establish the rule of law that it recommended teams of 15 Army lawyers be rotated through the country to reinforce the UN effort. Additionally, the resentment of impatient Kosovars has grown against a UN presence that seems to be making little progress toward a transition to local control.³¹

Efforts in Bosnia are more advanced, and the environment more secure and peaceful. Deployed Army task forces have become lighter with every rotation and have moved from immediate security concerns toward enhancing long-term stability. By late 1997 it became apparent to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) that a large disparity existed between the ability of military forces to achieve their initially assigned tasks of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and that of their less-capable civilian counterparts to meet their own implementation requirements. SFOR realized it could not disengage with such a large “GFAP gap” remaining and expanded its mission to “assist international organizations to set the conditions for civilian implementation of the GFAP in order to transition the area of operations to a stable environment.” US military leaders on the scene recognized they were moving into the area of nation building but saw no alternative if SFOR was ever going to be able to withdraw or significantly reduce its commitment without risking the peace.³²

As the nature of the stability operations and support operations in Bosnia evolved, so did the requirements of the peacekeeping force. It needed fewer combat troops and more engineers, military police, and civil affairs personnel. Intelligence requirements changed and expanded. After-action reports highlighted many shortfalls in the Balkans force structure and peacekeeping policies, many of them common to previous smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs). Army lawyers again proved adept at “thinking outside traditional fiscal rules and applications” to support operational requirements.³³ The roles of military policemen expanded to include performing as maneuver battalion task forces and working with international law enforcement agencies.³⁴ Difficulties with tactical MPs trying to perform law and order missions reappeared.³⁵

There were problems again with shortages and recall procedures for Reserve Component engineer, military intelligence, and civil affairs augmentation.³⁶ The massive engineering requirements for Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD especially highlighted branch deficiencies with command and control,

construction unit allocations, and bridging.³⁷ A split-based logistics system trying to meet requirements in the Balkans and back in the Central Region of Europe required considerable augmentation but still strained combat support and combat service support assets considerably.³⁸ Liaison officers were in great demand, not just as Joint Commission Observers with the Entity Armed Forces, but also to coordinate with the myriad nongovernmental organizations and other civilian agencies.³⁹ There were shortages of linguists throughout the theater, which especially exacerbated problems with intelligence. MI doctrine was completely inadequate for supporting peace operations, and understaffed intelligence units had to adapt as best they could for the complex “multi-service, multi-agency, and multi-national” situation further complicated by a host of treaty requirements.⁴⁰

A Defense Science Board study concluded that Balkan operations revealed many shortcomings in psychological operations, as well, especially in planning and resources to support engagement and postconflict activities for all the geographic combatant commanders.⁴¹ Even with all these problems, Army units in Bosnia have continued to compile a superlative record of accomplishments. However, the “GFAP gap” remains, with recurring UN problems coordinating and directing civilian agencies. Recent elections were dominated by continuing political divisiveness, reflecting the limited progress in changing people’s attitudes.⁴² However, while American military leaders have complained about having the troops remain in the Balkans, the fact that decisions about their redeployment have been based on achieving measures of effectiveness and not on reaching a time limit has at least ensured stability in the region.

The world has changed a great deal since the massive occupation efforts that followed World War II, and wars and SSCs since the end of the Cold War are generally the best source for insights about contemporary Phase IV operations. However, there are a number of important guidelines that can also be obtained from analyzing the major American wars of the 20th century.

The Philippines

In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States began a long occupation of the Philippine Islands that officially ended with their independence in 1946. This very lengthy transition to self-government is not typical of American experiences with occupation, and the most useful insights are to be gleaned from the early years, when American forces were trying to subdue resistance and establish control in the former Spanish colony.

The Philippines example reinforces the point that “postconflict” operations are a misnomer. To be successful, they need to begin before the shooting stops, and will be conducted simultaneously with combat. Appropriate planning must be

completed before the conflict begins, so military forces are prepared to begin immediately accomplishing transition tasks in newly controlled areas. All soldiers will need to accept duties that are typically considered in the purview of CA detachments. There will never be enough CA troops to go around, and immediate needs will have to be met by whoever is on the scene. Even in the midst of combat, leaders and their soldiers must keep in mind the long-term goals of peace and stability and conduct themselves accordingly.⁴³

In the Philippines, both military and civilian officials recognized that the best agent for local pacification was the military leader on the spot. Considerable decentralization was required for a situation where village attitudes and characteristics varied widely. Officers had great discretion and were not closely supervised, though they also had clear directives from higher headquarters providing guidelines. The requirement for local familiarity meant that soldiers could not be rotated quickly. In village societies personal relationships are important and take considerable time and effort to establish. Even one-year tours in a tribal society such as Iraq are probably too short. The Army in the Philippines had to accept some decline in the combat efficiency of their units in order to keep them in lengthy occupation duties. Troops had to be aware of the cultures they were in and not try to force American values. Knowledge of the Koran and local customs were important for everyone. Even John J. Pershing could spend hours talking to local *imams* about religion. This does not lessen the requirement to achieve the right balance of force and restraint, but the long-term consequences must be considered for every action. General Leonard Wood's predilection for punitive forays in response to even minor incidents such as theft did cow many Moro chiefs, but he also undermined many alliances and relationships painstakingly established by local commanders. Instead of quieting small disturbances, Wood's expeditions often created larger problems by driving pacified or neutral villages into joining more rebellious ones and made it more difficult for his subordinates to gain local trust.⁴⁴

Germany

The United States has been involved in the occupation of Germany twice in the past century. At the conclusion of World War I, 200,000 American troops moved to positions around Coblenz, preparing for the possibility that the Germans would not sign the peace treaty. When they agreed to the Versailles Treaty in the summer of 1919, the occupation force rapidly diminished, numbering only 16,000 a year later. By the end of 1922, that figure was down to 1,200, and all left the next year.⁴⁵ Though the bulk of responsibility for the details of the occupation and regime change fell on other Allied governments, occupying American troops did find themselves in charge of a million civilians. The US Army and government had not really accepted the administration of civil government in occupied enemy

territory as a legitimate military function after the Mexican War, Civil War, or Spanish-American War, and the officer in charge of civil affairs for the US military government in the Rhineland after World War I lamented that the American army of occupation “lacked both training and organization” to perform its duties.⁴⁶

As World War II approached, Army War College committees went back to the World War I reports and developed formal doctrine for military government. In the spring of 1942, a School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia, and thinking began there about postwar reconstructions of Germany, Japan, and Italy.⁴⁷ By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, detailed Allied planning for the occupation of that nation had been ongoing for two years. All staff sections at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces and Army Group headquarters invested considerable resources in developing what became Operation ECLIPSE. The plan correctly predicted most of the tasks required of the units occupying the defeated country. Within three months, those formations had disarmed and demobilized German armed forces, cared for and repatriated 4 million POWs and refugees, restored basic services to many devastated cities, discovered and quashed a potential revolt, created working local governments, and reestablished police and the courts.⁴⁸

Before any Allied armies entered Germany, planners designated specific military governance units to follow combat forces closely. The first civil affairs detachment in the country set itself up in Roetgen on 15 September 1944, only four days after US troops entered Germany. Once the Third Reich surrendered, small mobile detachments were sent out immediately to every town in the US occupation zone. Typically, unit commanders confronted mayors with a number of demands: a list of local soldiers and party members, the turn-in of all military and civilian firearms, and housing for American troops. Detachment leaders also imposed curfews after dark and immobilized the population. They also had the authority to replace uncooperative mayors.⁴⁹

The regime in Germany was changed from the bottom up. Throughout history this has been the best approach to rebuilding states. Local elections and councils were allowed to function, and responsibility was shifted to local authorities as quickly as possible. State governments were next in priority, and only after they were working effectively were national elections considered. At the same time, political life was strictly controlled to prevent any resurgence of radicalism, although public-opinion polls were conducted on an almost weekly basis to monitor what the German people thought about occupation policies. The German legal profession was totally corrupted by the Nazis, and each occupying ally took a slightly different approach in reestablishing courts. The British used many old Nazi lawyers and judges, while the Americans tried to reform the whole system, a

slow process. The best solution was probably the one the Soviets applied, whereby they found educated and politically loyal people and gave them six weeks of legal training. Their system built around these “lay judges” got criminal and civil court systems working very quickly.⁵⁰

One of the most vexing problems for occupation authorities was how to dismantle the Nazi Party and its security apparatus while retaining the skills of some members who performed important functions. This was accomplished by having all adult Germans fill out a detailed questionnaire about their associations. There were heavy penalties for lying or failing to answer questions. A board of anti-Nazi Germans and Allied representatives reviewed the “*Fragebogen*” (German for questionnaire) and determined which people had held leadership positions and deserved to have their political and economic activities curtailed for the occupation. By the time the Nazis were allowed to regain their rights, democratic Germans were so solidly established that a Nazi revival was impossible.⁵¹ This approach also allowed occupation authorities to clear key administrators and technicians along with some security forces to remain at their posts to assist in the reconstruction efforts. Most commentators agree that the most critical mistake made in the occupation of Iraq was the total disbanding of the Iraqi army and extensive purging of Baathists without any similar attempt at discriminatory screening.⁵²

Japan

The occupation force for Japan, a country slightly smaller than Iraq, included almost 23 divisions amounting to more than 500,000 soldiers in 1945. Because of uncertainty about how occupation forces would be received, General Douglas MacArthur decided an overwhelming force was the best insurance against unrest. Most ground forces were American, though allies were used in some sensitive areas, such as British and Australian units in Hiroshima.⁵³ While there had been ongoing interdepartmental deliberations in Washington about occupying Japan since the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the actual planning in the Pacific for Operation BLACKLIST did not begin until May 1945.⁵⁴ Within two years, most Japanese soldiers had been disarmed and repatriated (except from Soviet-controlled areas), a “purge” list of persons restricted from political activity had been completed, basic services were restored, police reform programs were implemented, the economy was restarted, land reform was begun, and the nation adopted a new democratic constitution that renounced war as an instrument of national policy.⁵⁵

In October 2002, reports emerged that the Bush administration was looking at the Japanese occupation as a model for achieving democratization and demilitarization in Iraq. The administration quickly withdrew from that position, and many experts have highlighted the important differences between the scenarios. The Japanese surrendered unconditionally after total defeat, and the whole world

acknowledged the legality and necessity of Allied occupation. Millions were dead, cities were in ashes, and the populace was destitute and cowed. Their more homogeneous culture did not feature the ethnic, tribal, and religious divisions so evident in Iraq, and the Japanese were conditioned to obey the command of the emperor to accept defeat and submit to their conquerors. They also had some experience with limited democracy, though it can be argued that Iraq had some similar experiences during their earlier history this past century. Another major difference is that Iraq is much richer in natural resources than Japan, providing another set of opportunities for occupying powers.⁵⁶

However, Operation BLACKLIST does provide useful insights about purging undesirable political elements and on how to design the insertion of military forces into a situation where the possibility of armed resistance remains ambiguous. There are also similarities between the way Americans viewed the Japanese in 1945 and the way they perceive Iraqis today, as a totally foreign and non-Western culture. John Dower, who has written the seminal work on the American occupation of Japan, argues strongly that it does not provide a useful model for Iraq, with the important caveat that it should give a clear warning to current policy makers, “Even under circumstances that turned out to be favorable, demilitarization and democratization were awesome challenges.”⁵⁷

General Observations

Along with the insights emphasized in the previous section, there are some others that deserve mention. Detailed long-term interagency planning for occupation is important and can considerably smooth transition. MacArthur’s staff managed to develop Operation BLACKLIST in just over three months, but analysis for such a course had been going on for years back in the United States, it required little interagency coordination, and the Far East Command staff made many adjustments on the fly during the early years of occupation. The ideal approach is exemplified by the interagency planning for Haiti, which produced a detailed list of post-crisis tasks and responsibilities well in advance of any possible combat. That operation eventually failed, however, because civilian agencies proved incapable of completing the mission once military forces left, due to inadequate resources or inflated expectations. The primary problem at the core of American deficiencies in postconflict capabilities, resources, and commitment is a national aversion to nation building, which was strengthened by failure in Vietnam. US leaders need to accept this mission as an essential part of national security and better tailor and fund the military services and civilian governmental organizations to accomplish it.

In the past, no part of postconflict operations has been more problematic for American military forces than the handover to civilian agencies. Ideally, the allocation

of effort and process of shifting responsibilities should proceed as depicted in Figure 1.⁵⁸ But in reality it normally looks more like Figure 2, where the handover is given directly to the local government.




Figure 1



Figure 2

A number of possible structural solutions are available to the Army to improve its performance in Phase IV operations. These range from internal reorganizations to relying more on civilian agencies.

Forming Specialized Peacekeeping Units

Some commentators have recommended that the Army establish constabulary units focused exclusively on peacekeeping duties. While this has certain training and organizational efficiencies, it is a bad idea for a number of reasons. At the beginning of Phase IV, strong warfighting skills are essential, and no progress is possible without peace and security. The overall conventional deterrent value of today's relatively small Army will be significantly reduced if some units are perceived as having more limited capability for offensive and defensive operations, unless these constabulary units are an addition to the existing force structure. They will also be of only marginal utility in meeting the requirements of the current national military strategy with acceptable risk. Whether created as new organizations or from modifications of existing ones, these specialized units would probably be inadequate to meet future demands for their skills, anyway, since Center for Army Analysis (CAA) projections based on data from the 1990s predict the United States will face 25 to 30 ongoing SSCs every month.⁵⁹ And that does not include the increased operational tempo resulting from the Global War on Terror. One alternative to deal with this approach would be to structure Reserve and National Guard units to perform stabilization phase functions. After active combat units have had time to provide a secure environment, deployment of such specialized RC/NG forces might be appropriate. Their performance in the Balkans has drawn rave reviews from many civilian administrators who like the different attitudes those units bring to stabilization phase operations. But there would need to be many of these units to prevent excessive deployments, and these same attitudes that please civilian observers will draw the Army even more into nation-building tasks.

Creating More Multipurpose Units

This option makes more sense, considering the realities the Army will face. The service's transformation initiatives are very relevant for this solution. The new medium brigades will retain some armored punch with more infantry. They will have augmented intelligence capabilities. They will be more mobile and versatile. The Army would need to invest in multipurpose technologies, such as platforms equally suitable for mounting lethal weaponry for combat or carrying relief supplies for humanitarian missions. This solution will require more than just new organizations or technology, however. There will have to be a recognition and acceptance throughout the Army of the likelihood and importance of Phase IV operations, and that they require a different mind-set and training than decisive combat operations do. Army schools at all levels will have to prepare soldiers better to meet

this challenge, and units will have to adjust mission-essential task lists (METLs) accordingly.

Increase Active Component CS/CSS Force Structure

A common theme in mission after-action reports, observations from civilian administrators, and exercise analyses is that the Army has serious shortfalls in providing the required CS/CSS support for Phase IV. Some of these shortfalls are the result of having theater-level elements in the reserve components that might be a late follow-on in normal force flows in war plans. This is the case with some engineer organizations. Some deficiencies are the result of elements that are almost exclusively in the reserves and have just become overextended by the unaccustomed demands of recurring deployments. In other cases, the force does not exist anywhere, sometimes because of the lack of reliable historical experience or planning data to determine requirements. This is a factor in the shortfalls in military police assets to conduct internment and resettlement functions with EPWs and refugees. The complicated multinational and multiagency environment of Phase IV has also created a host of new requirements not foreseen by planners used to combat operations.

Some deficiencies can be handled by training and equipping CS/CSS units to be more versatile, but most fixes to this problem are not that easy. To effectively increase its CS/CSS personnel and assets available, the Army will have to invest in that force structure, particularly providing more active component assets for theater or echelon above corps tasks. Utilizing scenarios included in the DOD *Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance*, the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 determined that the Army needed 230 new CS/CSS units to be able to conduct contingencies for 60 days without RC augmentation.⁶⁰ The list covers many of the shortages revealed by recent AARs and would be a good place to start to determine expanded requirements. Ongoing GWOT operations have revealed even more CS/CSS needs.

Strengthen Civilian Agencies

Though this is not something the Army can do directly, it is often a solution presented by those who believe the service should not be involved in any nation building, as well as by departmental secretaries and officials advocating the roles of their organizations. In some form this solution needs to be adopted anyway and supported by the military, though there is an obvious threat that reductions might be made accordingly in the DOD budget. But nothing in Phase IV can be accomplished without establishment of the secure environment on the ground that only military forces, and primarily the Army, can maintain.

The lack of quick response capability of civilian agencies and problems

coordinating them will ensure that the military will bear the brunt of all essential tasks in rebuilding and reorganizing a failed or war-torn state for a long time in any Phase IV. For instance, a representative from the Justice Department specializing in setting up police forces has stated that even with proper funding and commitment, it takes at least nine months to have a viable force, and recent experiences show that to be an optimistic estimate.⁶¹ The implication for the Army is that there is no foreseeable future reduction in the nation-building or nation-assistance roles that Phase IV operations will demand from it. Some relief from this burden could result from practices that have developed to contract services to companies such as Brown and Root, but these activities have recently come under fire from the GAO for their costliness and inefficiency, and suffer from the same limitations as operations by other civilian agencies.⁶²

Recently the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness told a group of defense correspondents that to prevent future wars the US military is in the nation-building business to stay, and its leaders need to accept that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines so engaged believe it is an important mission.⁶³ His assertion is supported by anecdotes from the field. For example, soldiers interviewed in Nova Brdo, Kosovo, emphatically expressed their support for nation building. One of them announced, “With every plate of glass we replace in a window, with every door we install, we’re helping these people get back on their feet.” He also described the importance of patching a child’s broken arm and giving a mother blankets to keep her children warm. He concluded, “With every town that we help, we’re helping the nation get stronger.”⁶⁴ While the incoming Bush administration initially expressed resistance to employing the US Army in nation building, recent history demonstrates it will occur anyway. Being prepared to conduct such operations will avoid a sense of “mission creep” when they inevitably have to be performed.

Dag Hammarskjöld once said, “Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.”⁶⁵ The same might be true for nation building, especially during the earliest stages of Phase IV before a safe and secure environment has been established and civilian agencies have been able to build up their resources. Accepting nation building or increased nation assistance as a mission has major implications for military involvement in Phase IV operations, but it would also bring service attitudes, doctrine, force structure, and training into line with the reality of what is happening in the field. This adjustment also probably will require congressional action to carefully alter legal and fiscal constraints about such military activities.

The Army especially is developing a set of leaders with experience in Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They understand the importance of Phase IV

in accomplishing national policy objectives. Almost always, most military missions in these situations will be the responsibility of ground forces. The US Army has been organized and trained primarily to fight and win the nation's major wars. Nonetheless, the service must prepare for victory in peace as well.

Notes

1. John J. Yeosock, remarks in “What We Should Have Done Differently,” Part II of *In the Wake of the Storm: Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert Storm* (Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000), 25.

2. Ibid, 29; Janet A. McDonnell, *After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999).

3. Conrad C. Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).

4. Combat operations were conducted superbly and quickly in a complex situation (with difficult terrain, many civilians, and restrained rules of engagement) that required intricate joint planning and execution.

5. John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC Strategic Studies Institute, April 1992), 7.

6. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991).

7. Fishel, 29-63.

8. US Army War College, *American War Plans Special Text-2001* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, November 2000), 233-306.

9. Lieutenant Colonel John Fishel and Major Richard Downie, “Taking Responsibility for Our Actions? Establishing Order and Stability in Panama,” *Military Review* (April 1992): 66, 69-70.

10. Fishel and Downie, 70-75; Oral History Interview JCIT 097Z of Lieutenant General Carmen Cavezza by Dr. Larry Yates, Dr. Robert Wright, and Mr. Joe Huddleston, “Joint Task Force South in Operation Just Cause,” conducted at Fort Lewis, Washington, 30 April 1992, available on the US Army Center of Military History website, <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/panama/jcit/JCIT97Z.htm>.

11. Cavezza Interview; Fishel, 38, 58-59.

12. Cavezza Interview. Lieutenant General Cavezza expressed doubt, however, that he could have trained his unit adequately for the Mission Essential Task List required for war and for the complexities of the postconflict operations he faced.

13. Fishel, 63.

14. CINCUSACOM CD-ROM, *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: US Forces in Haiti*, 1997, executive level AAR pamphlet, 1-13.

15. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System entries 10451-37950 and 10754-92362, USACOM CD-ROM.

16. CNN.com, “Bremer: More troops were needed after Saddam’s ouster,” 5 October 2004, available on line at <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/05/bremer.rumsfeld/index.html>.

17. David Bentley and Robert Oakley, "Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti," National Defense University Strategic Forum No. 30, May 1995, available on NDU website at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum30.html>.

18. AAR, 2-9, USACOM CD-ROM.

19. Haiti Planning Group, "Draft Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services," furnished to author by Colonel Mike Fitzgerald, CENTCOM J5; US Army Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, *America's Army...Into the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: HQDA, 1997), 5.

20. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Karl Warner by COL Dennis Mroczkowski, JTF-190 Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY AAR, 266-267, USACOM CD-ROM.

21. Interview of Colonel Gerald Palmer by Major Christopher Clark, JTF-190 Operation Uphold Democracy AAR, 269, USACOM CD-ROM.

22. Chronology, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, USACOM CD-ROM.

23. This expansion of missions is evident from the Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Logistics Support Operations briefing from the USACOM CD-ROM.

24. Warner Interview, 267.

25. JULLS entry 10829-67459, USACOM CD-ROM.

26. Memorandum from 358th Civil Affairs Brigade to CG, US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, SUBJECT: After Action Report, USACOM Operation Uphold/Maintain Democracy, 26 May 1995, 3, USACOM CD-ROM.

27. JULLS entry 11566-55234, USACOM CD-ROM.

28. JULLS entries 00676-58398, 00969-70100, 01040-06216, 02656-20553, 10355-63106, 10447-74360, 10758-27517, 11558-362234, 11640-05029, 11640-61460, 50257-20594, 50258-39326, 92638-89373 USACOM CD-ROM.

29. US General Accounting Office, *Foreign Assistance: Any Further Aid to Haitian Justice System Should be Linked to Performance-Related Conditions*, GAO-01-24, October 2000; "Haiti is Nightmare for U.S.," *Charleston Post and Courier*, October 5, 2000; "Haiti's Disappearing Democracy," *New York Times*, 28 November 2000; Ben Barber, "U.S. Officials See Failed Haiti Policy," *Washington Times*, 29 November 2000; "Annan Urges End to U.N. Mission in Haiti," *New York Times*, 29 November 2000.

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31. Gregory Piatt, "A Good Bit Of Progress...A Long Way To Go," *European Stars and Stripes*, 17 September 2000, p. 2; "UN-NATO Court Setup In Kosovo Faulted," *New York Times*, 20 October 2000; Donald G. McNeil, Jr., *New York Times*, 22 November 2000; Emily Kelly, "Peacekeeping With An Iron Fist," *Stars and Stripes Omnimedia*, 29 November 2000; Major General Donald Campbell, Memorandum for Record, SUBJECT: Trip Report for Reserve Component (RC) Judge Advocate General (JAG) Legal Assessment

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32. Headquarters, US Army Europe, *After Action Report: Operation Joint Guard*, November 1998, 3-2, 3-21 to 3-23.

33. Ibid, 9-26.

34. Ibid, 9-36.

35. Headquarters, US Army Europe, Operation Joint Endeavor: After Action Report, May 1997, 235.

36. *Operation Joint Guard*, 4-5, 5-18. Problems were so acute that the AAR asked for both the Reserves and National Guard to realign their units and specialties for peacekeeping missions.

37. Colonel David A. Kingston, *Towards a More Relevant Engineer Command* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 2000); *Operation Joint Endeavor*, 206, 210.

38. *Operation Joint Endeavor*, 130-31.

39. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Joint Military Commissions: Lessons Learned From Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR*, May 1996. The large requirement for military liaison with the myriad agencies involved in such contingencies was a key point of discussion at a Post Conflict Strategic Requirements Workshop conducted by the Center for Strategic Leadership at the US Army War College 28-30 November 2000.

40. *Operation Joint Endeavor*, 78-94; Lieutenant Colonel Melissa E. Patrick, *Intelligence in Support Operations: The Story of Task Force Eagle and Operation Joint Endeavor* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 2000).

41. "Outdated Equipment, Organizational Issues Hamper Effective PSYOPS," *Inside the Pentagon*, 28 September 2000, 1.

42. Admiral (ret) Leighton W. Smith, "NATO's IFOR in Action: Lessons from the Bosnian Peace Support Operations," National Defense University Strategic Forum No. 154, January 1999, available on the NDU website at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum154.html>; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Ethnic Hatred Permeates Bosnia's Bitter Peace," *Washington Post*, November 10, 2000, 30; Paul Watson, "Bosnian Vote Seen As A Setback," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 November 2000, 9. For a good summary of the lack of long term progress in the Balkans, see Kimberly Marten, *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

43. Most of the ideas in this section on the Philippines were developed in conjunction with Dr. Brian Linn of Texas A&M University. He is the author of *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989) and *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000).

44. Linn discussions; Jack C. Lane, *Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 124-25.

45. Edward M. Coffman, *The War To End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 359-60.
46. Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1975), 3.
47. Ibid, 6-8.
48. Major Kenneth O. McCreedy, *Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1995).
49. Lieutenant Colonel Wally Z. Walters, *The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the Peace Against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany May Inform Operations Against Saddam Hussein's Iraq* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2002), 18.
50. The ideas in this paragraph were provided by Professor James Corum, of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL.
51. Corum.
52. Michael R. Gordon, "Debate Linger on Decision to Dissolve the Iraqi Military," *New York Times*, 21 October 2004.
53. John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 73; Charles A. Willoughby, editor-in-chief, *Reports of General MacArthur, Volume 1 Supplement, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase* (Center of Military History: Washington, DC, 1966), 2, 16.
54. Dower, "Lessons From Japan About War's Aftermath," *New York Times*, 27 October 2002; Willoughby, 2.
55. For more complete descriptions of these reforms, see Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, and Willoughby.
56. Dower, "Lessons", Chalmers Johnson, "Rebuilding Iraq: Japan is No Model," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 October 2002; James P. Pinkerton, "Iraq is No Stage for MacArthur-Japan Sequel," *Long Island Newsday*, 15 October 2002; Trudy Rubin, "Pre-Occupation Blues," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 16 October 2002.
57. Dower, "Lessons".
58. This depiction was developed by Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, and first appeared in Conrad Crane, *Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001), 34.
59. Center for Army Analysis, "Stochastic Analysis of Resources for Deployments and Excursions: A Historical Perspective," December 2000.
60. Reserve Component Employment Study Group, *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 Study Report* (Washington, DC: DOD, 1999), 1, 12-13, Annex E. The study group recommended against these changes mainly because of the cost to develop new force

structure and because giving the AC this capacity to conduct SSCs independent of the RC would take away the Army's "political check and balance" to prevent the Executive Branch from committing substantial troops to an SSC without a debate in Congress on mobilization. The latter rationale seems a questionable usurping of the president's prerogative and could have the result of limiting Army utility and increasing response time. The policy has also contributed to the RC strains mentioned in this study and has not produced much congressional discussion about the large numbers of reservists and National Guardsmen deploying to the Balkans. It can therefore be criticized for its effectiveness as well as its constitutionality.

61. It took almost a year and a half for UN civilian police and Italian Carabinieri to relieve American troops of some of their law enforcement duties in Kosovo, and a local police force is still being formed. Bosnia has a working indigenous force, but six UN policemen frustrated with its corruption had to resign after "exceeding their authority" and acting on their own to liberate women forced into prostitution. Gregory Piatt, "KFOR Soldiers' Roles Changing In Kososvo," *European Stars and Stripes*, 27 November 2000, 3; Colum Lynch, "Six UN Officers In Bosnia Resign After Unauthorized Raid," *Washington Post*, 30 November 2000, 20. A GAO study examining the lack of progress in reforming the Bosnian law enforcement and judicial systems concluded, "Senior Bosnian officials have not demonstrated the will to address the problem of crime and corruption and work toward a society based on the rule of law." USGAO, *Bosnia Peace Operations: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement*, GAO/NSIAD-00-156, July 2000.

62. USGAO, *Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in the Balkans*, GAO/NSIAD-00-225, September 2000.

63. Dale Eisman, "Top Defense Official Defends US Military's Role As Peacekeeper," *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot*, 15 November 2000.

64. Emily Kelley, "GIs Reluctant To Leave Kosovo Town," *Stars and Stripes Omnia*, 28 November 2000.

65. Quoted in US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: HQDA, December 199

Crane Question and Answer Session

Question: I have a problem with mirror imaging. We've done mirror imaging in Russia. Now we seem to have done the same with Iraq.

Answer: We tried to avoid the problems of mirror imaging. Our study group had people from the Middle East and regional experts. And they talked about using what was already there, making sure the Iraqis were involved, and using whatever types of institutions—and institution is a fairly broad term—using whatever kind of institutions were on the ground to build on, understanding the religious and tribal realities of being over there. You're right that overall planning seemed to make some bad assumptions based on mirror imaging. But the flaws also resulted from the problems with the conflicting intelligence different groups were providing. A lot of the planning was based on what Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress was passing on. There were a lot of different truths floating around.

Question: You mentioned the problem of information operations, which I think is very important. I've also been running around telling people that I thought our information operations were very poor. And particularly that we'd done a very bad job of getting our story out to the American people and to our soldiers and to the rest of the world, and so forth. The response that I've been getting frequently is that the Army doesn't do information operations directed at the American people. I can see some validity in that statement. Especially when you've got some people saying they fear the Army's going to lose its ability to "check the president" if it abandons the Abrams Doctrine, which is one of the scariest things I heard in your presentation. So, how do we balance the need to get our story out, basically to be doing information operations, with the desire not to be attempting to manipulate American democracy through information operations?

Answer: Here's an example of how I think we can do better getting our story out. I had a *Wall Street Journal* reporter talk to me before he went to Iraq. I said, "You've got to go up to Mosul and see [Major General] Dave Petraeus, [Commander, 101st Airborne Division], and what he's doing up there." So, the reporter got over to Baghdad and tried to get transportation to Mosul. Nobody would give him a helicopter to go. So he never got to Mosul. He spent all his time writing about all the problems in Baghdad. We should have given him a helicopter to get him up there. That's a story we really wanted to get out.

Question: That story is out. Petraeus was followed all through combat and into Mosul. There have been other reporters who have been putting that out on a regular basis.

Answer: But they didn't come out at the time, early in the operation. They've

come out later. Rick Atkinson wrote a book about it, but it came out a year later. The example I gave was right when things were first kicking off at the beginning. We needed to shape the information battlefield early with that story, before the negative stories from Baghdad dominated the airwaves. As another example of our difficulties in this area, I was talking with someone working in CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) on the budget for information operations for the new Iraqi government. One problem over there is that we didn't pay people enough money to get the good journalists. The good journalists all went to work for the Iranians and the Egyptians. And this guy was trying to get the Iraqi information budget cranked up so they could hire the better people, and they wouldn't do it. I just think there are little things we could do to emphasize the importance of information operations. Try to get the best local journalists to write for our side. Try to help people go where the good stories are. We've recovered from most of our early miscues. But, for instance, it took us six months to get our television station up in Baghdad. And, in the meantime, the Iranians are swamping the airwaves. Not to mention *Al Jazeera*. But, the bottom line is, we've just got to plan for information operations better right from the start and understand how important they are. Perception quickly becomes reality. We've got to understand how important it is to shape these early perceptions of any operation we conduct.

Question: John Fishel, NDU. Just a quick correction to one of the minor points that you made. Max Thurman's guidance downward on postconflict operations, in his own words, was not what he would have chosen to do. He told me directly that his one regret from the entire operation was he didn't pay enough attention to his *Blind Logic* plan.

Answer: I'm sure he considered the guidance he gave inadequate, especially considering the result, but what guidelines he did set down were pretty much ignored, anyway.

Question: I haven't heard any mention of, for example, the reconstruction of Japan while MacArthur was there. MacArthur's powers were far more expansive and even absolute than what your recommendations were. Why didn't you look at Japan? Why not use that as a model, where you have a full military proconsul?

Answer: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Smith. Iraq is a completely different situation than Japan. You had a homogenous society there, for one thing. It was also clearly a defeated nation; there was no insurgency that came about. And, too, the Japanese gave MacArthur absolute power with very little resistance because the emperor acquiesced. I don't think you can compare them. You can't recreate that situation again. I would agree with you, though, that the combatant commander should have overall responsibility. He wouldn't be another MacArthur. I mean,

there aren't any other MacArthurs around. For good and bad. General [John] Abizaid, though, should have more power than he does. If you're going to put in Ambassador Paul Bremer and the CPA to do reconstruction, you should have put them under the combatant commander. I just think the command structure should have been organized differently. In some ways you're right about creating a sort of military pro consul. I think the combatant commander needs a lot more power than he's got in these situations.

Question: Major Jim Brown from the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. I was on Colonel Benson's staff as one of the CFLCC civil-military planners. I can tell you that our planning did take into account that we were going to build on the existing structures that were already there. But we were kind of overruled in that when CFLCC turned over during the transition of authority to JTF-7 and V Corps. So, that piece of the plan, at the operational level, did include building on the existing structures all along. And we did do things like instead of having a separate Phase IV, we had Phases IIIA and IIIB, and went through an unbelievable number of planning sessions on how we were going to do the actual stabilization part of this. Another thing I would like to talk about and address is your point about every soldier is a civil affairs soldier. There's another side to that. And that's that your civil affairs soldiers are advisers. They do not have a monopoly on civil-military operations. From my perspective, that's one of the big problems we've had in the past year or so in Iraq. "Hey, that's a civil affairs guy's problem. Let them handle it." Civil-military operations (CMO) require an integrated staff approach to everything. There's an engineer piece, there's a logistics piece, there's a transportation piece, there's a public health piece. All the staff elements, not just the civil affairs guys, need to contribute to the CMO plan. I think that's been one of our main problems right now.

Question: Colonel Bailey, National Ground Intelligence Center. I would say that we also need to look at the political effect of individual soldier actions.

Answer: That's the old "strategic corporal" argument. Some private can make a tactical mistake on the ground, and it can have serious implications all the way up to the strategic level. What you do in the local restaurant and what you do on the street can be important; you're always on parade. We have to realize that. This applies to all soldiers in these situations, but especially Americans.

Question: The study you co-wrote with Andy Terrill on reconstructing Iraq; could you talk about the origins of it, the audience it was designed for, and the impact it had or didn't have?

Answer: Okay. In October 2002, the commandant of the Army War College, Major General [Robert] Ivany, visited the Army G3, I think it was Lieutenant

General [Richard] Cody at the time, and they decided that a war with Iraq was probably on the horizon and that we needed to be prepared for what military responsibilities we would have at the conclusion of the combat phase. I was given the mission to organize our study team that month. In November, I went to a conference at the National Defense University, which was dealing with some of the same things. I went around the audience and asked selected people if they would participate in our working group. Andy Terrill was the Middle East expert in the Strategic Studies Institute. At the same time, he was gathering Iraqi experts to talk about a more regional look. I did a historical overview, and I started to develop a mission matrix based on the Haiti interagency reconstruction plan. Then, in December, we called up the people in our working group and met for two days at the War College in the Center for Strategic Leadership. What we came up with was a very good regional assessment of Iraq, I thought. We came up with a very good mission matrix to reconstruct Iraq, which defined 135 tasks. We had them in three categories. Thirty-five were in the top “critical” category, 32 were in the next “essential” category, and the remaining 68 were labeled as “important.” We figured out who would do each of those missions in each of the four pieces of transition I talked about, and who we would hand them off to, whether it was State Department, AID, Justice Department, the UN, World Health Organization, and so forth. We had everything from medical support to transportation to security for the borders to protecting historical artifacts. We covered all the things that needed to be done and who was going to do them.

I know Colonel Kevin Benson’s planners saw at least some drafts of that. We also provided copies of the report to Army G3 on 29 January 2003. We gave a copy to Lieutenant General [David] McKiernan, and ORHA (Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance) had copies. I was at a session with ORHA in mid-February with Ambassador George Woods, who was their top civilian, and he made the point of standing up and saying, “This [study] is not our plan.” That was pretty obvious from the way things turned out. But I know our study got around. I know within the Army people had it. I know the Joint Staff had it. I know a number of people who have come back from the theater and said, “We saw your stuff. We tried to implement some of it, but we just either didn’t have the resources or weren’t allowed to do all the things we wanted to do.”

I know that when USAREUR got our study they concluded CENTCOM was going to need MP support. And they offered an MP brigade. They were actually going to form an MP brigade—I think it was 4,500 or 5,000 MPs—to provide for security and follow-on forces for the guys going into Iraq. EUCOM would have needed augmentation from the Germans to restore those positions, and also a reserve call-up to fill up holes. The proposal got to Washington and it was killed for those reasons. So, the MP brigade was never formed or sent.

The study was not as important as we hoped it would be. We concluded that General [Eric] Shinseki's opinions about the number of US troops it was going to take to occupy Iraq were shaped, to some extent, by the study. Because we think he read it.

Question: I was, at that time, in Advanced War Fighting and Strategic Campaign Planning. We spent several weeks at it. The interesting thing about that exercise was, instead of doing Phase I through IV in campaign planning, and especially in the war-gaming piece, we kind of spent one day on I-III and we spent the next eight days on the IV piece. So, that was very different for the planners in there and the combat arms officers in there. It was really hard to do. It was very difficult. When you had already built the TPFDL (time-phased force and deployment list), you already had your movement under way, and now you've got to wrestle with these resources that you need for Phase IV, which are somewhere in the stack back there, you're not going to get them on time.

Answer: And the study is available at the Strategic Studies Institute website. If you go to it, you can download it. There's actually a short version, which is basically the matrix with a short explanation, and a longer version, which includes all Andy Terrill's stuff. They're both on the SSI website.

Question: Colonel Dave Sutherland, Center for Army Tactics. In your recommendations, or your proposals, you listed things like larger staffs, larger organizations, but I didn't notice, or I didn't see any discussion of education systems—to integrate this material more fully into the education system, especially the officer education system. Would you touch on that a little bit?

Answer: That's an excellent point. Each school's got to handle that as best it can. At the War College, they're starting to do more. I mean, we had a whole day on Phase IV operations last year. That's an increase from the past, and there will be more this year. Some seminars are doing more with it than others. There actually is a transition operations elective that people can now take, as well. There have been more presentations on the subject at every school and more people are thinking about it. I did a presentation at the Joint Forces Staff College about three weeks ago, and they're adding it into their curriculum as well. I'm sure they're doing similar things here at Leavenworth. But it's hard to get the message out. Again, I think that what we've got is a whole generation of majors and lieutenant colonels who have lived through these operations, who understand why they're important. Maybe that's going to be where the real changes come in; when these officers all become generals, and they start to revise the education system to match the reality that they've experienced. Lenny Wong has a new study he just did for the War College, which is on the War College website this month, September [2004]. The main point he emphasizes is that, in Iraq, we've created a bunch of junior leaders

who have been given a lot of leeway and done a lot of innovation and have been developing new ideas as they go. Now we're going to bring them back to a training environment where they might not have that same amount of flexibility. And the dilemma is, how do we maintain this atmosphere of innovation and freedom in the current training environment? That's another challenge for the education system, as well.

Question: Shane Story from the Center of Military History. You've really been looking at the operational problems of peacekeeping. I'd like to ask you to elevate it just one level higher to strategic problems, and specifically what we're talking about before Iraq. What I see is a fundamental contradiction in the planning and the assumptions and the intent of liberation with minimal forces, followed by a very quick draw down which was on line in early May. This is contradictory to what subsequently became the policy after de-Baathification and disbanding the army. So, on one hand the commitment was to a minimal force, but total success was expected with little resistance. In early May we didn't necessarily know who the enemy was. But by late May, the enemy was all Baathists and the former military training thousands of opponents to the US vision for Iraq. How do you reconcile those competing visions?

Answer: The insurgency over there is very complicated. There are a lot of pieces to it. The US dilemma going in was the sense that we didn't want to go with a big footprint because that would create more Iraqi antagonism. We wanted to keep troop strength to a minimum. I understand the reasons why they wanted to keep the footprint small. There was a sense the Iraqis wouldn't accept a large number of our troops there. At the same time, it's always better in these situations to go in heavy and then draw down quick. So, it's a dilemma. My sense is it's always better to have too much than too little.

Question: I had a few eaches that I wanted to share with you, but it's not a critique of a great product. One is, I think that in your examples you end up with too dark a picture of Iraq; in part, because you have too light of a picture of these other insurgencies and comparable operations that we've been through. The impression you have from your slide on Germany, for example, suggests that our problems were over in about three months. I don't think you intended to communicate that, but Germany was a big problem for a long time. As was Japan.

Answer: One example I should point out is that Germany and Europe took up between 3 and 4 percent of our GNP for four years after the Marshall Plan began. Yes, it was a problem for a while.

Question: As you look over the 20th century and some of the 19th, what's happening to us in Iraq right now isn't really a Category V mess. It's a Category II or III.

I mean, it's a mess, but as things go it could come out okay. The second point I'd like to make is that you focus a lot on what I would call a lack of vision, a lack of appreciation of all the counterinsurgency requirements. I'm not sure that completes the story. I think if you were to take any of the general officers involved and give an interview in a room, if you were to talk to Petraeus or you talked to Schwartz, any of them would be able to tell you, with pretty good fidelity, the kinds of imperatives you've traced out in your recommendations. They know what's supposed to happen. I think a problem exists with respect to execution. And a subset with respect to execution is the turnover, the changing of horses. And the most dramatic was changing from whatever was before Garner to Garner, and from Garner to Bremer, and from Bremer, and each time you had this change you lost a lot of traction. But within the organization you were cycling people through for three months and six months and you have contractors doing important jobs and they're there for two months. This lack of personnel stability is a big issue.

The only ones who were staying any length of time were the soldiers who were there for a year. And a collateral point I'd make with respect to the vision, in the big picture of what went right; you kind of zipped through that because it wasn't your subject. But I think one thing in particular should be emphasized, when you said there was no humanitarian crisis. A huge preoccupation of the prewar planning was to make sure the bombing and the war fighting were discreet enough and discriminate enough that you had no big movement of refugee populations. You didn't want to have millions of people on the road. In the immediate aftermath, there was a great fear there was going to be a food shortage and there was going to be a crop failure. So, your first civil affairs activities that mattered went into reconstructing the irrigation ditches and the agriculture. This effort succeeded. Less successful were the electricity and the oil, but they're coming around.

Answer: We made overly optimistic statements early about what we were going to accomplish.

Question: That's right, about how fast it was going to go. So, my comment, and I'd like to hear your response, would be that the leadership on the ground knows what is supposed to happen. It's trying to make that occur, but it's facing impedances to execution. It's those sources of friction that need to be addressed more so than failures with respect to initial planning.

Answer: OK. I'll say one thing as an explanation for glossing over my slide on our many successes in Iraq. If I'm giving this talk to a more civilian audience, what I see as a more hostile audience than a military one, I spend a lot of time on that "what went right" slide. But for this audience, I feel I need to talk more about what went wrong.

Question: And you want to goad us a little bit.

Answer: Yes, that's true. I think the big problems were ... again, as you mentioned, resources. I just think we needed more stuff in many categories. We might not have required more combat guys, but we did need more of other types of units. You're right, a lot of people had the right ideas, but you just didn't have all the pieces to make it happen. So, resources are key. I had an interesting discussion with a CENTCOM planner a couple of weeks ago. He was saying that what happened in CENTCOM headquarters was people didn't understand how complicated the war was, how complex a war like this could be. He said that on the CENTCOM staff, planning the war sapped our energy, sapped our resources, and sapped our people. He said we just didn't have anything left to put into the post-conflict effort. So, that goes back to this issue of headquarters resources, as well. He said, "You know, we knew this was important. But it's kind of like the marathon runner who hits the wall at mile 20. We knew we had to get that last 6 miles. We couldn't get there." So, again, I think part of why we are making progress intellectually is because we've got a generation of leaders who have grown up in these environments, and they know how important they are. We've just got to get an institutional commitment all the way up through DOD about how important these things are and to allocate the resources required. So, yes, there are great signs of progress.

The bottom line is that we're making progress. Resources are the major issue, though planning is, also. We've still got to plan better for these operations. But, yes, a lot of things went right. And again, we are still the best scrambling organization in the world to do these missions. In contrast, I'm just very skeptical that we can change civilian culture when somebody in the Senate says, "We're going to create an Office of Reconstruction in the State Department and they're going to take this responsibility away from the military." A congressional staffer drafted such legislation and sent it to me for comment. I told her, "Lorelei, let me give you my concerns about this. Number one is where are the resources going to come from to do this? And how are you going to revamp State Department culture to do this kind of mission?" For me, this reform is in the "too hard to do" box. It'd be nice, but I just don't see it happening.

Question: Bill Flavin, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. I'd like to build from what you said is the civil side of the problem. Transition operations must be a harmony of military and civilian agencies. Military involvement is necessary but is not sufficient by itself. But how do you bring in the other civilian players? This is not a DOD issue. The office of Ambassador Pascal, the new office that's been created in the State Department, shows some thought about this problem. But, indeed, it's an issue. I talked with our ambassador who was in charge of Brcko, in the Balkans, Ambassador Ferrin. He told me, "You know what a State

Department ambassador does? He takes a message from his president, walks down the hallway and gives it to another president. Who ever thought I knew how to run a city?" The question to address is, what's the last country Bremer ran? I don't mean to be flippant, but really, what is the capacity, the training, and the ability of all of those other civilian agencies to coordinate with each other and accomplish these kind of missions? There's talk about solutions, but that's an issue that's just moldering out there. With that capability gap, of course, it falls to the military to fill it. For example, remember the helicopter pilot in CPA who was given charge of fixing the rail lines because he had a model train. He was a good man who tried his best, but he just did not have the right skills. Military people are much better at scrambling than their civilian counterparts, and have more resources.

Answer: I think we're always going to end up having to do these transition operations, and we should be ready to do them again. Mission creep is often self-inflicted. We have got to be ready, but it's a sad commentary on our interagency process.

Question: Sir, Major Todd Plotner, SAMS. Sir, you mentioned that you see signs of hope in the US military from the way the education system regards transition operations. Perhaps you've answered this already, but increasingly we recognize that we can't succeed in transition ops without healthy interagency cooperation. Do you see any signs of hope in the way other US agencies and departments regard transition operations?

Answer: Yes, Bill Flavin, from the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, who just spoke, has been working on some of those issues. You know, people in other agencies are talking the talk. They're just not walking the walk. And again, it seems to me that there are some basic things that have to change. I don't understand why the State Department can't say, "By God, you're going to Baghdad for a year." Or, "You're going to Afghanistan for a year." And I don't know how they pick their people. I'm on a seminar teaching team at the War College with a State Department exchange instructor who is a personal friend of Ambassador [Zalmay] Khalilzad, knows Hamid Karzai as well, has spent years in Afghanistan, wants to go there to help, and nobody in the State Department has even approached him to do it. I guess I'm pessimistic. I don't see the required motivation for change out there.

Question: I think, you know, in the military we're used to thinking about how we've got constrained resources and we can't do everything we have to do. You haven't seen really constrained resources until you go to the State Department. I mean, they do not have, in general terms, the personnel to do the things required of them, especially if we're going to start getting them involved in these kinds of

operations. And I think what this drives to is the larger problem that we are still operating as though we were fully at peace in terms of the way we are staffing and resourcing the agencies responsible for foreign policy and defense in this country. Even as we are fully engaged in the most complicated military struggle we've been engaged in probably since the Second World War. You know there's a myth out there that says if you want organizations to change, put resource pressure on them. My study of bureaucratic change tells me that the exact opposite is true. If you actually want organizations to change, you need to make resources not an issue, because as long as the main issue is, how are we going to pay the people we have, nobody is going to be thinking about change. Until we can find a way to break this resource logjam, I don't think there's very much prospect of having any significant change in this area. Whatever they do to the DCI.

Just something quickly. It's always fun to pick on the State Department. God knows I've done it myself. But let's look at some of the other successes that have occurred with some of the other agencies. For example, one eye opener for me was in Afghanistan, where, in the same room talking to each other (a miracle in itself), you had representatives of the NSA, CIA, FBI, all the services, and different elements of special operations. They actually were sharing information freely with each other when the pressure was great for a specific series of operations. So, there is some hope the interagency process can work if the resources are there, and if they're forced to look each other in the eye about a significantly important mission. So, maybe there is even hope for the State Department someday.

Answer: I've heard a lot of good reports about USAID, both out of Iraq and out of Afghanistan. They're trying.

Question: Edward Peck. I'm here as one of your lecturers this afternoon, having spent 32 years in the State Department but still able to employ active verbs. One of the things you ought to know about the State Department is that it is small. You know, in the kind of macho, stud-muffin language we use in the Foreign Service, it's itty bitty. To put this into context ... there are 1,300 more full-time members of vocal and instrumental musical groups in the Defense Department than Colin Powell has diplomats. We are very, very thin on the ground. So, it's hard to do a build up. Colin Powell arrived and one of the first things he said to the assembled people there was, "What's the float factor in personnel?" And they all said, "What's a float factor?" There wasn't one, as you may know. In the State Department we try to minimize underlaps when you have transfers because when you go off to training, the chair sits empty until somebody comes back. Now Colin Powell is trying to put a float factor in.

Answer: I agree. The more and more I get a sense of the resource problems

in other agencies, I just don't know where the resources are going to come from to fix them. Again, that's why I just say I think the military needs to be prepared to suck it up for transition operations because we're going to be fated to do them. But maybe there's a long-term solution out there with Ambassador Pascal's office. They're talking about the interagency process. They're trying to staff his requirements. They're trying to develop a plan of interagency headquarters with interagency people connected to different theater commanders. But it's going to be a long row to hoe.

Question: My name's Mike Hochlich. I'm with the University of Kansas, where I teach in the law school. I specialize in the legal basis of empire, older ones than this one. I'm really rather interested that in your presentation and in the questions, you haven't considered the fact that an imperial army is a very different thing from an army which is episodic and campaign oriented. And in all sorts of ways, imperial structures are far different. For instance, on education. If you look not at the second British empire in the 19th century, but at the first British empire at the end of the 17th and the 18th centuries, they created a whole college, Haileybury College, to train colonial administrators. And it mixes both military and civilian people. And it hires the best possible people, such as Thomas Malthus, to teach them economics. You find civilian administrators such as Sir Edward Jones, who goes to India and sits down in Madras. And, by the way, the first British empire in India has a lot of lessons to teach folks. They understood about the Northwest Frontier very well. And again, what you find is they are applying a very different model about insurgency, which they had plenty of. I think that when you're going to look at models, if you're looking at models in the 19th and 20th centuries, and only doing that, (and I assume you're not), you really need to look back at a different model, which is a transitional imperial one that requires a very different relationship between civilian authorities and military authorities. And a different mind-set in both. You mentioned the influence of von Moltke on the American military mind-set and you're absolutely right. There's also Lieber, who influenced von Moltke, and all of them were studying the Roman empire. Indeed, one of the things that has been very important recently among legal historians, of which I'm one, is the influence of General Orders 100, written by Lieber in the Civil War. But if you read General Orders 100, he is citing my stuff. He's citing Roman Imperial law. This is important if you want to talk about history helping you with strategy, particularly not so much the military strategy but the structural and bureaucratic strategy. As an outsider, but as a historian and a lawyer who listens to this stuff in a different way, I think you're talking about issues that have been around for centuries. I know you've read the 20th-century stuff, I've read the 18th-century stuff. I've read the 6th-century stuff. The same discussions are going on, about the same kinds of problems, the same lack of resources, the same problem of extended

supply lines, the same problem of integrating tribal society into a more modern technological society. There were many innovative kinds of things that were done; for instance, the manipulation of citizenship rights, which I've heard no one discuss in the Iraqi context. We should consider the notion of citizenship as a tool for integration. I really do think you need to have a somewhat broader view. The British, when they confronted their imperial destiny, recognized that they had to look at another empire, the Romans. The Romans looked back to Alexander. Like it or not, we have an imperial destiny. The road is there and we've stepped on it. And we are looking for lessons in a period when we explicitly rejected an imperial model, which is the 19th and early 20th centuries. I think that is the wrong place to look.

Answer: When this administration came into office, nation building was a bad word. Now empire is a bad word. But during one of our working group discussions, one of the participants came up with a solution for our continual problem with transition operations and said, "What we need to fix all this is an American colonial office." That didn't go over well. That was not a recommendation we put forward any further. You need to bring in Skip Basevich to talk about the dangers of empires. That's a slippery slope, and there are a lot of serious implications for the Army if you think that is exactly where this nation is heading.

War and Aftermath

Frederick W. Kagan

I'm very pleased that TRADOC and CSI are putting on a conference on this topic, which I think is enormously important. I think there is little better that we can do right now than to continue to focus the Army's attention on this and then continue to try to focus the national leadership's attention on this incredibly important problem.

I teach the Military Art course at West Point. We just finished our annual reading of the chapter on the Battle of Long Island out of *America's First Battles*, which is a wonderful little book. For those of you who aren't familiar with it, it studies the first battle that American armies fought in each of the wars from the Revolution through Vietnam, and the thesis of the book is really fairly simple: that, with the exception perhaps of the Ia Drang, all of those battles have a common thread, namely that we lost them. And the focus of this book, which was written in the late 1970s [and early 1980s], was that in the future, we might not be able to afford to lose the first battle and then come back and achieve victory as we had in the past. Therefore, we must put all of our effort into winning the first battle. And I think recent events have shown we have done that. DESERT STORM reversed the trend. We won the first battle. In fact, we won all of the battles. And in ENDURING FREEDOM, such battles as we fought, we won. And in IRAQI FREEDOM, we won the first battle, and we won all of the battles. But as I was reading this chapter and thinking about what the book was about, it occurred to me that perhaps we have succeeded too well; perhaps we have created an organization that is superbly qualified and able to win the first battle of every war but is not able to actually win the war.

What do I mean by that? Well, I want to get from there into the question of what is war, and what is war about? And how do military operations fit into war, which I think is the single most important question we need to consider today.

For reasons that I do not understand, some graduate student in Germany wrote a little bio on me; I think it was in *The Frankfurter Allgemeine*, based mainly on an article I had published, "War and Aftermath," in *Policy Review*. I mention this because it gave me the best epithet that I've ever had in my life or ever expect to have. The title of it was, "Frederick W. Kagan, *Clausewitzianer*." And it just doesn't get better than that as a military historian and a military theorist, right? But the question is, what do you take from Clausewitz? Clausewitz is the most quoted source and the least read, and I think in the case of the Army, we have a tendency to quote one part of Clausewitz and implement another part. We will always talk about how war is an extension of politics by other means, and, yes,

he did really say that. I know there is an argument about that, but, yes, he did say, “War is an extension of politics by other means.” But that’s not actually the part of Clausewitz that the Army likes. In my experience and study, the part the Army likes is the one that says the way you win is to find the enemy’s army, attack it with your army, crush it decisively, and move on to the next thing. Pursue the strategy of overthrow, and you will achieve whatever it is that you want to achieve. Now, if you think about it for a minute, those two propositions are not necessarily even equivalent, and they may not even be compatible, because if the situation is such that the simple military overthrow of the enemy’s army will not lead you directly to achieving the political goal, then it may not be the right strategy to pursue. In fact, it’s unlikely to be the right strategy to pursue.

What I have noticed is that in recent years, more and more, not just the Army, but the entire Defense establishment has moved in the direction of accepting a Clausewitzian simplification of war that says the only important target is the enemy’s armed forces and that once you have destroyed the enemy’s armed forces, political success will inevitably follow. I think recent events have shown that to be absolutely not true. And I think if we once reflect on the fact that we can’t accept that shortcut, then we have to rethink in a fundamental way how we conceive of war, how we’re organized for war, for planning, for execution, and we have to recognize that the very term Phase IV is going to lead us into wrong thinking because it implies that the accomplishment of the political aim is something that happens after the enemy’s army has been defeated, and that won’t do.

I don’t think this is a new problem. I think that we have spent a lot of time in the Army and the Defense community talking about how 9/11 changes everything and talking about all the problems that are created by 9/11. I don’t think this is a new problem at all. I think if you go back over American history, you will see that we have frequently failed to plan adequately for achieving our political aims, even as we have been planning superbly for defeating the enemy’s armed forces. I think sometimes it’s worked out okay. Sometimes it hasn’t worked out at all. But it has been a common problem in the American military.

I guess I should have introduced myself up front. My name is Cassandra, and I am up here to tell you in my opinion all the things that are wrong with the American military. That doesn’t mean I don’t think there are a lot of things right with the American military. There certainly are. But one of the characteristics of Cassandra is that she’s always right. And what’s disturbed me is that, as over the past few years I’ve made pessimistic predictions about things that would happen, they’ve mostly come true. And so as I was looking at the unfolding of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, I was writing at the time, saying, “We’re not going to achieve our political objective here because we went in with a military plan that was going

to undermine the possibility for ultimately achieving our political goal.” And the slide that Conrad Crane just put up and lots of other evidence make it very clear that that is true. There are some good things that are happening in Afghanistan, but there are many more bad things that are happening in Afghanistan. One thing not happening in Afghanistan is the development of a clear, stable, central political authority that actually controls the country. And if that doesn’t happen, we will not have achieved our political aims there. In Iraq, I said at the time, and I have argued subsequently, the way we fought the war set us up to have maximum difficulty in pursuing our political objectives during the peace.

[General Eric] Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the Army, was right to press for larger forces in the initial phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He should have made the point sooner. Others should have made it with him, and it should have been generally accepted. When you talk about a “small footprint,” what was the small footprint for? The small footprint was for the forces that would be necessary to defeat the Iraqi army. But the defeat of the Iraqi army, with all respect to the complexity of the operation, was never in doubt. I don’t think any serious person imagined there was a chance that the Iraqis would defeat us. We could talk about more or fewer casualties. The truth was that objective military evaluations of the situation suggested to me and others that it was even unlikely the Iraqis would be able to hurt us very badly, even if we went in with a fairly stupid plan. The hard part was always going to be what happens afterward.

But the main point I want to make to you today is that what happens afterward is powerfully affected by what happens during the war. And that seems like a really obvious point, but I think we’re having a hard time getting our hands around it and what to do about it. You do not fight a war for the purpose of defeating the enemy’s army. You fight a war for the purpose of achieving a discrete set of political objectives. Those objectives should guide every aspect of campaign planning. You should never ask the question, what is the minimum number of forces we need to achieve victory in the combat operations, and let’s minimize our footprint and then end the discussion there. Because achieving victory in combat operations is not the objective. The question is, what are the forces that will be necessary to achieve our political goals? A part of which may be, but is not necessarily, the full defeat of the enemy’s armed forces. So what I’m suggesting is that we are in fact doing our planning exactly backward. First, we do Phases I through III, then we do Phase IV. If you understand and really have internalized the idea that war is an extension of politics by other means, it should be the other way around. You plan Phase IV first. And the questions you ask should be, what do we want this state to look like when we’re done? What do we want the region to look like when we’re done? What will be the obstacles that we will face, and how will we have to overcome them? And, of course, one of the obstacles is going to be the enemy’s army, and we’re going to

have to deal with that. But the truth of the matter is, especially from a grand strategic and a strategic perspective, that is a secondary consideration. And our best planning should be going into how to achieve our political goals. And only then how to fit military operations into that.

Audience question: Are you talking from a military perspective or a US Government perspective?

I'm talking from a military perspective and from a US Government perspective at all levels. Everyone has to internalize this. And I know your next sentence, "The military understands that and people have been doing that." Right?

Audience question: No. I think your target audience is not us. We're constrained by resources. One of those is time.

I understand. But if you're not doing it, it's not going to get done. If what you want to do is fence off the combat operations and say this is what we do, and we don't have the resources to do anything else, you run the risk of winning the war and losing the peace. You run the risk of designing combat operations that do not support the ultimate political goal.

Let me be a little bit more specific about this. My favorite example is ENDURING FREEDOM, because in IRAQI FREEDOM, it's a little more complicated. And also we're being a lot more successful in Iraq than we're being in Afghanistan, in my opinion. ENDURING FREEDOM had the characteristic that we had virtually no forces on the ground in the theater during most of the most significant combat phase of that war. We went in with the lightest conceivable footprint, primarily special forces troops, who were mainly serving as liaison with indigenous armies that we were renting for the purpose and served as target designators for our crushing air power superiority. It was a very well-run campaign in a certain sense, however well planned it was militarily. But it had the following results. It meant that we had absolutely no control over how the situation on the ground developed when the Taliban broke. And that meant the following things. [To begin with,] it had been a political desideratum not to allow the forces of the Northern Alliance to take Kabul, because we were fearful that—and did not think that, and rightly did not think that—the Northern Alliance would be able to form a stable government that could hold power. We were fearful that, if we let them into Kabul, we would not be able to get them out again, and they would thereupon insist upon a much greater share in power than we might want to give them. But we could not prevent that from happening because we had no forces with which to occupy Kabul in theater. That created a vacuum. When the Taliban broke and ran, Kabul was open, and the Northern Alliance went in. We told them not to, and they went anyway, and that was the end of the story. And that, frankly, has compromised our ability to set

up a stable government there ever since. We knew we would need ground forces to support the air power. We didn't want to send our own. So we rented the indigenous forces by giving a lot of money to warlords. Those warlords have now used that money to set up their own private armies and their own private palatinates all throughout the country, and the major problem Karzai faced after being elected, or selected, was the problem of getting control of the regions that the warlords were controlling with money we had given them. That's not a success.

Another problem we had, another major objective, was to capture and destroy all of the al Qaeda forces in theater, if at all possible. And al Qaeda did us an enormous favor in Afghanistan. Rather than continuing to exist as a shadowy terrorist organization that's very hard to track down, they actually concentrated a significant number of fighters in a combat unit and stationed it north of Kabul. That gave us the opportunity, if we had been able to insert even relatively small forces into the theater, to cut off and destroy and capture or kill all of those guys, but it didn't happen. Instead, as the bombing campaign broke the front line, most of those soldiers filtered away, and we have ever since been chasing them around the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan trying to get control of the problem, where we had a much better chance of getting control of it if we had pursued a different military strategy from the one that we did. In other words, the way we fought the war in Afghanistan, I believe, created a series of problems or exacerbated a series of problems that a different campaign plan might have mitigated or minimized.

I think you can make an argument that similar things happened in Iraq. We did not make it a priority to seize and control the territory of Iraq as we were fighting. We made it a priority to destroy Saddam's military power. We were hoping to do that with air power—didn't work—came in with ground power and rolled over them in a very successful military operation that took them down in very little time. But as a result of the campaign plan, which had not made a priority of seizing control of the country, the last area that we occupied was the Sunni Triangle. And I'm open to correction. There are many people who are more expert on this campaign than I, but from what I could see, it looked to me like there was an entire Republican Guards division up there that we did not destroy and that was largely able to melt into the countryside and begin the process of organizing itself for an insurgency to follow. That could have been mitigated or minimized if we had made it a priority from the outset to occupy the entire country and especially that area which was likely to be the biggest problem. The way we fought the war created very serious problems for the sort of peace we wanted to be able to establish there.

Now, you can make the argument that a lot of what's going on in Iraq was based on bad intelligence. Chalabi was certainly feeding us a lot of moonshine that

we were buying for a variety of reasons, which tended to reduce our focus on the need to do all of this stuff. But that's not the point I'm trying to make. The point I'm trying to make is that we fought the campaign in a certain way that was very successful in terms of destroying the enemy's combat power but was not very successful, or at least not as successful as it could have been, in laying the groundwork for achieving the political goals we wanted to achieve when the fighting was over. And I do think you are very much the audience that needs to hear this, because if the political objectives are not driving the military campaign plan, then you run the risk of having divergence between the two. And that, I think, is part of the problem we have going on. Now, I think this is being very strongly reinforced, and to some extent even driven, by problems at the level of the National Command and especially DOD. And I think that if you look at—and this is the thrust of my article—if you look at the transformation program that Rumsfeld brought with him into the Pentagon and has been pursuing single-mindedly ever since, you will see that it is a program designed to increase the cleavage between military operations and the achievement of political goals, because it is a transformation program that focuses almost exclusively on creating the capability to destroy the enemy's armed forces as rapidly as possible in the minimum time, with a minimum footprint – which means relying to a maximum extent on air power. And you get wonderful comments from Air Force officers saying things like, “In the next war, we won't ever have to have anybody leave CONUS.”

If that's all you're interested in, then you can fight the next war without ever leaving CONUS. We can absolutely disaggregate the armed forces of just about any major power in the world. We can do that. If we give ourselves a long enough time and enough missiles, and we're prepared to get into a real, very one-sided attrition war, we can destroy anybody's armed forces right now. But that's not the goal. And the problem is that destroying enemy armed forces from the air leaves you in no control over the situation on the ground. And the Air Force likes to argue, and has been arguing ever since DESERT STORM, but especially after OIF, that they can now control the ground. And they talk about air patrols over regions that they were using to control this and that, which is not a new concept. Hugh Trenchard, the British chief of the Air Force in the 1920s, had the Royal Air Force take over the mission of imperial policing in Iraq and relied, so it is said, exclusively on air power. Now, it's not true. He actually had armored cars on the ground that he was running as though he was an army commander and without which he wouldn't have been very effective. But he said, “We can do this mission.” They policed it, and ever since, we've had this model that air policing can actually work. Well, it depends on what you're trying to do, and it depends on what else is going on. In Iraq, we need to remember that the British actually had a colonial infrastructure that was running the show politically. And Trenchard was supporting

that. When we went into Iraq today, we didn't have anything like that. We had to rebuild. And before you rebuild, you have to transition. And before you transition, you have to lay the groundwork for the transition. And this "backward" planning has to guide the way you think about military operations from start to finish, and it must be seamless. It must be seamless, and it must be integrated, and it can't be done as Phase I, Phase II, Phase III, Phase IV.

As the point was made earlier, if the TPFDL (Time-Phased Force and Deployment List) is not going to get the troops necessary for Phase IV into theater until six months after the war is over, then you're not going to succeed. But even more than that, think about it this way. Think about it at the micro level. When an American military unit goes into a region in Afghanistan or Iraq and destroys the local military organization and thereby frequently also the local police—because in most countries in the world, we would be fighting the police or paramilitaries that we are not going to be happy just to leave around—what have you just done? Now you own that little region. What are you going to do from that moment that is going to support your Phase IV objectives? Well, you can just hold it for a little while, and people will allow you to do that as long as you actually hold it. But if you just smash it and move on, you're running a big risk, because nature abhors a vacuum and the local population will work immediately to start filling that vacuum with indigenous structures if you don't do it for them and if you don't control the area. Because someone's got to run life around there. And that means that by default, the local leaders, the natural leaders, will pop up and start taking control. If you let them do that for a week, two weeks, two months, while you're finishing combat operations and thinking that you're then going to come back and do Phase IV over there, you will find—as we found in Afghanistan—that a lot of those local leaders will be so entrenched by the time you turn around and try to deal with them that you will not be able to do anything except deal with them, and you will have given away a lot of options and a lot of opportunities that you might have had if you had been in positive control of the situation.

So the key point there, again, is that the combat operations must be focused entirely from start to finish on creating the preconditions for the political objectives, and even during combat operations, we must begin the process of directly working to achieve those political objectives.

Now, I wanted to toss out some points quickly, and we can address this more. I think this is going to require fundamental intellectual and cultural shifts in the military. I think we are very eager as an organization to separate these things, not just because we like to stovepipe things, but because we find involvement in politics to be difficult and uncomfortable, which is perfectly understandable. But I think we have to get over that, and the military has to learn to embrace the fact

that it is a direct political instrument, and it cannot try to pretend that politics are “echelons above us.”

I think we need to move beyond jointness. There are, of course, still limitations in the degree to which jointness works, as the current transformation debate shows. But as we work to solve those problems, we are also going to have to work to solve the interagency problem. As we do that, we’re going to find that other agencies are not necessarily resourced adequately and have to undergo their own cultural transformations to make this work. But we, the military, which will have always, I think, the primary responsibility for this task, have to be reaching out and working as hard as possible to integrate with other agencies. To be fair, I think we do that on the whole. I think that the Army, especially, is the best at this.

I think it’s critical that as we think about transformation, we not forget the Army’s uniqueness as an organization. The more we allow transformation to pull us in the direction of being another set of equipment that can put precision-guided munitions down range, the more we lose sight of the unique element the Army brings to joint warfighting, which is the ability to control terrain and to work from the very beginning to achieve political objectives, without which political success cannot be accomplished.

I think we need to recognize that it is essential to preserve both people and technology, and the trade-offs that I think we’ve seen in recent years, as Army leadership has been effectively preserving technology at the expense of maintaining a force that I think is of adequate size, should give us pause. Because technology will never provide the solutions to the problems you need to solve in order to achieve political successes of this variety; only the Army’s people can do that, and if we don’t have enough of them, it won’t be done.

One last thing that I want to throw out—here’s my grenade, and then I’m going to duck behind the table. I’m not sure that the military should be in command even of the war. Unless the military can really turn its cultural biases around and place political goals at the center of everything it does, I don’t really think it’s qualified to do this. I think it can do that, and I think in many respects, it would be the best if it could, but otherwise we run the risk of continuing to have wars where we win all the battles and start losing the peace. Thank you very much.

What War Should Be, What War Really Is

John A. Lynn

Turning battlefield victory into political success at the start of the 21st century will require us to re-examine the very nature of war itself in an age of globalization, Islamic extremism, and terrorism. The American military is apt to search for technological solutions to the challenges before it. Certainly, weaponry, vehicles, aircraft, and other tools of war matter a great deal; however, such hardware is ultimately less fundamental today than is the “software” of thought. Soldiers often say that an army fights the way it trains, which is true, but it also trains the way it thinks. Preparation begins with conception.

Neither the struggle against terrorism nor the conflict in Iraq conform to traditional American military definitions and expectations. We may want war to conform to the heroic dimensions of World War II, but that is not what war really is today. Back then, Americans embraced a clear and just cause, confronted an easily identified enemy, conducted large-scale military operations, and fought battles against the uniformed armed forces of the enemy. Now, our adversaries, whether al Qaeda terrorists or resistance fighters in the Sunni triangle are elusive, intermix with the civilian population, employ the weapons of terror, and require us to respond more with patrols than with divisions. The ghost of George Patton cannot help us much when our main task morphs from the Battle of the Bulge into house-to-house searches in Baghdad.

This paper proposes a theoretical model concerning the interrelationship between conception and reality in warfare as developed in the recently published second edition of my book, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*.¹ Some of the theory’s underlying assumptions derive from cultural history, although these pages will try to avoid the arcane language and convoluted ideas so typical of that field. The model’s essential claim is easy to grasp: Throughout history, different cultures have held different ideas about war, these ideas have affected the way they fought, and such ideas have also been shaped by the evolving realities of conflict. The model was crafted with a broad audience in mind, not targeted at academics alone.

Before going further, permit me a personal declaration. Pundits who proclaim their certainties about war and politics abound; such authorities succeed to the extent that they implant their version of the truth in the minds of those who hear or read their words. They offer a quick and easy path to knowledge—simply agree with them. I am no pundit, nor do I ever wish to be. What appears on these pages may be the product of a lifetime of study but the length of time I have been a military historian does not guarantee that my arguments are correct. They are not intended as shortcuts to knowledge but as food for thought. My model is of value only if it makes

sense to an active reader, a reader who must bear the responsibility of making his or her own judgments.

An Overview of the Model

This theory differentiates between the “reality of war” and the way a culture conceives of war, forming a “discourse on war.” These seem destined to be quite distinct, the one not matching the other. Despite my disdain for the language of cultural theory, I have found it convenient to borrow the term “discourse” for the conceptual pole of the model. Here, the term signifies the complex of assumptions, perceptions, expectations, and values on a particular subject. Many cultural historians include those practices that reinforce values, and so forth, in the definition of discourse, but I would like to keep action separate from conception for the purposes of this argument. It is also necessary to point out that a single society can harbor several discourses on war that vary by class, gender, and profession—the last an important differentiation with the emergence of a professional military. Thus, aristocrats might think of war very differently than did peasants, men than did women, and soldiers than did civilians.

The value of the cultural model proposed here derives from its exploration of the relationship between discourse and reality. The fundamental principle of the model contends that there is an essential feedback loop between them. In the diagram of the model in Figure 1, this basic feedback appears graphically as the main, bold, arrows. Cultures try to change or control reality to fit conception, while reality modifies the cultural discourse to better match the objective facts of combat. Essential to classical Greek warfare, for example, was the way in which contending city states, *poleis*, agreed on conventions that determined the timing and character of combat. This imposition of conventions upon combat provides a strong example of how discourse shapes reality. In the other direction, reality can compel a cultural discourse to modify itself so that it better represents the way things really are. The physical losses and psychological shock suffered by armies, governments, and peoples in World War I due to outmoded notions of combat forced the discourse to change.




Figure 1

The model becomes more complex and interesting when factors interfere with the basic feedback loop of the model. Consider first the left of the model, as discourse imposes itself on reality. Should cultural needs for special forms of combat be great enough and reality unable to adjust to them, a society may go so far as to replace reality in whole or in part with a “perfected reality,” which more closely adheres to ideals within the discourse. Such was the case during the Middle Ages with the creation of the tournament.

Now consider the right side, which stresses reality as the actor and discourse as the object. At times, a form of real violence is so at odds with the discourse, and the discourse is so inflexible, that the violence in question cannot be incorporated within the discourse. Such rejection follows two paths in the model. The first can create an “alternate discourse,” which can then justify a more “extreme reality” of conflict. Things move to extremes because the formalities and limitations that often circumscribe war within the dominant discourse disappear in the alternative discourse. Such occurred in World War II between American and Japanese combatants, when little mercy was expected or given.

The model registers a second form of rejection—one so complete that a culture refuses to recognize the violence as war in any sense. Such a “refusal to consider as war” has apparently shown itself in recent events in Iraq, where some American officers have regarded the combat that continued after the defeat of Sadaam Hussein’s regular forces as something basically different from war. Unlike “extreme reality,” the kind of combat affected by the refusal to consider as war might be sharply limited in scale or constrained by rules of engagement, and it is precisely these limitations that cause soldiers to see such operations as aberrations that need not be incorporated into doctrine and training.

The Model in Detail

The Discourse on War

Having sketched the primary distinctions within the model, let us probe them more deeply, beginning with the discourse on war. We must recognize that because organized armed conflict fundamentally and comprehensively affects society at many levels, different segments of society generate their own discourses. As a result, a culture has no single discourse on war. Rather a number of distinct discourses encompass the values, expectations, and so forth, of varied groups that harbor potentially very different, and at times opposing, interests and points of view. Consequently, the conception of war contains a multiplicity of attitudes and expectations. Any generalizations about these conceptions must be specific to class, gender, and—in societies with strong racial divisions—race as well. To emphasize class, gender, and race is *de rigueur* among historians today; however, my *au courant* colleagues are likely to overlook the fact that geography and borders can create

important cultural distinctions as well. Moreover, profession is a relevant category, particularly when command and planning become the province of military professionals.

Variety of interest and opinion within a single people is great enough that it is dangerous to make easy assumptions about how a culture regards armed conflict. It is also fair to say that one group's opinions about war may matter much more than do another's. The discourse on war is a discourse on power in the traditional sense, and in such matters not all segments of a society are equal. In decisions as to whether to fight or not, and when, where, and how to combat an enemy, elites usually weigh in far more heavily than do segments of society with less status.

Social, political, and military elites—often, but not always, the same as in Western societies—think of warfare in ways markedly different than do lower strata. Medieval and early-modern European aristocrats could view violent martial activity as an end in itself, as a necessary proof of prowess and courage and a validation of noble status, as well as a source of wealth. But often geography draws lines between elites. Even in an era with an international aristocracy, there remained differences, so the late-medieval French held different principles regarding violence and military participation than did their Italian counterparts. And, of course, European peasants who had no need to justify themselves through war viewed it as an unqualified disaster leading to misery and death. Of course, even here there are exceptions, as in the case of the Swiss, who provided the most important mercenary market at the close of the Middle Ages.

Spiritual and religious communities can oppose fighting through moral codes banning violence, or at least violence directed against coreligionists. At least until Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085), the papacy condemned warfare and war makers. However, it seems that all great religions come to accept warfare on certain levels and some produce military religious orders, such as European Catholic Templars or the armed Japanese Buddhist monks. There certainly have been religious leaders, such as Mohandas Gandhi, who eventually opposed all violence, but more common were those like the German preachers who insisted *Gott mit uns* or the American chaplain at Pearl Harbor who shouted encouragement to those resisting the attack on Sunday, 7 December 1941, “Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition!”²²

Expansion of political participation multiplied the number of those whose attitudes toward war and peace had to be taken into consideration. At the same time that the public sphere expanded, modern military professionalism took root. To the extent that war became an affair defined and directed by military professionals, opinions held by the general public toward the technical conduct of war mattered

less, even if public commitment to a particular war as a whole became increasingly important. A professional military develops its own discourse on war. In earlier ages this was not particularly systematic, but the rise of general staffs and war colleges in the 19th century, generated formal doctrine. For a number of reasons, professionally generated doctrine can have a great impact on society and culture; one need look no further than the consequences of military practice at the onset of World War I. As is clear from the American experience, different branches of the military services also develop their own distinct military cultures, which incorporate differing attitudes, assumptions, and values.

Gender is a complicated and unpredictable variable. Modern attitudes might well expect that the historical record would reveal that women resisted war and military values, while men promoted them. And at times this has been the case, as in such movements in the United States as Mothers Against the War during the Vietnam era. However, even when women have not participated directly in the fighting, they usually endorsed it through praise of warriors and condemnation of cowards. Spartan women admonished their sons to either come home bearing their shields (well and victorious) or on them (dead but having been resolute in battle). Medieval women adored the knight of proven prowess, and ladies of Louis XIV's court sought the attentions of brave officers. And even before our modern age of women in uniform, women commonly served as washerwomen, seamstresses, cooks, and amateur nurses with the men at the front.

The discourse on war often glorifies martial action. Cultures may praise martial prowess for various reasons: social values require masculine military performance; the consequences of victory or defeat in war are of great importance to a society; and cultural tastes generate romantic notions of valor. Concern with glory need not be foolish or ignorant. During some historical eras, societies bestowed accolades on warriors precisely because the people of those societies knew grimly, often firsthand, about the labor, suffering, and danger of war. Such certainly was the case in Greek *poleis*. And even idealized notions of war can encompass appalling brutality, as did Nordic sagas or codes of chivalry.

The Reality of War

The reality of war rarely if ever matches the discourse on war. If nothing else, the variety of discourses within a single society ensures that no one reality could match the diversity of conception. But there are other factors driving a wedge between conception and reality, and they are not necessarily implied by the definition of discourse.

Different peoples can have dissimilar conceptions of war as it should be, and when they clash in battle, the fact that they are fighting by different rules creates a

reality that neither adversary expected. Opponents can have different principles about the value of human life, the acceptability of surrender, the fate of prisoners, and the inflicting of civilian casualties. It is argued that certain Native American communities engaged in combat designed more to capture than kill the enemy, and when they confronted the more bloodthirsty conquistadors, the discourse on war among these Native American warriors simply did not fit what they had to deal with. Similar statements are used to explain the victory of the French over Italian *condottieres* at the close of the 15th century and the start of the 16th.

Technical factors can also cause the real to diverge from the conceptual. Logistics provides a most important example of this, as the necessities of supply shaped the conduct of war and the behavior of armies. For most of history, armies have not been able to carry all that they needed to support themselves in the field, particularly fodder and food. Consequently, they largely lived off the country and committed theft, destruction, rape, and murder, as soldiers who foraged to find what they needed also took what they wanted. Therefore, even when wars were conceived of as righteous ventures, armies often acted like marauding bands who preyed on friend and foe alike. To keep soldiers and their horses fed, ideals of war had to be sacrificed, pious statements of monarchs and ministers notwithstanding.

During eras of military change, when even military elites and professionals cannot predict the full effect of innovations, war can be different than expected. In such circumstances, memories of past conflicts, particularly those tinged with nostalgia, may fail to guide a military, and they certainly mislead civil populations. New weapons and tactics can change the character of warfare before professionals and the public realize it. The longbow of the Hundred Years' War and the rifle in the American Civil War altered conflicts with deadly results, but the impact of modern weaponry during World War I provides the most disastrous example of a lag between the reality of killing power and the discourse on war. Then, many military professionals knew and accepted the deadly effects of modern weaponry, but more did not, and the civilian discourse on war hardly understood it at all.

But there is another side to the coin, at least by the 20th century. At times, a discourse on war expects technological progress and assumes that the power and accuracy of weapons is certain to increase. Such rising expectations can create a discourse that outstrips reality. The American military, and to a large degree the American public, believed in precision bombing in World War II, but the shortcomings of bomb sights and the difficulties imposed by weather and combat made such precision illusory. Precision bombing of factories gave way to area bombing of cities in contradiction of dominant conceptions of warfare.

Beyond the more obvious questions of technique and technology, dynamics of

war defined by Carl von Clausewitz also compel real war to differ from warfare as it should be. One such influence is the role of friction, which among other things involves the importance of chance and the unexpected. Some modern military theorists speak of the non linearity of warfare.³ They insist on the unpredictability of warfare and attack assumptions that war is linear in the mathematical sense, for instance that inputs yield predictable outputs. Nonlinear theorists experiment with notions of chaos theory, the “new science,” and complexity theory. Projections concerning war based on linear assumptions must be frustrated in a non-linear world. Another aspect of war explored by Clausewitz is the tendency of warfare to escalate toward an absolute form, free of limitations. If one’s definition of a discourse on war is an expectation of what war should be, Clausewitz would argue that it almost necessarily will be overturned by the forces implicit in real war.

The Model in Detail: Imposing the Discourse on Reality

For the reasons indicated above, and for still others, the discourse on war differs from the reality of war. But while the two differ, they are not independent of each other, because discourse imposes itself on reality and vice versa. Cultural dictates can be so powerful that they shape the life and death confrontation of combat, and the imperatives of reality can force cultures to rethink their ideas of warfare. Often there is a tension between conception and reality that drives a dynamic of change.

A fundamental assertion of cultural history is that human communities impose cultural constructions upon reality, that they make the actual fit the conceptual. Cultural historians sometimes insist that reality is simply what is perceived, and thus culturally constructed. Such an attitude in war is fatal, in the literal sense of the word. But avoiding foolish intellectual excess, this principle applies to the cultural history of war within limits set by the objective facts of armed conflict.

There is a great deal of truth in arguing that human communities have tried to shape combat to fit principles imagined by the dominant discourse. In fact, this process has a long and honored history in the West. From the 7th to the 5th centuries, B.C., classical Greek *poleis* tacitly or expressly agreed to a number of conventions concerning what weapons would and would not be used, what tactics would be employed, and when and where combat would take place. These conventions ensured an essentially heroic form of combat that led to quick and decisive battles. Such agreements did not, however, limit bloodshed, because when Greek phalanxes clashed, the fighting was particularly brutal.

Western warfare has usually not conformed to conventions as all-encompassing as those accepted by the classical Greeks; however, military forces usually do follow certain conventions. Consider the taking and treatment of prisoners. During the

early modern era captured officers won their release on their word that they would not rejoin their army until formally exchanged. It was quite literally a gentlemen's agreement. That was a more polite age, but 20th-century European conflicts between major states have usually been fought with rather elaborate standards of behavior toward prisoners of war. Although breached, these rules have remained and spread. The Geneva Conventions represent an attempt to make war as it really is rise to the standards of war as it should be. In fact, the existence of laws of war demonstrates an important and enduring attempt of conception to master reality. Rules of engagement are modern examples of the same impulse—conventions designed to tailor violence to circumstance. Most commonly, they set limits designed to constrain troops for political and humanitarian reasons.

So adamantly can a society, or part of it, desire to force warfare into accepted patterns that the society may replace real war with a perfected reality that more completely conforms to the relevant discourse on war. War itself cannot always be modified, and if the wall between reality and discourse is too high, then a culture may need to create an artificial and idealized form of violence. Never has such an alternate reality been more apparent than during the Middle Ages, when codes of chivalry led to the creation of tournaments as a surrogate for war. By aristocratic standards the tournament was a chivalric ideal, as only properly certified nobles displayed their prowess before fellow warriors and their ladies in a properly regulated but still dangerous environment. Days of danger could be followed by evenings of comfort at banquets that allowed knights to enjoy the attention of women.

While the tournament represented the ultimate replacement of a real with a more perfect form of combat, it was not unique. The common and enduring practice of dueling in early modern Europe did much the same, particularly the form of duel fought by groups rather than individuals. For elite males, dueling fulfilled many of the same purposes as did war, demonstrating courage and prowess in the name of establishing and defending honor. Both war and the duel provided stages upon which a man could display his courage.

It may seem a bit far-fetched, but modern militaries preserve practices that could be seen as replacing the reality of today's warfare with elements conforming to ideals of what war should be. Drill, ceremony, and parades project a dated but tidy and gallant image that presents the military in an artificial light that sanitizes war. Sport, particularly American football, might even be analyzed as perfected war; the American military often employs the metaphor of football and football the terminology of war. Both provide theaters of conflict for values of courage in the face of discomfort, pain, and danger.

Imposing Reality on the Discourse

If lack of correspondence between the discourse on war and the reality of war can stimulate an attempt to make reality more like the concept, the reverse is even more likely; the discourse on war must change to take into account the evolving character and conduct of war.

The force driving such change in the discourse would seem to be the overwhelming need to recognize and adjust to the reality of war to survive. This survival is physical, in that recognition of reality allows armed forces to deal with and exploit changes in weaponry and military practice, and psychological, in that by accepting reality one is less likely to be unhinged by it. Adjustment can come rapidly, particularly when a military is prepared and organized to analyze and adapt. During World War I, so often used as an example of a costly misperception of trench warfare, the German army radically changed tactics in 1917 as a result of correctly re-examining reality and producing a new doctrine, or professional discourse, and new tactics. Much the same can be said for German development of armored warfare between the wars or US development of amphibious warfare and naval air power.

But discourse can also lag when elements of it are closely bound to social or political principles. Aristocratic military elites of medieval Europe may have been slower to appreciate the shifting realities of war because their aristocratic privileges were tied to their expertise in a particular kind of combat; consequently, a change in the style of fighting might threaten the very justification of elite status. William the Conqueror's victory at Hastings (1066) resulted from a combination of arms that took advantage of non-aristocratic archers and of aristocratic heavy cavalry, but the elite interpreted the battle as a victory of the knight and as evidence of the impotence of infantry in the face of chivalry. During the Hundred Years' War, French chivalry fell victim at Crécy (1346) to new English tactics that took advantage of the peasant longbow in defensive positions that supported dismounted knights. A decade later the French responded at Poitiers (1356), not by confronting the problem posed by English longbowmen but by mimicking the English knights and dismounting. It was as though they could only interpret their earlier defeat as being wrought by their social equals, the English knights. The result was that the longbowmen enjoyed even better targets. Sixty years later, at Agincourt (1415), the French repeated their aristocratic mistake.

There are also cases in which the difference between reality and discourse is so fundamental that an adjustment in the dominant discourse on war is not possible. This could involve either some specific aspect of a conflict or its essence. Such an impasse leads to the rejection of the conflict as what the culture defines as proper

war. Such rejection can take two forms, either the creation of an alternative discourse on war or the somewhat different response of a refusal to consider as war.

Because an alternate discourse probably lacks the limitations implicit in the dominant discourse on war, the alternative discourse justifies a more extreme reality of combat. When greatly exaggerated, contempt for the enemy can drive combatants to abandon crucial constraints embedded in their discourse on war. The treatment of Native Americans by settlers and soldiers in North America certainly qualifies as this kind of situation, leading to wholesale massacres of Native Americans. Much has been written concerning US Marines and Army troops in the Pacific during World War II, who came to regard the Japanese more as animals than as men. The result was a rejection of the usual US restraints on treatment of the enemy. This may not have changed US strategy, but it justified the refusal or reluctance to take prisoners and the barbaric abuse of enemy prisoners, wounded, and dead. That part of the conflict had slipped outside the discourse on war and become a new extreme reality.

Throughout much of history, fighting against rebels, guerrillas, and partisans has often rejected the discourse on war. To consider internal rebels as soldiers and their cause as a war may be unacceptable because it would seem to legitimize them. For example, the torture of prisoners by the French in Algeria certainly qualifies as outside the discourse on war, as may also the mutilation of French prisoners by Algerians, although native practices of fighting were traditionally cruel by Western standards. Even within a normal war, certain conduct can stand alone.

Each of these cases brings up another factor in driving an extreme reality. When different cultures that embrace contrasting discourses on war fight, there is no common ground of military practice. Each side sees the other as violating sacred principles and retaliates by abandoning restraints. Therefore, the danger of going to extremes is particularly great in cross-cultural wars.

Refusal to consider as war is another form of rejection. In this case, the military does not form an alternative discourse to fit a new situation or enemy but simply dismisses the notion that the kind of violence at hand qualifies as war in any sense. The response may be simply to meet the situation with ad hoc measures to deal with a situation the military has no intention of accepting as something it will have to deal with in the long term. The ad hoc responses relied upon will not be enshrined in doctrine, for instance the professional discourse; instead, they will be abandoned and forgotten as anomalous, as not the real business of the military.

Iraq has witnessed such refusal to consider as war. In December 2003, Mark Danner reported on the form of combat after President Bush's premature "mission accomplished" speech. He quoted the pointed analysis of Lieutenant Colonel William

Darley: “What we have here is basically a constabulary action. We’ve seen almost nothing above the squad level. Basically this is not a real war.”⁷⁴ Interviews with American officers led Danner to conclude: “Most of these men I found deeply impressive: well trained, well schooled, extremely competent. What joined them together, as the war grew steadily worse for American forces, was an inability, or perhaps a reluctance, to recognize what was happening *as a war*.”⁷⁵ In the language of the model, they were refusing to consider this as war, refusing to incorporate it within the discourse. They would cope with the situation and do the best they could, but it was not what they went there to do. So Bush was reflecting a conception of war, not simply jumping the gun on victory—the “real war” was over. But in this troubled time, “real war” does not really encompass the full variety of war; the discourse must be broadened.

Unlike extreme reality, refusal to consider as war does not drive combat toward unbridled brutality. The kind of operations rejected as “real war” today are often small-scale operations circumscribed by formal and extensive rules of engagement. In fact, it is these necessary limits on violence that make the operations seem like something other than war.

Stupidity or Destiny?

The model presented here suggests that what is often condemned as military stupidity is, in fact, cultural destiny. Intellectuals are prone to accuse soldiers of being hidebound, dull, or even dumb. Comedian George Carlin used to bring down the house with his monologue about oxymoronic language: “The term Jumbo Shrimp has always amazed me. What *is a Jumbo Shrimp*? I mean, it’s like Military Intelligence—the words don’t go together, man.”⁷⁶ One of the most common digs, charging the military with being retarded in the literal sense of the word, asserts that “generals are always preparing to fight the last war.”⁷⁷ George Clemenceau, the adamant premier of France during World War I, pronounced another famous condemnation of the narrow military mind when he declared, “War is too important to be left to the generals.” However, what many perceive as rigidity or sheer lack of brain power should be recognized as the power of the discourse on war.

It is natural and inevitable that militaries try to shape the reality of war to fit their conception of what that war should be. Of course, reality is not always so obliging as to fit the prescriptions of military planners, so deadly mismatches occur. In any case, discourse is destined to play this role, and there is great force to the professional discourse on war, enshrined in theory and doctrine.

The trick is to escape the confines of currently accepted discourses on war, to question and if necessary, to change them. This demands intellectual courage, to be sure, but it also requires imagination. *The 9/11 Commission Report* hit on something

fundamental when it charged that one major failure explaining American inability to counter the al Qaeda plan was a lack of imagination.⁸ Phrases like “thinking outside the box” have trivialized a valuable principle. Particularly at times of transition, it is essential that militaries think outside the discourse; after all, lives are at stake.

The Need to Construct a New Discourse on War

If we are faced with a new reality of war, then to respond to it, we must change our discourse, or discourses, on war. Certainly the military must reconsider its own assumptions, but so must the political leadership and the citizenry. In *Battle Ready*, written by General Anthony Zinni and Tom Clancy, Zinni puts it in no uncertain terms: “The truth is that military conflict has changed and we have been reluctant to recognize it. Defeating nation-state forces in conventional battle is not the task for the twenty-first century. Odd missions to defeat transnational threats or rebuild nations are the order of the day, but we haven’t yet adapted.”⁹ I would say that we need a new discourse on war, but his words are more direct. In a speech he delivered in September 2003, Zinni criticized the usual path of American military reform and appealed for a new vision; he was talking precisely about turning victory into success:

What strikes me is that we are constantly redesigning the military to do something it already does pretty well. I mean. . .breaking the organized resistance in Iraq, even though it may not have been the greatest army in the world, was done extremely well. We’re very proud of our troops and very proud of the way that was executed and led. But it wasn’t enough. At the end of the third inning we declared victory and said the game’s over. It ain’t over. It isn’t going to be over in future wars. If we’re talking about the future, we need to talk about not how you win the peace as a separate part of the war, but you’ve got to look at this thing from start to finish. It’s not a phased conflict; there isn’t a fighting part and then another part. It is nine innings. And at the end of the game, somebody’s going to declare victory. And whatever blood is poured onto the battlefield could be wasted if we don’t follow it up with understanding what victory is.¹⁰

In *Battle Ready*, Zinni comments on habits of thought among the American military that still would cast war in the mold of World War II. To posit war in such terms, and to organize, equip, and train for large-scale maneuver warfare leaves us ill prepared for current reality. Memory of past success can be a poor guide for the future. General William Westmoreland exemplified such a classic misapprehension

of lessons learned when he gave his formula for victory in Vietnam: “We know how to do this war. We’re going to put massive firepower down on our targets because that’s the way we did it in World War II and Korea. That’s the American way of war.”¹¹

To turn victory into success, we will have to recognize that war as we want it to be differs sharply from war as it really is. How might we need to reshape the discourse on war? Conrad Crane made an important point that echoes Zinni, by arguing that perhaps Phase IV planning should really be our first concern, not a tag-along to the clash of maneuver elements. In an environment that dictates state building after a victorious campaign, state building, not defeating the conventional forces of a second-echelon foe, will be the most difficult and most essential part of military operations. Should we not, then, plan other aspects of armed operations with regard to the outcome we desire in Phase IV? To take Phase IV as the starting point for planning is a significant change in the professional discourse.

If we must accept that state building is not an unwanted encumbrance to “real war,” but the very essence of present and future warfare, we need to restructure forces to discharge this task better. Such a restructuring will probably require shifting resources and manpower away from maneuver units to strengthen other forces better suited to state building and peacekeeping. The fastest growing segment of military forces in the world today is what Sunil Dasgupta terms “paramilitary” forces, by which he means regular, sanctioned, military units created exclusively for interior security roles.¹² Both India and China maintain paramilitaries manned by about a million troops. To the casual observer, such forces as India’s Border Security Force (which patrols Indian Kashmir), look like the army; however, they are organized, armed, and trained for constabulary duties. Similar constabulary forces, but meant not for internal security but for state-building operations, are worth considering, although in the American political-military environment they would probably be defined as light infantry battalions within the Army and Marine Corps. At present, such units lie outside the American discourse. Yet the most fundamental need for the US Army today may not be to increase our rapid deployment capabilities but to alter the nature of the troops we deploy.

Terrorism poses another threat that obliges us to re-examine the discourse on war. In this case, it is not enough that the military rethinks its values and preparation, although this is a critical matter. In a democratic state, the politically active segments of society must confront the issue, and even if a single consensus is impossible, positions should emerge that provide the basis for public debate and a majority will. This stands as a fundamental task of the decade. Political and military responses will be guided by how we as a society come to see this war against terrorists.

One fundamental aspect of this emerging discourse on terrorism must be the realization that the fight against Islamic terrorists will not be uniquely, or even predominantly, military. The struggle will continue for a long time, and it will vary in form and intensity. As a national and international intelligence effort, it cannot flag at any time; security depends upon vigilance. When enemies and threats are identified, responses must fit the circumstance. Often counterterrorist action should be the responsibility of police and security agencies, and their actions must be in accord with law. Sometimes, clandestine units, including special-operations personnel from the armed services, must meet the challenge. Less commonly, regular military forces will conduct bombing raids meant to punish, preempt, or decapitate terrorist groups. Special forces and larger units will be detached to aid regimes battling Islamic terrorist groups in their own countries. On rare occasions, the confrontation with terrorists could take the form of conventional warfare.

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of this necessary discourse on war will be a redefinition of victory. Douglas MacArthur believed that this term meant the complete surrender of the enemy and thus the end to any threat he might pose. Such a goal is meaningless in the context of terrorism, because it is a tactic that can be used by small cells or even isolated extremists who require only limited resources to do their work. Ultimately terrorism is a problem that cannot be eliminated but only managed. For some time to come, the United States will be the target of extreme Islamic terrorist groups, and if and when they subside, there may be others who turn to terrorism. Every death is tragic, but we may have to learn to tolerate a certain amount of loss. Surely this does not mean being callous about the lives of men, women, and children, but rather being resolute in continuing on course in the face of terrorist attacks.

Turning victory into success is no simple matter. Continued combat and casualties in Iraq demonstrate that we did not prepare for the kind of resistance we would face after the destruction of Saddam Hussein's army. This failure was not one of force, but of conception. We won the war we wanted but risk losing the reality we did not foresee. At some level—military, political, or both—we became captives of our inertia, dupes of our desires, and victims of our expectations. To get it right—if that is still a possibility—we have to realize that we thought it wrong.

Notes

1. John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*, 2d ed. (Boulder, CO: 2004). The first edition appeared in hardback in 2003.
2. For the story of the famous line by chaplain Howell Forgy, aboard the U.S.S. *New Orleans*, see <http://my.execpc.com/~dschaaf/praise.html>.
3. See Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security*, 17, no. 3 (winter 1992-93): 59-90.
4. Darley in Mark Danner, "Delusions in Baghdad," *New York Review of Books*, (December 2003): 92.
5. Ibid.
6. George Carlin routine available on the Internet at <http://snltranscripts.jt.org/75/75acarlin2.phtml>.
7. If one doubts how often this line is used, do a search on the internet and see how many hits come up. It is almost certainly the most commonly voiced criticism of military planning.
8. *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: 2004), 339-48.
9. Tom Clancy, with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and Tony Koltz, *Battle Ready* (New York: 2004), 424.
10. Address at the forum, "How Do We Overhaul the Nation's Defense to Win the Next War?" held at the Crystal Gateway Marriott, Arlington, Virginia, 4 September 2003. Transcript available at <http://www.mca-usniforum2003.org/forum03zinni.htm>.
11. Westmoreland quoted in Max Boot, Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, on the web at <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Boot/boot-con1.html>.
12. Sunil Dasgupta, "Internal Security and Military Organization: The Rise of Paramilitaries in Developing Societies." Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2000.

Kagan/Lynn Question and Answer Session

Question: Your proposal seems to hinge on changing the military's way of thinking. Most military personnel are concrete, sequential-type thinkers. You're proposing more of a random, analytical way of thinking and adaptation. That would require a major change in thinking and training. What are your proposals for doing that?

Answer Kagan: I'm very excited that you asked that question because it was actually something that I wanted to get to, but I ran out of time. I think that's an overgeneralization. I've met officers who are sequential thinkers, and I've met officers who are incredibly complex, chaotic thinkers. There are lots of different people in the military. But we do have a cultural bias and a cultural stereotype toward linear, sequential thinking, and I am part of the problem here in a certain sense. At least my institution is a big part of the problem. Because, if you come to West Point, we will beat into you the engineering mind-set, and we will beat into you linear, rational, logical, sequential thinking until your ears are falling off your head. And we'll do it for four years. I think we need to change that. I think we've made some moves in the direction of changing that, but I think they're woefully inadequate. I look at the Mil Art (Military Art) course, which now talks almost exclusively about war and operational military history. (You can tell, obviously, I'm not speaking on behalf of West Point right now.) I have been fighting for 10 years to try to incorporate more political history and political background and international relations in that course, and I'm failing. As long as I continue to fail, we will continue to turn out generations of cadets who believe that Mil Art is all about warfighting and that politics is what other people do. As long as we continue to have a curriculum that is very heavily weighted toward, not science, because science isn't necessarily the problem, but toward hard quantitative physical-engineering sciences, we're going to continue to reinforce that mind-set. I continue to be horrified every day that there is no biology department at West Point. In my opinion, we should be studying biology. We should be rethinking the way we think abouts education in the country, but especially in the Armed Forces. In other words, I think there are a whole host of things that we could do at every educational level that could help us break out of this cultural mind-set. It's going to take 30 years and more. If we got it perfect today, it would take 30 years and more before we had general officers running around who were thinking in the way we wanted them to on a regular basis. But I think this is primarily an educational problem. And I think we can take steps to solve it.

Answer Lynn: I know you guys in this room often say that an Army fights the way it trains, but I believe an Army trains the way it thinks. To say the problem is insoluble or imply that it's insoluble is a really pessimistic thing here. Because if

you don't change the way you think, you're just going to keep on doing the same damn thing. The fact is that the military officers I tend to run into are really impressive men and women, and I don't put it beyond them to look at the facts and think about it and come to new conclusions. But I really do think it is a huge task. And again, I don't think it's just a military one. In the most immediate sense, sure. But you know, the military doesn't elect the president. The American population elects the president. And corporations help out. And you can't just work on the military view of . . . one of the reasons why I think [General Anthony] Zinni [USMC, Retired] has a real big role here, he isn't just speaking to the military. He's speaking way beyond that audience.

Question: Dr. Kagan, this is first for you. You addressed five points that need to be changed. Things we need to change culturally. Doesn't operational art and the nine elements of operational design out of Field Manual (FM) 3.0 or the 14 out of Joint Publication 5.02 do just that? Isn't it more of a problem of application and education than it is of changing these things? My perspective is that's what the elements of operational design do.

Answer Kagan: Well, over the years, I've had the opportunity to watch the development of FM 100-5 and then into FM 3-0 and watched the change in its verbiage, watched it have an extremely trivial impact on how the Army actually does anything, which I think is very unfortunate. I do think there is a lot of good stuff being written in the doctrinal community. I think it's going to be very important to operationalize it and to get it into the planning staffs and the execution staffs so that it actually has an impact. I agree with you that some of the intellectual groundwork is being laid for this. I think the problem is that we still have a cultural block against simply saying that in war the political goals are preeminent, they are always preeminent, they can never be placed behind specific military operational goals. Because to do that means you are elevating the simple defeat of the enemy to a position of prominence beyond achieving political goals. We can write that in doctrine from now until Armageddon (although it's not now written in doctrine, at least not that I've seen). We can write that in doctrine all we want to. But we have to attack the cultural bias that says, "That's not our job. This is not what we do. This is what we have the State Department for." And above all, I think it's worth taking this on directly. Why do we all rebel at this—or some of us rebel at this? Because when people are fighting, lives are on the line. As soon as lives are on the line, our natural humane and human and morally right reaction is to say that there's nothing more important than protecting those lives. There's nothing more important than designing operations that will achieve their goal at minimum cost to the lives of our soldiers. In a certain sense that's true, but in a certain sense we have to recognize that it's false. Because if we minimize casualties and fail to achieve the objective, the political goal, then all of those casualties were in vain, which I find a

morally less defensible position. But I think this is a cultural block and an emotional block that we're going to have to get over as an institution if we're going to be able to think and act well to ensure that everything we do is aimed at achieving the political objective of military operations.

Question: I was at a conference talking about military ethics one time, and I was getting beat up by a bunch of civilian educators about how we taught ethics at West Point. And Bart Bernstein stood up in the back and said, "You know, you're asking the wrong guy this question. You should be asking 'What are they teaching you about military ethics at Harvard Business School and Yale Law School' because they are the people making the decision whether we put people in harm's way." So as we talk about these views of war, and we talk about what the military can do better, my question for academia, especially for John Lynn who is in the middle of it, is how do we, in an environment where people aren't taking military history, they're not even taking diplomatic history at most schools, how do we get the civilian leadership we must answer to also to be knowledgeable of the very things we're talking about today?

Answer Lynn: You don't want to get me going on this. It's a very disturbing world. I look at the way history is taught in the United States right now at major campuses, and I'm terribly upset. I have this feeling like I'm holding the fort, and I would just have to hold it as long as I can. So my revenge is to never retire. I think things are crazy enough right now that they'll be self-adjusting somewhere down the road. But right now we're at a period where certain kinds of, for want of a better term, politically correct approaches to the past are absolutely dominant, terribly self-righteous, and gaining ground. But pretty soon, some bright, young pennies who are not 60 years-old and making their own career are going to say, "This is all bullshit, and we really have to stop this." But it isn't there yet. I think right now I'm more pessimistic than I've ever been about when we're going to get back to some sort of balance. The things being taught right now absolutely need to be taught. No doubt about it. It's a question of balance. It's gone way too much on the other side.

Answer Kagan: I agree entirely with John's pessimism. And I'm not at all convinced that there's going to be a corrective in any reasonable period of time. This is a major problem for the Army because it means that, on the whole, as you get to senior levels of civilian officials, you are talking to people who have no idea what war is. And it's a major crisis in a nation that is now talking about how we're a nation at war and going to be at war indefinitely. That's fine, but if the electorate has no comprehension of war, then how are we going to choose leaders one way or the other? This is a major crisis in American democracy, in my opinion. What does it mean for you? It means that, in my opinion, the onus on the military to help

educate America's political leadership in every way possible, not about I want you to do this policy or I want you to do that policy, but about this is what war is, is greater than it ever has been. That means the senior military leaders have to be interacting with their civilian colleagues in a way that is not simply partisan—this is what I want—but is also helping them gently to understand what's going on, which I recognize, with many civilian leaders, can be almost impossible. About like if the civilian leaders started trying to educate generals about what diplomacy is all about. But, that is something we have to do. And I would suggest one of the ways that we can be more successful at that is, again, by embracing the terms within which the political debates are cast and avoiding at all costs allowing ourselves to be seen only as technical experts in the art of breaking shit and killing people. Because the more you do that, the more you allow yourselves to be portrayed, and the more you portray yourselves to yourselves, simply as technical experts in that art, the less effective you will be at helping your civilian counterparts understand the things they need to understand to make the right decisions.

Question: I have a comment and a question for Dr. Kagan. To follow up on the point you just made, I think it's a very good point in the sense that what we want is generalists, and one of the problems of professionalization, not just in the military but in our whole society, is that professionalization is specialization. If you're a doctor, you're not just a doctor. You're a gynecologist. Or you're a heart surgeon or something. If you're a heart surgeon, you only do heart surgery. You don't do anything else. This is a military, but also a societal-wide issue. In some ways, the 19th- and early 20th- century armies, which were less professional in some senses, might have been somewhat more flexible and adaptable for doing the types of things that you want to see them doing because that professionalism we have today was still in its infancy, comparatively. But that ties into another question, which has been touched upon by other folks.

While we're harping on the Army as an institution or the Department of Defense as an institution, the problems really are much broader than that, because the Army does not dictate policy. That is not its function. We have politicians who do policy. Our whole society from the start was based on a premise of separation of military and civil. We came from a background of not wishing to repeat the Cromwellian experience of the military taking over the state. The idea of a professional soldier doing anything in the civil realm in the 18th, 19th, and much of the 20th centuries—even though they quite often did do it—but if you went to the average person on the street and asked him, "Should the military be making policy on political matters?" he would have thought you were insane. The American public would not have stood for such a thing. Someone mentioned the School of Military Government and the reaction to that. It was seen as training militarists who would have control of policy. And all the civilian bureaucracies fought very much against

it because they, as they quite often do, failed in the early occupations of Africa and Europe. By default, the military took on that role, and that survived. But one of its legacies was that the School of Military Government pretty much focused on technicalities of military government and civil affairs. How do you repair a sewer system? How do you do infrastructure? The political aspects of that were stripped out because it was too politically sensitive.

The American public would not stand for that. American politicians would not stand for that. We saw the same thing in the 1960s. While John F. Kennedy liked to beat up on the Army and harp about how the Army needed to change and reorient to counterinsurgency, we found also that the civilian bureaucracies—the State Department, USAID, other agencies—were very resistant to those types of things, very resistant to the military having more of a say, more of an input into political matters, crossing into their bailiwicks. The military was reluctant to do this, but the civilians were not keen on it either. In fact, many of the problems that Kennedy pointed out were really problems system-wide in the government. He formed a special group (counterinsurgency), which was designed to pull the military, but it was also in a large part to beat the civilians over the head because they weren't following through. When they did a 1965 multi-agency study, government wide, of counterinsurgency in the government, they decided that the Army had done the most in creating doctrine, training institutions, disseminating information on counterinsurgency. The Marine Corps was second, and the Navy and Air Force, forget about it. And civilian agencies—State, USAID, etcetera—far behind. Virtually every officer who has been posted to command in a civil-military role, whether it was the Indian Wars, Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrection, the interventions in Russia, has been crying for political guidance, has been crying for something he could act on so he could know he could make those types of plans and act accordingly. But time and time again, politicians have refused to provide that guidance, either because they just want the flexibility to deal with things as they evolve, or they don't know themselves how they want to go about doing it. The type of guidance that you [Prof. Kagan] were trying to seek to make that Phase IV plan first and then plan the war back from that, well, it sounds like a wonderful ideal. My question really is how, in the realities of American society, culture, politics, and the system of government, are you ever going to create a system where you can get that type of guidance firm enough, clear enough, and supposedly non-changing enough—because if something changes during the context of the war, that whole political plan may change—how are you ever going to achieve that type of guidance?

Answer Kagan: I think that you're never going to achieve political guidance that is firm and unchanging about what is supposed to happen any more than if I asked you as a military officer to commit, in advance, to a plan for the entire campaign

that would be unchanging. Political objectives may well shift over the course of the conflict, and it is the duty of the military to change its plans and operations to support them. The goal should not be seeking a firm and unchanging political goal that allows the military subsequently to exclude political considerations from operations. The goal must be to see military operations as intimately interrelated with political objectives and political operations from start to finish. I recognize that there may be considerable resistance to the idea of military involvement in political decision making on the part of the political leadership itself. But the question is not so much trying to get the military more involved in political decision making. It is trying to get the military to include political considerations throughout its own military decision making.

Question: Dr. Kagan, my question concerns an interpretation you'd made of the measure of success we have had or have not had in Afghanistan. If I understood you correctly, you stated that we went in with a light footprint, and you stated that there was a relation between that and having subsequently lost control of the warlords that emerged. I wanted to offer a somewhat different interpretation, a historically based one, and get your reaction to it. That, as an additional objective, the United States was looking back at previous histories in the Third World, particularly in places such as Latin America, and that the intention in strengthening those warlords was to place in power individuals who would be hostile to the Taliban, to al Qaeda, and that, in the interest of placing them in power, we were willing to accept certain compromises between the type of Afghanistan they wanted and our idealized version that would repeat a pattern of supporting authoritarians and warlords in many other areas of the world well back into the 19th century. And if that interpretation is valid, then indeed would not a light footprint aimed at putting a new group of people in power, in fact, represent a rather decent coordination of military tactics with political objectives?

Answer Kagan: Well, it would have. I wasn't involved in the policy decisions and I haven't seen the memos, so I don't think either one of us can say definitively what the objectives were or weren't. Based on what's come out, it seems pretty clear to me that that absolutely was not the objective. There was a lot of concern being put out at the time—and people such as Bob Woodward have gone back and interviewed a lot of people about what they were talking about—seemed to have showed that there was no intention at all to fragment Afghanistan in this fashion or to establish independent warlords. On the contrary, the intention was very much to help Afghanistan form a unified, centralized state that would be stable, precisely because we were afraid, and rightly so, that if that didn't happen, it could continue to be used as a base for terrorists because of the terrain and a variety of other things. So I really do think there's some evidence to show that our objective was to create a stable, unified entity with its capital in Kabul. Going in with a light footprint

was one of the things that compromised that. Lack of planning was another. If our objective was to break Afghanistan up into a bunch of chaotic warlordships that are fighting one another and creating the conditions for terrorists to return if ever we leave, then we've succeeded brilliantly, but I can't imagine why we would ever have aimed at doing that.

Question: It occurred to me that what is needed at virtually every level of command are the skills and abilities of a Marshall and an Eisenhower. At some point in the process, the integration of military into political factors has to be accomplished. In the past, it was done at much higher levels of command, while most of the people within the Army, within the military, focused on the core competencies of their organization. But what we face now seems to be a situation where that integration has to take place at a much lower level, which means that much more of the force has to be effective at doing it. Part of the preparation of Eisenhower and MacArthur and Marshall, to be able to do that, was the fact that they spent a lot of time interfacing in the National Guard, in political affairs, dealing with these things. And they had an intellectual construct, Fox Conner and others, who provided them a framework to be these kind of people. But today there is a tendency for the Army to be inwardly focused rather than allowing this opportunity for interface with broader intellectual pursuits. How do you think it's possible that we can continue to bring expanded intellectual consideration to the lowest levels, captain, major, lieutenant colonel level of command?

Answer Kagan: I think you've put your finger on an incredibly important point. I would propose a radical solution of a different variety. Do we need to have State Department representatives on battalion staffs? I'm not sure that we don't. I think when you look at the sorts of issues that we are dealing with, I think we certainly need to push interagency interaction down to lower echelons, which would help with the problem of this interface. We do need to constantly be seeking out opportunities to have officers interfacing, and not only for the officer's benefit. It's also a way for the officers to help educate civilian colleagues at lower levels in the problems and techniques and issues of war. I think the more that we can do that, and the more we can find ways to do that at every level of an officer's career, the better we'll be. I think the point was made earlier about the problem of professionalization and the attack on generalism that comes as a force professionalizes. I'm really impressed by the number of capabilities we're increasingly saying all officers, all soldiers, need to have. We're way beyond the "strategic corporal." Now we're talking about every soldier as a civil affairs officer. On the other hand, Iraq also shows every soldier has to be a war fighter, has to be a warrior. There is no "rear area" in this war. So the transportation guys also need to be steely eyed killers. Do we need to rethink the branch structure? Do we need to rethink the way we do training and promotion? Do we need to be willing to reconsider fundamental ways the

organization is designed right now that tend to create and strengthen professional stovepipes, especially early on in an officer's career when an officer's mentality and mind-set is being formed? I think maybe we do. This isn't a 9/11 thing. This isn't something where the world has suddenly changed and now this is a problem. I think this was always a problem. I think current events bring it into high relief. And I really think we owe it to ourselves to be willing to ask questions and answer them honestly about to what extent the organization might need fundamental change, not because organizational change will solve the problem, but because we need to be creating leaders of the right variety with the right background and the right skill set and the right mind-set to prosper at various levels.

Question: Just a follow up to that last point. Your point of training in a variety of skills at a variety of different levels is well done. We might have to rethink the entire idea of the 20-year career, however, to pack all of that in one particular package. I mean, you have to be joint. You have to be combined. You have to learn this. You have to learn that. You need to have this ticket punched, that ticket punched. Well, there's not enough time to do everything and make you a skilled soldier/diplomat at the same time. So there needs to be some fundamental rethinking of every level of education from commissioning through to the end point, whatever that end state might be.

Answer Kagan: Absolutely, and we'll have to make sure there's a strong dose of reality and that we don't just list all the things and not pay attention to what kind of time is available, of course.

The Critical Role of Cultural Orientation

Edward L. Peck

I have been asked to speak on the subject of culture, and the title I have chosen is “The Shock of Foreign Cultures—Especially Yours.” Yours may seem as strange to them as theirs may seem to you. No surprise there, but think about cultures and subcultures for a second. In my terminology, they are the result of multiple inputs on groups of people over a period of time. You learn, in the home, the neighborhood, the military, the State Department, as an American, as an Ethiopian, whatever, how it is you’re supposed to behave.

Let’s just take religion. Religious beliefs will impact on the way you and your subculture see things. This is an important point to bear in mind. If there are 4,321 recognized religions in this world—and you should be aware that most, I think it’s about 86.213 percent, verbalized statistics are made up on the spot—if there are 4,321 recognized religions, then 4,320 of them are wrong. Because they can’t all be right, can they? Well, mine is and yours isn’t. Religion is going to make a difference.

How about history? Think about Iraq for just a moment. The British occupation ended in 1932, which means that there are living Iraqis who remember what an occupation is. And don’t forget that they were occupied for almost 400 years before that by the Turks. So they’ve been there; this has been done to them. When you talk about occupation to those folks, they know what you’re talking about. It’s part of their cultural history, which is why our president, a year ago, apologized for using the word “crusade” in talking about our activities in the Middle East. Out there they know what that is, even though it was 1,000 years ago. In the Crusades, as some of you may remember, the Christians came down from Europe and killed every Muslim and Jew they could lay their hands on, plus any Christians that weren’t Christian enough.

Now, the people of the Middle East have not forgotten. If you go down to Birmingham or Savannah, they will talk to you, very heatedly, about something they call the War of Northern Aggression. That was 150 years ago, but they have not forgotten it. And it has an impact on how they see things, because history, even though it didn’t happen to you personally, is one of the things that affects your view of things.

How about languages? The word *jihad* in Arabic means “struggle.” It does not mean holy war. You can call it holy war, but that’s not what the word means. How about the political system? Whether it’s a titular head, whether it’s a king, whether it’s a democracy. How about the economy and how you’re living?

How about such things as prejudice? Now, this is not a dirty word, you understand. It merely means making a decision before you have all the facts. Anyone guilty of that over the last 48 hours raise your hand. Prejudice is going to color how people see things. So will class structure, or the lack thereof. So will education, or the lack thereof. All of these things, and the family, and geography, affect how cultures interact—their attitudes, their values, their behavior. These things are terribly important when you go to really different cultures.

Cultural behavior is learned. Nobody teaches you this stuff. How come we all do the “V” for Victory this way? How come you don’t do it palm in? Because you learned to do it palm out. Winston Churchill brought us this gesture in World War II, and the reason he did it palm out is that, in the United Kingdom doing it palm in is an obscene gesture. You don’t need to know that; everybody does it the same way, and only that way. It’s a cultural thing.

My oldest son has lived in Tokyo for 20 years. He says, “It’s not my skin or eye color or face that makes me remember I’m a foreigner, Dad. It’s more that I will never, ever know when to bow, how deeply, or how many times.” There’s no book for that, you just know it. It’s learned and it’s unconscious. You grow up that way.

How many of you have been to Algeria? At birth, every Algerian male is taken to the maternal village, where his smile muscles are cut. Have you ever seen a smiling Algerian? They don’t smile.

Now, go down to Charleston, South Carolina, like I did a couple of months ago. I’m walking through the park there, a lovely, sunny day and all the kids from the College of Charleston are out playing Frisbee and soccer and all of that. I’m walking up the path, with two very striking young women coming toward me. They give me a big smile, and say a few nice words, and I think, “Wow, I’ve still got it.” Then I realized that in Charleston everybody smiles and speaks to everybody: black, white, young, old. On their license plates it says, “Smiling faces, Beautiful places.”

Those same two girls shouldn’t try that approach on the streets of New York City. One, it’s not going to work because no one’s going to make eye contact. But, if anybody does, they’re going to make assumptions about what those two girls are up to. It’s a cultural thing. It’s pervasive. Everybody does it like that. In Denmark, you smile, in Algeria, you don’t, but next door in Tunisia you do. Cultural behavior is pervasive, it’s accepted, and it’s slow to change.

A brief digression about change. In America, we believe that not only is change possible, but it is good. There are other cultures in this world where you don’t change things because God decreed them that way: “It is written.” If you’ve got a child with a clubfoot and you’re really religious, you don’t take the child to an

orthopedic surgeon because God gave him that foot. As you know, in Hinduism, if you live properly you come back in the next life as a Brahmin; if you don't, you come back as a dung beetle.

Change is not something everybody accepts as being great, as we do. It's not a question of right or wrong, it's a question of cultural perception. Culture reflects every aspect of group behavior, of what's important to that culture—their beliefs, their attitudes, their behavioral norms, their outlook, and their acceptance of both change and differences.

Now, the point of all this is not to say that one culture is good and another is bad, but when cultures come into contact with each other, there can be problems in communications and behavior. But if one culture is attempting to impose itself on another, the problems are magnified greatly.

Let's just talk briefly about cultural generalizations. Everybody eats. That is a universal function. Some people eat out of a group bowl. If you've never done that, it's quite an experience. Somebody in the dim light of a tent out in the desert hands you part of a sheep that you're quite certain you've never eaten before, and may never even have seen before.

Some people use a knife, fork, and spoon. Some use chopsticks or fingers. There is kosher for Jews, and *halal*, the same thing, but for Muslims. No meat, or no meat on Friday. Very hot spices in Thailand, or rotted fish in Norway. You get family style, adults first, fast food. Everyone should accept that people may eat differently, but they don't because the right way is their way.

You can only see 10 percent of a culture, the part that's visible. The problems, the potential problems, are in the 90 percent that you cannot see. You can see how people dress—a bikini, an *abayah*, a skullcap, whatever. You can see their gestures (which can be highly misleading), facial expressions, public behavior, leisure activities, and so much more. This is all visible, but you may not really understand what you see.

I was living in Baghdad when the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power. Shortly after that, we got this telegraphic CIA assessment that said specialists had been watching the Ayatollah on TV, and it was clear that he was dying and would not be around long enough to worry about. They knew this because they saw no changes in his facial expression and no noticeable body movement: he just sat there. But that's the way Ayatollahs behave, in a very calm and motionless manner, and if you don't know that you can leap to the conclusion that he's dying. Well, he may well have been, but that isn't how you tell. The folks making the report did not understand the cultural implications of being an Ayatollah.

How about Islamic headdress? Some women will wear the really severe covering, which looks like what nuns traditionally wear, and for the same reason: to cover all the hair. Islamic headdress can also be merely a scarf, a kerchief that looks very much like the babushka women wear in Russia, or Spain, or Argentina. It reflects how the wearer interprets what the Koran says.

You cannot see, for example, concepts of leadership. How a leader is expected to behave depends on the culture. Is he supposed to be exactly like you, or does he get all kinds of deference and respect because he is the leader? You can't have a real understanding of how a leader is expected to behave in a foreign culture. It can be significantly different from what we expect. How about the implications of history? I don't need to go into any details here, but if you're fooling with the Middle East, where almost every country has been colonized, several of them more than once, they have a different perspective.

How about the importance of family? In the US, T-shirts say, "Be kind to your children. They will select your retirement home." In some other societies, you care for your parents until they die in your arms. We don't do it that way here, but it is not a question of good or bad, right or wrong, it's just different. In the Middle East, for example, family is everything because of their cultural orientation. They do things for their extended family that Americans don't even consider to be useful, let alone important.

How about superior-subordinate relations? People understand, in their cultures, how that's supposed to be done, whether collegially or by a direct order. That's also personality driven, of course. But you cannot *see* how it is they're supposed to behave. I went once to hear the president of Algeria make a speech on a hillside, and saw that policemen kept the crowd back by using three-foot sticks with three-foot knotted leather thongs. They kept the pressure off the people standing in the front rows by smacking people in the rows farther back right across the face. You would not want to try that in societies that are not accustomed to that sort of thing.

How do you define justice? It depends. Should it be a slap on the wrist or 30 lashes? Do you cut off the head or use an electric chair? And what constitutes a really serious crime? You have no way of knowing, because you cannot see that part of a culture.

How about the work ethic? We always laugh because, in some parts of the world, people don't seem to be working as hard as Americans do. We'll come to some of that in just a moment. But you can't see it. What's the definition of achievement? In America, it's the big house on the hill, the big car, the swimming pool. Or is it inner peace and nirvana, or the love of your family? What constitutes being successful? Whatever it is, you cannot always see it.

Let's go back up to the approach to problem solving. How many of you have been in Thailand, where they all seek consensus? I have gone to Malaysia and to Thailand several times over the years, to teach courses for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs on Effective Multilateral Negotiations using detailed role-play scenarios.

In Kuala Lumpur it worked well, in part because the population is diverse; roughly 1/3 ethnic Chinese, 1/3 Indian, and 1/3 Malay. They are therefore good at role-playing and behave the way their instructions tell them to, so there is no way they can resolve the problems laid out in the game. (That's done on purpose, to make a point.) In Bangkok, where quiet, gentle people are all pretty much of the same ethnicity, they quietly work on the problems and resolve them without contentious debate or raised voices.

IBM set up a special school in Armonk, New York, brought in IBMers from all their various countries to train an international team that could go anywhere to work problems out. They had them engage in all sorts of team-building activities, and they discovered that it didn't work well because when they'd go to work on problems, culture kicked in: Brazilians, Americans, Swedes, and Germans would argue their positions, but Japanese and Thais would sit quietly, because in their cultures you don't behave that way.

Religious issues can be key determinants for behavior. Look at the role they're playing in American domestic—and foreign—politics right now. A number of the topics we perceive quite differently are basically religious questions.

How about appropriate behavior? There's a tough one. Queen Victoria's ambassador to Siam, going to the palace to present his credentials, was accompanied by the chief of protocol. They came around a corner of the road, and there, across the field, bathing in a stream, were a bunch of women with no clothing on. His excellency turned to the chief of protocol to ask if it wasn't considered rude for women to bathe naked in public. The reply was that it was considered rude to *look* at women who have taken off their clothes to bathe naked in public.

How about the handling of emotions? Is it okay to cry? Is it okay to scream? Is it okay to yell and shriek? You can't really tell what the person's feelings are unless you understand what the rules are in that culture for handling and displaying emotions.

How about competition versus cooperation? When I went to Officer Candidate School, just after World War II, there were a lot of veterans in the class. They told us rookies there were two ways to get through this school, eliminate or cooperate, and that we were going to cooperate. Some people don't see it like that and conclude that if they can get rid of another, they have a better chance.

How about the meaning of friendship? What does it really mean? How about such critical issues as rules for gender interaction? You don't know if it's really a foreign culture. I was part of the training team for a federalized National Guard brigade getting ready to go to Iraq. A number of officers who had been in Iraq were there to help prepare the new guys, and they repeatedly stressed the importance of never, never touching the women—unless you're a woman. Otherwise you leave indelible scars because you break key cultural taboos without even thinking about it.

If you've been there, you know that Brazilians prefer to stand closer to each other than Americans do. So you'll see people at parties slowly moving around the room, as the Brazilian tries to get closer and the American tries to get farther away. It's like a slow dance.

How about notions of modesty? Can you picture high school boys in Saudi Arabia saying, "Man, did you see the earlobe on that girl?" An earlobe, compared to what happens here. Which is more demeaning to a woman, to require her to cover herself completely or to put her photograph in a magazine in a position that's usually reserved for gynecologists? It's a question of culture.

How about status? You've got to understand that overseas, in other parts of the world, and even in some parts of our own country, these things make a real difference, and you can't *see* it. At the National Foreign Affairs Training Center two months ago, a young student came up to say that she had just been assigned to Baghdad. She asked what she would have to do to really understand the importance and relative standing of families and tribes there. I told her that was easy: all you have to do is be born and raised there. Otherwise, you're never going to know where to place a Brahimi or an Aduri. Age can give a person a great deal of status in a society, so it may not be a good idea to push old folks around.

These are issues about which you know nothing, really. Situations may arise in which you can make major, unfortunate mistakes without knowing any better. Culture controls perception. Your culture, without you necessarily even being aware of it, is what determines how you perceive things. And perception controls everything else. You know this. Everything you do in your life is based upon your perception of what is the right thing to do. It doesn't mean you're going to be right; you may be wrong. You can also be afraid, and you can be coerced. But perception determines what you will do.

Perception is how you choose a hairstyle, a car color, a necktie, a spouse. Somebody else comes along and asks why in the world you picked that necktie—or spouse. Their perception may be different from yours. But perception is reality; all you have to work with is what you perceive. That is largely a function of the culture in which you were born, in which you were raised, or in which you are working.

You know, verbal exchanges can cause problems, because there are different meanings in languages. You have misconceptions and/or false cognates. Those of you who speak Spanish know that the word *embarasada* means pregnant, not embarrassed. And you get unfortunate connections, when you turn to your Indian colleague and say, “Why that company is a real cash cow.” There are subjects that you just do not raise.

Here is the result of a very massive series of studies that were done by people who know far more about this business than I do. And they came up with five categories of issues to think about culturally.




Figure 1

The first one is Structure and Power in the culture, as seen in Figure 1. On the left, you have low dependence needs, inequality is minimized, and you don't need/want much structure. You can see where the United States fits. Hierarchy is useful in a military organization, for example. Superiors are accessible. People have equal rights, and you get change by evolution. Now, at the other end of the scale there are high dependence needs where inequality is accepted, and hierarchy is needed/wanted. One of the things the culture wants is somebody in charge who tells people what to do. Superiors are inaccessible. Power equals privilege. Change is done through revolution.

Here is a scale from low at left, high on the right. Look where the United States is in terms of these issues. Here's Iraq and there's Malaysia all the way to the right. There's a big difference in the way Americans as a cultural group perceive these

issues as compared to Iraqis—or Malaysians. They are far more comfortable with strict leadership than we are. They accept—this is all relative you understand—that power gives privilege. We accept it much less willingly. This is where cultural issues can become serious, for example, when it involves military actions and occupation.




Figure 2

Let's take a look at the very important second set of issues seen in Figure 2: Collectivism versus Individualism. On the left is collectivism, where people are "we" conscious. They value relationships over task completion. They're concerned about group obligations, so that you lose face and you're ashamed if you have failed to do something. On the right is Individualism, the "I" conscious. Guess where we fit? In our country, it's "I," and over there, in Thailand for example, it's "we." In the United States, private opinions are acceptable. And we have obligations to the self, to the individual. You lose self-respect, which is different from shame, if you fail. On the scale, there's Iraq and there's America, with major differences in how the two cultures perceive collectivism and individualism. It makes a difference in the way people behave and a big difference in the way they interact.

The third category, Task and Achievement (Figure 3), will interest you, I think. Quality of life and service are important to the people who are on the left side. They strive for consensus and work in order to live. Small and slow is good, and there is sympathy for the unfortunate. Men's and women's roles overlap. On the right side, task orientation and ambition to excel is the goal, and that's much more important than it is on the other side. You live in order to work. Big and fast

is good. Admiration for the achiever, men's and women's roles are separate. So here is the scale. You won't be surprised to see Japan out there at the right end. And Iraq and the United States are not that far apart in this particular category of orientation.




Figure 3

Uncertainty Avoidance is the fourth category (see Figure 4). This is a major cultural issue, folks. On the left, we see that hard work by itself is not necessarily a virtue in a situation in which people are fairly relaxed in terms of uncertainty avoidance. Emotions, you don't show much. You get a lot more passive expressions. Competition is good. They will accept dissent, and they are willing to take risks. Few rules are needed. On the right side, you've got an inner urge to work. You're prepared to show emotions. Conflict is considered threatening. You have a need for consensus. You try to avoid failure; you have a need for rules and laws. Once again, the United States and Iraq are not that far apart. Singapore is very low and Greece is at the high end. It's interesting, if you've been to those two countries, to keep this in mind when you deal with their people.

The fifth facet is Confucian Dynamism and is seen in Figure 5. They never completed this particular part of the study in the Arab world, but it's nonetheless interesting. On the left you have a belief in absolute truth, a pragmatic approach, and planning for the near term. You accept change and you expect results. You spend for today. On the other side, you've got many truths, traditionalism is more important than pragmatism, you plan long-term, stability is wanted, you persevere, and save for the future. And there is the scale.




Figure 4



Figure 5

The thing you might want to bear in mind, at this stage, is to understand that in every culture or subculture, its members believe strongly that theirs is the best one, the right one. When they have contact with other cultures, they still believe that theirs is the right one, the best one. And if they've had extensive contacts, they

know that theirs is the best one and the right one. And from time to time, they may undertake efforts to convince others, one way or another, that theirs is the right one. It's called ethnocentrism and merely means that people tend to see things that way because they're part of that culture.

Now, cultural awareness. You know, cultures may create differences. Some of these differences are really very critical. Some of them are discernible. You can see them, you're aware of them. Others you are unaware of, even though they may be significantly more important and meaningful. Some are predictable. Awareness helps to reduce or avoid problems and to increase benefits.

Now, let's talk a little about Iraq in general terms. The individual and the family are far more important there because they haven't had a nation for very long (see Figure 6). And it consists of significantly diverse ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, which have not developed yet the feeling of nationhood that we have here. But think back to the time when a man named Robert E. Lee said, "I am forced to give my sword to Virginia." That's the way it was here only 150 years ago. You fought for the state. And that's what the War of Northern Aggression was all about, in a sense. The idea of fighting for a state is probably a little less prominent today than it was in the days of the Civil War.




Figure 6

In this same category, it is useful to remember and consider the fact that the Koran, unlike the Bible, covers every aspect of life: social, cultural, political, and economic. Second, no one has ever welcomed an occupation. What's the difference

between a liberator and an occupier? It kind of depends on which side you're on. We are liberators, but some people in Iraq see us as occupiers. The difference is perception, strictly, only, always.



Figure 7

Perception is everything. If you lose sight of that, so much of what we want to do in the world, as individuals and as a nation, is going to become infinitely more difficult to accomplish. There is no requirement that you change a policy, or abandon a policy, or modify a policy. But the point is this: If you choose to pretend that other people may not have differing perceptions, or worse, if you choose to ignore that they clearly do, you are merely making it that much harder to get to wherever you're trying to go, that much harder to achieve your objective. Awareness of differing perceptions is something that isn't always as necessary within the culture as it is cross-culturally, especially when you're a liberator or occupier. We know without equivocation that our way is the best way, but other people may not agree. That does not make them right, but it helps explain what's going on.

In the mid 80s, I was the deputy director of the Reagan White House Cabinet Task Force on Terrorism. This was in the days of the Achille Lauro, TWA 847, the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Red Army Brigades, the Sendero Luminoso, all kinds of terrorism all around the world.

We met with Vice President George H. W. Bush, the task force chairman, to get our marching orders. He said we had carte blanche to go into every aspect of terrorism—except one: “Don't worry about causes.” You could feel the atmosphere

in that room change. And that is exactly where we are today.

Today we are told, endlessly, that they hate us because we have freedoms. I personally find that an insult to my intelligence. Why in the world would anybody hate us because we have freedoms? There are a lot of people out there who envy our successes, and some of them may resent our excesses. But nobody is going to kill and die for that. There are some people, however, who are prepared to consider killing or dying because, from their perception, we are responsible for their people dying and being killed, indirectly in Palestine for the last 50 years, and directly in Iraq for the last 14. And they don't like it. It doesn't make them right, but that's the problem. If you want to deal with terrorism you must, however painful, consider what some of the causes might be to determine whether or not something could or should be done. And our nation still refuses to do it.

In November 1990, after the United Nations passed the Iraq embargo resolution, President Bush said, "The embargo will remain in place until the people of Iraq get rid of Saddam Hussein." That's what it was for, to make life so intolerable for the Iraqi people that they would rise up against Saddam. Two problems with that. One is that they couldn't: marches on the palace in Baghdad are extremely short, and you're only around for one. Second, many people didn't want to because they considered Saddam to be an OK guy.

Think about this: No leader in the world has ever been as loved, admired, revered, and respected as he liked to think he was; no leader in the world has ever been as hated, despised, and detested as his enemies liked to think he was. Proof, the day before September 11th, President Bush had an approval rating of 54 percent. Twenty-four hours later it was at 96 percent. What had happened? When the nation is under attack, you rally behind the leader, even if you don't like him. And that didn't happen in Iraq? You bet your life it did.

Leslie Stahl went to Iraq with her 60 Minutes crew in May 1996, four months before the Oil for Food program went into effect, when the embargo was still total. One of the things the Iraqis could not import was chlorine, the vital ingredient in sewage treatment and water purification. In addition, we had destroyed the Baghdad power grid in 1991, rendering the sewage treatment plants and water purification plants inoperative, so raw sewage flowed directly into the Tigris and came right out again into the water distribution system.

And the people of Baghdad, in the millions, were drinking seriously contaminated water. A bad case of simple diarrhea can kill a child, but the children in Baghdad, suffering from massive gastro enteric infestations of a violent, virulent kind, were dying in droves. Stahl talks to British, UN, French, and American doctors, then

she comes back to New York and interviews American Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright.

Stahl then says, "We have heard that a half a million children have died. That's more children than died in Hiroshima. Is the price worth it?" Albright's answer, "I think this is a very hard choice. But the price, we think the price is worth it."

That's the coldest thing you ever heard in your life. The death of a half-million children is worth it. It is not a slip of the tongue, because she then goes on and explains why it's worth it. This interview was shown in this country once. But it has been shown overseas hundreds of times, especially in the Middle East. And if you've never seen it, then it's more difficult to understand why some people are unhappy with our policies. If you don't think that got some people pretty upset with us, then you don't understand human nature.

I went to El Salvador with two members of the Terrorism Task Force Working Group, where four Marine guards had been killed a couple of months before. We were standing across the street from the embassy, and the embassy's security officer said, "Ambassador Peck, gentlemen, the embassy you see there is invulnerable to an attack by anything less than a field army." I turned to the Navy SEAL, a captain, and I said, "Lou, your job is to get the American Ambassador, and we've just found out the embassy is invulnerable. What're you going to do now, big guy?" He said, "Gosh, I guess we'll have to wait until he comes out." And the Marine colonel said, "In the meantime, which way is the American school?"

You want to play games with terrorists, homegrown or otherwise? There's no way in the world you can totally defend yourself against them. What you need to consider is what we might be doing to generate this kind of problem. If there are such things, the question is whether you can or want to do something to fix it. If we choose to ignore the evidence that's laid out before us, or should be laid out before us, then we will be left facing the consequences.

Let me ask two questions, quickly. Peace and security, my definition, means that the parties to the dispute, whatever it is, are sufficiently satisfied with the resolution of that dispute and that any small groups which are not satisfied (and you can't please all of the people all of the time) are either marginalized or, at a minimum, not supported. Now, on the basis of that definition, raise your hand if you agree with me that the world in general, and the Middle East in particular, will be a better place when Israel and her neighbors are living in peace and security. OK, raise your hand again if you are of the opinion that the current policies of the Israeli government will lead that nation to peace and security among her neighbors. And there's the problem: you can't talk about this, despite the fact that everyone recognizes that you cannot get there from here. It's not going to work.

It distresses me when I hear people saying, “What we’re doing in Iraq is going to lead to a spread of democracy all over the region.” Yeah, unless you stop to think that there are two democracies actively at work in the Middle East, busily violating every precept of law and rule that they insist is important: the United States in Iraq and the Israelis in Palestine, with our extensive help. Our actions there are not going to leave people fully satisfied with the way we behave.

They don’t hate us; they hate our policies. In the same way, we bombed and killed Iraqis, not because we hated them but because we didn’t like Saddam’s policies. But America is not the problem: it’s not who we are that they reject, but what we do. And over there, we are doing a lot. That does not mean that we are wrong or evil. From our cultural perspective, from our government’s perspective, we’re doing the right thing. But that perception is not the same on the other side. This causes problems.

As the global hyperpower, we can do whatever we want, wherever we want to do it, and whenever. And we cannot be stopped, even if they work together. But there are small groups, and it doesn’t take many, who will look around for ways to make us sorry we did it. They have, and they can, and they are, and they will. And I hope I’m wrong. So, I’ll take questions.

Peck Question and Answer Session

Question: Mr. Ambassador, I would gather that one of the canards, one of the most recent canards, is that everything has changed since 9/11. The world isn't the same as it was. I would assume you would argue that, to the contrary, our perceptions of the world have changed. The shock of 9/11 has just changed our perceptions of the world. Is that accurate?

Answer: I think that certainly is part of it. You know, the horror of 9/11, the real horror of it, was that we could see it. December the 7th we saw afterward. So 9/11 went down, and the nation was justifiably horrified and shocked and stunned. And you look around for some way to strike back at the people you're going to go after. And the world changed largely because we decided it was going to.

I'm now stepping into the realm of politics, for which I apologize in advance. If you have ever read Program for a New American Century, the document written in the 90s by the people who now run the government, you know it says that with the demise of the Soviet Union, it's now time for us to run the world. Anyway, they all signed this document and are in positions of responsibility now. (By the way, it's on the web at NewAmericanCentury.org if you're interested in that kind of thing.)

And it says in there that you start the process in Iraq, which becomes the base from which we accomplish three objectives: control the flow of oil, guarantee Israel's security, and start a program of regime change throughout the region. Now that last part is guaranteed to generate respect and admiration by our friends in the Middle East. Regime change, right.

If we had contented ourselves with Afghanistan, the world would not have changed so dramatically. But you just invaded Iraq for no reasonable reason that anybody's been able to produce, and you're in there doing things to the Iraqis that they don't appreciate. I was on CNN a couple of months ago, and one of the moderators asked what I would do in Iraq. I said I would get out, and he said, "You can't get out. There would be chaos." I waited a moment and asked, "What do you have now? Chaos with us killing them and them killing us. Every day you stay it's going to get worse, because they're not going to accept it." How do I prove this to you? Northern Ireland. And they're all Christians up there. How long has that been going on? 200 years? Hey, you don't do it like this. It doesn't work, history shows you, without equivocation. Unless you kill them all.

Colonel [David] Hackworth (USA, Retired), writes good books, novels. He and I were on television once, and he said, only partially jesting, "The solution for Iraq is simple. Kill them all, make it a parking lot. Problem solved." I said, "Okay,

two conditions. One, you better make damn sure you've killed them all. Second, you better make absolutely certain you've killed everybody who is unhappy that you killed them all. Then your problem is solved, not before." You just cannot do it like that.

Question: Sir, in the past, and it seems in the present as well, Americans have conceived of nation building frequently in ethnocentric terms. I wondered if you could comment. Do you think it's possible for Americans to do nation building without ethnocentrism, and what might a nation building program. . .if it's possible to do. . .what might it look like?

Answer: Those are powerful, heavy questions. Let me see. I was down in Sarasota, Florida, talking to 600 people in the Institute of Lifelong Learning. Somebody asked, "In your opinion, how long will it be before Afghanistan has a fully functioning democratic government?" And I had one of those podium epiphanies. I said, "How many of you in this audience, you're all well-to-do, you're all retired, you're all educated people, how many of you are fully comfortable using a cell phone?" Fifteen hands went up, several of them slowly. I said, "Think about this. A cell phone is a piece of hardware which you can hold in your hand, and it comes with a beautifully detailed instruction book that tells you precisely how to make it work. But you're not comfortable using it because you're not used to it. People of my generation look at a cell phone with the same level of comprehension a squid looks at a nuclear submarine. When I use my cell phone, when I remember to take it with me—and remember to turn it on, I do it with my index finger, and my kids laugh because you're supposed to do it with your thumb.

Now, democracy is not a piece of hardware. There is no instruction book. It's psychological, it's historical, it's philosophical, it's experiential. How long will it be before the Afghans have a functioning democracy? It could be days. They don't even know what you're talking about. And further, here is a key point to consider: Who says that that's the best way to do things? Who says it's the only way to do things? Think about this. Democracy has become our nation's secular religion. We are prepared, if necessary, for conversion by the sword. You *will* be democratic.

Ladies, gentlemen, by definition, you cannot impose democracy. An imposed democracy is a dictatorship. You can't force people into a democracy. To think so is ethnocentrism carried to a high degree, in the sense that we *know* that democracy is the best way. It works for us, but that's *our* way. It doesn't mean that they have to go for this. And remember that, in Islam, the church is the state. The Koran covers all of this. So, when we come running in, pushing for separation of church and state, they say, "Whoa, whoa, God says this is the way it's supposed to be, and you're bringing us something that human beings have created. We'll take God's

way first.” So I think that this is massively ethnocentric.

We want the Palestinians, for example, to have new elections because we do not accept the guy they elected. On 24 June 2002, the President of the United States said the Palestinians have to have new elections and choose anybody they want, *except* Arafat. What kind of democracy is that? Can Saddam run in Iraq? Absolutely not.

We are dealing with issues that are so far beyond our canon, our experience, that it’s difficult to understand. Americans, unless you’re a Native American, you all came from somewhere else, and you left behind your village hatreds and memories. Americans don’t understand why people butcher each other for possession of some stony hillside with a couple of trees on it—because that was my great-great-great grandfather’s until his great-great-great grandfather took it away, and now we’re going to get it back. How can you tell the difference between a Bosnian and a Croatian or a Serb? They know, they can tell, because they live there.

Question: Mr. Ambassador, I’ve enjoyed your talk very much, and there’s a great deal you’ve said that I agree with, but there are a couple of points that are troubling me. One is that you’ve really implied rather strongly that the major causes of terrorism directed against the United States are our actions in the world. I have a little bit of a hard time fully accepting that, because having read a little bit, and I’m much less of an expert than you are I’m sure, but having read a little bit in the writings of Zawahiri and some of the things that Khomeini has written, these people were identifying us as the Great Satan and the seducer of the Muslims, and the epitome of all that is evil, and something that needs to be targeted and attacked. And, in Sayad Kudib’s case, long before we had anything like the sort of dramatic impact and footprint in the Middle East that we’ve had now. In Khomeini’s case, not primarily in response to the sorts of things you had been describing, but primarily, I think, in response to what we had been doing in Iran. I’m not going to hold that up as something that was extremely praiseworthy, but I am going to say that the situation seems to me a little bit more complicated than that we support Israel, and Israel does bad things to the Palestinians. We invade Iraq, therefore these guys don’t like us and otherwise it would be okay. Because there does seem to be a rather well developed strand of ideological thought that has played a powerful role in generating these terrorist movements against us and in supporting them as they continue. It’s not clear to me that that would go away if we simply stopped doing the things that they complain about. And a couple of things in there that bother me. First of all, the French, who have been steadfastly opposing us at every turn and attempting to mitigate our influence in the Middle East and generally supporting the Palestinians and not supporting the Israelis, nevertheless had two reporters taken hostage and threatened with beheading because they imposed a ban

on headscarves in France. And this leads me to the question, it may be that things that we do are going to bother these people, but can we really afford to allow their prejudices and desires to edit what we do in the world to such an extent, because after all, they are representative of a tiny fringe as well? That's the main question I want to pose to you, but I want to tack one other thing on. As a member of the project of the New American Century group that put that report together, I think you've simplified it a little bit; and I would also like to clarify that virtually none of the people in senior positions in the administration today played any significant role in the formation of that document. Some of them signed it, but virtually none of them played any important role, and virtually none of them, in fact, came to any of the meetings. So it is absolutely a myth. By the way, neither did they implement about 99 percent of the things that were proposed in that report. It is absolutely a myth that that report has been the blueprint that the neocon conspiracy took into Washington and that has guided all of our actions ever since.

Answer: You may be entirely correct. Three things, Dr. Kagan. Returning the compliment, I was very impressed with your presentations. And I was grossly oversimplifying. We only have a little bit of time here. If I had a whole college course, I could do a better job. And I'm trying to lay out some points. Let me start with something else. It is perfectly clear to me that there are in all kinds of groups—what's the medical phrase?—"nut cases" who are prepared to do nasty things to someone because of something that his group has done. This is in the field of religion, surely. The Iranians have some feeling that we may have had a hand in getting rid of the people and putting the shah back on the throne. And, yes, it turns out that we did. And the Iranians remember this. The Iranians remember the CIA's involvement in the overthrow of Mossadegh and putting the shah in power and why we did that. It was because of oil . . . they say. So they remember this.

I was on NBC with Tom Brokaw one night, and he said to me, "Why would the Iraqis launch this unprovoked scud-missile attack on Israel?" And I said, "Well, whatever else it may be, it is not unprovoked." He said, "What do you mean?" I said, "Well, 10 years ago, Israel bombed the reactor in Baghdad. Now, we may have forgotten about that, but the Iraqis haven't. Because it happened to them. I'm not justifying it. You can call it retaliation, but it's not unprovoked because they were already bombed. And Americans have forgotten about this.

So, if you look at the Middle East, where we have been propping up harsh regimes, where we have been participating in the suppression of an occupied people in Palestine, providing the arms and the money, they don't like that. And their reaction is, why are those people doing that to our people?

Nobody's attacking Ecuador, as far as I'm aware. People are not launching

bombs on Australia. But the Americans are out there doing things, directly and indirectly, to the residents that those residents perceive as being hostile. And maybe even hostile to their religion. You know, a person who wraps himself in the flag of Islam and goes and blows himself up is violating Islam, if you've read the Koran. But, we are on the verge, I'm afraid, of making this into a religious war. And if you do that, and you bear in mind that there are a billion and a half Muslims in this world, things do not bode well for peace, harmony, justice, and the growth of free trade and free-market economies.

Question: I wonder if there's a phony dichotomy between who we are and what we do. Because at the point where people take up arms against you and become suicide bombers, they have been committed to a position that isn't going to be changed by reform. The only thing that's going to change them is elimination. But there will continue to be people recruited into that, in the long run, if there are not reforms. Consequently, you have to have a long-term policy of reform, a short-term policy of restraint toward these populations, and then a focused ruthlessness on those who are attacking you. I don't see any other alternative than that. People who are that committed do, indeed, hate you for who you are. It has become an issue of their form or their distortion of Islam. It's there in the writings. I don't know how you deny that. On the other hand, how in the world can you turn off the spigot that turns out these people without the kinds of reforms that you're talking about and that I particularly would feel are essential.

Answer: Not too long ago, this Palestinian woman blew herself up in one of the little seaside cities in Israel. She blew herself up. She was a lawyer. The people in Jenin told us about her. She lost her husband and her brother in the Israeli incursion. They were killed. Six or seven weeks afterward, her aged father, who lived with her, had a heart attack, and he died at the checkpoint as she tried to get out of the city to the hospital. Because the people wouldn't let her through. I've got to tell you, if you had to go through those checkpoints several times a day, you'd be a little steamed. But this woman lost it all. Essentially she said, "You're going to die for this." And she didn't attack the people who did this to her; she attacked the people she could get to, which is what folks do in this kind of business.

I do not want anything bad to happen to the state of Israel. I don't want bad things to happen to us, but I think they will. That's part of it. So if you look carefully at the situation, you might decide that, well, maybe we shouldn't be doing this. But if you don't want to look at the issues, then you can't even consider the question of continuing or changing a policy.

In the Middle East, they see us as hostile and they have proof of it all through the area—now in Iraq and in Palestine. That's going to motivate some people to

become aberrational—that’s the word we’d have to use. These people are worthy of being gotten rid of, if you can figure out who they are beforehand. But you can’t.

Question: I’d like to compliment you on most of what you’ve said today. I think the emphasis on cultural differences is extremely valuable. But I think it needs a couple of caveats. I’ve always held as a principle that facts never speak for themselves. There’s always a ventriloquist. And, in part, we see, especially in an age of media-driven demagoguery, that certain aspects of culture can be emphasized. Milosevic was one of the prime examples. You had very considerable intermarriage among Serbs, Croatians, Bosnians, Muslims, Christians within Bosnia, et cetera. You had a society that was moving in one direction, and Milosevic playing on one part of the culture helped to push it very hard in another direction. Let me suggest, also, that our own experience in the American south, things that were seen as immutable in American southern culture vanished within an amazingly short time, in part thanks to political leadership, in part thanks to media, in part thanks to education, in part thanks simply to the pressures of cold reality. So I think one of our real tasks is to almost understand the prayer of St. Francis, to know what cannot be changed, but also to know what can be changed, and how to do it.

Answer: I agree with you totally, sir. Yet, there are some people who are die-hards who don’t let go. That’s why this idea of let’s find these people and take them out . . . Who are they? Some of them are just growing up. You remember what one Serb said when they accused him of killing all these little Croatians in Bosnia. He said, “Kill them when they’re young. It’s much easier. They don’t get a chance to grow up.” This is bloody stuff. Americans have a hard time understanding it. How can they possibly feel that way? They do, and they’re driven by things which may not even be anything more than class hatred or ethnic hatred. We, on the other hand, are doing physically measurable, discernible things, which I do not think are in our interests.

In closing, I do suggest that the cultural differences I started with are so vast, and so profound, and so serious that you ignore them at your peril. Now, some of you guys in uniform are still doing what I used to do. I enjoyed that trip very much. My years in the Army and my years in the civilian service of my country. I envy you your opportunities to go on down this path. I’ve already completed the trip. Enjoy it. Thank you very much for your attention.

Leonard Wood, John J. Pershing, and Pacifying the Moros in the Philippines: Americans in a Muslim Land

Charles A. Byler

As Americans are now learning in Iraq, the military occupation of another land can be an extremely difficult task, especially when significant religious and cultural differences exist between the occupiers and the local population. Such was the case a century ago when the United States made its first attempt to govern a large Muslim population. The Muslims in question—known as the Moros—resided in the southern Philippines, which the United States had won from Spain following the Spanish-American War. Between 1899 and 1913, the US Army had the assignment of establishing American control over the area. The army had considerable success in reducing the Moros' resistance to that control as a result of an approach that combined a "policy of attraction," designed to persuade the Moros of the advantages of US rule, with a readiness to use force against those who defied American authority.

The American officials most responsible for the success were two of the Army's rising stars—Generals Leonard Wood and John J. Pershing. Both held the position of governor of the Moro Province, Wood from 1903 to 1906 and Pershing from 1909 to 1913. An examination of the records of the two governors reveals some noteworthy similarities in how they went about the tasks of pacifying the area and encouraging its economic and political development. Both men, for instance, thought the Moros incapable of self-rule but recognized the necessity of using Moro leaders as instruments of the provincial government's authority. Aware of the US government's desire to avoid violent clashes in the Philippines, both usually relied first on diplomacy to resolve disputes with the Moros, yet both also believed that the Moros would respond to diplomatic overtures only if the Army demonstrated its willingness to use its superior military power against them. The experience of both governors also shows that Moro resistance became extensive only after the provincial government imposed changes that the Moros perceived as threats to their way of life—for example, Wood's decision to abolish the traditional system of laws and Pershing's efforts to disarm the population.

There were also important differences in how the two men handled their assignment. Lacking Pershing's patience and his respect for the Moros, Wood was more likely to push aggressively for the transformation of Moro practices and to respond with force when the Moros resisted. Pershing, in contrast, became a student of Moro culture and was more inclined to follow the path of persuasion and conciliation in his dealings with them. Partly as a consequence of this method, Pershing had fewer violent clashes with the Moros during his time as governor

than did Wood. In fact, Pershing's period in office might have passed without much bloodshed at all had he not departed from his usual course of patience and gradualism in pursuing the disarmament of the Moros.

When the United States acquired the southern Philippines following its victory over the Spanish in 1898, it assumed sovereignty for the first time in its history over a significant Muslim population. The Moros made up most of the population of the Sulu Archipelago and the southern half of the large island of Mindanao. They belonged to 13 different cultural-linguistic groups, but their Islamic beliefs gave them a sense of common identity and a history of conflict with Christian Filipinos to the north. As the Spanish had discovered over centuries of warfare with them, the Moros were fierce fighters. Moro culture emphasized the warrior virtues of honor and courage, and many Moros preferred to fight to the death rather than submit to the enemy. Despite numerous military campaigns in the southern Philippines, the Spanish had never achieved much more than nominal control over them.¹

When American soldiers first arrived in the southern Philippines in the spring of 1899, the United States was embroiled in fighting Filipino nationalists in the northern islands. Told by the War Department to do all they could to keep the southern Philippines quiet, American commanders in the Moro lands faced the challenge of trying to establish American sovereignty without the kind of assertion of authority that might provoke the Moros into armed resistance. As a consequence, the commanders generally kept American soldiers in their posts and relied on the *datus*—hereditary Moro chieftains—to maintain order. Under the Bates Agreement of 1899, the Sultan of Sulu had governing authority in the Sulu Archipelago in return for his recognition of American sovereignty.²

This system of indirect American rule proved satisfactory in some respects. The Moros generally accepted the American presence, especially after US officials made it clear they had no intention of interfering with the practice of Islam. Fighting between the Moros and American troops rarely occurred; one volunteer regiment that had been stationed for over a year on Mindanao returned to the United States in 1901 without having fired a shot in battle.³

Indirect rule had its frustrations, however. US officials were irritated by the continual fighting among groups of Moros and by Moro attacks on non-Moros, including American soldiers on occasion. Army officers condemned as ineffectual the efforts of local leaders, the Sultan of Sulu in particular, to halt the violence. In addition, the practice of slavery among the Moros rankled many of the officers and proved to be a source of embarrassment for the government in the United States, where anti-imperialist critics attacked the McKinley administration for permitting its continuation in the Philippines.⁴

For those US officials who were determined to remake the Philippines along American lines, the Moros presented a frustrating obstacle. Such Americans found it increasingly difficult to agree with the notion that Moro culture should remain untouched and that the responsibility for day-to-day government should stay in the hands of Moro leaders. An officer's catalog of the undesirable characteristics of the "strange and fanatical" Moros represented the negative views of many Americans in the region: "[The Moro] is a polygamist, has no moral sense, is tyrannical, vain, fond of show . . . treacherous, and for his religion commits the worst of crimes—murder—with no compunction." Influenced by the prevailing ideas regarding racial hierarchies, inherited character traits, and Anglo-Saxon superiority, many soldiers were loath to deal with people that they held in such disdain. The idea of Moro fanaticism, a characteristic the Americans often associated with Islam, made many officers skeptical that diplomatic efforts would accomplish much. They grew impatient with tedious negotiations with Moro leaders, a type of work many officers were unprepared for by training and unsuited for by temperament. "The Moro is a great talker," complained one officer, "practically nothing of consequence can be obtained from him in conference, and the less of him the better." Another officer noted in his diary that a week of negotiations had severely tried his patience. "Have wrangled with Moros about stolen rifles and pistols until I am ready to kill them," he wrote.⁵

By 1903 the United States had decided to abandon the system of indirect rule. With the end of major fighting between Americans and Filipino nationalists, more troops were available to help establish direct control over the Moros. The government created the Moro Province and, anticipating the necessity of military action against recalcitrant Moros, decided that the position of governor should be reserved for a high-ranking army officer. Although officially acting under the direction of the Philippines Commission, the governor would have considerable independence. As the chief civil and military authority in the province, he would supervise the district governors and other civil officials as well as command all US forces there. Since most of the appointments to important civil government positions went to army officers, the responsibility for running the new province rested almost entirely with the Army.⁶

To fill the governor's seat and oversee the challenging task of instituting direct rule, President Theodore Roosevelt chose a good friend, Major General Leonard Wood. Already well known in the United States as the former commander of the Rough Riders and the military governor of American-occupied Cuba, Wood brought to the job abundant energy, excellent political connections, and an enthusiasm for reform. He also brought a desire for quick results—he anticipated that he would only be in the province briefly before moving up to command the Army's Philippine Division. Wood planned to use a combination of diplomacy and coercion in his

dealings with the Moros. Although he was willing to talk with Moro leaders and urged his subordinates to do the same, he believed that the Americans had to prove their readiness to impose their will through force. He anticipated that a single decisive blow would be enough to convince the Moros to submit. "I think that one clean-cut lesson will be quite sufficient for them," he wrote to President Roosevelt, "but it should be of such a character as not to need a dozen frittering repetitions."⁷

Under Wood's guidance the new order took shape. Although the Americans assumed more responsibility for governance, Wood recognized that on the local level the United States would have to continue to exercise its authority through the *datus*. Eventually he formulated a system of appointed "headmen," most of whom were *datus* loyal to the government. Wood also worked to develop policies intended to promote the "benevolent assimilation" that President William McKinley had earlier announced as the central goal of the United States in the Philippines. By taking steps to expand commerce, increase education, and improve public health, Wood hoped to show Moros the benefits that the provincial government could provide and thereby win support for American rule. Wood's government accelerated the building of roads, port facilities, and schools, established cooperative markets, and instigated campaigns to improve sanitation and reduce disease.⁸

Those actions caused little controversy, but many Moros were disturbed by Wood's efforts to alter aspects of Moro culture that he and other American officials considered deleterious to the preservation of morality and order. Wood's passion for reform—a characteristic he had shown in Cuba and would later exhibit as the Army's chief of staff—made him impatient to launch his program of cultural transformation. His most notable reform was the new law banning slavery in the province. At Wood's urging, the province's legislative council (a body made up almost entirely of American officials) passed the law shortly after his arrival. Wood also moved quickly to discard the traditional Moro legal code in favor of a new set of laws closer to the American model. To help pay for the new court system as well as the internal improvements he had initiated, he restored the *cedula*, an unpopular Spanish-era tax on all adult males in the province.⁹

In the case of each of those reforms, some of Wood's subordinates advised against taking action until the Moros had gained more confidence in American rule, but Wood wanted to move ahead. Although he expected that many Moros would object to the measures, he hoped to avoid stirring resistance by implementing the laws only gradually. Here he miscalculated. Regardless of his intention to move slowly in enforcing the new laws, word of their existence spread rapidly, and Moro leaders reacted with anger. Since the elimination of slavery and the traditional legal code struck directly at the power of the *datus*, some of them decided to take-up arms against the Americans. Some Moros chose to resist for religious

reasons—despite the assurances of Wood and other officials, they feared that the Americans would eventually demand their conversion to Christianity. The *cedula* intensified that concern because many Moros viewed it as a form of tribute to a non-Islamic government.¹⁰

Wood might have faced less of an uproar if he had done more to educate the Moros about the changes he desired before enacting legislation. For instance, he might have consulted more closely with Moro leaders about revisions to the legal code rather than simply announcing its replacement. A major campaign to encourage the Moros to emancipate slaves voluntarily in return for compensation would not have ended slavery, but such an effort might have made the Moros more accepting of an eventual anti-slavery law.

The Moros' armed resistance took several forms. Some Moros, especially on heavily forested Mindanao, practiced guerrilla warfare. They raided American encampments for weapons and set ambushes on jungle trails. From the American standpoint, the most unnerving form of Moro resistance was the *juramentado*, a Spanish term for a devout Moro who had taken an oath to carry out a suicidal attack on non-Muslims. A *juramentado* would seek to reach paradise by slaying as many nonbelievers as possible before being killed himself. Although such attacks were not common, they happened often enough to keep the Americans on edge. Usually, however, Moro resistance was more defensive in nature. Resisting Moros would enter a fortification known as a *cotta*—a structure constructed of logs, earth, and stone—and hope that the strength of their position would discourage their enemies from attacking.¹¹

The Moros faced some definite disadvantages in confronting the Americans. For one, their weapons were far inferior to those used by the US soldiers. Although some Moros had managed to obtain American or Spanish rifles, more typically Moros armed themselves with swords and spears, weapons that were effective only at close range. Even more troublesome for the Moros was the fragmented nature of their resistance. They were divided into tribal groups such as the Tausug or the Marannao, each with its own language and customs, and further divided into the multitudes of clan-based groups headed by the *datus*. These leaders were frequently at war with one another, and no Moro leader emerged to unite the factions and provide overall direction to the fight against the US forces. As they had in earlier wars against the American Indians, Army officers used long-standing hostilities among the Moro groups to their advantage. In going to war against a *datu*, the Americans often received help from other *datus* eager to bring about the downfall of a rival.¹²

Wood soon took to the field to direct American forces against obstinate Moros.

He led major expeditions on the island of Jolo in 1903 and into the Taraca River area of Mindanao in 1904. Drawing upon the army's experiences in fighting Indians and Filipino nationalists, Wood's troops developed some effective tactics. Since the Moros usually avoided tangling with large columns of American soldiers, the Army learned to send out smaller patrols designed to lure the Moros into combat. The soldiers then used their superior firepower to shoot down the Moros before they could draw close enough to use their swords and spears. One officer described how the Americans, well supplied with ammunition, "developed" the enemy by firing freely into brush that could conceal Moro fighters. The Americans used mountain howitzers to bombard the cottas of hostile leaders. On occasion the artillery barrages caused the Moros to flee from their strongholds. More often the Moros stayed put in hopes of surviving the attack, but the artillery blasted holes in the cotta walls and inflicted casualties on the defenders, thereby making the cotta easier to assault with infantry. The American advantage in firepower produced lopsided casualty rates on the two sides. In the campaign on Jolo, for example, the Americans had only 17 dead and wounded compared with Moro losses of at least 500.¹³

As one Army officer noted, Wood went after the Moros "with a rough hand." His troops killed hundreds of Moros and burned their houses and crops. Wood's comments on the Taraca campaign in his diary reflected his approach. Since the Moros of that area had been intractable for generations, he observed, he had "decided to go thoroughly over the whole valley, destroying all warlike supplies, and dispersing and destroying every hostile force, and also to destroy every cota [sic] where there is the slightest resistance." As those comments suggested, Wood cast a wide net in his campaign against resisting Moros. He directed his forces to attack not just offending leaders but their followers as well, and not just Moro outlaws but the communities that harbored them. "When a crime is committed," he wrote, "the offender must be surrendered or the punishment must be promptly applied."¹⁴

Wood and other officers expressed satisfaction with the results of these campaigns. "It has been a very busy day's work and I think has given the Moros a very wholesome lesson," Wood remarked after a day in which his command had killed around 150 of them. In another officer's opinion, the punishment of one group of Moros had an intimidating influence on the others. He noted that groups that had formerly been "lukewarm and hostile" were now inclined to submit to the Americans. On Mindanao in particular, Wood's campaign effectively ended large scale resistance by the Moros.¹⁵

The punitive campaigns no doubt caused many Moros to abandon their struggle against American rule, but in some cases the campaigns may have actually undercut the pacification effort. Contrary to Wood's confident assertion in 1903

that “one clean-cut lesson” would suffice to quiet Moro opposition, the fighting continued. As one friendly *datu* noted in 1906, one uprising followed another during Wood’s time as governor:

After the fight with Hassan I thought there would be no more fighting in Jolo. After Hassan, Lakamasa Usap sprang up; when he was fought, I thought that would be a lesson; and after he was fought, Peruska Utig and Pala sprang up, and after they had been done away with the Dajo people sprang up.¹⁶

The death and destruction that Wood’s harsh campaigns produced may, in fact, have stimulated opposition from some Moros. The killing of women and children by the Americans, a result of the indiscriminate firing by the soldiers and the Moro practice of taking their entire families into the cottas when troops moved against them, angered many Moros. One rebellious Moro leader took-up arms against the Americans following the death of his daughter in an attack on a cotta. The punitive expeditions, which left in their wake people without homes or food and clans without leaders, contributed to the breakdown of the Moro social order in certain regions of the province.¹⁷

The gathering of hundreds of displaced, fearful, and angry Moros in the fortified crater of a dormant volcano known as Bud Dajo on Jolo indicated how Wood’s methods could help create the very disorder he wanted so badly to eliminate. Moros had fled to the mountain in 1905 following an attack by Wood on some nearby *datu*s and their followers. By early 1906 the original group of refugees inside the crater had been joined by other disaffected Moros. Some were there because their homes had been destroyed by the American attack, some because they feared the soldiers, some because they wanted to escape the authority of their *datu*s, and some because they had refused to pay the *cedula* and feared the consequences. American officials tried unsuccessfully over several months to persuade the Dajo Moros to return to their homes.¹⁸

At the Americans’ request, some prominent Jolo *datu*s ascended the mountain to demand that the resisting Moros leave, but the *datu*s’ commands were ignored. The *datu*s blamed this turn of events on American policies. As they pointed out, the imposition of a new legal code and the willingness of American officials to overturn the *datu*s’ judicial rulings had caused an erosion of the *datu*s’ authority over their own people. The new code had also ended the ability of the *datu*s to levy fines on their people—such fines had been a major source of the leaders’ wealth and power. The Bud Dajo episode revealed a contradiction in Wood’s policy regarding Moro leaders. On one hand, he believed that the preservation of order in the province required the United States to rely on the authority of the *datu*s. On

the other hand, he wanted to end many of the practices that gave the *datus* their prestige and strength. The reality was that Wood never fully accepted the notion of ruling through the indigenous leaders, especially since those leaders gained their positions through birth and, in Wood's view, used their powers arbitrarily. As Wood put it to a British friend, the British "are quite content to maintain Rajahs and Sultans and other species of royalty, but we, with our plain ideas of doing things, find these gentlemen outside of our scheme of government Our policy is to develop individualism among these people little by little, teach them to stand upon their own feet independent of petty chieftans."¹⁹

As the months passed with the Moros still living on Bud Dajo, the Americans became more concerned. Reports that some Moros were using the mountain as a base from which to steal cattle and commit other crimes heightened those concerns, but above all officials worried about the Dajo group's defiance of authority—both of the Americans and of the *datus*. They feared such defiance might be contagious. The danger, one officer warned, was that the people of Jolo might come to see the malcontents as "patriots and semi-liberators of the Moro people." Recently appointed commander of the Philippine Division and eager to depart for Manila, Wood decided to halt the negotiations and use force to remove the Moros. "This is a ridiculous little affair from every standpoint," he wrote to a subordinate, "and should be brought to an end." Rejecting the advice of a subordinate to take the intermediate step of besieging the crater, Wood ordered US troops to Bud Dajo with the purpose of "cleaning up the place." Wood was on hand to observe the assault on the fortified crater, an effort that lasted three days. At the cost of 15 dead, the American force eventually overran the fiercely defended Moro positions. In the aftermath the troops found over 600 dead Moros, including women and children.²⁰

To Wood's surprise, his conquest of Bud Dajo brought more excoriation than praise from Congress and the press. A newspaper correspondent in Manila had somehow learned that the death toll included a significant number of women and children and reported that in his dispatch. For the next several weeks, the battle became the subject of controversy in the United States. Anti-imperialists and Democratic opponents of the Roosevelt administration questioned the necessity of the attack and accused Wood and his soldiers of carrying out a ruthless slaughter. Some asked why Wood's report mentioned 600 dead Moros but none wounded—had the soldiers killed the wounded or left them to die?²¹ One member of the House mocked Wood with a satirical poem titled, after Tennyson, "The Charge of the Wood Brigade," part of which read:

Chased them from everywhere
Chased them all onward,
Into the crater of death

Drove them—six hundred!
‘Forward the Wood brigade;
Spare not a one,’ he said
‘Shoot all six hundred!’²²

The Roosevelt administration, no doubt fearing a repeat of the political storm that had followed the revelation four years earlier of atrocities by American soldiers in the war against Filipino nationalists, moved to dampen the outcry. Asked by Secretary of War William Howard Taft about the allegations of “wanton slaughter,” Wood defended himself vigorously. The soldiers had not intended to kill women and children, he argued, but the Moro women had been fighting alongside the men and were inevitably shot down in the confusion of battle. That assertion at least was corroborated by other participants in the fight, unlike his dubious claim that the children were killed because Moro warriors used them as shields. Despite the holes in Wood’s case, he weathered the crisis. President Roosevelt and the Republican press had given him solid support, and strong public interest in the matter never developed. As Asians, Muslims, and practitioners of slavery, the Moros were not natural subjects of American sympathies, and many in the United States had grown tired of issues regarding the Philippines. Wood moved on to command the Philippine Division and then to serve as the Army’s chief of staff.²³

Wood’s successor as governor of the Moro Province, Brigadier General Tasker Bliss, experienced far less resistance from the Moros than had Wood. In part this was because Wood’s aggressive actions had already eliminated those Moros who were most likely to revolt. Bliss’s policies also contributed to the more peaceful condition, however. He stopped Wood’s practice of using punitive expeditions against communities in favor of a policy that emphasized the punishment of individual wrongdoers. “Our effort is to make the natives understand that when one or several of their number commits an outrage,” he stated, “we do not seek revenge by harassing the whole countryside, but that we will go after the culprits alone and the other people will not suffer.” Bliss also acted to reduce the potential for clashes between Moros and American soldiers. He complained of overly belligerent officers, including one whose “disposition seemed to be to kill a Moro on sight.” A partial solution to the problem, Bliss believed, was to use native troops—members of the Philippine Constabulary and the army’s Philippine Scouts—to do most of the patrolling and arresting. Bliss kept the American soldiers, whose relations with the Moros were so fraught with fear and cultural misunderstanding, on posts near the towns as a reserve force. Under Bliss the fighting between Moros and Americans diminished noticeably. “The Moros as a rule are quiet and peaceful because we interfere with them to the least possible degree,” Bliss reported to his commander, General Wood. Wood, however, was not overly impressed with Bliss’s performance

as governor and privately criticized him for being too passive.²⁴

In 1909 Bliss was replaced by a veteran of Moro affairs, Brigadier General John J. Pershing. Between 1899 and 1903 Pershing, then a captain, had served on Mindanao and developed there an impressive reputation for dealing effectively with the Moros. Unlike most of his fellow officers, he had a strong interest in Moro culture and worked assiduously to learn about it. According to an Army colleague, Pershing put his knowledge of the Moros to good use—“By associating with them and studying them [he] won their confidence and admiration. He became, in fact, very influential with them locally.” In Pershing’s opinion, successful relations with the Moros required tremendous patience and a willingness to treat them with respect. It also required the readiness to strike militarily at those Moros who, after repeated attempts to persuade them otherwise, still refused to accept American rule. Indeed, Pershing first gained notice in the United States not for his diplomatic efforts but for his successful attacks on the cottas of recalcitrant Moros in the Lake Lanao region of Mindanao.²⁵

Unlike Wood, Pershing had the benefit of being able to build on the work of his predecessors in the province. He continued many of the policies already in place, including that of using local Moro leaders to help govern (although he differed from Wood in believing that the United States should not try to break down the authority of the hereditary chiefs). Pershing also followed his predecessors in devoting much of his effort to developing the “policy of attraction;” under his leadership such projects as road building, the promotion of public education, and the improvement of agricultural practices continued.²⁶

Although Pershing, like Wood, considered the Moros savages, he believed them to be reasonable people. More so than Wood, he had confidence that he could persuade them to adhere to American policies by appealing to their self-interest and even to their religious principles. Like Bliss, Pershing emphasized conciliation and tried to keep fighting between Moros and Americans to a minimum by using military force only against individual Moro wrongdoers and not entire communities. “[W]e shall not molest your rights, families, property, or any of your affairs,” he told a group of *datus*, “and if any bad Moro injures us or other Moros we shall seek him only.” In practice, Pershing admitted, this policy sometimes meant that the government chose to let a Moro criminal go unpunished rather than pursue him into a community that might rally to his defense and thereby precipitate a battle. Pershing thought, however, that Bliss had gone too far in seeking to avoid conflict by concentrating his troops close to the major posts. In so doing, Bliss had lost an opportunity to use the presence of the soldiers to generate greater support for American rule. “We must branch out and let all the people in the Moro Province know there is a government which is looking after them and which proposes and

intends to encourage and protect them.” To make the government more visible to the Moros, Pershing divided his forces into smaller units and distributed them around the province.²⁷

Pershing’s tenure as governor might have passed relatively peacefully but for his decision to disarm the population, a policy that infuriated many Moros and opened a new period of conflict. Although the idea of disarmament had been around for some time, higher authorities, fearful of a violent reaction by the Moros, declined to approve its implementation. Interestingly, one of its chief opponents was Leonard Wood, now chief of staff. As governor of the Moro Province, Wood had not hesitated to take decisive action against slavery and the Moro legal code, but he balked at trying to take the Moros’ weapons. Such a move would only enrage the Moros, he argued, and they would simply hide their best weapons. In 1911 the disarmament issue re-emerged following the killing of an Army lieutenant by a *juramentado*. The killing provoked condemnations in the press of the “lawlessness” in Moro Province, and Pershing decided the time had come to push for disarmament. In September of that year, he announced the new law—it required Moros to surrender their firearms and forbade them from carrying edged weapons. Many Moros, for whom weapons were precious possessions, refused to give them up, and fighting broke out between some of them and the troops sent to enforce the order.²⁸

In December 1911, about 800 defiant Moros fled to the old battleground of Bud Dajo to make a stand. Pershing’s handling of this development differed significantly from that of Wood in the earlier episode on the mountain. With enough patience, Pershing maintained, the confrontation could be ended without violence. His explanation of this approach to a superior suggested his disapproval of Wood’s methods. “It is not my purpose to make any grandstand play here and get a lot of soldiers killed and massacre a lot of Moros, including women and children.” Pershing’s restraint was appreciated by his superiors, including Wood—with the 1912 election drawing near, they wanted to avoid the kind of controversy that had followed the attack on Bud Dajo in 1906.²⁹

Pershing succeeded in dispersing the Dajo Moros with few casualties. Acting quickly before the Moros could gather provisions, he had his soldiers surround the mountain to cut the Moros off from their sources of supply. He then sent cooperative Moro leaders to the mountaintop to negotiate on his behalf. They convinced most of the people to leave Bud Dajo and surrender their weapons. His soldiers fought off an attempt by the remaining Moros to break through the siege lines, and eventually the holdouts were captured. The operation resulted in the deaths of only 12 Moros compared with the 600 killed there five years before.³⁰

Pershing's handling of another case of strong resistance also showed his desire to avoid heavy casualties, whether American or Moro. In 1913 thousands of Moros moved to the fortified crater of Bud Bagsak in eastern Jolo to defy the disarmament order. Pershing again pondered how to deal with the disaffected Moros without bloodshed. His policy had been to "disarm them by any means except by fighting," he informed the Governor-General of the Philippines. Noting that a large majority of those on the mountain were noncombatants, he made it clear that he would not "rush in and attack them while they are surrounded by women and children."³¹

Pershing believed that if the Americans were patient, the Moros on Bagsak would eventually drift back to their homes. In this he was partially correct. Negotiations resulted in an agreement to allow the Moros to leave the mountain, weapons still in hand, to plant their spring crops with the understanding that they would surrender their weapons later. When the time came to give up those weapons, however, most refused to do so and remained ready to return to Bud Bagsak should American soldiers move against them.³²

Unwilling to accept such open defiance and under pressure to end the insurgency, Pershing developed a plan to take Bagsak with a minimum of casualties among the noncombatants. He issued orders that left the impression American forces were withdrawing to their posts, then secretly sent troops to launch a surprise attack on the mountain before the Moros in the surrounding area could reassemble there. After five days of intense fighting, the soldiers captured the mountain stronghold, which was occupied by about 500 Moros. Fifteen members of the government's force lost their lives in the battle. Pershing's men killed almost the entire group of Moros, including as many as 50 women and children. Although Pershing failed to end the resistance on Bud Bagsak bloodlessly, he deserved credit for taking steps to ensure the far larger group of Moros that was originally on the mountain did not gather there again—the death toll could have been much higher. Still, it seems possible that a siege similar to the one he conducted at Bud Dajo in 1911 might have resulted in the defeat of the Bagsak Moros with even fewer deaths.³³

Bud Bagsak represented the last major case of Moro resistance to American rule. Fighting between Moros and government forces virtually ceased, in part because the disarmament policy had removed thousands of weapons from the province. When Pershing left in 1913, his replacement as governor was a civilian, and native troops replaced most American soldiers. The Moros had at least outwardly become less hostile to American control. One possible reason for that development was that prosperity had increased in the province due to such improvements as new roads and public markets. The success of the provincial government in halting warfare between Moro groups benefited the economy as well. The Moros also became more supportive of the Americans as the prospect for independence for the

Philippines increased; they realized that independence would probably result in their lands falling under the control of the hated Filipino Christians and preferred to remain under the Americans.³⁴

The experiences of Wood and Pershing in seeking to stabilize and develop the Moro Province yield several possible lessons. First, the efforts of the governors to produce substantial improvements in the daily lives of the Moros—road building and better medical care, for example—helped increase support for US rule. Second, the attempts of both men to bring about dramatic changes in Moro culture—however well intentioned—tended to create more opposition. The province was relatively tranquil until the imposition by the Americans of laws prohibiting slavery, scrapping the traditional legal code, and banning weapons stirred many Moros into armed resistance. As desirable as those changes may have been, the generals could have done more to persuade the Moros of the virtues of the reforms before making them the law of the land. Finally, the employment of force by Wood and Pershing against Moros who challenged American control succeeded in reducing active opposition in the province. As several of Wood's punitive campaigns demonstrated, however, the sweeping and indiscriminate use of force had the potential to increase rather than diminish disorder.

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From Military Victories to Political Stalemate: The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1917

Irving Levinson

The Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917 and the involvement of the United States in that struggle constitute a case where military success did not lead to the full realization of the American government's postconflict objectives. My review of this period consists of four parts. First, I will summarize the causes of the three civil wars that wracked Mexico during these seven years. Then, I will examine the objectives and methods employed by President William Howard Taft in response to the outbreak of fighting. The third and lengthiest part concerns the very different efforts of his successor, Woodrow Wilson. Finally, I offer my conclusions.

Let us begin at the beginning. In 1910 Porfirio Diaz served in his 33rd year as president of Mexico. He maintained control of that nation using a combination of staged elections, compliant and corrupt courts, press censorship, extensive patronage, and an unaccountable and brutal national police force of less than 10,000 men known as rurales. Estimates of the size of Diaz's army range from 15,000 to 20,000 troops.¹ Although this apparatus of repression remained a pale imitation of the more totalitarian forms of government experienced in later phases of the 20th century, Diaz nonetheless could repeatedly bring critical force to bear when challenged.

The dictator retained the admiration of many leading foreign statesmen as well as a minority of his countrymen. His administration had brought order to a nation long wracked by civil strife. With this framework, industrialization and the urbanization accompanying such growth proceeded apace. However, this development proved unsustainable for several reasons.

First, industrialization brought about the rapid growth of an educated middle class as well as literate and politically active coalitions of factory workers. The absence of a participative political system fed their frustration. Simultaneously, the great majority of Mexicans lived in rural areas and experienced falling living standards and lowered levels of individual freedom during the Diaz era.

In an effort to foster the growth of commercial agriculture and the development of natural resources, the regime allowed domestic and foreign investors to declare any land not being used for such production as vacant and subject to sale. In this manner, Diaz's government seized 27 percent of all the land in Mexico, amounting to 134,547,885 acres.² This included much of the nation's best agricultural land. The resulting polarization of wealth and power proved so extreme that in the northern state of Chihuahua, the estates of one extended family, the Terrazas,

exceeded in size the combined territory of Belgium and the Netherlands.³ US Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson observed:

Perhaps 80 percent of the population of Mexico were without an abiding place except by sufferance and took no more than a nominal part in the affairs of the country.⁴

Inevitably, the transfer of land titles from independent owners of small farms and from villages that once held their territory in communal ownership to the new landlords reduced millions of economically and socially independent Mexicans to the status of poorly paid laborers.

Finally, the heavy extent to which the Diaz government's industrialization program relied upon foreign capital created a situation where foreigners owned the majority of the oil, mining, and railroad industries as well as more than 100 million acres of land. This massive external presence inexorably led to the accumulation of nationalist resentments. That hostility came not only from employees who resented the often arrogant conduct of the foreigners, but also from the most affluent and educated of Mexican citizens, who found themselves unable to compete with foreign capital or technology.

Following Diaz's 1910 announcement that he would soon retire at the tender age of 80, the nation's first truly contested presidential election campaign in more than three decades began.

As his chosen successor, the dictator endorsed General Bernardo Reyes. The opposition forces coalesced around Francisco Madero, a successful industrialist who also owned numerous ranches in northern Mexico. The challenger campaigned on a platform calling for a complete set of civil and political liberties. His advocacy of that cause became the focal point of his campaign. Although Madero's movement proved to be national in scope, his refusal to emphasize the return of the confiscated lands alienated millions of potential supporters in rural Mexico who hoped for a restoration of the property and independence that they considered to be theirs. Yet, as the campaign wore on the threat of intimidation became so intense that Madero fled to the United States to avoid imprisonment on criminal charges manufactured by Diaz. He arrived in America convinced that only violent means would achieve reform.

The call to arms came not from within Mexico, but from the self-exiled Madero and some of his supporters, then sheltering in San Antonio, Texas. Declaring himself to be president of Mexico, the ex-candidate called for a national day of uprising on 20 November 1910.⁵ This civil war thus began not with a single confrontation, but with hundreds of small encounters in Mexico's towns and villages. The rebel groups coalesced into bands and then into companies and occasionally

into brigade-size forces. Three factions thus emerged. The first swore allegiance to Madero and derived substantial support from Mexico's more affluent and educated citizens in both urban and rural areas as well as from many other Mexicans in the northern half of the country, who hoped for a restoration of their lands.

The second faction emerged in the nation's major centers of industrial production and received the support of organized labor. Although these Mexicans shared Madero's goal of dismantling the Diaz regime's apparatus of repression, their objectives also included the seizure and redistribution of a substantial portion of the nation's industrial wealth. In spirit and often in name, these groups most properly could be termed socialist. Their major organization, based in Mexico City, was the *Casa de los Obreros* (House of Workers).

The third force consisted primarily of poor and frequently illiterate villagers and peasants in central and southern Mexico. Above all else, they sought the annulling of the land confiscations of the Diaz era. Emiliano Zapata emerged as the most powerful of their leaders and waged war from his base in the state of Morelos, just to the south of the national capital. He and his followers identified primarily with their localities and did not build a coordinated national resistance movement.

President Taft confronted the challenge of responding to this course of events. Unlike many of his countrymen, he had never accepted the veneer of stability that Diaz so carefully applied to his regime. Writing in 1909, Taft declared: "There will be a revolution growing out of the selection of his [Diaz's] successor."⁶

The president set two policy goals and directed his application of military force solely toward those objectives. First, he sought to prevent the wave of violence engulfing Mexico from spilling over the frontier into US territory. Also, he intended to limit the involvement of American citizens in the revolt. To these ends, he sent 16,000 troops to the border. Broadly stated, the deployment:

Would strengthen the forces for law and order in Mexico and would put both parties on notice in the Republic that we were ready to defend our rights if the occasion arose. I concluded that it would have a very healthful effect with reference to the care which might be exercised in respect of American citizens and property, and that the presence of troops near at hand might have a very healthful effect all along the border in stopping the crossing and recrossing of filibustering expeditions which make their field of action in both countries and supply the insurrectors with ammunition.⁷

He qualified that commitment by setting two limitations on the use of force. First, he stated: "The assumption . . . that I contemplate intervention on Mexican soil

to protect American lives or property in Mexico is of course gratuitous because I seriously doubt whether I have such authority under any circumstance and if I had, I would not exercise it without strict Congressional approval.”⁸ As his secretary of state subsequently acknowledged:

This government does not undertake to furnish police protection for the lives and property of its citizens who reside in foreign countries. Our inability to discharge such an obligation in respect to such a country as Mexico over whose vast area are scattered tens of thousands of American citizens engaged in divers and disconnected occupations is obvious.⁹

Having thus limited the space in which the United States Army would operate to the US side of the border, Taft promptly obtained the permission of the United States Congress to prohibit the export of arms: “Whenever the President shall find in any American country conditions of domestic violence which are promoted by the use of arms or munitions procured from the United States.”¹⁰

Taft’s policy merits mention because of its narrow scope and its success. Given that the forces under Madero’s command never totaled more than 17,500 men, the presence of the 16,000-man US force served as an ample deterrent to any Mexicans contemplating military action near the United States border.¹¹ Indeed, in May 1911, Madero ordered that an assault on Diaz’s forces in the city of Ciudad Juarez be halted for fear that some shells might land on the neighboring city of El Paso, Texas. The subsequent assault took place with great care being exercised to avoid any injury to American citizens and their property on the north side of the Rio Grande.

Also, the deployment probably served to deter those Americans in the border region sympathetic to the rebel cause. Brigadier General J.W. Duncan of the Texas Department reported that such sympathies were widespread and Taft sought to address that issue.¹² President Taft confined his objectives to securing his own nation’s borders and restricting the participation of US citizens in the conflict. He succeeded in both regards. Meanwhile in Mexico the course of war flowed on.

Exactly two weeks after the 11 May 1911 fall of Ciudad Juarez, an ailing President Diaz resigned his office and left for exile in Spain. Madero, accompanied by his victorious generals Francisco (Pancho) Villa and Pascual Orozco, entered Mexico City. During a six-month transitional period, the Mexicans held a free election and Madero took office on 6 November 1911. Although that moment marked the end of the first civil war of the Mexican Revolution, the peace proved to be of very short duration as the victors promptly fell out among themselves.

During Madero’s first month in office, Emiliano Zapata declared himself in rebellion. Claiming that the new national government did not intend to restore lands

formerly held by in communal ownership, Zapata's Plan de Ayala called for the seizure and immediate redistribution of one-third of all land in Mexico to the poor. His guerrillas soon controlled much of the state of Morelos and parts of the nearby states of Guerrero, Tlaxcala, Puebla, Mexico, and the Federal District itself.

In December 1911, a second rebellion erupted as General Bernardo Reyes ended his exile in the United States and raised the standard of rebellion, seeking support from those Mexicans who believed that their nation required the services of a strong leader in the tradition of Diaz. A detachment of rurales soon captured him, and the would-be ruler arrived in Mexico City as a prisoner.

Then in March 1912, one of Madero's two senior commanders, General Pascual Orozco, announced from his headquarters at Ciudad Juarez that he too was rebelling on the grounds that Madero had betrayed the cause of the revolution. His Plan Orozquista called for the nationalization of the largely American-owned railroads, granting land titles to anyone who had resided on a property for 20 years, seizing and redistributing all estate lands not under cultivation, and instituting a range of labor laws. His force rapidly grew to 8,000 men, only to be defeated by another of Madero's generals, Victoriano Huerta, in October 1912.

In the same month that Orozco's rebellion ended, Felix Diaz, the nephew of the former dictator, landed at Veracruz with a small expedition. Troops loyal to Madero promptly reduced this force to a party of one. Like Reyes, the would-be conqueror of the capital entered it as a prisoner.

In the northern state of Chihuahua, General Francisco Villa began gathering an army. He funded this particular effort and the administration of the state he now governed by expropriating without compensation substantial estates owned by both Mexicans and foreigners. Those seizures began in December 1912. In summary, by the end of that year, Madero had faced five rebellions, several of which continued into the new year.

One month later, the United States inaugurated a new president, Woodrow Wilson. He did not share Taft's strict constructionist perspective of executive powers. More important, the new chief executive believed the obligations of his nation extended far beyond its boundaries. He declared: "We are, in spite of ourselves, the guardians of order and justice and decency on this Continent. We are, providentially, naturally, and unescapably charged with the maintenance of humanity's interest here."¹³ While Taft had acted as the watchful steward concerned primarily with matters inside the territorial limits of his own nation, Wilson stood as the stern archangel with mighty and righteous impulses to be exercised beyond the national boundaries.

In terms of Mexico, he defined those goals as encouraging legitimate business

interests, bringing about a constitutional settlement of the issues relating to land ownership, and creating a “secure foundation for liberty” that included free elections and a full range of civil liberties.¹⁴

The principal difference between Wilson’s objectives and those of his predecessor lay in the extent to which they stood divorced from military goals. While Taft’s policy focused on the traditional and military-centered objectives of securing the territory of the United States and regulating a frontier, his successor’s goals focused on objectives in which successful military action became not an end, but a means. The distinction proved crucial.

Wilson scarcely had finished his first month in office when events took an unexpected turn. On 9 February 1913, General Manuel Mondragón led a small force that released the imprisoned Diaz and Reyes. After their liberator fell while charging a machine gun on horseback, the two former prisoners barricaded themselves and their troops in the centuries-old Ciudadela, a thickly walled fort in the heart of Mexico City. From there, they launched artillery rounds at Madero’s forces based around the national palace. The Mexican president retaliated. For nine days, the city became a battleground.

At the invitation of US ambassador Henry Lane Wilson (no relation of the president), the two rebel generals journeyed to the US embassy for a meeting with the commander of Madero’s forces, General Victoriano Huerta. Wilson later wrote that his objective in convening the conclave was to have the opposing commanders “enter into an agreement for the suspension of hostilities and for the joint submission to the Federal Congress.”¹⁵ Yet he had objectives that extended well beyond ending the deadly fighting slowly destroying Mexico’s capital.

The ambassador shared no common ancestry or ideology with his nation’s new president. Henry Lane Wilson deemed democracy a form of government wholly unsuited to Mexico and argued that, “When it is understood that of the fifteen million Mexicans, over ten million are illiterate and wholly without the training to fit them for the responsibilities of intelligent citizenship, some idea may be formed of the situation which will result from the adoption of universal suffrage.”¹⁶ The ambassador’s low estimate of Mexicans extended to Madero, whom he thought “could not govern his unruly people; [and] that his government could not keep its promises, and was fast leading the country to the verge of ruin.”¹⁷ Thus, Wilson thought that Mexico needed a dictator in the national palace and he took this opportunity to further that objective.

He convinced the opposing generals to conclude an agreement by which “General Huerta was to be the provisional president and General Diaz was to be free to pursue his candidacy for the presidency.”¹⁸ Years later, Wilson expressed no regret

about his role in ending the rule of a freely elected president.¹⁹ On 18 February 1913, Madero and his vice president, Adolfo Pino Suarez, were placed under arrest. Three days later, both men were shot while being transferred from the national palace to a federal penitentiary.

In response to this turn of events, Venustiano Carranza, a former Maderista commander then serving as governor of the state of Coahuila, declared himself the successor to Madero. From his base in the neighboring state of Coahuila, Villa too issued a declaration of rebellion. In Morelos, Zapata declared his intent to wage against Huerta the war he had waged against Madero.

Fighting spread across Mexico as Huerta rapidly ended the vestiges of democracy in areas under his control. When the Mexican Senate refused to suspend its inquiry into the assassination of one of their members who had been shot soon after criticizing the new dictator, he dissolved both chambers of the federal legislature and arrested a majority of their members. In November 1913, President Wilson decided to force Huerta from office. The options considered at the White House included the withdrawal of diplomatic representation, raising the arms embargo to allow the rebels (now known as Constitutionalists) to import arms, blockading Mexico's ports, and invading.²⁰

An invasion of Mexico and march upon the national capital would have been no light matter. According to a memo prepared by Henry Skillman Breckenridge some months earlier, a minimum of 40,000 troops would have been needed for that particular expedition and that number could have been landed at Veracruz only on 25 days' notice. Plans for the taking of Veracruz had been drafted earlier.²¹

On 2 January 1914, the president's special envoy to Mexico, former Governor John Lind of Minnesota, reported that, "If given time, he [Huerta] will extricate himself from his present embarrassment sufficiently at least to prolong his rule indefinitely."²² In response, Wilson issued instructions on 15 January 1914 allowing 10,000 Krag-Jorgensen rifles and an unspecified amount of ammunition at San Francisco be identified as cargo bound for China and then surreptitiously shipped to a port on Mexico's Pacific coast.²³ Barely a month later on 13 February 1914, Wilson lifted the arms embargo against the Constitutionalists. Despite this, Huerta still survived.

Fortunately for Wilson, a *causus belli* surfaced barely two months later. On 10 April 1914, a Huerista general at the port of Tampico arrested a US Navy officer and seven crewmen from the whaleboat of the cruiser U.S.S. Dolphin. The men were taken into custody after they wandered into a restricted dock area. Although the Mexican commander offered a conditional apology, the United States demanded a full apology and a 21-gun salute to the Stars and Stripes. The Mexicans

in turn agreed on the condition that the US Navy similarly render honors to the national banner of Mexico. Since this could have been interpreted a recognition of the Huerta government, the United States refused. The Mexican commander then withdrew his settlement offer.

On 20 April 1914, Wilson asked Congress for authority to defend the national honor, and the House of Representatives obliged with a 337-37 vote. The Senate passed the resolution after including Senator Henry Cabot Lodge's amendment identifying the protection of American lives and property as an additional objective. One day later, the United States seized Mexico's principal port of Veracruz. Any Americans who expected to be welcomed met with disappointment. Despite an order from their commanding officer to withdraw, many Mexicans remained on the waterfront to fight. After 12 hours of shooting that cost 129 Mexican lives and 19 American lives, the United States took control of the city.

Carranza protested the assault.²⁴ Despite such protests, his cause benefited handsomely from the US seizure of Veracruz. For in response to the invasion, Huerta decided that he must reinforce his deployments in the central region of Mexico and consequently withdrew or drew down his forces in other areas. As Huerta executed these changes, both Carranza and Villa moved their troops into the territory vacated by the withdrawal of their opponent's forces.

Simultaneously, factors not visible to a civilian observer such as Lind contributed to a weakening of Huerta's army. The new dictator had assumed that a larger army would be a more potent army. By the use of forced drafts of recruits with marginal military potential and the commissioning of inadequately trained officers, he expanded the size of his army from 50,000 to 250,000 in scarcely six months. As always proves to be the case, a greater quantity of military chaff turned out to be far less useful than a much smaller amount of wheat. His army began to desert in droves.²⁵ The tide of battle turned.

On 19 July 1914, Huerta announced his resignation, publicly blaming Woodrow Wilson for this decision. Less than one month later, Carrancista General Alvaro Obregón marched east from the city of Guadalajara and entered Mexico City on 15 August 1914. Huerta fled the country. Thus ended the second civil war of the Mexican Revolution.

The uneasy unity between revolutionary factions lasted only until the convention to draft the new constitution met at Aguascalientes on 10 October 1914. Each of the major armed factions sent delegates in direct proportion to the number of troops they had fielded in the final phase of the campaign against Huerta. Irreconcilable plans soon emerged. The Villistas called for seizure of haciendas for which the current owners would receive no compensation. In Villista-controlled territory,

seizures of estates had been going on for several years. The Zapatistas' demands proved similar. By contrast, Carranza displayed no enthusiasm for such agrarian schemes and believed the leaders of Mexico's industrial and financial community ought not to be threatened. He preferred the company of educated professionals to that of men such as Villa and Zapata. The Carrancista delegates soon recognized that the combined opposition (known as Conventionists) could outvote them. Following their opponents' success in electing General Eulalio Gutiérrez as provisional president of Mexico, Carranza ordered his followers (known as Constitutionals) to withdraw from the deliberations at Aguascalientes. On 10 November 1914, the newly elected Gutiérrez responded by declaring the departed leaders to be in rebellion. For the third time since the revolution began, Mexico would go to war with itself.

Carranza's forces headed eastward toward Veracruz as the numerically superior Conventionists of Villa and Zapata entered Mexico City in mid-May. The United States now faced the choice of standing aside or of supporting one side. On the one hand, Villa's and Zapata's previous seizure of foreign property without compensation, their plans for taking yet more land, the many excesses attributed to them, and their general demeanor troubled the Americans. By contrast, during his pre-revolutionary political career as interim governor of Chihuahua and in his service in both chambers of Mexico's federal legislature, Carranza had caused the United States no great troubles. His successful management of his family's haciendas, the eloquence that was a product of his training at Mexico's finest preparatory school, and the manner in which he represented himself convinced the Americans that their interests would be better served if his Constitutionals emerged as the victors. The favor of the United States now proved to be of critical consequence.

During the occupation of Veracruz, the Americans had shipped some 4,500 crates of armaments to that port. These materials filled three unusually large structures, each of which was 57 yards square and 21 feet high.²⁶ Within that space, the United States deposited modern artillery pieces and shells, machine guns, barbed wire, radios, trucks, rifles, pistols, and millions of rounds of ammunition.²⁷ Only a very short time before Carranza's forces entered Veracruz, American officers left the keys to the warehouses with that city's chamber of commerce, boarded their ships and sailed for home with their soldiers. Carranza's commanders took possession of the new equipment, familiarizing themselves with appropriate tactics, and then advanced westward under the command of Obregón.

In April 1915, their newly strengthened army met Villa's forces at Celaya. The Carrancistas prepared for the battle by constructing a strong defensive position. Making considerable use of barbed wire, interlocking fields of fire provided by state-of-the-art machine guns, substantial indirect artillery fire, and a series of

trenches, General Óbregon awaited Villa's attack. His opponent responded with the tactic that had proven so effective throughout his career in the north of Mexico: the massed cavalry charge. In his official report, Obregón listed Villa's Celaya losses at 4,000 dead, 5,000 wounded, and 6,000 taken prisoner. He set his own losses at 138 dead and 247 wounded. By all accounts, Villa lost at least 50 percent of his forces at this one engagement. Successive defeats at Aguascalientes and León reduced his army to a mere 6,500 troops. Given the turn of events, the United States granted official diplomatic recognition to Carranza and the Constitutionalists during October 1915.

In November of that year, Villa approached the US border with the intention of taking Agua Prieta and thereby acquiring a base from which he might illicitly purchase arms. The apparently easy task of capturing the city's small garrison turned into a disaster when Mexican forces transported across US territory via Brownsville, Texas launched a surprise counterattack. They routed the Villistas and seized much of their remaining equipment.

To retaliate, Villa decided to attack the United States. Although wounded, he ordered that a strike be made against US troops in Columbus, New Mexico. As proved to be the case at Celaya, the foe proved far stronger than he thought would be the case. On 9 March 1916, his column attacking Columbus suffered 100 dead in return for inflicting 19 fatalities on the defending US Army garrison. By 1600 that day, the commanding general of the US Army's Southern Department, Frederick Funston, received orders to organize a force under the command of Brigadier General John J. Pershing to counterattack. Secretary of War Newton Diehl Baker stated: "The work of these troops will be regarded as finished as soon as Villa's bands are known to be broken up."²⁸

There was a method to Villa's madness. By bringing about a US invasion, he confronted the Constitutionalists with the choice of either resisting the forces of a militarily superior nation or of passively accepting a loss of sovereignty by permitting a foreign expedition to operate on Mexican soil. As Pershing's force of 6,675 men proceeded southward, Mexican opinion hardened. On 15 April 1916, US Special Representative James Rodgers told Secretary of State Robert Lansing: "Every high official of the de facto government insisted upon immediate withdrawal of American troops. . . General Obregón and Carranza are determined to secure withdrawal at once."²⁹ Two days later, Pershing firmly noted rapidly hardening attitudes in Mexico and pointed out that if the pursuit of Villa were to continue, the US Army would have to occupy rather than merely pass through Mexican territory as well as take over the operation of the railroad supplying his forces.³⁰ In the event that his civilian superiors could not read between those lines, General Hugh Lennox Scott thoughtfully sent them additional text:

With Villa hiding very small chance exists of finding him in a population friendly to him and daily becoming more hostile to us. Realizing that first course [staying in Mexico] cannot be considered, General Funston and I recommend the second course [withdrawing].³¹

However, Wilson did not wish to budge. He believed that until the US frontier with Mexico was secure, Pershing ought to remain in Mexico. The deaths of several Americans at the hands of cross-border raiding parties following the Columbus attack strengthened this position.³² Carranza proved just as adamant in demanding that the Americans depart forthwith. Both sides threatened war. On 18 June 1916, Wilson authorized the mobilization of the 125,000 militia of the 48 states and sent the Mexican government a note stating that his administration's objectives consist only of protecting its own border from the incompetence of a government that cannot control its own territory.³³

On 21 June 1916, two US patrols under the command of Captain Charles T. Boyd requested that the commander of Mexican forces in the town of Carrizal, Chihuahua, General Felix U. Gómez, permit Pershing's forces to pass. The Mexican refused and Boyd ordered an advance. In the ensuing melee, Boyd and 13 other Americans died while 25 troopers were taken captive. The Mexicans lost 30 dead and suffer 43 wounded. War now seemed closer than ever.

By 3 July 1916, tempers on both sides of the border cooled as the reality of the military situation reasserted itself. Carranza knew that he did not possess the resources to wage war against a nation with almost eight times Mexico's population, a far more advanced economy, and a full treasury. Conversely, the Americans proved sensibly leery of being drawn into the occupation of a nation of some 761,000 square miles. Also, the prospect of US entrance into World War I meant that any conflict in Mexico well might involve the United States in a two-front war. Following seemingly interminable negotiation, the last of Pershing's men crossed back into US territory on 5 February 1917. At this point, the United States could claim a victory in the campaign against Villa. As of mid-April 1916, Pershing's force had killed more than 100 of their foe's men and driven their chief prey some 400 miles south of the Rio Grande. Villa never again troubled the US border.

During this period, Carranza began violently consolidating his control of Mexico. The Casa de los Obreros first felt his wrath. Although their leadership had supported the new leader of Mexico because his vision of an urban and industrialized nation seemed more relevant than the agrarian world of the Villistas and Zapatistas, that union's decision to stage general strikes in 1915 and 1916 provoked a violent response. Carranza used troops to break their strikes, seize their

headquarters, and then dissolve their union.

The turn of the Zapatistas came next. In late 1916 and early 1917, Carranza sent 30,000 of his soldiers into Morelos with orders to destroy Zapata's forces. Using forced reconcentration of civilians and widespread destruction of villages, these invaders reaped only defeat and they withdrew some months later. Carranza then bided his time and fell back on an ancient technique: assassination. At a 10 April 1919 truce negotiation, a federal honor guard leveled its rifles at Emiliano Zapata and shot him to death.

In the north, Villa waged a guerrilla war against Carranza for several more years. Yet even he eventually tired of life in the saddle and lay down his arms in return for amnesty, a substantial hacienda and pension. On 20 July 1923, a 12-man squad assassinated him. Thus ended the Mexican Revolution. I offer these conclusions.

First, the US armed forces emerged as the military victors in each of three separate missions. The troops posted along the US frontier by President Taft deterred the revolutionaries from raiding American territory and also convinced all Mexican factions that even the slightest damage inflicted upon US citizens residing peacefully on their own nation's soil would prompt massive retaliation.

Also, the Veracruz landing proved a success by any measure. The occupation of the city forced the Huerta government to shift some of its dwindling forces away from the opposing armies of Mexicans, thereby enabling the soldiers of Carranza and Villa to advance. By their continued presence, the American forces inflicted a humiliation upon a dictator who could no longer claim the ability to defend the national territory. Perhaps most important, the ships at anchor and the soldiers and marines ashore served as a shield behind which the United States established and maintained a massive supply base for potential allies. Similarly, General Pershing's forces successfully completed their mission as originally defined by their civilian superiors. From the day that the Punitive Expedition left Mexico, Pancho Villa never again troubled the border.

But American military successes did not bring about the change in Mexican society sought by President Wilson. As noted earlier, the commander in chief defined those goals as the encouragement of legitimate American business interests, a constitutional settlement of the issues relating to land ownership, and creating a "secure foundation for liberty" that included free elections and a full range of civil liberties.

The United States did not achieve its first objective. That failure became very evident in the constitution adopted by the victorious Carrancistas in 1917. Article

27 of that document claimed as the property of the nation all natural resources both on land and on the continental shelf.³⁴ With this one declaration, Mexico asserted its claim not only to the American-owned oil fields of eastern Mexico, but to the massive copper mining complexes of the north as well as to the coal reserves. While some of the nationalizations took place over a period of decades rather than at once, these industries remain closed to foreigners as of this day. Although some observers frequently cite these nationalizations as evidence of the essentially socialist nature of the Mexican Revolution, I beg to differ.

While this particular clause of the constitution certainly appealed to powerful leftist sentiments within Mexico, its wording also promised and subsequently delivered employment and business opportunities to more affluent Mexicans who did not possess the capital or the technical expertise to compete with foreigners. The playing field now tilted sharply in favor of Mexican industry and industrialists. In the nationalization of foreign oil concession that took place throughout Latin America during the Great Depression, this pattern would be repeated.

Further, the new constitution banned foreigners from owning any land within 100 kilometers of Mexico's international frontier or within 50 miles of its coast. In the others areas of the country, non-Mexicans could buy land if and only if they allowed themselves to be treated as Mexican citizens and to refrain from appealing to their embassies for assistance in the event of disputes. Also, any commercial stock company, be it Mexican or foreign, could no longer acquire, hold, or administer rural properties.³⁵ As in the case of the nationalization of the oil industry, this process took place over a period of decades rather than a period of years. In both cases, the outcome did not meet with Washington's approval.

Similarly, Wilson's goal of establishing a democratic Mexico with a full range of civil liberties did not come to fruition. While a substantial set of freedoms existed on paper as per the constitution of 1917, the reality proved far different. Under Carranza and his successors, the government organized labor unions, employers' associations, development banks, and federal companies as part of a seamless whole under the control of the dominant national political organization, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Defiance of the party could jeopardize one's job and position in the community. When the PRI deemed violence necessary for the sake of order, force was applied. Although the killing of some 400 activists at the Tlaltelolco Massacre of 1968 remains the best known of these repressive acts, the government did away with a number of dissidents during the 1920-1992 period. The PRI also employed less severe tactics, such as bringing criminal charges under the social dissolution laws of Mexico.

Similarly, the Mexican government took full advantage of constitutional provisions

giving the government power to set a national curriculum in primary and secondary schools and to close the religious counterparts of those educational facilities. Two generations of Mexicans would be raised with official party versions of Mexican history.

Only in the last decade of the twentieth century did a functional multi-party system come into existence on a national basis. It did so not as a result of foreign pressure, but as the result of the cumulative effects of a banking collapse, hyperinflation, and a flight of Mexicans to the United States unparalleled since the most violent days of the Revolution. In both cases, some 10 percent of the population fled to the United States. Thus, Wilson did not achieve his objective of transforming the structure of Mexican politics.

By contrast, the president's second objective of settling the land question by constitutional means did come to fruition. However, this occurred within a framework determined by Mexicans rather than by Americans. The new constitution set forth the methods by which land would be seized, valued, and redistributed. Article 27 voided any concession for the sales of lands, waters, and forests issued later than 30 November 1876 if that transaction encroached upon communally held lands. American investors consequently lost tens of millions of acres and did not receive compensation they considered adequate.

To summarize, US military successes during the Mexican Revolution did not lead to the emergence of the type of post-revolutionary Mexico sought by President Woodrow Wilson. That failure is attributable to several factors. Most important, the American president failed to distinguish between an ally with parallel objectives as opposed to one with identical objectives. While both Wilson and Carranza sought to drive Huerta from power and to keep the more radical Villa and Zapata from succeeding him, the American president did not share or even recognize his Mexican ally's strong nationalism. For even though Carranza arguably owed his success to US aid, he did not recognize an obligation to repay that assistance.

Also, Wilson erred in assuming that the values of his industrial and predominantly North Atlantic culture would readily and rapidly transplant to another political environment. For centuries, Mexico's rulers divided the nation by various criteria of wealth and ethnicity and, in the process, established bitter chasms within their society. To remedy the traditional division between those above and those below, aggrieved Mexicans sought to restore that which they once had rather than to substitute the foreign alternative of a free market. For Mexican villagers whose identity, social network, and economic sustenance rested upon their possession of a piece of land, the goal of regaining that territory held far higher priority than the creation of an economy in which investors, both foreign and domestic, could bid

for the property.

Similarly, the most affluent and powerful of the post-revolutionary Mexicans lived in a nation where governments had granted legally sanctioned commercial advantages since the early days of the Spanish Empire. This situation continued for centuries and arguably does so today. In the end, we are left with a crucial distinction.

Military victory consists of successfully applying force to break a hostile foe. By contrast, restructuring a society requires the participation and consent of those whose existence is to be altered. Through the application of direct as well as indirect military force, the US Army could have influenced the course of the Mexican Revolution. However, such influence did not extend to nonmilitary objectives.

Woodrow Wilson never abandoned his faith in the capacity of the United States to remake the world. During the Mexican Revolution and World War I, he sought to influence not merely the military outcome, but also the shape of the peace. In each case he failed. There are times when force, even when victorious on the field of battle, has its limits.

Notes

1. Howard F. Kline, who contends that half of the army's stated strength of 30,000 consisted of phantom soldiers, claims that the size of the active force totaled only 15,000. Howard F. Kline, *The United States and Mexico* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 123. By contrast, Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman place the pre-revolutionary size of Diaz's force at 20,000. Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, *The Course of Mexican History, 3d edition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 526.

2. Helen Phipps, *Some Aspects of the Agrarian Question in Mexico: A Historical Study* (Austin: University of Texas, 1935), 110-111

3. Carlos Fuentes, *The Buried Mirror: Reflections of Spain and the New World* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), 299.

4. Henry Lane Wilson, *Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1927), 199.

5. Although they wrote this proposal in San Antonio, Madero and his supporters named their plan after the last major city in Mexico from which he spoke before fleeing to the United States. This particular labeling spared him possible difficulties in terms of violating American neutrality laws.

6. William Howard Taft, October 17, 1909, Letter to Helen H. Taft, *The Papers of William Howard Taft*, Library of Congress, Series 8, 7:460-61.

7. William Howard Taft, March 11, 1911, Letter to Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, *The Papers of William Howard Taft*, Library of Congress, Series 8, 24: 353.

8. William Howard Taft, March 11, 1911, Letter to Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, *The Papers of William Howard Taft*, Library of Congress, Series 8, 24:143.

9. Philander C. Knox, March 15, 1911, *The Papers of Philander C. Knox*, Library of Congress, n.d., 14:2280.

10. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 745-46.

11. Madero's forces are discussed at somewhat greater length by Howard F. Cline, *The United States and Mexico* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 122.

12. Brigadier General J.W. Duncan to the Adjutant General of the Army, Report of February 25, 1911, Internal Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929, Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, 812.00/968.

13. Woodrow Wilson, *The Presidential Papers of Woodrow Wilson: Volume 28* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 33.

14. Woodrow Wilson, Interview of April 27, 1914 with *The Saturday Evening Post*, found in *The Presidential Paper of Woodrow Wilson, Volume 31* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1979), 517-23. Woodrow Wilson, *Public Papers: The New Democracy I: 116-117* cited by P. Edward Haley, *Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1917* (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970), 138.

25. Henry Lane Wilson, *Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1927), 279. In the summer of 1913, President Wilson recalled the ambassador and requested his resignation, which the latter promptly tendered.

36. Henry Lane Wilson, May 23, 1911 *Letter to Secretary of State Knox, Internal Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929*, Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration), 812.900.

47. Henry Lane Wilson, *Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1927), 240.

58. *Ibid*, 281.

69. The ambassador wrote: "After years of mature consideration, I do not hesitate to say that if I were confronted with the same situation under the same conditions, I should take precisely the same course." Henry Lane Wilson, *Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1927), 282.

20. William Jennings Bryan to Walter Hines Page, *Letter of November 19, 1913*, Internal Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929, Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, 812.00/9817.

21. Henry Skillman Breckenridge to Woodrow Wilson, Memo of August 8, 1913, *The Presidential Papers of Woodrow Wilson: Volume 28* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1978), 130.

22. John Lind to William Jennings Bryan, *Letter of January 30, 1914*, Internal Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929, Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, 812.00/10688.

23. P. Edward Haley, *Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), 125.

24. Isidro Fabela and Josefina E. Fabela, editors, *Documentos Historicos de la Revolución Mexicana: Periodo Constitucionalista* (Mexico City: Fonda de Cultura y Economica y Editorial Jus), 2:357: "The invasion of our territory, the stationing of American troops in the port of Veracruz, the violations of our rights as a sovereign, free, and independent state could provoke us to an unequal but just wear, which we wish to avoid."

25. Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, *The Course of Mexican History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 533.

26. John Mason Hart, *Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 14.

27. John Mason Hart, *Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 16.

28. Newton Diehl Baker to Woodrow Wilson, March 10, 1916, *Enclosure III sent with*

Memorandum for the Adjutant General sent by Hugh Lennox Scott, The Presidential Paper of Woodrow Wilson, Volume 36 (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1981), 285-86.

29. James Rodgers to Robert Lansing, April 15, 1916, Internal Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration 812.00/17872.

30. Brigadier General John J. Pershing to General Frederick Funston, Report of April 17, 1916, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1916* (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1925), 522.

31. General Hugh Scott Lennox to Secretary of War Newton Diehl Baker, Letter of April 22, 1916, *The Presidential Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Volume 36* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 528.

32. Considerable disputes about the source of these mini-raids persist. One interpretation argues that a handful of Mexican highwaymen crossed the border in search of prey. A second school holds that the raiders were Carrancista soldiers assigned to convince the Americans that they would enjoy no peace on the border until they left Mexico. Neither camp believes that Villa ordered the mini-forays.

33. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1916* (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office 1925), 589.

34. *Constitution of the United Mexican States, 1917* (Washington DC, Secretariat of the Pan-American Union. 1964), 8-9.

35. *Ibid*, 11.